

4. 本研究関連の学会誌発表等（主要論文のみ）

信頼感と基本的価値観

—アジア太平洋価値観国際比較調査における文化多様体解析—

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1. 新たな時代への過渡期における「信頼感」の崩壊

本発表では、我々の「国民性」に関する意識調査で遂行された人々の意識、態度、価値観等に関する回答データに映し出された「信頼感」について、時系列的比較や国際比較のデータ解析の一端を紹介することである。特に活用するのは、数理研究所による1953年以来、半世紀に及ぶ「日本人の国民」調査、1985-93年における「意識の国際比較調査」、そして2002-2005年度の「東アジア価値観国際比較調査 (East Asia Values Survey [EAVS])」及び2004-2009年度の「アジア太平洋価値観国際比較調査 (Asia-Pacific Values Survey [APVS])」における対人関係における信頼感や、社会制度に関する信頼感を探る項目のデータである。

冷戦終了以降の急激な世界的再編が進む中で、文化や歴史的背景の多様性のために統合は難しいとされてきた東アジアでも、急速に経済を中心とする協力関係が模索され、実現されつつある。その成功には人々の「信頼」が一つの鍵となっており、その鍵を見出すための基礎情報としての当該地域の人々の「信頼感」に関する意識の国際比較データの収集と解析の意義が了解されよう。

この20年ほど、「信頼」について、国内外の学会、学術雑誌等で盛んに議論が展開されてきた。特に、日系人歴史経済学者 F. Fukuyama (1995) の著書「TRUST」が出版されて以降、このテーマについてマスコミも含め、広く論じられるようになった。Fukuyama (1989) は米国政府のブレインとして、著書「歴史の終わり」の中で、冷戦後の世界の流れを人々の気概 (guts) が重要な要素となる民主主義の発展として位置づけたことで有名である。Fukuyama は、例えば米国やドイツ、日本、韓国は地域共同体やボランティア組織など国家と各家庭との中間にある組織が発達しているため人々の間の信頼性が高く、大企業が発達し経済的にも豊かな国となっている一方、イタリア、フランス、中国は中央集権が強い歴史が長かったために血族間の結束は強いが、それを越えた一般の対人関係では信頼性が低く、大企業が発達しがたく、経済的にも成功しがたい社会であるとした。

2. 対人的「信頼」を測る — GSS 項目による「信頼感」尺度 —

冷戦時代、その世界情勢を背景に社会心理学では「信頼感」尺度の構成が種々試みられたが、米国の GSS (一般社会調査) の中には以下の問 26、問 27、問 28 のような人々の「信頼感」を尋ねる 3 項目が含まれている。

問 26 たいていの方は、他人の役にたとうとしていると思いますか、それとも自分のことだけ考えていると思いますか。 1. 他人の役にたとうとしている 2. 自分のことだけ考えている

問 27 他人は、機会があれば、あなたを利用しようとしていると思いますか、それともそんなことはないと思いますか。 1. 他人は機会があれば利用しようとしていると思う 2. そんなことはないと思う

問 28 たいていの方は信用できると思いますか、それとも、常に用心した方がよいと思いますか。

1. 信頼できると思う 2. 常に用心した方がよい

吉野(2005b)は、これら3項目全てに楽観的回答(問26は1、問27は2、問28は1)をした日本人の割合を、この四半世紀にわたり示し、概して、この指標に関しては、日本人の「信頼感」は安定していることを示す一方で、米国人の回答パターンは、経済変動との連関を想定させるような変化を示した。

さらに、国際比較調査データではYoshino(2002a)のFig.6のようになるが、海外調査の一部では、GSS3項目中間26と問28のみ採用した場合もあり、それらの国や地域も含めると図(発表時に提示)のようになる。特に、各地の日系人や中国人を含めたデータなので、先述のFukuyama(1995)の高信頼性の国々と低信頼性の国々に関する主張や、GSS項目のように一つの尺度で広い範囲の国々の「信頼感」の国際比較可能性(global standard)を追求することの是非に関する議論のために、参考となろう。例えば、中国人の「信頼感」はそれほど低くなく、Fukuyamaの主張と矛盾するようである。これは、1)このような尺度では「信頼感」が直接には測定できないからか、あるいは2)中国人が国際的信用回復のために努力した結果なのか、あるいは3)そもそも各国の信頼感にFukuyamaの言うようにはなっていないということなのか。今後、それぞれの視点から検討が必要であろう。

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宗教的な心の国際比較に向けて

—2008年インド調査を踏まえ、環太平洋価値観調査から—

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1. はじめに

日本における宗教に対する考え方が、欧米とは異なっていることが指摘されており、これまでの国際比較調査からもそれが示されてきた。例えば、1990年前後の「7カ国調査」により、信仰を持っている日本人は3割程度であるが、信仰を持たなくても宗教的な心が大切だという回答を合わせると7割になること、一方、欧米では信仰を持っている人が多く、持っていない人の中で宗教的な心が大切という人は少ないことがわかっている。東アジア価値観調査の目的の一つは、これらの特徴がアジアの特徴なのか日本の特徴なのかを考察することであった。そして、いくつかの点では日本は欧米とも異なるがアジア各国とも異なる特徴を持っていることが示唆されたが、その中で中国の特殊性も明示された。環太平洋価値観調査は、新たに調査票を検討し、アメリカとオーストラリア、シンガポールを加えて、アジア各国と西欧への比較の連鎖を念頭に計画実施された。この過程でも、宗教、宗教的な心とは何か、またその国際比較の可能性や日本の独自性について、興味深い点が示唆されてきた。例えば、宗教を信じたり、宗教的な心が大切という考えと、先祖を尊ぶこととの関連については、特に日本での相関性が高く、これがひとつの日本における宗教意識の特徴である可能性が述べられてきた。

今回、新たに2008年に実施されたインド調査の結果を踏まえることで、ヒンズー文化圏という欧米とも、また狭義の意味での東アジア文化圏とも違う地域の実情の分析を開始し、宗教的な心の国際比較に向けて新しい側面を付加していきたい。

2. インド調査の概要

環太平洋価値観調査の一環としてのインド調査は2008年11月から2009年2月にかけて現地調査会社に委託して行われ、N=2002である。サンプルが主要都市部とその周辺に限定されているため、必ずしも母集団が全国レベルではない、といった制約はあるものの、それでも国外の調査主体が行った総合的世論調査としては質、量ともに現時点で最も充実した内容のものと言えるだろう。宗派上での内訳は以下の通りである：

ヒンズー教=84.9%、イスラム教=2.9%、キリスト教=3.7%、仏教=0.8%、
シーク教=1.8%、ジャイナ教=0.7%、DK=5%

3. 初期段階分析

右の表からも分かるように、インド人は全体としては信仰を持っている人の割合は非常に高いように見える。一方で、信仰はあると答えているが、宗教的な心は大切ではない、と答えている人の割合が高いのも興味深い。ヒンズー教が世俗的、形式的な傾向が強い宗教だろうか、今後のさらなる分析が期待される側面である。

信仰の有無 宗教的な心大切	はい			いいえ		
	大切	大切ではない	分からない	大切	大切ではない	分からない
India 2008	74.4	16.7	1.4	4.3	3.0	0.2
ITALY 1992	80.7	4.9	2.4	5.3	5.2	1.6
USA 1988	79.8	4.8	1.4	7.8	5.5	0.7
USA 2006	69.4	7.7	2.4	6.9	11.3	2.3
Singapore 2004	69.2	5.9	4.3	6.4	10.5	3.7
Singapore 2007	67.4	8.1	3.3	7.0	12.3	1.8
FRG 1987	55.6	16.8	5.1	3.2	17.2	2.2
Taiwan 2003	62.2	8.3	4.4	11.7	10.8	2.6
Taiwan 2006	58.0	5.5	1.3	20.4	12.4	2.3
UK 1987	48.0	14.2	3.0	10.5	22.3	2.0
FRNCE 1988	51.9	10.9	2.0	10.9	22.3	1.9
NL 1993	41.4	13.5	4.7	9.0	25.9	5.5
South Korea 2003	47.0	2.4	1.1	27.1	15.9	6.5
South Korea 2006	51.1	1.5	1.1	27.0	13.5	5.9
Hong Kong 2002	29.0	3.4	1.5	31.4	28.3	6.3
Hong Kong 2006	31.2	5.1	2.1	32.4	21.6	7.7
JPN 1988	34.5	0.8	1.1	40.9	10.2	12.3
Japan(KS) 2003	28.5	0.5	1.3	41.5	14.3	13.8
Japan 2004	27.3	0.5	0.5	44.9	15.3	11.5
Hangzhou 2002	14.8	2.5	2.9	19.5	35.7	24.6
Kuming 2002	13.5	4.0	2.5	21.4	37.7	20.9
Shanghai 2002	14.6	3.4	1.0	27.7	37.9	15.3
Shanghai 2006	17.1	5.2	5.5	15.5	35.1	21.6
Beijing 2002	6.9	1.3	1.0	27.6	57.6	5.6
Beijing 2006	9.4	3.1	1.2	30.0	47.3	8.9

面である。一方、インドでは、「先祖を尊ぶべきか」の質問に否定的な回答をした者はほぼ皆無で、実質的に「強く肯定」か「弱い肯定」の違いだけである。そして、この違いに対しては、信仰、宗教的な心ともにまったく相関関係は見られず、この意味では日本よりは多くの東アジアの国に近いパターンといえるかもしれない。また、インドでは「いろいろな宗教の教えは結局は同じ」の設問に対し、肯定が87%、否定が12%と肯定の割合が極めて高い。宗教対立が激しい国としては意外な結果にも思えるが、この設問に対しては懐疑的な人が多い日本とは対照的といえよう。さらに、「死後の世界」を「ある」、もしくは「あるかもしれない」とする人の割合は、65%とかなり高めである。信仰心は死後の世界の認識と関連があるのに対し、宗教的な心はまったく相関性が見られない。全体としてみると、現段階ではインドの状況は日本よりは東アジア、もしくは場合により欧米に近い印象を受けるが、今後のさらなる分析、検討が必要となるだろう。

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健康感から捉えた文化的連鎖

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1 はじめに

これまで自覚的健康度（自覚症状、健康満足度、生活満足度、自覚的健康度、幸福感）と社会・生活関連要因（属性、信頼感、ソーシャルキャピタル（SC）の指標）との関連を分析し、健康関連指標の性差はアメリカ、ドイツではあまり顕著ではなく、社会階層意識が高い、SC（人的資源）があることが自覚的健康度を高めることと関連したことを報告してきた。本研究では、環太平洋価値観国際比較研究の一環として、健康感として上記自覚的健康度に近年多くなっている不眠の訴えを加え、これらの健康感の質問への回答傾向の関連性から文化的連鎖について検討し、その特徴を明らかにすることを目的とした。

2. 方法

両国における調査は、母集団として各国在住の成人男女（各国の成人の定義に順ずるが、ほとんどの国・地域で18歳以上もしくは20歳以上）で母国語を理解し話すことができる者とした。本研究で用いたデータは環太平洋価値観国際比較調査（PAC）（2004-2008年）、東アジア価値観比較調査（EA）（2002-2004年）（代表 吉野諒三）を中心として用いたが、一部、これらにこれまでに実施された7カ国国際比較調査（7N）（1987-1993年）、日系ブラジル人調査（1991）（代表 林知己夫）、ハワイ日系人調査（JA）（2000年）（代表 吉野諒三）、医療と文化調査（HC）（2003年）および生命感と文化調査（LC）（2006-2007年）（代表 山岡和枝）を用いた。なお、生命感と文化調査はRDD CATI調査として実施し、他はすべて面接調査として実施されたものである。

本報告では健康指標として自覚症状の個数（SRHS）、健康満足度（HS）、生活満足度（LS）、幸福感、健康状態（DS）、不眠に関する指標を取り上げ、共通する質問について数量化Ⅲ類によるパターン分類（SAS CORRESP プロシージャ）により国・地域グループ別および全データについて、祖データのまま、サンプル数が同等となるように重みをつけた場合、および比率の差を項目間の距離として定義して（Yamaoka, Hayashi, 2003）、多次元尺度法（ALSCAL）により国・地域グループ間の関連性を検討した。

3 結果と考察

調査結果の分析にあたっては、調査方法、調査年度、質問票の相違などに留意して解釈する必要がある（表1参照）。回答分布から捉えたとき、年齢効果が一部逆向きになっていた地域もあるため、年齢調整を行わずに、生データで比較検討した。さらに、数量化3類でパターン分類を行う際に、国・地域グループ間でサンプル数の相違の影響を受ける可能性がある。そこで、分析にあたってはまず、性別と総数の場合について個別に分析し、関連性の相違を確認した。その後、散布図から視覚的にはあるが項目間の関連性はほぼ同様とみなせたため、すべての利用可能なデータを合わせて分析を行った場合、およびサンプル数が同等となるように解析の時に重みをつけた場合について分析し、国・地域グループの関連性の検討を行った。さらに、比率の差を項目間の距離として定義してALSCALにより国・地域グループ間の関連性を検討した。以下にこれらの検討のうち、特徴的なものについて示す。図1には重みなしの場合のPAC、EA、7N、HC、LCのデータでの分析結果である。この結果からは調査時期を越えて、同じ地域・国は比較的近くに布置されており、シンガポール（健康感・高）と韓国（健康感・低）が両極端に布置されていた。また、7N時点での

文化観の国際比較

— 東アジアの伝統文化と現代文化を中心に —

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1. はじめに

文化は、社会を構成する人びとによって習得・共有・伝達される行動様式ないし生活様式の総称で、人間が長年にわたって創造してきた慣習や振舞いの体系を指す。文化は明確な分類はないが、衣、食、住などの日常生活にかかわる言語や習俗から、これにより支えられる芸能、道徳、宗教、政治、経済といった社会構造まで幅広く捉えている。今日では、それぞれの集団が個別の文化をもち、種々の文化が独自の価値をもっており、その間に高低・優劣の差はなく、平等に尊ばれるべきと主張する文化相対主義が広く支持を集めている。このような意味で、自らの考え方を他人や多集団に強要することはなく、異文化の交流を通じて自分と異なる人、社会の価値観、習慣や行動様式などを理解し、尊重しあうことが大切である。

一方で、東アジア文化圏において、儒教が歴史的に大きな影響を与え、文化的な主軸の役割を果たしてきたと言っても過言ではない。その一方で、時代変化や各国の近代化による固有の性質を帯び、様々な文化の違いを生じているのも事実である。特に、EU や北米に比べ、東アジア共同体の形成が困難になっているのは政治的な壁があることは否定できないが、文化的な変容による影響は看過できない。したがって、東アジアにおける相互交流をより一層促進するためには、今日の日本、韓国と中国において自国文化に対する理解、いわゆる文化観がどこまで共通しているか、そして相違点が何かを客観的に分析することが重要である。

本報では、東アジアの伝統文化および現代文化に主眼を置きながら、現代社会の人びとにとって常に考えている「成功の鍵」、「メンツ」と「子供を育てる目的」を取り上げ、実際の調査データを用いてその異同を計量的に分析してみた。なお、性別、年齢、学歴、世帯収入などの人口統計学的属性による影響についても考察した。一連の分析を通して、東アジア文化圏の相互理解と協調関係形成の一助となる情報を模索した。

2. 研究方法

本報では、東アジア価値観国際比較調査(2002～2004年度)から収集してきた日本・韓国・北京・上海・香港・台湾のデータを中心に、統計科学的分析を行った。各調査地域の標本抽出、標本の大きさ、調査票の詳細については関連の調査報告書を参照いただきたい。本研究では文化観に関連する調査内容として、以下の質問項目を取り上げた。

- (1) 「自国文化」: 「自国文化と聞いて、まず思い浮かべることは何ですか。」という自由回答質問
- (2) 「成功の鍵」: いまの社会で成功している人を見て、その人の成功には、個人の才能や努力と、運やチャンス、あるいは血縁・地縁・学閥などの人のつながりの、どれが一番大きな役割を果たしていると思いますかという質問
- (3) 「メンツ」: 今日の我々の社会では、「メンツ(面子)」を立てることが重要だとあなたは思いますか、という質問
- (4) 「子供を育てる目的」: 現在あなたに子供がいる、いないに関わらず、子供を育てる主な目的は何だとお考えですか、という質問

自国文化という質問項目では、それぞれの国・地域の伝統文化と現代文化を問わずに、人びとの文化観を聞くものであるが、他の3つの項目は、いずれも日常生活に関わる事柄で、歴史的に継承してきた伝統文化がどのように変容したかを捉えるものである。なお、属性変数として性別、年齢層(若年層・壮年層・高年層)、学歴層(低・中・高)、世帯収入(低・中・高)などを用いた。

データ分析の方法として、各質問の単純集計を中心に東アジアの文化観の全貌を分析すると同時に、取り上げた項目間の関連、人口統計学的要因による影響の分析に数量化Ⅲ類を用いてパターン分類を行った。なお、一部の分析では、同時期に調査を行った中国本土の杭州、昆明及びシンガポールのデータも用いた。

3. 結果と考察

(1) 誇りに思う「自国文化」

自国文化について、まず思い浮かべるは何かという質問では、複数の項目を挙げた回答者もあるが、一番目の内容を基に、集計した上位10位までの結果は、表1の通りである。括弧内の数字はそれぞれ国・地域別の回収標本数(732~1062名)に占める百分比を示している。日本では、能や歌舞伎、寺院、着物などの伝統文化にかかわる事柄が上位3位に入っているが、韓国では、礼儀、韓服、キムチなどの現代文化と思われる内容が最も多く挙げられている。北京、上海、香港、台湾に共通するのは、儒家思想が上位3位に入っており、歴史、漢字文学、万里の長城が上位ランキングとなっていることである。日韓中はともに東アジア文化圏に属しているが、国別に見れば誇りに思う自国文化には共通点が少ないことが明らかになった。一方で、中国本土、香港と台湾では、いろいろな歴史的な攪乱があったが、伝統文化に対する意識は差は見られないのが特徴的である。また、今日の韓国では儒教の影響が未だに残っているが、日本では言葉すら殆ど挙げられていない状況が浮かび上がった。

表1. 思い浮かべる自国文化のランキング

順位	日本	韓国	北京	上海	香港	台湾
1	能・歌舞伎(6.6)	礼儀(9.1)	歴史(10.5)	儒家思想(9.8)	儒家思想(11.2)	儒家思想(12.7)
2	寺院(6.4)	韓服(6.5)	四大発明(8.2)	長城(9.4)	伝統(8.9)	歴史(7.2)
3	着物(5.8)	キムチ(4.6)	儒家思想(8.1)	漢字文学(8.7)	漢字文学(6.7)	古跡(5.5)
4	芸能(5.0)	芸能(4.2)	芸能(6.8)	四大発明(8.7)	長城(6.5)	長城(4.1)
5	茶道(3.9)	先祖を尊ぶ(4.1)	漢字文学(6.1)	歴史(8.4)	歴史(6.5)	漢字文学(2.6)
6	京都(2.5)	親孝行(2.2)	長城(6.0)	芸能(8.3)	書画(4.6)	宗教(2.6)
7	祭り(2.5)	祭り(1.8)	古跡(4.5)	書画(4.8)	古跡(3.3)	帝制(2.2)
8	歴史(2.5)	伝統(1.8)	礼儀(3.9)	古跡(4.2)	龍文化(3.2)	伝統(2.0)
9	伝統(2.3)	儒教(1.7)	伝統(3.0)	故宮(1.9)	芸能(3.0)	芸能(2.0)
10	料理(1.5)	料理(1.5)	故宮(2.1)	伝統(1.8)	料理(3.0)	書画(1.4)

(2) 日常生活に見られる現代文化

成功の鍵については、各国・地域に共通するのは、半数以上の回答者が「個人の才能や努力」を選んだが、「運やチャンス」および「血縁・地縁・学閥」に対する回答には大きな差がみられた。また、日本以外の国・地域では、「メンツが重要である」と主張する回答者が多い。さらに、子供を育てる目的については、中国本土で「社会的責任」が広く支持されたが、それ以外の国・地域で「子孫を伝える」という選択肢を選んだ割合が高い。

一方で、数量化Ⅲ類によるパターン分類の結果は図1に示している。これによれば、質問項目(2)~(4)回答については、地域別、属性別の特徴がはっきりと見られている。日本、韓国とシンガポールでは、「子供を育てる目的が子孫を伝わったり、生活を改善するため」と「成功の鍵が血縁・地縁・学閥である」と主張する傾向がある。また香港と台湾では「メンツが重要である」が支持されている。一方で、中国本土は「成功の鍵が運やチャンスである」と「子供を育てる目的が社会的責任である」という見方が強い。

以上の分析結果から、東アジア文化圏といても、時代とともに各国・地域の文化観が変容しつつあることが浮き彫りになった。これは、東アジア文化圏の再検討に大きな意味をもつだろう。




図1 文化観に対する回答のパターン分類

4. おわりに

国際比較調査データを分析した結果、日本人、韓国人と中国人は歴史的に同じ儒教文化の影響を受けたとは言え、文化観には大きな隔りがあると言わざるを得ない。つまり、東アジアにおいても異文化理解に取り込む必要性があると言えよう。

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組織に対する信頼の文化多様体解析

—東アジア価値観国際比較調査とアジア・太平洋価値観国際比較調査から—

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1. はじめに

1953年以來、5年ごとに統計数理研究所で実施されてきた「日本人の国民性」調査は、1971年頃から、国際比較調査へと拡張された。近年では、東アジア価値観国際比較調査¹、その第二ラウンドにも位置づけられるアジア・太平洋価値観調査が実施されている² (表1参照)。この異なる時期に行われた二つの調査プロジェクトでは、7つの国・地域が共通の調査地域となっている。そのため横断的な国際比較分析だけでなく、異なる時点間の調査として縦断的に分析することも可能となっている。

ところで、これまで国際比較調査を積み重ねてきたことで、文化の連鎖的調査分析 (CLA, Cultural Linkage Analysis; 当初は Cultural Link Analysis) (林・鈴木, 1997, pp4-7; 吉野, 2005) と呼ばれる国際比較調査の連鎖的な比較分析法が提案されてきた。意味がある比較を連鎖のように徐々につなげる「比較の環」によって、グローバルな比較の実現を目指すアプローチである。しかし、このCLAは、本来国際比較調査の方法論として提案されてきたものであるもので、調査後の統計分析手続きとしては、どのような比較の方法論を考えれば良いかは明確でなかった。そこで、近年に入り、このCLAの考え方を拡張させ、時系列、空間、項目による階層構造を得ることによって全体の傾向を把握することを目指すアプローチが提案されてきた³。これが、文化多様体解析 (Cultural Manifold Analysis, CULMAN) である (吉野, 2005)。

表1 東アジア価値観調査とアジア・太平洋価値観調査 (実施時期・地域と標本サイズ)

年	日本	北京	上海	香港	杭州	昆明	台湾	韓国	米国	新嘉坡	豪州	印度
2002年	787	1062	1052	1057								
2003年					911	1020	732	1006				
2004年	A1139 B 785									1037		
2005年		1053	1062	849								
2006年							603	1030	901			
2007年										1032	700	
2008年												2002

(注) ■の網掛けが、該当する時期・地域において調査が実施されたことを示す。数字は、回収標本の大きさ。

2. 分析の方法と結果

国際比較分析では、構造分析と単純集計の相補的な活用が重要であることも知られている。これは、データの構造分析の結果から国々の類似性や相互関係を把握し、その知見を前提として単純集計から有益な知見を得ることであるが (林, 2001, p.105), 同時に Robinson (1950) の指摘に由来するような集計データ・個票データの示す結果の齟齬の有無 (生態学的推論の問題) を確認することもできる。

¹2002年の日本調査に始まり、2004年のシンガポール調査を最後の調査とする一連の国際比較調査である。本稿では、杭州市と昆明市における生活・文化意識調査 (杭州市・昆明市民生活文化意識調査) を含めている。(総称して、東アジア価値観調査 (East Asia Value Survey, EA VS) と呼ぶこともある)

²本稿では、日本調査04A, 北京調査2005, 上海調査2005, 香港調査2005, 台湾調査2006, 韓国調査2006, USA調査2006, シンガポール調査2007, オーストラリア調査2007, インド調査2008を含むアジア・太平洋地域の調査を総称してアジア・太平洋価値観調査 (Asia-Pacific Value Survey, APVS) と呼ぶ。日本調査04Bは調査内容が他と異なるので、本稿では分析対象としていない。また、インド調査2008の結果は、十分な検証を踏まえ、慎重に分析される必要がある。

³もっともCLAにおいても地域の連鎖、質問の連鎖、時間の連鎖が構想されていた。

そこで、本稿では、文化多様体解析の立場から、集計データ・個票データ両方において、各国地域の「組織に対する信頼」(a. 宗教団体, b. 法律や裁判の制度, c. 新聞・テレビ, d. 警察, e. 国の行政, f. 国会, g. NPO・NGO, h. 社会福祉施設, i. 国連)のデータ構造の把握を行った。

その結果、集計レベル・個票レベルからほぼ同様の示唆が得られた(図1, 2⁴)。すなわち各地域の時系列のデータ構造は安定的であり、同じ地域の異なる調査年の間のデータが近似していること、相対的に調査年の違いよりも地域の違いの方がはつきり出ること等である。ただし、シンガポールについては3年間で大きな変化が見られた。これは、宗教団体への信頼をはじめ、組織に対する信頼そのものの低下を反映している。しかし、この場合でも構造そのものは安定していたことが確認されている(表2, 3)⁵。

図1 組織に対する信頼の CATPCA (地域の重心座標)





図2 集計レベルの近接性の階層



(クラスター分析のデンドログラム, 群平均法)

表2 調査(地域・時期)別のCFAモデルの適合度

地域・時期	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	地域・時期	CFI	TLI	RMSEA
日本02	<u>0.96</u>	<u>0.977</u>	0.137	日本04a	<u>0.959</u>	<u>0.97</u>	0.111
北京02	<u>0.934</u>	<u>0.956</u>	0.105	北京05	<u>0.967</u>	<u>0.977</u>	<u>0.08</u>
上海02	<u>0.952</u>	<u>0.962</u>	<u>0.093</u>	上海05	<u>0.966</u>	<u>0.975</u>	<u>0.081</u>
香港02	<u>0.961</u>	<u>0.972</u>	<u>0.091</u>	香港05	<u>0.969</u>	<u>0.981</u>	<u>0.081</u>
昆明02	<u>0.973</u>	<u>0.981</u>	<u>0.077</u>	台湾06	0.94	<u>0.956</u>	0.103
杭州02	<u>0.988</u>	<u>0.991</u>	<u>0.067</u>	韓国06	0.904	0.919	0.129
台湾03	0.876	0.907	0.126	USA06	<u>0.927</u>	<u>0.965</u>	0.138
韓国03	<u>0.941</u>	<u>0.956</u>	<u>0.098</u>	新嘉坡07	<u>0.975</u>	<u>0.985</u>	0.101
新嘉坡04	<u>0.967</u>	<u>0.983</u>	0.118	豪州07	<u>0.96</u>	<u>0.975</u>	<u>0.083</u>

CFI(Comparative Fit Index): 0.9以上に下線, 0.95以上にはさらに太字。

TLI(Tucker-Lewis Index): 0.9以上に下線, 0.95以上にはさらに太字。

RMSEA(Root Mean Square Error of Approximation): 0.05以上0.1未満に下線。

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表3 地域別同時分析: 因子負荷量一定

7地域における調査(二つのデータセット)	CFI	TLI	RMSEA
日本(2002と2004)	<u>0.967</u>	<u>0.983</u>	<u>0.098</u>
北京(2002と2005)	<u>0.968</u>	<u>0.98</u>	<u>0.072</u>
上海(2003と2005)	<u>0.961</u>	<u>0.976</u>	<u>0.076</u>
香港(2002と2005)	<u>0.975</u>	<u>0.987</u>	<u>0.065</u>
台湾(2003と2006)	0.92	<u>0.954</u>	<u>0.097</u>
韓国(2003と2006)	0.93	<u>0.96</u>	<u>0.092</u>
シンガポール(04と07)	<u>0.974</u>	<u>0.989</u>	<u>0.091</u>

表記方法の詳細は、表2に準じている。

⁴ 図2のクラスター分析は、各地域の各対組織信頼項目(順序尺度)の集計レベルの数値に適用したもののだが、その数値はノンパラメトリックな方法によって得たものである。

⁵ なお、信仰する宗教の質問、一般的信頼の三質問といった関連する質問も、三年間での低信仰化、低信頼化を示唆する結果となっていた。

国際政治観

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1 はじめに

アジア太平洋地域の人々は、国際政治や外交に関してどのような意識をもっているのだろうか。国際政治に関する先行研究の分析単位は、国家レベルや国内の省庁や利益集団といった組織レベルにとどまり、国民個人レベルを分析対象としたものは少なかった。しかし、諸国の外交政策は、国民の価値観を反映したものとなる可能性がある。本研究は、国際政治に関連する価値観・国民性においてアジア太平洋地域にどのようなパターンがみられるかについて検討することを目的とする。その際、吉野をはじめとする研究者が発展させてきた文化多様体分析に基づいて見出されるパターンに着目する。

2 方法

本研究で主に用いるデータは環太平洋価値観国際比較調査(PAC)(2004-2008年)(代表 吉野諒三)であり、可能な場合には東アジア価値観比較調査(EA)(2002-2004年)(代表 吉野諒三)も用いて分析を行う。本報告では、イデオロギーに関する2つの質問(すぐれた政治家に任せることに賛成か、個人の幸福と国全体とどちらが先か)と、対組織信頼に関する2つの質問(国の行政と国連に対する信頼)を取り上げる。イデオロギーに関する質問を取り上げるのは、政権政党と外交政策の間に関連性があるように、イデオロギーが外交政策については国際組織への態度に関連すると予測されるからである。対組織信頼として(国連のみならず)中央政府に対する信頼を取り上げたのは、対組織信頼を測った指標を複数取り上げることによって、より信憑性の高い分析結果を得るためである。クロス集計や数量化Ⅲ類の手法を用いて、これらの質問項目に関する国民性のパターンとして浮かび上がる特徴を検討する。

3 結果と考察

クロス集計で、対国連信頼の質問について単独で検討してみると、予測通りアメリカと台湾では信頼すると回答した割合が低く(57.1%と52.7%)、シンガポールでは高い(78.2%)。ただしシンガポールでは、多くの組織に対する信頼が高い中、国連に対する信頼は相対的に低いことに注意する必要がある(吉野 2005)。したがって他の国に比べて国連への信頼が高いかどうかは一概に言えない。また、中国国内の複数の都市で比較してみると、北京では対国連信頼が比較的低い一方(62.4%)、上海や香港では高く(69.5%と68.4%)、小さからぬ差異が認められた。ここで述べた傾向は、PACでもEAでも同様に観察される。従来、ある国の国際組織に対する態度は、当該国の国際的な地位による説明が図られてきたが、ここで観察された結果は、国内に起因する意識要因が重要なことを示唆しているかもしれない。

クロス集計で得られた結果は、国家(地域)間で相対的な差異はそれなりにあることを示しているが、いずれの国(地域)でも6割以上が信頼すると回答しており、絶対値で見ると大きな違いはないとも解釈できる。また、「考え方の筋道」を考慮するならば、異なるパターンが浮かび上がるかもしれない。そこで、イデオロギーに関する質問も含めて数量化Ⅲ類によるパターン分析を行うことにする。まず、イデオロギーに関する2つの質問だけで分析にかけたところ、分析対象諸国(地域)は、中華圏の地域(北京、上海、香港、台湾)と非中華圏の諸国(アメリカ、オーストラリア、日本、韓国)、そしてその中間に位置するシンガポールと、3つのグループに分かれた。

「インド調査」の衝撃

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1. インドの人と社会

昨年11月上旬、インドのムンバイのタジマハール・ホテル等で悲惨なテロが生じ、日本人の被害者も出た。ムンバイは、昔は「ボンベイ」と呼ばれたが、現在、インドでは各地の地名を英国の植民地時代の呼称から本来の呼び方へ戻している。

テロ事件の2週間ほど前に、われわれの国際比較調査チームも、現地調査の打ち合わせや視察のために、当地を訪れ、タジマハール・ホテルにも立ち寄った。公費で旅行している身では、一泊、最低でも7万円の、お城のような高級ホテル宿泊はかなわず、せめてレストランで紅茶を飲もうと、ホテルの中を少し見て回っただけであった。入り口では、ものものしく銃器をもった警備員がホテルに入ろうとする者の荷物の検査をしている。鉄道など、街のあちこちで同様の警備の体制があるのだが、どこもバックの中身を開けさせてみるだけなので、「本当に効果あるのか？」と疑問であった。

テロ発生のおとでの報道で分かったことだが、われわれの訪問のすぐ後に、当地の人間も警備の効果に疑問を感じ、それをやめたところ、例のテロが発生したという。テロの計画は突然ではなく、少なくとも数カ月の準備を進めていたらしいので、その警備の有無とテロの計画との関係はあったのか、偶然の一致かは知らない。欧米の国際空港などでも、ものものしい警備や検査が続いているが、いつも感じていたのはテロリストが本気になればそのような警備をくぐるのはそんなに難しくはなさそうであるということだ。しかし、実は警備担当者たちも警備の物理的效果の限界は知っていながら、それでも心理的效果は必ずしも小さくはないということで、続けているように見える。他方で、各国の景気低迷の中で、警備の費用の支出が失業対策、景気対策の一部となっているという見方もあった。

さて、われわれのインド訪問の主目的は、「アジア・太平洋価値観国際比較調査」と称して2006-09年度までの日本、韓国、中国(北京、上海、香港)、台湾、シンガポール、アメリカ、オーストラリア、インドの一連の調査の最後を完成させるために、まず、現地の様子を観察し、現地の調査担当会社と標本抽出法の詳細や調査票の項目の確定のために打ち合わせをすることであった(Yoshino, 2009; Yoshino, Nikaido & Fujita, 2009)。

この過程で、これまでの人生では経験しなかったタイプの衝撃をうけた。誤解を恐れずに一言で言えば、「不信」である。

それは、人々の間の不信、社会のシステムへの不信、男女の平等やカースト制や民族・言語の違う人々の間の不信であり、それに関わるわれわれの側に生じる不信である。

今回の調査に関連していろいろと経験した後で考えると、それは、まず、日本で調査票のヒンドゥー語への翻訳者を探し出すところから始まっていた。インドでは、英語を

次に、対組織信頼をも加えて数量化Ⅲ類による検討を行ったところ、4つのグループが現れた。ここで注目されるのは、中華圏のグループは先と同様の地域で構成される一方、非中華圏のグループは2つに分かれたと解釈できる点である。そしてこの両グループの間に、シンガポールが位置している。すなわち、分析の際の変数（尺度）の数を増やすことで、サブ・グループの数があらわれた。ここには、文化多様体分析の想定する形が見出されたとも言えよう。

4 まとめ

国際政治に関する価値観においても、文化多様体分析の観点の重要性が確認されるような結果が見出された。すなわち、中華圏と非中華圏との区分で把握できるようなパターンや、どの範囲の国（地域）でグループが形成されるかは分析の変数（尺度）の数によって異なるといったパターンが見出された。従来、ある国の外交政策や国際政治現象に対しては、とかく当該国の国際的な地位や国内政治体制等による説明が図られてきた。しかし、ここで見出されたことは、それらとは独立の国民の価値観や意識という要因を探ることの重要性を示唆しているかもしれない。


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
Table: Ratio of Confidence in the UN


			nation								Total	
			Japan	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	USA	Singapore		Australia
Confidence in UN	Confident	Count	634	620	631	550	280	594	493	759	413	4974
		% within nation	65.0%	62.4%	69.5%	68.4%	52.7%	61.2%	57.1%	78.2%	61.5%	64.7%
		Std. Residual	.1	-.9	1.8	1.3	-3.4	-1.3	-2.8	5.2	-1.0	
Not Confident	Not Confident	Count	342	373	277	254	251	376	371	211	259	2714
		% within nation	35.0%	37.6%	30.5%	31.6%	47.3%	38.8%	42.9%	21.8%	38.5%	35.3%
		Std. Residual	-.1	1.2	-2.4	-1.8	4.6	1.8	3.8	-7.1	1.4	
Total		Count	976	993	908	804	531	970	864	970	672	7688
		% within nation	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Joint Plot of Category Points



Joint Plot of Category Points





含め、ヒンドゥー語、ベンガル語など、公用語だけでも18ある。私は、その18言語すべて調査票を用いるのかと思っていたが、調査会社は、英語を含めた9言語だけを用いるという。にわかには理解はできなかったが、われわれの国際比較調査研究は、まず、現地で通常用いられている調査方法を尊重し、その問題点を把握しながらも、それで調査を遂行させるのが基本方針であるので、それに従い、英語と他の8言語各々の対で表現された8種類の調査票を作成することとした。日本では、英語とヒンドゥー語との対で構成された調査票のみを翻訳・再翻訳(バックトランスレーション)の技法で作成、検討するようにした。

ヒンドゥー語への翻訳者を募集し、応募してきた東京大学の研究生という女性はネパール人であるが、教育はすべてインドの学校であり、現地の大学の講師をつとめたと言った。調査票作成のための翻訳や再翻訳は、ただ言語が分かる程度の人ではだめで、現地に生まれ育ち、なおかつ英語や日本語がわかり、それらから現地語に翻訳できる人が必要である。英語で会話していても、ヒンドゥー語の問題以前に英語の能力にも疑問を感じたが、本人は問題ないと強く主張した。不審には思ったが、おそらく、ネパールとインドの国境に住み、近隣のインドの学校に通ったのだと了解した。とにかくこの人にも作業させて、並行して他のバイリンガルにも作業させ、その結果を比較検討することを思い描いた。

しかし、翻訳の作業をその場ですぐに進めるのかと思ったら、入力に時間がかかる家でやるという。さらには現地の調査は自分の親戚に手伝わせろというようなことを言い出す。また、われわれの場合は、翻訳費用は定められた公費の使用規則にのっとり支払うのであるが、それを担当の先生の判断で決めてもっと寄こすようにと、くどくどと繰り返す。法で定められた支払いなので、そうはできないといっても、繰り返す。最後には堪忍袋の緒が切れて、それでは仕事は頼まないという、承知した。その後で聞いたことであったが、私のアシスタントに、交通費と用いた時間に対する支払いを要求したそうである。それをきいてさらに憤慨した。無用な労力と時間を浪費させられたのはこちらであったのだから。

調査票で用いられる文章は日常の平易な言葉であり、その翻訳作業など、そのような要求をくどくど繰り返す間に、どんどん仕事をすればその日のうちにかたづいた話である。

だいぶ後になり、気がついたことであるが、このエピソードがインド人とのビジネスのすべてを象徴していたようである。仕事本体よりもその報酬についての要求の時間の方が長い。家族・親戚の利益へつなげようとする、仕事では責任よりも言いわけ、駄目でもともとでも、とりあえず要求してみる。法律や規則ではなく、すべて担当者のその場の思いで物事が決められる。議論好き、自己主張の強さ、毎日のように様々な理由をつけて賃上げを要求してくる。インド人のビジネスの在り方に関するマニュアル本の基本知識らしい。

私が思い描いていた、東洋哲学の深さからは遙かに遠い。いや、現実がそうだから、



むしろ、概念の上で立派な話が展開されたのだと解釈する人もいる。政治でも、「ガンジー主義者」とは、非暴力の善意の政治活動家のことかと思っていれば、いまでは、政治的利権をむさぼる人々のことを指す場合があるらしい。

現地調査会社は「仕事本体よりもその報酬についての要求の時間の方が長い」ことはなかったが、それは後でよく考えると、日本と比べ名目上でも10分の一、生活実感では50分の一という人もいる現地の物価を考えると、暴利を貪っていたのかもしれない。

NHKでは、昨年あたりから、「インドの衝撃」や「続・インドの衝撃」を放送し、21世紀半ばまでには、中国と並び、さらには追い越すと予想されている国の目覚ましい変貌ぶりをドキュメントしている。しかし、その一方で、書籍として発刊されたNHKスペシャル取材班の「続・インドの衝撃」の冒頭にチーフ・プロデューサーが書いているように、海外取材経験の豊富で屈強なカメラマンですら「海外の仕事で初めて早く帰りたいと思った」といったエピソードの方が、私の実感にも近い。

ホームレスの数は、全体で、日本の人口に比肩するくらいという。ニューデリーやムンバイで、あの恐ろしい交通渋滞の中でなおかつハリウッド映画のカーチェイス並のスピードで動くタクシーの間を縫うようにして、ホームレスの子たちが、客に物乞いをし続ける姿の衝撃は忘れがたい。彼らは、いつ事故にあっても不思議ではなく、事故にあわずとも、あの恐ろしいほどの空気汚染の中で長生きできるとは思えない。

日本に戻ってきてから、アジア経済研究所で、インドの農村の児童労働の問題の研究発表会があり、インドの農村ではほとんど子供たちが学校にも行けず、非合法に農家の納屋に押し込められて、マッチ製造などの仕事している状況が報告された。しかし、大都市部のホームレスの子供たちを見た後では、その話の子供たちの方が幸せに思えてしまった。


誰か、インド全体を向上させるリーダーの登場を期待する。

人口から考えて、「世界最大の民主主義の国」といわれるが、その政治の実態を知っているものは、本当にそう思うだろうか？ 中国を牽制するために、一方で「民主主義」の価値観を共有すると唄いあげ、他方で核拡散禁止を唱えながらインドの核開発を援助するというダブルスタンダードをみせてきた近年のアメリカの外交の稚拙さを見るのは穿ちすぎだろうか？ 多様な文化社会の中から生まれたオバマ大統領へは期待が高まる。

2. 調査の理念

日本の世論調査関係者であれば、皆、日本の世論調査の方法が戦後の「一人一票の民主主義」の理念を具現してきたことは了解している。その目から見て、「世界最大の民主主義の国」といわれるインドの世論調査の方法はどうなっているのかは、興味深いに違いない。

結論から言うと、「一人一票の民主主義」の理念からは失望、最近の国政選挙の選挙結果予想が大きく外れたのは不思議ではない。他方であれほど腐敗している政府や警察、公務員の



国の中で、ホームレスの人々さえ把握している選挙管理委員会の公正さは参考になる。

ここでは調査の標本抽出法について触れよう。


今回のインド調査は、われわれがこれまで遂行してきた国際比較調査の各国の統計的標本抽出とはかなり異なり、母集団を推定する厳密な統計学の視点からは、そのデータの質の点で問題が多かった。しかし、われわれの基本方針は、飽くまでも現地の調査機関が通常活用している方法を尊重し、それを学ぶことである。現地の社会的、歴史的背景から実践的に遂行されている調査方法は、狭義の統計学の視点だけではなく、政治や経済、歴史、文化などの社会的条件を総合して、なおかつ、採用されているものと信じ、その方法を学ぶこと自体が、その社会の様相を理解するのに、大いに役立つと考えるからである。

現地の調査会社に詳細な標本抽出設計の説明書を求めたが、結局、得られなかったもので、以下では、現地調査会社からの資料や打ち合わせで、われわれが把握していることを記す。また、現地でわれわれが随伴するプリテストを行うことは、準備不足という理由で拒絶されたので、調査の実践で何が行われたかは、回収データのクリーニングなどから推察するしかなかった。もっとも、プリテストができるといわれても、あの街中に出かけて、調査に随伴するのは勇気のいることであつたらう。

現地調査会社IMRB internationalは、日本側の仲介会社がインドのいくつかの会社から見積もりをとり、適切なものと思われるものとして選択した。日本側でインドの社会調査や世論調査の機関を詳細に把握している者はいないので、我々の選択の幅は狭かった。調べていくうちに、業務として世論調査を主としている機関はほとんど見当たらず、市場調査を主とするものがほとんどのようである。民間企業として利潤をあげなければ成立しないので当然であろうが、これは、日本の戦後民主主義を発展させるために各調査機関が生まれてきた歴史(吉野、2008)とは著しく異なり、その調査の方法論にも影響しているようである。

つまり、常にそうであるわけではないが、日本の市場調査では、日本全体の成人を対象にするときは、基本的に、世論調査と同じような厳密でコストのかかる標本抽出調査を用いることも多かった。しかし、市場調査の最終目的を考えると、世論調査とは異なり、必ずしも日本全体から偏らずに得られたデータが絶対に必要というわけではなく、絶対数として十分に多数の顧客の嗜好や特定の製品に対する満足度が把握できればよいので、費用対効果を考慮して、それなりの標本抽出調査の方法が工夫されることもある。しかし、これは逆に言うと、「一人一票の民主主義」を標榜する世論調査では、そのようなことは許されないということも、日本の調査関係者の了解事項である。

しかし、インドでは調査会社自体は目新しくはないが(英国の植民地であった影響か)、市場調査が主で、その巨大な人口から考えて母集団を偏らずに標本抽出する方法はとられていないようである。これは、あまりにも多様な宗教や言語(公用語だけでも18言語、



英語とヒンドゥー語が国語)や階層の構造、経済格差などから、精度の高い国勢調査のデータに基づき、整った住民基本台帳などから個人を抽出できる統計調査からはほど遠い現状なので、やむを得ないことなのであろう。

先述のように、ホームレスの人々だけでも日本の人口を超えともいわれているが、選挙に関しては、社会階層のすべてに議員数の割り当てがあり、ホームレスの人々にも選挙権があり、公務員の腐敗が目立つ中で、選挙管理委員会だけは厳正にことを遂行しているといわれる。もしそうであれば、ホームレスの人々を含めた世論調査も可能なはずであるが、調査会社の説明では、インド全体の識字率を考慮し、さらに下の方の階層の人の識字率や収入を考えると調査に値しないという。私には、それは「市場調査」主体の機関の意見であり、「一人一票の民主主義」を標榜する世論調査の機関の意見ではないと思えた。しかし、現実にそれらの人々を統計学的に適正に標本抽出し、面接調査が遂行できるかと言われれば、著しい困難や極端なコストが想像できる。


このような状況で、われわれは、現地の調査会社が遂行する作業を学ぶ態度に徹することにした。この過程で、あまりに統計学的に厳密な遂行不能なことを押し付けると、われわれが直接検証できない状況の中で、事実を隠蔽されることを一番に怖れた。

3. 調査の実際

調査対象はインド国籍でインド在住の18歳以上－69歳までの男女であり、個別訪問面接を行った。この調査は、平成20年末から21年1月にかけて遂行された。調査開始予定はそれよりも早かったが、われわれが現地調査会社との打ち合わせをした11月上旬の直後に、ムンバイのテロが起これ、遂行に影響を与えたのだった。(ただし、テロ自体は、それまでもインドの各地でかなり頻繁にあった。)

調査実施地点は、インド国内の10都市(表1 参照)より抽出した地点である。(まず、都市部だけの調査となっていること、また各地の地点数や標本数の選定が国勢調査データにそろえたわけでもなく、母集団に対する代表性は崩れている。)各都市をブロックに分け、各ブロックで統計的に無作為にランダム・スタート地点を決め、ライトハンド・メソッドと称する、いわゆるランダムルート・サンプリングにより、道に沿って角では右手周りし、世帯を訪問し、訪問世帯で年齢とSEC(社会経済階層)の割当表に従い、個人を抽出する。この方法で、合計2000名になるまで有効回答者を抽出する。

実際には、各都市を4ブロック(ムンバイは5ブロック)に分け、SECの対象となる回答者が多く住む居住区を考慮して、各都市で25地点を抽出する。各地点でランダム・スタート地点から道路に沿ってライトハンド・メソッドで3軒ごとの世帯等間隔系統抽出で14人の面接を行う。各世帯では、調査対象となりえる者が複数のときは、誕生日法で回答者を抽出した。各地点では約25回(世帯)の訪問を行う。もし、25回までの訪問で



14人の回答者が得られなかった場合は、さらに回答者を求めて続ける。(このあたりの数字の整合性も怪しい。)

表1 調査10都市、サンプルサイズ、及び調査票の言語 (英語との対となる言語)

都市	サンプルサイズ(人)	調査票言語(英語と各地の言語)
Mumbai	250	Hindi
Delhi	250	Hindi
Kolkata	225	Bengali
Chennai	225	Tamil
Bangalore	225	Kannada
Hyderabad	225	Telugu
Ahmedabad	225	Gujarati
Pune	125	Marathi
Ludhiana	125	Hindi
Kochi	125	Malayalam
合計	2000	

表2 年齢の割り当て

年齢	Mum	Del	Kol	Chen	Blr	Hyd	Ah'bad	Pune	Kochi	Ludh
18-29	90	100	60	75	85	85	85	50	50	50
30-39	70	70	65	60	60	60	60	30	30	30
40-49	50	40	50	40	40	40	40	20	20	20
50-59	20	20	30	30	25	25	25	15	15	15
60-69	20	20	20	20	15	15	15	10	10	10
合計	250	250	225	225	225	225	225	125	125	125

表3 SEC (社会経済階層) の割り当て

SEC	Mum	Del	Kol	Chen	Blr	Hyd	Ah'bad	Pune	Kochi	Ludh
A	60	80	75	60	70	90	55	30	30	30
B	70	90	80	75	60	65	75	40	40	40
C	120	80	70	90	95	70	95	55	55	55
合計	250	250	225	225	225	225	225	125	125	125




(参考) 調査において用いたSECの割り当て確認表(調査票のフェースシート項目)

以下のように、SECはAからEの5段階に分類され、さらにA1,A2などの小分類もある。しかし、実際の調査対象としては、表3のようにA,B,Cの3段階のみとされた。現地の調査会社によると、「文盲の人が多いD,E層を調査してもしょうがない」という回答であった。

		Illiterate	School Up to 4 years	School 5-9 years	SSC/ HSC	Some college but not graduate	Graduate/ Post Graduate	
							General	Professional
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Unskilled	01	E2	E2	E1	D	D	D	D
Skilled worker	02	E2	E1	D	C	C	B2	B2
Petty trader	03	E2	D	D	C	C	B2	B2
Shop owner	04	D	D	C	B2	B1	A2	A2
<i>Businessmen/ Industrialist (No. of employees)</i>								
None	05	D	C	B2	B1	A2	A2	A1
- 1-9	06	C	B2	B2	B1	A2	A1	A1
- 10+	07	B1	B1	A2	A2	A1	A1	A1
Self employed professional	08	D	D	D	B2	B1	A2	A1
Clerical/Salesman	09	D	D	D	C	B2	B1	B1
Supervisory level	10	D	D	D	C	B2	B1	A2
Officers/Executive								
- Junior	11	C	C	C	B1	B1	A2	A2
-Middle Senior	12	B1	B1	C	A2	A2	A1	A1

4. 調査票

統計数理研究所が設計した英語・ヒンドゥー語調査票をもとに、英語と他の8言語の各々の対となる合計8種の調査票を用意させた。われわれの過去のシンガポール調査とは異なり、これらの8種の調査票が全地点で用意され回答者の主言語によって使い分けられたのではなかった。表1のように、10都市それぞれで1種類の調査票を用いて面接調査が遂行された。



回収データの結果からみると、表4のように、確かに、大方の都市では回答者の主言語と用意された調査票としては言語が一致しているが、調査会社の本部のあるムンバイでは、むしろ、回答者の主言語はMarathiの方が多く、Ludhianaでは用意しなかった調査票の言語の方がはるかに多い。ここでは、回答者の「主言語」の程度や英語力、さらに面接調査員に多言語の能力がどの程度あり、調査現場で問題をカバーできているのか、不明である。

また提示カードも各言語で用意したのだが、本当に現場で使用されたのかは不明である。(調査終了後に、回収調査票のコピーや使用した提示カードを送らせたのだが、それらを送らせる際のやり取り、送られたものの筆跡鑑定や各都市での整合性チェックで、様々な点で不信を深めた。)

「English & Hindi版」は、日本側でインド人のヒンドゥー語・日本語のバイリンガルを探し翻訳させ、それを日本人の日本語・ヒンドゥー語のバイリンガルに再翻訳させて、当方で確認し、最終版を作製した。ただし、このプロセスの中でも、先方の調査会社とのやり取りの中で、しばしば、誤謬が紛れ込んだ。他の7種の調査票は、先方で用意させたため、われわれの側では詳細な確認はできていない。

こちらが確認できる「English & Hindi版」は、対応する3か所で異なる印刷が行われたらしく、調査地点LudhianaではQ33の脱落などが見られた。こちらが脱落を指摘した直後に、「該当する部分は別紙に印刷し調査を遂行した」といい、それが後で送られてきたが、対応する回収調査票の筆跡とは明らかに異なっていた。先に送ってあったSPSSデータに合わせて新たに記入した書類を送付しただけと推察した。その後のすべてのやり取りから、先方は回収調査原票ではなく、そのコピーのみを保有しているだけなのが推察された。おそらく各都市の調査支局が原票のコピーのみを送付し、SPSSデータファイルに数値入力後に原票は失われ、われわれのデータ・クリーニングの際に発見した問題解決に対応できない状態になったと推察され、その都度その場しのぎの作業で、むしろこちらを混乱させた。

さらに調査地点MumbaiとDelhiとLudhianaの「English & Hindi版」ではQ22の英語質問部分の脱落があった。表4のように、回答者のほとんどの主言語は英語ではなかった。しかし、Delhiはともかく、MumbaiとLudhianaでは主言語がHindiですらない人が多い。調査員が口頭で、他の言語で質問したのだろうか?あるいは、主言語ではないものの、英語やヒンドゥー語で受け答えしたのであろうか?




表4 10都市ごとの回答者の「主言語」の割合 %

都市	Hindi	Bengali	Tamil	Kannada	Telugu	Gujarati	Marathi	Malayalam	English	他	D K
Mumbai	18.0	0.4	0.4	1.2	2.0	21.6	50.8	0.4	0.8	2.0	2.4
Delhi	88.0		0.4	0.8			0.4	1.6		6.8	2.0
Kolkata	4.9	92.9									2.2
Chennai	0.9	0.4	90.7	0.4	5.8			0.4			1.3
Bangalore	4.4		8.0	70.2	8.4		1.3	1.8		5.3	0.4
Hyderabad	23.1		1.3	0.9	68.0		0.9			3.1	2.7
Ahmedabad	4.0		0.4	0.4		88.9	2.2			2.7	1.3
Pune	8.7		0.8	1.6		4.0	83.3	0.8		0.8	
Ludhiana	32.5									65.9	1.6
Kochi				0.8				97.6			1.6
全体	20.0	10.5	11.4	8.5	9.5	12.9	12.1	6.6	0.1	6.5	1.6

5. 結びにかえて

インドについて、かなり悲観的なことを書き連ねてしまった。難しい政治や経済については、全くの素人が書いた、的はずれの文章と読み流してくださればありがたい。

私が短期間に視察したり、経験したりしたことは、あの大きな国のほんの一部にしか過ぎないのであろう。きっと、世の中の多くの方々が着目している多様な魅力や潜在力のある国なのに違いない。

実証的証拠に基づいた政策立案が唱えられて久しい。経済や政治の専門家の方々も、統計数字の独り歩きの机上の学問ではなく、日本の調査研究で確立してきた、まず「現場でどのように統計データが得られるか」を十分に認識する態度を身につけ、データの質の評価能力を持ち、その上で、各国や世界の将来の平和と繁栄に資する本当の学問へとつなげていただきたい。これが政治や経済の素人の願いである。

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過去の国際比較調査については、(<http://www.ism.ac.jp/~yoshino/>) 参照。過去に出版した報告書の誤謬訂正なども同所を参照。

(よしの・りょうぞう)

Editorial

Ryozo Yoshino*

The current number and a part of the forthcoming number are special issues centering on our longitudinal and cross-national surveys on national character. The authors are members of our interdisciplinary and international conjoint research project.

The introductory paper of this issue, by Yoshino, Nikaido and Fujita, presents a brief explanation of the history of our survey research and the research paradigms called "Cultural Linkage Analysis (CLA)" and "Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN)". Some data analyses on this paradigm are exemplified by the four papers by Yoshino, Fujita and Yoshino, Hayashi and Nikaido, and Kuroda in this issue, and three papers by Yamaoka, Zheng, and Matsumoto in the next issue. A brief background explanation of this research is as follows.

The Institute of Statistical Mathematics (ISM) has been conducting longitudinal nationwide social surveys on the Japanese national character every five years since 1953 (Mizuno et al., 1992). Here the term "national character" means the characteristics shown in people's response patterns to the survey's questions. The questionnaire items cover various aspects of people's opinions about their culture, daily life, economy, education, environment, interpersonal relationships, politics, safety, etc. This research began after World War II to establish a public opinion survey system based on a statistical sampling theory as well as to clarify the Japanese national character. This statistical and sociological survey was important at that time, as Japan was expected to shift from a military regime to a democratic country. Stimulated by this survey, many countries currently carry out similar time series surveys: GSS, Eurobarometer, Allbus, Credoc, etc.

Since 1971, this survey research has been extended to foreign countries to arrive at a more advanced understanding of the Japanese national character in a cross-national comparative context. A cross-national comparative survey, however, involves many methodological problems concerning language and sampling. In our search for conditions which can guarantee meaningful cross-national comparability of social survey data, we decided that to begin our study by comparing two nations (or races) which have some similarities and some dissimilarities, e.g. in their racial origin or language, would have greater meaning than attempting to begin from a comparison of two totally different countries. Therefore, our task is to investigate in what aspects and to what degree the peoples of the countries involved are similar or dissimilar.

Our cross-national survey began with a comparison of the Japanese in Japan and Americans of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii in 1971, and has since covered many countries and regions (Table 1, Yoshino, Nikaido & Fujita in this issue). Some of these nations or regions share certain common features such as race or language, both of which are mean-

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ingful links for comparison. Extending the chain of links, eventually we may obtain a global chain of cross-national comparisons. Therefore, we call our research methodology Cultural Linkage Analysis for cross-national comparison (Hayashi et al., 1998). Furthermore, the paradigm has been developed as Cultural Manifold Analysis by introducing hierarchical structures into a set of cultural links (Yoshino, 2005a). We intend to develop our theory on data science under the principles of complementarity in social science toward certain practical problems in the world. Here the meaning of “complementary approach” includes aspects of complementarity in methodology, in range of aspects to investigate, in areas or countries to compare, and in statistical scaling.

Our final goal is to develop a behaviormetric study of civilizations through the social survey. Some results of past surveys have been published as a series of ISM Research Reports and simple tabulations of survey data are posted on our homepage <http://www.ism.ac.jp/~yoshino/> and http://www.ism.ac.jp/ism_info_j/kokuminsei.html

Once we establish the methodology, we will be able to step forward toward a scientific foundation of cross-national comparison. This will be useful for the mutual understanding of peoples all over the world, for the prediction of mass behavior of a certain nation in response to a particular event, the prediction of the attitude or political determination of a particular nation in international relations, and the scientific understanding of the rise and fall of civilizations as well as the investigation of an ideal condition in Japan and in the world for the development and maintenance of world peace.

We hope that these papers will provide some fundamental information which may prove useful toward the development of world peace and trust among people on earth in the 21st century.

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CULTURAL MANIFOLD ANALYSIS (CULMAN) OF NATIONAL CHARACTER: PARADIGM OF CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEY

Ryozo Yoshino*, Kosuke Nikaido*, and Taisuke Fujita**

The Institute of Statistical Mathematics has been performing a longitudinal survey on Japanese national character since 1953. Beginning in 1971, this survey was expanded to include cross-national comparative surveys as well as surveys on people of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii, the U.S. West Coast and Brazil. The main focus of the cross-national survey is the comparison of social values, ways of thinking and feeling, and other relevant aspects of people from various nations. Another important purpose of our study is to investigate the conditions under which meaningful cross-national comparability of social survey data is guaranteed.

In the introduction to this special issue, we explain our research paradigm, which we refer to as 'cultural manifold analysis (CULMAN),' discuss methodological problems of cross-national surveys and give an overview of our past surveys. Finally, we provide some comments on our future research.

1. Introduction

The last two decades have witnessed a rapid global change that has led to the destruction of the traditional world order and chaos before the construction of a new order could be accomplished. Among other nations, Japan has been struggling with recession, beginning in the period called the "lost decade"; recession might persist because of the crisis that has emerged from the housing loan problem in the USA. On the other hand, several military or political conflicts have been occurring in certain areas. A key phrase for world peace might be generosity toward differences in cultures, races, religions, and values (Yoshino, 2005a, 2005b).

Each nation and race has its own culture, social values and ways of thinking, which underlie its system of economics, politics, social life, etc. We believe that mutual understanding of these aspects with respect to each nation and race is the key to peaceful development and economic prosperity throughout the world. Therefore, we need to develop generous social values that accept manifold social values over the entire world.

The Institute of Statistical Mathematics (ISM) has been conducting a longitudinal nationwide social survey on the Japanese national character every five years since 1953, using mostly the same questionnaire items (Hayashi, 1992a; Mizuno et al., 1992; Sakamoto, et al., 2000). By the term "national character," we intend to mean characteristics reflected in people's response patterns in questionnaire surveys, which may be closely related to

Key Words and Phrases: Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN), national character survey, Asia-Pacific Values Survey, East Asia Values Survey, policy-making

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Inkeles' (1997) concept of national character concerning statistical modes of people's responses. The survey is a type of general social survey, so the questionnaire covers various aspects of people's opinions about their culture, daily life, economy, education, environment, interpersonal relationships, politics, security, etc.

This survey research was begun to establish a system of public opinion polls based on the statistical sampling theory introduced from the USA immediately after World War II and to clarify the Japanese national character. Although the sampling theory had been invented by the Japanese statistician Kameda as early as 1924, it had not been linked to the development of public opinion polls in the post-World War II democracy in Japan. Public opinion polls must have had an important role in the post-war period when Japan was expected to change from a military regime to a democratic country (Yoshino, 1997, 2005a).

It is said that, stimulated by this survey, some now well-known surveys such as the European Values Survey, Eurobarometer (EU committee), and General Social Survey (GSS) of the USA have started. Currently, many countries are performing similar time series surveys: Allbus in Germany, Credoc in France, World Values Survey (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995), and so forth.

Beginning in 1971, the Japanese national character survey was expanded to cross-national surveys for a more advanced understanding of the Japanese national character in the context of a comparative study (Hayashi et al., 1973). In selecting items for those nationwide surveys, we designed our questionnaires to compare peoples' social values, their ways of thinking and their feelings, and, more explicitly, their cultural identities, interpersonal relationships, leadership qualities, religious attitudes, social values related to science and technology, politics, economy, social security, freedom of speech, etc. These aspects may yield information on the psychological distances between nations or races as evidenced by certain response patterns. Based on statistical survey data on these aspects, our research team has been attempting to clarify quantitatively peoples' attitudes and values as well as the characteristics of their civilizations. Our final goal is to develop a behaviormetric study of civilizations through social survey data as a branch of social science so that it will give us fundamental information for the peaceful development of the world (Hayashi, 1998, 2000; Hayashi et al., 1998; Yoshino, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Yoshino et al., 1995a, 2000).

In order to be considered a scientific study, the cross-national survey must overcome multi-faceted methodological problems. It is a difficult task to scientifically compare responses collected under different conditions. Since various countries may utilize different languages and statistical sampling methods, there is no *a priori* knowledge as to how these varying conditions would influence peoples' responses even in cases where there is no substantive difference between peoples.

Thus, an important problem in our study is to investigate those conditions under which meaningful **cross-national comparability** of social survey data is guaranteed. This problem involves many analytical and methodological sub-problems. Among others, they are concerned with 1) translation (i.e., the same questionnaire items must be written in different languages), 2) comparison of data sets collected by different sampling procedures

used in different countries, 3) characterization of nations or races (i.e., in which aspects and to what degree certain nations or races are similar or dissimilar to others), and 4) the description of nations or races in terms of common logic rather than logic particular to a certain nation or race. These sub-problems are complementary in the sense that solutions to these problems are interrelated. Some findings on these topics have been reported in our past publications (Hayashi 2001; F. Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2001; Yoshino, 2001; Yoshino [ed.], 2007; Yoshino, Chino & Yamagishi, 2007).

We have moved forward toward a scientific foundation for cross-national comparison with our established methodology for the mutual understanding of peoples all over the world, for prediction of mass behavior within a certain nation in response to a particular event, prediction of the political determination of a particular nation in international relations, scientific understanding of the rise and fall of civilizations, and investigation of an ideal condition in Japan and the world for the development and maintenance of world peace.

Although we described our paradigm and history of our cross-national surveys in Yoshino & Hayashi (2001), here we shall briefly explain the new version of our paradigm (Yoshino, 2005a; Yoshino, Hayashi, & Yamaoka, 2009 [to appear]).

The composition of the remainder of this introduction is as follows. In Section 2, an explanation of our paradigm called the "cultural manifold analysis" (CULMAN) is presented. Some methodological problems of cross-national comparability are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 provides an overview of our past surveys. In Section 5, a basic explanation is given of each country or region that is included in the current analyses, including its relationship with Japan, racial and religious composition, and stage of economic development. Section 6, finally, presents some comments for our future research.

2. From Cultural Linkage Analysis (CLA) to Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN)

In the early years of our survey research, we developed a paradigm called "cultural linkage analysis (CLA)" (Yoshino & Hayashi, 2001). The idea is roughly as follows.

In our search for conditions that could guarantee meaningful cross-national comparability of social survey data, we decided that beginning our study by a comparison of two nations (or social groups) that have some similarities and some dissimilarities would have more meaning than attempting to begin with a comparison of two totally different nations (or social groups). Then, our task was to investigate in what aspects and to what degree the peoples of the nations (or social groups) involved are similar or dissimilar to each other.

Our cross-national survey was begun with the comparison of Japanese in Japan with Americans of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii (Honolulu residents) in 1971. See Table 1 for a partial list of our past cross-national surveys. Some of these nations or areas share certain common features such as race or language. Therefore, they provide meaningful links for comparison. Extending the chain consisting of these links may eventually create a chain for global cross-national comparisons.

Table 1: Partial List of Past Surveys by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics
1953–present **Japanese National Character Survey** (every five years)

1971	Japanese Americans in Hawaii
1978	Honolulu residents, Americans in Mainland USA
1983	Honolulu residents
1988	Honolulu residents
1987–1993 Seven Country Survey	
1987	Britain, Germany & France
1988	Americans in Mainland USA, Japanese in Japan
1992	Italy
1993	The Netherlands
Recent Overseas Japanese Surveys	
1991	Japanese Brazilians in Brazil
1998	Americans of Japanese ancestry on the U.S. West Coast.
1999	Honolulu residents in Hawaii
2002–2005 East Asia Values Survey	
	(Japan, China [Beijing, Shanghai], Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, & Singapore)
2004–2009 Asia-Pacific Values Survey	
	(Japan, China [Beijing, Shanghai], Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, USA, Singapore, Australia & India)

(All of these surveys are based on nationwide sampling data, except for Hawaii, Mainland China, i.e., Beijing and Shanghai [urban areas only]), Australia [Queensland, New South Wales, & Victoria]), and India [10 major cities]).

Developing the idea of spatial comparison for temporal and thematic comparisons, CLA eventually included the following: a **spatial** link as described above, a **temporal** link inherent in longitudinal analysis, and an **item-structure** link inherent in the commonalities and differences in item response patterns within and across different cultures (Yoshino, 2005a). This is the basic idea of CLA, which was developed by Chikio Hayashi around 1978.

Succeeding Hayashi's works, Yoshino (2005a) and his colleagues have been developing the paradigm "CULMAN," which introduces *hierarchical structures* into the three types of links of CLA.

The concept of "manifold" is originally from geometry: a map of the globe (the earth) consists of a set of local charts, where each local chart covers a certain area or region in a simple fashion (such as a Euclidean plane), some of which may partially overlap each other, and the whole set of charts covers the globe (a non-Euclidean space). The set of charts may construct a sort of hierarchical structure, where each level of charts may correspond to an extent of coverage (e.g., Japan and China, Asia, Eurasia, or the world): a larger chart corresponds to a higher level. A larger chart may correspond to a less restricted scaling. In our case, the concept of a spatial chart can be extended for both the temporal link and item-structure link. (The idea is closely linked to Klein's Erlanger




Figure 1: Example of Temporal Linkage

Each temporal chart covers a specific time, and all charts together make a longitudinal linkage of time series comparison. Each chart may correspond to a certain set of items under study.

Program of modern geometry.)

(See Matsumoto [2006] for an example that shows a sort of trade-off between the range of countries studied and depth of analysis on peoples' sense of trust of social systems or institutions.)

This introductory paper briefly illustrates the idea of CULMAN, and the other papers of this special issue exemplify it.

We are developing our survey research on “data science” (Hayashi et al., 1998; Yoshino, 2001; Yoshino [ed.], 2007) under **the Principles of Complementarity** toward a certain practical problem. Here the meaning of “complementarity” is multi-fold, and it covers the following aspects:

- 1) Complementarity in methodology: data collection vs. theory.
- 2) Complementarity in the range of aspects to be investigated: analysis of a single aspect vs. synthetic study of various aspects.
- 3) Complementarity in areas or nations that will be compared: local region vs. a more global area.
- 4) Complementarity in statistical scaling: uni-dimensional scaling vs. multi-dimensional pattern analysis.

3. Cross-National Comparability

The procedure of our cross-national surveys generally consists of the following eight steps.

Step 1. Making a Japanese questionnaire

Step 2. Making a questionnaire in a foreign language (translation and back-translation)

Step 3. Choosing a survey sampling method (Steps 1, 2 and 3 are parallel.)

Step 4. Developing a semi-final version of the questionnaire

Step 5. Preliminary survey on a small sample to make a final version of the questionnaire




Figure 2: Illustration of Hierarchy of Charts (Links) of a CULTURAL MANIFOLD
 Some charts may overlap each other in a hierarchy, and the structure may show dynamic changes over many decades.

- Step 6. Nationwide survey (data collection)
 Step 7. Data cleaning (including recoding of response categories)
 Step 8. Data analysis (cross-tabulation, pattern analysis. . .)

One should keep in mind that all eight steps involve the problem of comparability of cross-national survey data. Some significant explanation of this problem, along with some findings based on certain trial and error processes in our data analyses, have been reported in previous books and papers (See Yoshino [ed.], 2007, and the references).

We provide an explanation relevant to Steps 2 and 3 as follows. Other steps should be exemplified by data analyses described in the papers in this special issue.

3.1 Making a questionnaire in a foreign language — Back-translation technique —

If an item that we want to use has never been used in a cross-national survey, we must translate it into a specific language(s) for the cross-national survey. Here we explain the case wherein we used the back-translation technique to make a questionnaire in English from a questionnaire in Japanese (Yoshino, Hayashi, & Suzuki, 1995).

The procedure of translation and back-translation in making foreign questionnaires is as follows. 1) A bilingual (preferably a native English speaker) translates a particular Japanese question item into English. 2) Then another bilingual (preferably a native Japanese speaker) translates the English back into Japanese. 3) We compare the wording of the original Japanese and the back-translated Japanese. If there is no difference between them, we may assume that the translated English can be used as an equivalent to the Japanese question (unless we have other evidence against that assumption). If there is an essential difference between them, we have to modify the translation (we may repeat the translation and back-translation process, if necessary).

Occasionally, however, we have had some difficulty in deciding whether or not a certain difference in wording was critical, even though we were sure that there was no grammatical error in the translation. This motivated us to carry out the following experimental survey. By the split-half method, we formed two homogeneous Japanese samples, and we administered Questionnaire A to one of these two samples (Japan A) and Questionnaire B to the other (Japan B). Questionnaire B consisted of those items in the **original** Japanese wording, whereas Questionnaire A consisted of those items with the back-translated Japanese wording. The wording of some items was completely the same in both Questionnaire A and B, but there were slight differences in the wording of some of the other items. We compared the distribution of responses from Japan A and B.

An example of an item is as follows. In translation from the original Japanese to English and back-translation from the English into Japanese, there was no change in the question, but there were some changes in wording in the response categories (choices).

The question was: "Q.33. If you were asked to choose the two most important items listed on the card, which two would you choose? (Select two)" (Percentages following each choice indicate the response percentage.)

In the original Japanese, the choices were:

- | | |
|---|-------|
| a. 親孝行 (Filial piety) | 73.2% |
| b. 恩返し (Repaying to one's benefactor) | 45.8% |
| c. 個人の権利 (Respect for the rights of the individual) | 37.7% |
| d. 個人の自由 (Respect for the freedom of the individual). | 36.6% |

(Here the English in the parentheses is the tentative word-by-word translation by the authors for the readers' convenience.)

These items were translated into English as follows.

- a. Filial piety/Love and respect for parents
- b. Repaying people who have helped you in the past
- c. Respect for the rights of the individual
- d. Respect for the freedom of the individual

Then the English was back-translated into Japanese as follows.

- | | |
|---|-------|
| a. 親孝行/親に対する愛情と尊敬 (Filial piety/Love and respect for parents) | 77.7% |
| b. 助けてくれた人に感謝し、必要であれば援助する (Repaying people who have helped you in the past) | 56.8% |
| c. 個人の権利 (Respect for the rights of the individual) | 25.2% |
| d. 個人の自由 (Respect for the freedom of the individual) | 32.8% |

Thus, in the back-translation the Japanese wording was different for categories a and b, but unchanged for categories c and d. In the comparative survey, "b" produced a significant change in response percentage. Even though there was no wording change for "c", the largest change was observed for that item, probably because of an effect from the change in "b."

Fig. 3a and 3b summarize the differences in response distributions between Japan A and Japan B for all items and show that a slightly different wording of items may produce response differences, sometimes up to 10–15%. Therefore, we must be very careful when we compare response percentages from various nations where different languages are used. Even if we find a certain difference in responses, we cannot be sure whether it is due to a real difference or due to a difference in wording.

Some people may think that a potential response difference of up to 10–15% due to wording differences is too large to secure cross-national comparability. However, in pattern analysis, e.g., Hayashi's Quantification Method (Hayashi, 1993), applied to data from several nations or areas for all items on the same questionnaire, we have confirmed that the difference between Japan A and Japan B is small enough to be disregarded in the analysis compared to the differences between several nations in the total data sets (Fig. 4). Therefore, this leads us to the conclusion that if we compare response distributions of two nations with respect to a single item, it may be difficult to see whether a difference is essential or if it is due to translation. However, if we compare response patterns of several nations with respect to many items, we may be able to ignore the influence of minor differences in wording involved in translation processes.

It may be worthwhile to address some issues regarding bilingual comparative surveys. Some people may suspect that there could be response differences even by the same




Figure 3a: Comparison of response percentages of Japan A (back-translated Japanese questionnaire) and Japan B (original Japanese questionnaire). In the case where the wording is completely the same in both Japan A and Japan B, there are some percentages of variance, which may be comparable to sampling errors.




Figure 3b: In the case where there are some wording differences between Japan A and Japan B, the differences in response percentages sometimes amount up to 10–15%.

bilingual respondent when he/she is administered the same questionnaire in different languages. In order to investigate this problem, Hayashi and Suzuki (1997) carried out a comparative survey of persons bilingual in Japanese and English by the split-half method, and they detected certain differences as follows. Roughly, respondents to the Japanese questionnaire tended to avoid polar answers and to choose middle answer categories or “DK (Don’t Know)”, whereas respondents to the English questionnaire tended to choose




Figure 4: The result of Hayashi's Quantification Method applied to the response data of all common items from several nations and areas. The difference due to wording differences (Japan A & Japan B) or due to sample weighting (JBS & JBW) is so small that we may disregard it in the global comparisons.

polar categories ("very..."). Moreover, the Japanese were as individualistic and optimistic as Americans if they were responding to a question in English (cf. linguistic relativity of Sapir & Whorf hypothesis). See Hayashi & Suzuki (1997) for more details.

Our more recent surveys suggest that the response using a "common language" [English or Arabic] in a multiracial country may tend to produce polar answers in greater numbers simply because of poor literacy of the people who have to use the common language rather than their real mother tongue. This may explain the response tendencies found by Hayashi & Suzuki [1997] of Japanese responding in English. We are still investigating our recent survey data from Australia, Singapore, and India from this point of view. (See Yoshino's paper in this issue.)

3.2 *Difference of survey sampling methods*

In a social survey, we usually use statistical random sampling of the population under investigation. In cross-national comparative surveys, however, we cannot avoid situations where each country uses its own traditional method of sampling. For example, many European countries use random-route sampling, and many survey companies in Britain and the USA use quota sampling. In addition, some companies often modify response percentages by weighting with respect to age, gender, rate of absence (rate of unavailability

at the time of interviewing); etc. For the comparability under question, multidimensional analysis might be preferable to simple tabulation of response distribution, which often fails to secure cross-national comparability.

Yoshino & Hayashi (2002) and Hayashi (2001) showed robustness of outputs in multidimensional analyses. That is, one can disregard differences in sampling methods in a total configuration obtained by multidimensional data analysis (Hayashi's Quantification Method III) when comparing data from many countries with respect to a group of items in contrast to an examination of only a single item. In addition, Yoshino (1992, 2001) showed that one could even detect falsified data by applying multidimensional scaling, called the superculture model (Yoshino, 1992). Here again, we could confirm the power of multidimensional analysis, as shown in the explanation of back-translation of items.

For example, see Fig. 3 again for the comparison of two sets of data: a) weighted sample data from the Japanese Brazilian (JBW) survey with respect to races and b) non-weighted sample data (JBS). As in the case of comparison of the two Japanese surveys (Japan A and Japan B), the difference between the two sets of data is so small that we can ignore it for the comparison of data from all countries in the analysis of patterns of responses with respect to many items.

Thus, Hayashi's Quantification Method cancels out minor differences in wording of items and those of sampling methods and gives us a stable macro pattern.

4. Overview of Our Past Surveys

In this section, we briefly explain some results of our past surveys. For details, see the references.

4.1 Longitudinal Analyses of Japanese National Character Survey (1953-present)

In the longitudinal survey of the Japanese national character that is the core of CLA, we have found a central dimension of the Japanese character and society, which may be labeled as modernization vs. tradition. Various aspects of Japanese social systems are concerned with this dimension (e.g., views of nature, acceptance of science and technology, etc.) in one way or another. This dimension may represent a conflict between innovation and conservation in Japanese history.

We found also five enduring predominant values held by more than two thirds of Japanese without regard to age, education, and gender over some five decades. These are: 1) fairness in employment situations (Q.35 (#5.1c-1 & c-2), 2) preference for Japanese style gardens (#9.3), 3) preference for a workplace to be governed by the rule of primary group relations (paternalistic department chief, family-like firm) (Q.35, #5.6b), and 4) although only one third of the Japanese have religious faith, most non-religious Japanese also think that a religious attitude (heart/mind) is important (Q.42a & Q.43)¹⁾.

¹⁾ Codes such as Q.35 are those for the Asia-Pacific Values Survey (Yoshino [ed.], 2004), and those such as #5.6b are in the Japanese national character survey (Mizuno et al., 1992).

It is natural to think that some changes must be associated with the 1) transformation of Japan in the post-industrial era, 2) shift from collectivity to an individual orientation, and 3) liberalization: change from subjects to citizens (becoming more democratic). Possible causes of these changes in Japan would be 1) the move from an agriculture-based economy to a manufacturing-based economy, and finally service-based economy, 2) a more affluent economy, and 3) the internationalization or globalization of the Japanese economy (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997, for more details).

Incidentally, it may be interesting to examine the following example of a contrast between stability of men's attitudes and change in stability of women's attitudes as shown in Figure 5. This contrast might be closely related to various aspects of changes taking place in Japan over the past half century after World War II.




Figure 5: Japanese National Character Survey

Q. "If you were born again, would you like to be born as boy or girl?"

In the past half century there has been stability in Japanese men's response of "boy" (approx. 90%) and significant change in Japanese women's response from "boy" to "girl."

4.2 Macro Comparison of Several Countries

Although the Japanese national character survey is the most important source for the study of changes and stability of Japanese social attitudes, opinions, and values, the Japanese national character must be more distinctively characterized through cross-national comparisons.

1) Seven Country Survey (1985–93)

With special financial aid from the Ministry of Education, we performed a cross-national survey of seven nations: Japan, USA, Britain, France, West Germany (before the unification) (1986–88), Italy (1992), and the Netherlands (1993). Applying a psychometric pattern analysis, called the "super-culture model", Yoshino (1992) found two main dimensions: a) European vs. Japanese and b) Latin vs. Anglo-Saxon. In the dimensional coordinate, there are three clusters: a) Britain and USA (common origin and language),

b) France and Italy (Latin nations and geographical neighbors), and c) Germany and the Netherlands (geographical neighbors). In our multidimensional analyses of social surveys, we frequently find these clusters. Probably the clustering is robust with respect to changes or differences in sets of question items, at least in general social surveys.

Yoshino & Hayashi (2002) gave an example of an item that initially seemed to have nothing to do with national character, but later turned out to have some hidden relevance to national character in our cross national survey. The item is as follows.

Q.14. During the last four weeks, have you suffered from any of the following?

	Yes	No	DK
Headaches/migraines	1	2	0
Backaches	1	2	0
Nervousness	1	2	0
Depression	1	2	0
Insomnia	1	2	0

This item was about medical problems, therefore, seemed apparently irrelevant to national character. Survey results showed that the percentages of those who claimed to have suffered from those health problems were higher among women than among men in all seven countries and that the percentage of Japanese men experiencing those problems was the lowest among the seven countries (Hayashi et al., 1998, pp.129–128). One knows, however, that the life span of women is longer than of men in most countries worldwide. Besides, the suicide rate of Japanese men is the highest among those in advanced industrial countries. These facts apparently seemed to contradict the survey data shown above.

All seven countries involved in this survey are highly industrialized states. Thus, there would appear to be no significant material difference in the stressful conditions of their environments nor in the quality of their medical systems (although medical systems may be related to political issues in each country as evidenced by the situation in the USA that denies many people systematic access to healthcare because of lack of a national healthcare program). On the other hand, it is known that women usually reduce stress effectively by chatting with others, and that Japanese men tend to close their heart and mind when experiencing trouble, which increases stress, sometimes to the extent of suicide. Thus, we have come to suspect that the above-mentioned response patterns with regard to medical symptoms may be closely linked to differences in people's attitudes toward **self-disclosure**. Furthermore, Yoshino (Yoshino, Hayashi & Yamaoka, Ch.3, 2009, to appear) argues that the above-mentioned degrees of self-disclosure also may be closely linked to attitudes leading to avoidance of polar categories (e.g., tendency for intermediate answers among Japanese in questionnaire) (Yoshino, 2009, this issue).

2) People of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii (1971, 1978, 1983, 1988 & 2000), Brazil (1991) and the U.S. West Coast (1998)

Our cross-national survey started with the Hawaii survey project in 1970. This survey of Japanese emigrants provided us with some important information about acculturation. For example, the general Japanese tendency for even non-religious people to respect a

religious attitude was observed among people of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii, Brazil, and the U.S. West Coast (King County in Washington state & Santa Clara in California). The tendency of Japanese to avoid polar answers and prefer middle category responses was observed among people of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii and in Brazil, but not on the U.S. West Coast. Hayashi & Kuroda (1997) mentioned that probably language was a key factor in the ambiguity of the Japanese as well as the diffuse nature of the Japanese self. But, reconsidering all data on this matter from our past surveys, we might explain the general response tendency as follows. In Hawaii, no race comprises a majority and the Japanese group is the largest among minority groups. In Brazil, Japanese may live either close together in a town/village or live in a large and sparsely populated area. In contrast to those two groups, Japanese Americans in the USA mainland have already assimilated into a multiracial society. Although the Japanese may express their opinions in a roundabout way to suggest a delicate and subtle nuance, this type of communication may be possible only among people who share a culture and history, such as the Japanese in Hawaii and Brazil. In order to communicate successfully in a multiracial society such as the mainland of the USA, one is supposed to speak out definitely on one's opinion whenever asked. This may explain the differences in response tendency between the Japanese on the U.S. West Coast and those in Hawaii and Brazil (This may be closely linked with the tendency of self-disclosure explained concerning response tendencies regarding medical symptoms in the previous section.)

In short, the Japanese in Japan use euphemisms and show less self-disclosure because they can expect that others having the same culture and history will guess their real opinions (heart/mind). On the other hand, Japanese immigrants abroad may show the same response tendency as the Japanese in Japan when they communicate among Japanese groups even though they might speak out among people who do not share their culture and history. (There are generational differences among Japanese immigrants, which may be related to differences in their degrees of assimilation.)

Yamaoka (2000, Fig. 3 & Table 3) compared the Japanese with other peoples with respect to the following two aspects: interpersonal relationships measured by the Giri-Ninjyo scale (Q.40-2, Q.41-1 & Q.42-2, Q.48-1 & Q.49-2, Q.45-a & b, Q.50-2) and religious attitude measured by Q.62a-2 & Q.63-1²⁾.

Briefly, the Giri-Ninjyo scale captures the interpersonal relationships particular to the Japanese, where Giri-Ninjyo is associated with emotional conflict between obligation and warm heartedness. The percentage of those who have a particular religious faith (about one third) is smaller in Japan than in western countries. But, among those people who do not have a particular religious faith, the percentage of those who think that religious attitudes (heart/mind) are important is the largest among Japanese. These tendencies were observed among people of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii, the U.S. West Coast, and Brazil (Hayashi, et al., 1998; Yamamoto, 1992; Yoshino, 2000).

²⁾ Note that the number of Q is the item number used in the comparative survey of seven nations.

5. East Asia Values Survey (EAVS) 2002–2005 and Asia-Pacific Value Survey (APVS) 2004–2009

This section briefly gives basic information on the countries to be analyzed in this special issue. In order to provide a frame of reference for understanding the studies described in this issue, this section focuses on each country's or region's relationship with Japan, its racial and religious composition, and stage of economic development. These explanations mainly depend upon Hirano et al. (2007) and Kyodo News (2008) as references.

People's Republic of China

Shanghai and Beijing, which are the locales to be analyzed in this special issue, have the second and the third largest populations of all the cities in China. The majority of Chinese people are of the Han race. Major religions in China are Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. Although the Constitution of China guarantees freedom of religion, the government practically imposes restriction on it. (This restricted possible items on politics and religion in our questionnaire.)

The Chinese economy, on the whole, has grown rapidly. The gross domestic product (GDP) of China is about half that of Japan, and its GDP has grown at a yearly rate of 10 percent in the five years since 2003. However, per capita gross national income (GNI) is very low (\$2010), and the income gap is already wide and is still widening.

In 1972, Japan and the People's Republic of China established diplomatic relations. Their relations, both at the governmental level and in terms of feelings held by the people, however, have not been warm, mainly due to conflicts over the perception of history. In April 2005, some months before our China Survey 2005 was performed, for instance, there were anti-Japanese demonstrations in big cities, including Beijing and Shanghai, that were triggered by objection to content in Japanese high school history textbooks on events during World War II and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.

Sovereignty of Hong Kong was transferred from the United Kingdom to China in 1997. Ninety-five percent of the people in Hong Kong are Chinese. Per capita GNI in Hong Kong is more than 10 times as large as that in Mainland China.

Taiwan

Ninety-eight percent of Taiwanese is of the Han race. Major religions in Taiwan are Taoism, Buddhism, and Christianity. Its economy has developed rapidly so that its per capita GNI is about half that in Japan (\$17,000).

After it lost its UN membership to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971, many countries broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, with only 23 countries having diplomatic relations with Taiwan today. Japan also broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1972. Economic and cultural exchanges in the private sector, however, have continued. It is the Taiwanese who first imported the Japanese culture of cartoons and comics, thereby helping Japanese culture to become accepted in other countries in Asia. Thus, generally speaking, people in Taiwan have pro-Japanese feelings. Currently, the

number of visitors from one country to another exceeds 1 million a year.

United States of America

The USA is, of course, a country that has had a preponderant influence on so many aspects of Japan's society, culture and politics from its diplomatic policy and the structure of its legal system to pop culture and the directions of education, and just about everything in between. It is not necessarily true, however, that the general public in either country knows or understands much about the other's culture or the ways in which the people respectively think about important issues of the day. Partly, this probably has to do with some intrinsic difficulty in maintaining a military-political alliance between states that differ greatly in terms of underlying cultural consciousness or of the ways in which national identity is woven into state power. Japan is a deeply secular state whose people's behavior and customs are bound nevertheless by deep-seated tradition, whereas the American people are highly religious even though America's political and economic institutions have been rationalized and depersonalized to a greater extent than in any other country. In terms of denominational affiliations, both Protestantism and Catholicism have a strong foothold in the United States. However, it is probably fair to say that over the last few decades the most conspicuous and politically charged line of cleavage has to do with that between secularists and those with some sort of religious belief.

Then there is the problem of asymmetry in relations. To Japan, the USA is the dominant, and, in fact, often nearly the sole, guideline state in deciding on its diplomatic stance; to the USA, Japan is but one actor among many in a geographical region that only a few with some sort of specialized interests know or care about. Most ordinary people in the USA probably know far less about Japan than people in Japan would like to think. On the other hand, the asymmetry doesn't necessarily mean that the average Japanese person has a deeper understanding of American culture or politics than the average American person might have of Japan. Too often, the Japanese tend to think of the USA in terms of binary stereotypes — emblematic of greatness and fostering admiration or, alternatively, as symbolizing arrogance and promoting hostility, or alternately of resistance or anger (Hirano et al., 2007, p.51).

It is perhaps time for the Japanese people to develop a more nuanced, subtle and fuller understanding of the USA and its culture as it really works.

Republic of Korea

Most people in Korea are Korean. About a quarter of the population is Buddhist and another quarter is Christian, although Korean Christians retain some customs of Confucian teachings. Korea has succeeded in developing rapidly so that its per capita GNI is about half of that in Japan (\$18,000).

People in the Republic of Korea have deep anti-Japanese sentiment because of Japanese annexation and occupation of Korea in the first half of the 20th century. Diplomatic relations between the countries are often still tense due to problems over the interpretation of history and disputes over the ownership of the island called Takeshima in Japanese, or Dokdo in Korean.

Japanese culture, such as through books and movies, however, is popular in Korea. Therefore, pirated Japanese books and movies have long been circulated in Korea. After President Kim Dae-jung abolished its restrictive policy toward Japanese culture in 1998, cultural exchanges between the countries have increased more than ever.

Southeast Asian Countries

If relations between Japan and the USA have been characterized by a certain degree of asymmetry, then it is also quite true that Japan's relationship with Southeast Asian countries has been rather unbalanced in the sense that most people in Japan do not seem to fully realize just how much impact their country has had on the historical and political developments in Southeast Asia. But it is certainly reasonable to say that Japan's military ventures in this region during World War II, as well as the subsequent economic penetration in search of labor and natural resources, have had a major impact on the political, economic and cultural developments of the Southeast Asian countries (For instance, see Goodwin [2001] for an example of an argument in sociology that identifies the historical role played by Japan as the single most consequential variable in explaining the nature of a political regime in various Southeast Asian countries since World War II. Also, see Fujimaki & Segawa, eds., 2003, and a series of introductory books on Southeast Asia by Kobundo, for more general information on the politics, society and culture in these countries). In any event, the history of Japanese invasion and military aggression in many of these countries almost necessitates that their public opinion would be characterized by some strong emotion and distrust. Indeed, during World War II Japan occupied and established military rule in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and often conducted extensive campaigns involving massacre, pillaging and forced labor camps.

Post World War II relations between Japan and Southeast Asia have centered on business, investment and economic aid rather than on direct military intervention and have in general been quite productive. Meanwhile, culturally and socially, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are all multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and regionally segmented countries that are internally very diverse (Singapore is a partial exception because it is too small to be considered regionally segmented fully based on ethnicity. It is also notable that the Singaporean government over the years has tried to deliberately integrate the different ethnic groups residentially, with varying degrees of success in different historical periods. See Itobayashi [2000] for more information). On the other hand, the influence of Western and Japanese popular culture and lifestyle has been quite pervasive, especially in the cities, in recent years - adding yet another layer of cultural expression and identity to these societies that have historically existed at the crossroads of commerce and cultural exchange since pre-modern times.

Commonwealth of Australia

The majority of Australians are of European ancestry, especially Anglo-Saxon, and about 70 percent of Australians (whose population is 20 million in all) are Christian. Recently, the number of people whose race is Asian has increased to about 0.5 million.

Although the Australian economy is small in size compared to Japan, its stage of eco-

conomic development is as high as that of Japan in terms of per capita GNI.

Since Australia was directly attacked by Japan during World War II, the Australians had strong antagonism toward Japan. The development of Japan-Australia relationships was restricted to the field of trade for a few decades after the war. Around 1972 when the Whitlam Labor government abolished the racial discrimination policy, Japanese emigration to Australia began to appear. Since then, economic and cultural relationships between these countries have been activated. Nowadays, hundreds of thousands Japanese visit Australia for sightseeing each year. As an economic effect, the Australian feelings toward Japan have become better.

India

It is sometimes difficult to even think of such a large, diverse polyglot country as being a modern nation-state at all, but this country of over a billion people and of at least 18 major languages has managed to hold together as the "world's largest democracy" more or less uninterruptedly since its independence from Britain in 1947. The country's history since then has not been without tribulations or political disturbances; secessionist movements in some regions, fundamentalist zeal of both the Hindu and Islamist varieties, as well as the general difficulty in building an unified Indian identity out of the myriads of competing caste, ethnic and regional loyalties remain to be some of the significant challenges the Indian state faces (See Khilnani, 2004, for more on the last point).

While for some time India's post-independence economy was organized around the socialist principle, in 1991 the country shifted to a policy of liberalization in trade and investment. The IT industry has in particular been stimulated by this new approach, and India is now considered one of the world's largest sources of engineers, programmers and so on. Supported by this development, business and trade relations between India and Japan also have expanded and deepened, in spite of a temporary setback caused by India's nuclear testing in '98 to which Japan strongly objected.

6. Towards a New Trustful Social System in the 21st Century

The Japanese mind is the world of an ambiguous self, multiple realities, and multi-valued attitudes (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997). Occasionally, Japan is considered as a homogeneous society with respect to individual opinions, but this is not the case in reality. Simply because the Japanese tend to refrain from making definitive commitments in order to avoid possible conflicts, they often appear to be ambiguous and homogeneous.

A new style of society demands a new type of social system. Bringing this about would first necessitate destruction of the traditional system. A leader in Japan would have to think about the balance between conservation of fundamental human relational systems and quick destruction of obsolete social systems in the transitional age, as would leaders all over the world. The last decade, however, has seen that this destruction has gone too far even in the areas that we have to conserve, for example, in the realm of building trustful human relationships, under misguided globalization. A positive side of ambiguity may lead us to generosity in accepting different social values whereas a negative side may




Figure 6: A Manifold of Local Communities

Some pairs of these local communities may overlap each other and the total set may make a hierarchy as a global manifold. In order to realize steady peaceful and prosperous development, we may need a set of “soft” regulations to connect pairs of communities rather than a single restrictive global standard.

lead us to confusion or irresponsibility.

So far we have explained the idea of “manifold” as in the context of comparative surveys. However, the real world has already formed some local communities of a global manifold. We may be able to utilize CULMAN also for **policy-making** in balancing between strict construction and its spatial coverage of regulations. That is, if an international regulation is applied to a larger region, it should be made less restrictive and be adapted to local conditions. In order to have steady peaceful and prosperous development, we may need a set of “soft” regulations to connect pairs of communities rather than a single restrictive global standard. In the literature on international politics, Lipson (1991) and Abbott & Snidal (2000) argue the comparative merits and demerits between informal or “soft” international rules and formal or “hard” ones. Goldstein and Martin (2000) point out the possibility that the establishment of legalized or hard international rules might make international cooperation difficult.

Although Japanese ambiguity has long been criticized in the past, can't we make use of a positive side of it as a strategy of generosity by which we connect those local charts in order to avoid conflicts between different cultures or races and to connect them in a constructive way? It seems that current political confusions in the world are due to insufficient scientific data analyses and inadequate ways to study cultural diversity in this time of globalization. Therefore, it is worthwhile to reconsider world policy from the viewpoint of the world as a cultural manifold.

We hope that our survey research will provide some basic information for mutual un-

derstanding of different cultures and peoples in order to realize peace and prosperity in the entire world.

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Appendix

The following is a list of ISM Research Report Series on our surveys. (For the list of titles of all the reports in Japanese, see <http://www.ism.ac.jp/editsec/kenriipo/index.html>)

- No.54. A Statistical Method for Comparative Study of Fundamental Structure of Social Attitude. (Hayashi, C. [ed.], 1981)
- No.59. Statistical Methods for Comparative Study of Social Attitude by Surveys. (Hayashi, C. [ed.], 1984)
- No.70. Toward the Establishment and Development of Statistical Analysis for the Study of Comparative Culture: The Fourth Attitudinal Survey of Honolulu Residents, 1988. (Hayashi, C. & Suzuki, T. [eds.], 1991 [1988])
- No.71. Cultural Link Analysis for Comparative Social Research: A New Approach for the Exploration of Structure in Ways of Thinking Applied to Cross-National Analysis of General Social Attitudes (Hayashi, C. & Suzuki, T. [eds.], 1991)
- No.72. Cultural Link Analysis for Comparative Social Research: A Codebook for A Common File of 1987's German Survey, 1987's French Survey, 1987's British Survey, 1988's U.S. Survey, and 1988's Japanese Survey. (Hayashi, C. [ed.], 1992)
- No.73. Cultural Link Analysis for Comparative Social Research: Cross-Tables by Sex and Age for 1987's German Survey, 1987's French Survey, 1987's British Survey, 1987's U.S. Survey, and 1988's Japanese Survey. (Hayashi, C. [ed.], 1993)
- No.74. Research on National Character of Japanese Brazilian: 1991-1992. (Yamamoto, K. & Mori, K. [eds.], 1993 [1991-92])
- No.75. A Study of the Japanese National Character: The Ninth Nationwide Survey. (Research Committee on the Study of the Japanese National Character [ed.], 1994).
- No.76. Application of Cultural Link Analysis for Comparative Social Survey: A General Report. (Yoshino, R. & Suzuki, T. [eds.], 1995)
- No.77. Application of Cultural Link Analysis for Comparative Social Survey: A Manual for International Comparison of the National Character. (Yoshino, R. & Suzuki, T.

- [eds.], 1995)
- No.78. Application of Cultural Link Analysis for Comparative Social Survey: A Codebook of 1992 Italian Survey (Yoshino, R. & Suzuki, T. [eds.], 1995)
- No.79. Application of Cultural Link Analysis for Comparative Social Survey: A List of Responses for Open-Ended Questions of 1992's Italian Survey. (Yoshino, R. & Suzuki, T. [eds.], 1995)
- No.80. Application of Cultural Link Analysis for Comparative Social Survey: A Codebook of 1993's Dutch Survey (Yoshino, R. & Suzuki, T. [eds.], 1995)
- No.81. Application of Cultural Link Analysis for Comparative Social Survey: A List of Responses for Open-Ended Questions of 1993's Dutch Survey. (Yoshino, R. & Suzuki, T. [eds.], 1995)
- No.82. Application of Cultural Link Analysis for Comparative Social Survey: A Codebook for a Common File of 1992's Italian Survey, 1993's Dutch Survey. (Yoshino, R. & Suzuki, T. [eds.], 1995)
- No.83. A Study of the Japanese National Character: The Tenth Nationwide Survey. (Research Committee on the Study of the Japanese National Character [ed.], 1998)
- No.84. A Study of Statistical Science on Cultural Transmission: Japanese Americans on the West Coast Survey (JAWCS). (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2000)
- No.86. Hawaii Resident Survey 1999–2000 by the Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2001)
- No.89. Researches on the National Character of Chinese and Japanese: A Sampling Survey in Beijing, China. (Zheng, Y. [ed.], 2003)
- No.90. Researches on the National Character of Chinese and Japanese: A Sampling Survey in Shanghai, China. (Zheng, Y. [ed.], 2003)
- No.91. East Asia Values Survey: Japan 2002 Survey by the Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2004)

The following reports have also been published by ISM.

- The East Asia Value Survey: China 2002–03 Survey [Beijing, Shanghai & Hong-Kong] by the Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2004)
- The East Asia Value Survey: Japan 2004A Survey by the Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2005)
- The East Asia Value Survey: Japan 2004B Survey by the Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2005)
- The East Asia Value Survey (2002–2005): Data Analysis on Peoples' Sense of Trust. (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2006)
- The Asia & Pacific Value Survey: China 2005 Survey [Beijing, Shanghai & Hong-Kong] by The Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2007)
- The Asia & Pacific Value Survey: Taiwan 2006 by the Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. & Horoiwa, A. [eds.], 2007)
- The Asia-Pacific Value Survey: South Korea 2006 Survey by the Research Committee of

- Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. & Matsumoto, W. [eds.], 2007)
 The Asia-Pacific Value Survey: USA 2006 Survey by the Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2007)
 The Asia & Pacific Value Survey: Singapore 2007 Survey by the Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2008)
 The Asia & Pacific Value Survey: Australia 2007 Survey by the Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R., & Matsumoto, W. [eds.], 2008)
 The Asia & Pacific Value Survey: India 2008 Survey by the Research Committee of Cross-National Comparative Survey. (Yoshino, R. [ed.], 2009)
 A Study of Statistical Science on Health and Culture: Cross-National Comparative Survey on Life — 2006 America CATI Survey — (Yamaoka, K. & Yoshino, R. [eds.], 2008)
 A Study of Statistical Science on Health and Culture: Cross-National Comparative Survey on Life — 2007 German CATI Survey — (Yamaoka, K. & Yoshino, R. [eds.], 2008)

Five volumes have been published as a series of “Japanese National Character Survey” by Shisei-dou (Vol.1, 2 & 3) and Idemitsu-shoten (Vol.4 & 5).

Special issues on our longitudinal or cross-national surveys have been published in the following journals.

- Proceedings of ISM, Vol.43, No.1. (1995)
 (on Japanese national character survey 1953–1993)
- Proceedings of ISM, Vol.48, No.1. (2000)
 (on Japanese national character survey 1953–1998)
- Proceedings of ISM, Vol.53, No.1. (2005)
 (on Japanese national character survey 1953–2003)
- Behaviormetrika Vol.29, No.2 (2002) & Vol.30, No.1 (2003)
 (on our past longitudinal and cross-national surveys of national character 1953–2001)
- Japanese Journal of Behaviormetrics, No.32-1 (2005) & 33-1 (2006).
 (on the East Asia Values Survey 2002–2005).

The papers of these special issues are available on a free online journal of Proceedings of the ISM (<http://www.ism.ac.jp/editsec/toukei-j.html>), the Journal of Behaviormetrika (<http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/browse/bhmk>), and the Japanese Journal of Behaviormetrics (<http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/browse/jbhmk/>).

As for our past surveys, see our home pages of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics (<http://www.ism.ac.jp/~yoshino/> and http://www.ism.ac.jp/ism_info-j/kokuminsei.html).

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RECONSTRUCTION OF TRUST ON A CULTURAL MANIFOLD: SENSE OF TRUST IN LONGITUDINAL AND CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEYS OF NATIONAL CHARACTER

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The objective of this paper is to study the variability of peoples' basic social values as reflected in data from our past surveys on national character. Among other issues, I focus on trust systems in order to explore which aspects of sense of trust are stable and which aspects are variable under longitudinal changes in economic or political conditions. First, I explain peoples' general response tendencies based on our survey on national character, which is a key to the understanding of our survey data in the context of cross-national comparisons. Secondly, I summarize some aspects of people's sense of interpersonal trust from our longitudinal survey of Japanese national character. Thirdly, I present cross-national comparisons of interpersonal and institutional trust as well as some basic social values based on our past surveys, including surveys of seven-countries (Japan, USA and five European countries), the East Asia Values Survey (EAVS) (2002–2005) and the Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS) (2004–2008). The results show that East Asian countries have already departed from traditional Confucianism and that people share more common social values beyond the distinction of East and West. Fourthly, I present an overview of data on Japanese immigrants in Brazil, Hawaii and the U.S. West Coast in order to study the interaction between the environment and ethnicity. Fifthly, I provide some comments for our future research.

1. Reconstruction of Trust in the Transition Period

The objective of this paper is to study people's sense of trust as reflected in the data from our longitudinal and cross-national comparative surveys by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics on national character over the past half a century. The background and the significance of this study are as follows.

In the last two decades there has been a rapid transition from the established social system based on traditional industry to a system founded on highly advanced information technology. The transition after the end of the Cold War brought domestic and international confusion in various areas worldwide as well as in various domains of daily life. Each nation has its own culture, social values and way of thinking, and these underlie its economic system, politics and social life. Culture is a system that may unite the people within that culture, but it often excludes people outside of it. In this sense, culture is a system of distrust of outsiders, and, therefore, it can be the reason for conflict between different peoples. Thus, a mutual understanding of cultures in different countries and races is the key to the construction of a wider trust system for peaceful and prosperous development throughout the world in this time of globalization.

Key Words and Phrases: cross-national comparison, cultural manifold analysis (CULMAN), interpersonal relations, Japanese, longitudinal survey, national character, public opinion, social survey, social values, superculture model, trust

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The global movement has also brought confusion into our daily life. As a result, we are facing the collapse of our sense of trust in traditional systems of education, ethics, family, law, marriage, work environment and so on. This does not necessarily mean, however, that each individual has totally lost his or her interpersonal trust. Nowadays, many people are engaged in activities of non-profit organizations (NGO) or non-governmental organizations (NPO) more extensively and more intensively than previously seen (Hayashi & Iriyama, 1997). It may be that people's sense of trust and energy are being directed toward the development of a new interpersonal system. Thus it is important to investigate how people's attitudes toward the traditional trust system will be changed in the near future.

Under these conditions, "trust" has been extensively studied during the past two decades, probably as a result of the confusion that came about in the transitional period in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. It is now necessary to consider how we can develop international trust in order to prevent conflicts between different countries, races or religious groups.

This topic has become particularly popular since Fukuyama's (1995) influential book, "Trust." In his comparative economic theory, Fukuyama treated "trust" as a social capital and contrasted Japan, USA and Germany as highly trustful countries with China and Italy as less trustful countries. (See Yoshino [2006] for the study on trust in China.) Although he focused on aspects of trust as a property of national character, there are various possible definitions of "trust," all of which may be roughly classified into "trust in transactions" and "trust in normative philosophy," as summarized in Hosmer (1995). The study of trust in normative philosophy has a long history, at least since Aristotle in the West and Buddha and Confucius in the East, but it is rare these days. On the other hand, the study of trust in transactions has been the focus of many papers published during the recent years of globalization.

Zucker (1986) pointed out three ways for production of trust: 1) process-based trust tied to past exchanges; 2) characteristic-based trust tied to personal characteristics, such as family background and ethnicity; and 3) institutional-based trust tied to formal societal structures. Shapiro [1987] criticized the third category because he believes that trust cannot be institutionalized. Further, Zucker claimed that trust was not directly measurable. This may have influenced Fukuyama's methodology as he used various datasets concerning "distrust" such as the crime rate, divorce rate, and unemployment rate, rather than a direct measure of trust in public opinion surveys. My focus in this paper is mainly on the second of Zucker's three categories of trust, i.e., that based on personal characteristics, although the three categories are mutually dependent.

Banfield (1958) regarded "distrust" as the culture of the poor. This motivates us to investigate the relationships between people's sense of trust and their economic conditions. I deal with this issue in examining cross-national comparative data in later sections.

Miyamoto, Fugita and Kashima (2002) developed a theory of interpersonal relations derived from G.H. Mead's approach. In the theory, they presented a psychological framework balancing direct behavior and deep cognition to enable an understanding of the differences in character between Japanese and Americans. For example, they indicated

that the Japanese prefer to delay action and pay more attention to the perception of others, perception of themselves, and perception of the situation, whereas the Americans favor direct action and pay more attention to their own views. Their theory also can be used to study the acculturation of Japanese Americans (or Japanese immigrants in general) and transition of generations from Issei and Nisei to Sansei, etc. Or this theory may lead to an understanding of the interaction between racial origins and social environments, rather than acculturation (See next section for the analysis of general response tendencies of nations or races).

As for measurements of national character, Inkeles (1997) claimed that aspects directly related to economic or political conditions should not be regarded as part of "national character." However, it is reasonable to assume that people of different countries may respond differently to certain economic or political items on a questionnaire (i.e., "Are you satisfied with your living conditions?") even under the same economic and political conditions and that such differences in response patterns may be closely related to "national character." For example, Brazilians showed a high degree of life satisfaction and happiness even when their country was experiencing severe conditions regarding international debt in the late 1980s. On the other hand, the Japanese did not show a high degree of life satisfaction and happiness even when their economy was close to the top in the world. To understand this phenomenon, we need to identify general tendencies in people's manner of responding, and both objective and subjective means of measurement must be employed.

Among various efforts to relate trust with social issues in the last decade, public health may be one of the most productive fields in the study of social capital (voluntary activity or interpersonal trust) and social groups, as exemplified by Kawachi and his colleagues (1997). For example, they reported that a greater degree of social capital is closely linked to better health in medical research experiments and social surveys at the individual and state levels in the USA. These results have been confirmed in some other countries, but not in others. In Japan, no clear relationship had been confirmed until recently, probably because one difficulty is to identify what spatial unit (prefecture, city, village, etc.) should be adopted in attempts to relate health with social capital (sense of trust). Ichida and his colleagues (2005), however, performed intensive studies on this matter and finally showed a positive relationship between health and social capital in their survey of villages in Aichi prefecture.

Logistic regression analysis by Tsunoda, Yoshino & Yokoyama (2008) revealed certain relationships between two dependent variables on self-rated health and health dissatisfaction, and some independent variables such as religion, social capital, spirituality, superstitions, etc., as part of a national character study. For example, in males with negative attitudes on generalized trust, the number of self-reported symptoms was greater; in females, negative attitudes on norms of reciprocity were associated with a greater number of self-reported symptoms. Moreover, health dissatisfaction in females was enhanced by low perceptions of support. In both genders, self-reported symptoms and health dissatisfaction were greater in the presence of anxiety. A larger number of self-reported symptoms were associated with adherence to religion and spirituality in males. In females, the de-

gree of health dissatisfaction was greater in those with low income and concern about superstitions. Thus, from the viewpoint of social capital, perceived health is susceptible to personal relationships in females and to distrust in males. Among other factors, anxiety was found to be a key factor affecting perceived health. In addition, females were influenced by economic status and superstitions, whereas males were more concerned about religion or the mind in relation to health. The authors of that study suggested that these findings be used in developing public health policies in Japan.

In this paper, I consider certain aspects of "trust" reflected in responses to our nationwide surveys. I pay attention also to the survey data on variability of people's trust systems in order to explore which aspects of people's sense of trust are stable over many decades and which vary with changes in economic and political conditions. As mentioned previously, some researchers say that "trust" is not directly measurable. But I believe that people's responses in questionnaire surveys can reveal certain aspects of their sense of trust if time series patterns or cross-national patterns of those responses are adequately analyzed and general response tendencies of nations and personality types are adequately considered. (I never mean to imply that any scale on the sense of trust always works in the same way cross-nationally and longitudinally.) This study is based on the methodology called "CULMAN (cultural manifold analysis)" as explained in Yoshino (2005) and Yoshino, Nikaido and Fujita (in this issue).

In Section 2, I discuss general response tendencies as part of the national character. Section 3 summarizes some aspects of people's sense of trust identified in our longitudinal survey of Japanese national character. In Section 4, I present a cross-national comparative analysis of trust and some social values as determined through our past surveys. In Section 5, I consider the acculturation of Japanese immigrants in Brazil, Hawaii, and the U.S. West Coast. Finally, Section 6 includes comments on future research in these areas.

2. General Response Tendencies

As mentioned in the introductory paper of Yoshino, Fujita and Nikaido (this issue), there are problems in cross-national comparability with regard to differences in statistical sampling methods or language translation. For problems of statistical sampling and languages, the application of multidimensional scaling was suggested to secure cross-national comparability.

In this section, I address another problem in cross-national comparability, i.e., general response tendencies as evidenced from our longitudinal and cross-national survey research on national character.

Our past studies have already clarified some national differences in general response tendencies in our questionnaire surveys. For example, the French tend to give negative answers (Yoshino, 2001c), which may be closely related to their critical attitudes as an aspect of a mature democracy (Dogan, 2000). The Brazilians showed optimistic attitudes comparable to affluent Europeans even during the financial difficulties in the 1980s, as evidenced from surveys on their happiness and life satisfaction (Inkeles, 1997). On the other hand, the Japanese avoid polar categories and tend to choose middle response cate-

gories (designated as *middle-response category tendency* [MRC tendency] throughout this paper). For example, they did not show a high degree of life satisfaction even in the 1980s when the economy in Japan was close to the top worldwide. This was a surprise to the world (at least to the West), but it can be explained by their MRC tendency. Thus we need to keep in mind that response data from our questionnaire surveys are confounded by actual conditions and general response tendencies.

In this section, I compare degrees of the MRC tendency in data from our past surveys. This includes not only comparisons between countries, but comparisons between races in the same countries and comparisons between generations of Japanese immigrants. Although there may be several ways to measure the MRC tendency, I tentatively use the sum of percentages of polar responses to the following question (Q.18 in the APVS) that asks respondents to rate the degree of importance of seven domains of daily life using a 7-point scale.

Q.18 [SHOW CARD 12]

Using a scale of 1 to 7, where '7' is "very important," and '1' is "not important at all," can you tell me how important each of the following is to you?

	Not Important at all					Very Important	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
a. Your immediate family members such as spouse and children, if you have any	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
b. Career and job	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
c. Free time and relaxation	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
d. Friends and people you know	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
e. Parents, brothers, sisters, and other relatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
f. Religion	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
g. Politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

By definition, the sum of the polar responses "1" and "7" to all of the seven domains (a, b, c, ..., g) is called the *rate of polar responses* (abbreviated as *RPR* hereafter). I have analyzed the data with several possible statistical measures concerning the RPR or rate of middle category response. I decided to tentatively use this measure of RPR for the sake of simplicity, although the RPR may not be used to completely reveal the polar response tendency, which is separated from the actual intention to choose very positive or very negative categories.

Tables 1a, 1b and 1c show the RPR of all of our past surveys that included the same item as Q.18. These were the Seven Country Survey (1987–1993) (Japan A & B, USA, Italy, France, West Germany [before unification], the Netherlands, and the UK), the EAVS (2002–2005), the APVS (2004–2008), and the Japanese Immigrant Surveys in Hawaii (Honolulu residents) in 1988 and 1999, in Brazil in 1992, and on the U.S. West

Table 1a: Rate of Polar Responses of Q.18a-g.
(Figures show the sum of polar responses "1" and "7" to Q.18a-g).

The Seven Country Survey					
Year	1988	1987	1993	1987	1992
	Japan-A	UK	NETHERLANDS	WEST GERMANY	ITALY
RPR	317	306	284	222	312
year	1988				
	Japan-B				
RPR	317				

Table 1b: Rate of Polar Responses to Q.18a-g.

Year	1999 Hawaii		1991 JAPANESE BRAZILIANS			1988 West Coast of USA				
	Non-Japanese Americans	Japanese Americans	total	1st Generation	2nd Generation	3rd Generation	Japanese Americans (total)	2nd Generation	3rd Generation	4th & 5th Generations
RPR	311	318	457	514	463	413	319	380	327	300
Year	1988 Hawaii			JAPANESE BRAZILIANS (Degrees of Japanese-ness)						
	Non-Japanese American	Japanese Americans	total	Low	Middle Low	Middle High	Middle High			
RPR	320	317	457	465	413	465	413			

Table 1c: Rate of Polar Responses of Q.18a-g.

Year	East Asia Values Survey & Asia-Pacific Values Survey					Singapore											
	2002 Beijing	2002 Shanghai	2003 Kunming	2002 Hong Kong	2003 Taiwan	2002 Hangzhou	2003 South Korea	2004 Singapore	2002 Japan	2004 Chinese	2007 Singapore	2006 USA	2007 Australia	2008 India			
RPR	340	287	372	258	280	343	407	359	312	359	327	325	309	326			
year	2005 Beijing	2005 Shanghai	2005 Hong Kong	2005 Hong Kong	2006 Taiwan	2006 Hangzhou	2006 South Korea	2007 Singapore	2004 Japan A	2007 Singapore	2007 Singapore	2006 USA	2007 Australia	2008 India			
RPR	328	344	265	265	249	299	299	338	265	338	265	325	309	326			
					2006 Taiwan		2004 Singapore		2007 Singapore		2004 Singapore		Others				
					total	Native Taiwanese	Chinese mainlanders	total	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Others	total	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Others
					249	249	254	359	327	431	435	393	338	317	425	382	388

Coast (King County in the state of Washington & Santa Clara in California) in 1999 (See Table 1, Yoshino, Nikaido & Fujita).

A summary of Tables 1 a-c is as follows.

1) The pattern of RPR in the Japan A and Japan B surveys in 1988 were the same (Table 1a), which may suggest the stability of RPR as a measure. The RPR pattern shown in the 2002 Japan survey as part of the EAVS was similar to those of Japan A and Japan B surveys. However, in the APVS (2004), the RPR value was lower by approximately 50. We must reconfirm whether the RPR is inevitably influenced to some extent by changes in opinion over time and whether the context of the questionnaire has an effect.

2) All throughout our past surveys, the Japanese Brazilians had the highest RPR, whereas the West Germans in 1988 (before unification of East and West Germany) had the lowest. (The questionnaire for Japanese Brazilians was in Brazilian Portuguese.) The South Koreans had the second highest value in 2003, but the value was more than 100 points lower in 2006. The reasons for this decrease are unclear, but it would be worthwhile to investigate whether this difference represents actual changes in people's opinions or if variability is intrinsic to the RPR.

3) As for the Japanese immigrants in Hawaii, Brazil, and the U.S. West Coast, RPR values were lowest in the younger generation. This is not consistent with the observation of Hayashi et al. (1996, p.389) that Japanese Americans in Hawaii and Brazil had attitudes leading to avoidance of polar responses and preferences for responses in middle categories. And, it is not consistent with the analysis of Kuroda & Suzuki (1991a, 1991b), which attributes response tendencies mainly to culture or language rather than to other types of social conditions.

The respondents of Japanese Brazilian survey were classified into 4 groups, according to their degrees of Japaneseness (Yamamoto & Hayashi [ed.], 1993, p.86). The RPR was not proportional to the degree of Japaneseness.

In the past decade I have developed a research collaboration with F.S. Miyamoto, T. Kashima and S. Fugita (see Fugita, Kashima & Miyamoto, 2002; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Kashima, 2002; Miyamoto, 1984), preeminent researchers on second generation Japanese Americans. As a result, I have become more sensitive to the fact that the early generation of Japanese immigrants had very difficult experiences with racial discrimination, among others, during World War II, so that they had to develop an attitude that allowed them to speak out to protect their rights and gain political power. If that is the case, the RPR should tend to be larger in a multiethnic country or social group, which may be confirmed by our data on the US, Singapore and India, as well as for Japanese immigrants (Table 1a, b & c). Further, I have reconfirmed that even the data of Hayashi et al. (1996, p.389) showed that Japanese immigrants in Hawaii had considerably less MRC tendency. Culture and language may be closely linked, as Kuroda and Suzuki explained (1991a, 1991b); however, it seems to me that the effect of the social situation in a multiethnic society has a much stronger influence even when the same public language such as English must be used because people's communication abilities are more restricted in a multiethnic society. Therefore, people need to speak out in order to avoid miscommunication.

4) Even in English speaking countries, there are differences among various ethnic groups, as it was shown that RPR is higher in countries where English is one of the public languages, such as in Singapore and India. This also supports my analyses on RPR.

5) In Taiwan, there was little difference in RPR between the native Taiwanese and the Chinese mainlanders (the Chinese crossed over to Taiwan during the political confusion after WWII). The minor difference in RPR may suggest that there is less political tension over domestic policies between these two groups than in the past. This may also suggest that it is important to consider the current condition between Taiwan and Mainland China and the possible future of their relationship with regard to the economy and politics¹⁾.

6) In Singapore, there are three large ethnic groups: Chinese (majority), Malay and Indians (minority groups). The Chinese had the lowest RPR whereas RPR values for Malay and Indians were much higher both in 2004 and 2007. (The values for RPR of Indians changed from 435 to 382, but the general pattern of RPR was consistent among the three ethnic groups as well as with the other minorities.) This observation also confirms that the RPR of minorities tends to be larger in a multiethnic society.

7) As for gender differences, RPR were higher in women than in men in general. Here I do not present the details, but this difference may be closely related to the issue of self-disclosure as shown in responses for self-reported medical symptoms (see Yamaoka in this issue, or Yoshino, Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2009 [in press]).

Considering group differences in previously mentioned point 3), we may hypothesize that a disadvantaged group such as a minority group in a multiethnic society tends to have higher RPR (with the possible exception of gender differences), probably because of the need to speak out in order to obtain power and to protect its rights. I will not go into detail on this issue here, but some relevant data will be presented in Section 5.

In addition to general response tendency, many other factors may be involved in the data. Therefore, there may be several other possible interpretations. However, it is certain that responses in our surveys always involve some general response tendencies, particular to some nations or races. Furthermore, such a general response tendency also characterizes people not only at a national level but at an individual level, as suggested by Yoshino's (2008b) study on the formation of and changes in public opinions. This suggests that each nation consists of different groups of personalities and that differences in distribution of personalities represent some aspects of differences in national character of countries. But it does not suggest that the character of individuals is totally different between countries. Thus, it is necessary to pay attention to whether we deal with individuals or with a total nation or group in our analysis.

1) The distinction between the two groups is on self-report, and the sample of valid returned questionnaires in our survey was biased to fewer mainlanders than would be expected by census data. There are at least two possibilities: our sample might have been truly biased; or the mainlanders might have hidden their identities for certain political reasons. Therefore, this analysis is tentative.

3. Interpersonal Trust and Some Social Values

The Institute of Statistical Mathematics (ISM) has been conducting a longitudinal nationwide social survey of the Japanese national character every five years since 1953, using mostly the same questionnaire items (Mizuno et al., 1992). The survey is called "Nihonjin no Kokuminsei Chosa (Japanese National Character Survey)". The definition of "national character" may be very problematic in a political or sociological sense. However, here it simply means characteristics of people's response patterns to the survey's questions (Hayashi, et al., 1998). This is similar to the idea of Inkeles (1997) that each nation or social group is characterized by statistical modes of response distributions in surveys, although our approach was developed independent of his work. The question items cover various aspects of people's opinions about their culture and daily life.

Since 1971, the survey conducted by ISM has been expanded to a cross-national comparative study for a more advanced understanding of the Japanese national character (Hayashi, 1973). (See Table 1 of Yoshino, Fugita & Nikaido in this issue for a partial list of our past surveys.) The main focus of our cross-national surveys is the statistical comparison of peoples' social values and ways of thinking and feeling (Hayashi, 2001a, 2001b; Hayashi et al., 1998; Yoshino, 1994, 2001c).

Our longitudinal survey of Japanese national character shows some stable aspects of attitudes and social values of the Japanese (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997; Yoshino, 1994). The stability of interpersonal attitudes and religious attitudes may distinguish the Japanese from other people. For example, the Japanese have higher scores on the "Giri-Ninjo scale" than in other countries. Although only one third of Japanese have religious faith, more than 60% of Japanese supported the opinion that religious attitudes (heart/mind) are important, as shown by Hayashi (in this issue) and Yamaoka (2000).

In the following, I briefly explain certain fundamental dimensions of the Japanese social values, and some results of the analysis of the sense of trust among Japanese along several dimensions.

3.1 Fundamental Dimensions of the Japanese Social Values

Hayashi (1993) has identified two important dimensions that underlie the Japanese national character: 1) the dimension of interpersonal relationships ("Giri-Ninjo" attitude, or a sort of conflict between obligation and warm-heartedness that is particular to Japanese interpersonal relationships) and 2) the dimension of contrast between the modern and traditional in their way of thinking.

On one hand, Japanese interpersonal attitudes have been stable, at least over the last half century, and probably much longer. (Probably the basic aspects of interpersonal attitudes may be stable over the years. However, certain aspects sensitive to changes in economic or political conditions may vary in the short term in most countries.)

On the other hand, Japan has been striving since the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to overtake western science and technology and develop it into a Japanese adaptation. Probably this enduring effort underlies the dimension of the Japanese traditional vis-a-vis a modern

orientation in the Japanese way of thinking.

However, the Japanese way of thinking has been gradually changing. Our survey of 1978 identified a generation gap between people of 20–24 years old and those older than 25 years²⁾. Since signs of generational changes appeared as early as 1978, the Japanese way of thinking had become more complicated than ever. Furthermore, the Japanese are presently in a transitional period from the established social system to a system of a highly advanced information age. This has brought confusion not only in the fields of science and technology but also in the fields of economics and politics. In this period of confusion, the majority of Japanese people have come to distrust traditional systems such as banking and bureaucracy as well as congressional representatives, police, etc. (Yoshino, 2002), in spite of the stereotype of Japan being a highly trustful nation (Fukuyama, 1995).

In people's attitudes, values, or ways of thinking, there are some aspects that may change according to economic and political changes as well as some relatively stable aspects. In the following, I go over several aspects relating to people's sense of trust as revealed in the longitudinal survey.

3.2 Sense of Interpersonal Trust of the Japanese

Psychological studies of measures of interpersonal trust have been developed in the past decades (Rosenberg, 1956; Rotter, 1971). Many of these studies may have some methodological limitations because they are based on too small samples or not on random samples. The significance of such studies, however, may have been justified by the statement of Rotter (1971) in the time of the Cold War. He noted: "It seems clear that disarmament will not proceed without an increase in trust on one or both sides of the iron curtain" (Rotter, 1971, p.443). The iron curtain was torn down two decades before the present time, but new local conflicts have been occurring incessantly all over the world. This necessitates the continued study of interpersonal and international trust. And the study of production of trust necessitates the measurement of trust.

Zucker (1986) questioned the direct measurement of trust. Fukuyama (1995) was probably influenced by Zucker's idea. Therefore he used several objective measures related to distrust such as the crime rate, divorce rate, or unemployment rate for the study of cross-national comparison of trust levels. Although it is questionable whether trust can be *directly* measured, it is certain that people's responses to survey questions may provide us with some information on their sense of trust, provided that items are appropriately chosen and response data are adequately analyzed.

Three items have been used to measure people's sense of trust by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan in their survey on "Americans' Quality of Life" (NORC-ROPER, 1986), the now-called "General Social Survey (GSS)." Although the GSS started as a sort of American version of the Japanese National Character Survey,

²⁾ Note that the younger generation was born more than 10 years after the end of World War II. In 1956, the Economic White paper declared, "Japan is no longer in the post-war condition," and this symbolized the start of the high-speed development of industry and economy. On the other hand, Japan had to face pollution problems as a result of the high-speed industrialization around 1970.

beginning in 1978, we adopted the three items. They are stated as follows (See the ISM Research Report No.83, 1999, for the Japanese questionnaire.)³⁾

#2.12a) Would you say that most of the time, people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?

1. Try to be helpful,
2. Look out for themselves,
3. Other (PLEASE SPECIFY),
4. Don't know.

#2.12b) Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?

1. Take advantage,
2. Try to be fair,
3. Other (PLEASE SPECIFY),
4. Don't know.

#2.12c) Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

1. Can be trusted,
2. Can't be too careful,
3. Other (PLEASE SPECIFY),
4. Don't know.

Here I should discuss the dimensionality and wording of these items.

First, originally Almond & Verba (1963) used factor analysis to select several items among hundreds of items on trust in a survey of students, and the three items above survived to be included in the GSS or other related surveys. Thus, the three items were supposed to measure different dimensions of trust: #2.12a was related to a sort of trust of neighbors (or norm of reciprocity), #2.12c was related to generalized trust, and #2.12b may have addressed something in between these two items. Our data, however, have repeatedly demonstrated that #2.12b and #2.12c are highly correlated for the Japanese whereas #2.12a and #2.12b are highly correlated for Americans. Thus, two of the three items may have captured independent aspects but not necessarily all three. Therefore, I sometimes use the independent items #2.12a and #2.12c when we have to reduce the number of items in a questionnaire. (The independence of dimensionality of these two items always held in all of our past surveys, except in the 2008 India survey where #2.12a and #2.12c were correlated.)

Secondly, as for #2.12c, some people may doubt that the second response category "can't be too careful" means distrust, because this category is chosen more frequently than the first category "can be trusted" in many countries (Yoshino, 1995). NORC-ROPER (1986) reported comparative survey data with respect to the effect of the second category. In the survey two cases were compared: in Case 1 the same wording as #2.12c was used and in Case 2 the phrase "can't be trusted" was used. The second category was less frequently chosen in Case 2 than in Case 1; that is, more people answered "can

³⁾ All through this paper, figures, such as #2.12, correspond to the common item code of the questionnaire of our surveys. Except in some cases, I leave the exact wording of items and the precise data on response rates to the ISM Research Report No.85 [Sakamoto et al., 2000]. As for our past surveys, our home pages are: <http://www.ism.ac.jp/~yoshino/> and http://www.ism.ac.jp/ism_info_j/kokuminsei.html

be trusted.” The same pattern of response change was found in surveys in Japan (See Sakamoto, et al., 2000, and Osaka-syogyo University & Tokyo University, 1999). In summary, the wording of #2.12c uses a sort of advanced technique to induce people’s true opinion (“honnne” in Japanese) rather than a disguised opinion biased to a social desirable answer (“tatemae” in Japanese).




Figure 1: Interpersonal trust scale among Japanese based on three GSS items

The response distributions of the Japanese to the three items over the past three decades are shown in the home pages of our Japanese National Character Survey (<http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/data/html/index/index.htm>). Fig. 1 shows the percentage of those who chose optimistic categories for all three items (“1” of #2.12a, “2” of #2.12b, & “1” of #2.12c). In this paper, I use the percentage of positive respondents, that is, the percentage of those who selected positive responses to all three items, as the trust scale. However, there may be other definitions of the trust scale based on distribution of responses to these three items.

Based on this scale, the Japanese people’s sense of trust has been fairly stable during the last three decades. Fig. 2 of Yoshino [2005b, p.151] shows greater changes in trust in Americans than in Japanese during the past three decades. Closer analysis shows that younger generations generally have more positive attitudes on interpersonal trust (#2.12c) than older generations. In the 1998 survey, those 60–64 years old showed a remarkably low degree of trust, although when younger they had not shown such a low degree of sense of trust. They were children during WWII and experienced a drastic social change from the military regime to the postwar democracy. In addition, they had a hard time surviving in the time of famine during and immediately after the war. Furthermore, it is their generation who reconstructed the ruins of Japan into a highly advanced industrialized country. In 1998, most of people of this generation were retired from the lifelong employment system in Japan. Under the economic depression of the 1990s, the “lost decade,” they could not get as high a pension as they had expected and many of those people had a hard time finding new jobs. The above-mentioned data may reflect their distrust towards the social systems that did not compensate them sufficiently for their lifelong hard work. It

is remarkable that people of this generation form a cohort in the sense that their opinions and values are different from the other generations in many cases. (See Mizuno, et al., 1992)

In analyzing the most recent survey taken in 2008, I found the following. As for the education level, there was no significant difference in responses to #2.12b. However, graduates of only primary school indicated a higher rate of trust in #2.12a, and a counter correlation was shown in #2.12c, i.e., the higher the education level, the lower the level of trust. As for gender differences, the rate of positive responses to #2.12b was higher in women than in men but there was no difference in responses to #2.12a and c in comparison with men. In the cross-tabulation of gender and age, more young women aged 25–29 years and senior women aged 70–79 years tended to choose “can’t be too careful” in #2.12c than the other age groups. In addition, those aged 40–49 years had a slightly higher rate of negative answers to #2.12b than the other age groups. In the economic depression, senior women have occasionally become targets of crimes, so this may make them more sensitive in their attitudes regarding interpersonal relationships.

The Japanese sense of trust has been more stable with respect to economic changes than that of Americans. However, the economic structural reformation of the last decade seemed to have damaged the Japanese sense of trust to some extent. In the early 1990s, the educational system was changed significantly from a system that imposes hard work on students to a system that gives students more free time, called “yutori-kyoiku (relaxed education),” in spite of the fact that other countries were trying to imitate the hard-work education in order to catch up to the high economic level of Japan. The new system was expected to produce creative youth with diverse attitudes and social values, but it simply produced many individualistic persons lacking basic skills in various fields. In the early 1990s, economic conditions were still fairly good. Then, these young people enjoyed moving easily from one workplace to another, not within the system of traditional life-long employment, trying to find the best place for him/her, as if looking for a “blue bird.” On the other hand, the system of employment has changed from life-long employment to the system where workers can easily be fired including those in public sector jobs. This has produced distrust between employers and employees: workers are afraid of losing their jobs, whereas employers are afraid of losing workers soon after they invest highly in their training.

Meanwhile the government has lost people’s trust in the welfare system of national pension after retirement: Senior people have to rely on younger persons for future financial support. However, the population of younger generations has been decreasing, and they are less motivated to pay pension costs, considering the balance between their total payment and their return in the future. These situations necessarily lead to loss of trust between young and senior people.

Thus the difference in trust found in Japanese and USA samples may largely come from the difference between the employment systems: workers’ salary may be reduced but workers may not be fired so easily in the life-long employment system of Japan. This reminds us of the Chinese proverb of Mengzi: “No stable mind without a stable job.” All of those social reforms have been done under the guise of globalization. Without

consideration of the culture of each country, it simply leads to confusion.

Inaba (2002, p.72, Fig.1-12) showed the relationship between the crime rate and the sense of interpersonal trust (#2.12c) during 1983-2003. It was suggested that there was a certain causal relationship between the economy and trust in Japan: the economic change from prosperity to recession gradually led to an increase in crime and eventually to an increase in people's sense of distrust with a time lag of some five years.

Yoshino (2002) discussed several other aspects of trust such as trust in politics, science and technology as well as the work ethic of the Japanese. He concluded that some aspects of trust might be variable according to economic and political conditions whereas other aspects may be more stable over time. Generally, the Japanese show stability in interpersonal trust, whereas their attitudes toward work and the work ethic seem to have been influenced by economic and political conditions, although the Japanese used to have the stereotype of diligent worker (called the "economic animal"). As for the interpersonal trust measured by the three items on the GSS, the sense of trust of Americans was more variable than that of the Japanese, probably because of economic and political changes (Yoshino, 2005b, Fig.2).

This may remind us of Banfield's (1958) statement that distrust is a culture particular to the poor. This can be contrasted with Fukuyama's (1995) observation that certain people such as Japanese and Americans are more trustful than other people such as Chinese and Italians because the latter have had a long history of very strong political centralization and did not develop a trustful community beyond their families.

4. Cross-National Comparison of Interpersonal Trust & Institutional Trust

In this section, I present an overview of people's sense of trust as shown in our past cross-national surveys. These surveys included the three items on interpersonal trust from the GSS and the items on institutional trust from the World Values Survey (WVS) by Inglehart et al. (Dentsu-Soken & Yokakaihatsu Center [Ed.], 1999).

4.1 *Comparative Survey of Seven Countries (1988-1993)*

4.1.1 *Sense of Interpersonal Trust*

Table 2 shows the response distributions of the GSS trust scale for all countries (areas) that we have surveyed in the past three or four decades.

Miyake presented an analysis of this topic (Hayashi et al. [1998, ch.7 of Part II]) as a member of our seven country survey. This survey included Japan, USA, Britain, West Germany, and France during 1987-1988 and Italy and the Netherlands during 1992-1993. He concluded that the trust scale has low correlations with gender and religion, but stronger correlations with family income, academic background, and social class (higher scores for these attributes were associated with higher scores on the trust scale).

On this scale, West Germany, Britain, and USA were higher than Japan and the Nether-

lands, but the difference was small. The French and Italians were clearly lower than those in other nations. In addition, Miyake found that those who have religious faith gave more positive responses to item #2.12a “most of time, people are trying to be helpful for others,” irrespective of their religious affiliation.

Interestingly, Miyake found a gender difference in responses to item #2.12b “most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance.” Specifically, women gave more optimistic answers than men, i.e., “they would try to be fair.” As for item #2.12c “most people can be trusted,” there was a clear difference between the social classes in all seven countries: the higher the social class, the more trustful. The difference between classes was remarkably large in France and the USA. Miyake observed also that a higher level of education was associated with greater trust, and he suspected that the association was due to the correlation between education and social class. (Although there was a relatively strong correlation between education and social class or between education and income in the USA, this is not necessarily the case for all other countries.)




Figure 2: Cross-National Comparisons from All of the Our Past Surveys: Rates of Positive Responses to two GSS Items (#2.12a & #2.12c)

Fig. 2 shows the percentage in each country of those who gave positive answers to *both* #2.12a and #2.12c in the three items of trust. (I used those two items because #2.12b was missing in some of our past surveys. But I have confirmed that the general pattern on that figure was almost the same as on the figure that was made using all three items for the countries or areas where all three items were asked, except India.)

Temporal stability may be confirmed by comparisons of two or three surveys in the same countries (areas). That is, a comparison of the surveys in Japan in 1988, 2002 and 2004 or those in Beijing and Shanghai in 2002 and 2005.

The percentages of positive responses in the USA and Britain were high, whereas those in Italy and France were low. In a sense, this result may be consistent with Fukuyama's claim about trust and national character. However, the reality seems more complicated because the percentages of positive responses in surveys from Mainland China (Beijing & Shanghai) were higher than might have been expected. As for the data for China, there

may be several possible explanations. First, at face value the data indicate that the Chinese might have a higher sense of interpersonal trust. Secondly, the Chinese might have tried to show a higher sense of interpersonal trust because they are now sensitive to their international reputation such as that observed by Fukuyama. Thirdly, the questionnaire items are constructed as a trust scale for Americans, so the items used may be unsuitable for the measurement of trust in other nations. Fourthly, we must be careful about the semantics of the trust scale. For example, Dogan (2000, p.258) states "... Erosion of confidence is first of all a sign of political maturity. It is not so much that democracy has deteriorated, but rather the critical spirit of most citizens has improved. ..." This suggests that we must always be sensitive to the distinction between the face value of a scale and its semantics. In this context, trust and distrust may not be opposite in a uni-dimensional scale but, rather, they may be closely related in one's mind.

On the other hand, the translation of these items may be a problem in cross-national comparisons, particularly #2.12c. The Japanese wording of the response category "2. Can't be too careful" may be associated with a moral value such as self-discipline. This may explain the lower than expected percentage of Japanese who chose "2". (See Section 3.2)

4.1.2 Institutional Trust: trust of social institutions and systems

The questionnaire for the APVS 2004–2008 included the same item on organizational trust as used in the World Values Survey [WVS], with an additional item of trust in science and technology. The items are as follows.

Q.50 How much confidence do you have in the following? Are you very confident, somewhat confident, not confident or not confident at all? [SHOW CARD 31]

	Very Confident	Somewhat Confident	Not Confident	Not Confident At All
a. Religious organizations	1	2	3	4
b. The law and the legal system	1	2	3	4
c. The press and television	1	2	3	4
d. The police	1	2	3	4
e. National governmental bureaucracy	1	2	3	4
f. National Assembly (Congress)	1	2	3	4
g. NPO/NGO (Non-Profit and Non-Governmental Organization)	1	2	3	4
h. Social welfare facilities	1	2	3	4
i. The United Nations	1	2	3	4
j. Science and technology	1	2	3	4

Table 3 shows the sum of percentages of positive responses, that is, "1. Very confident" and "2. Somewhat confident," for each of the above items. Yoshino's (2005) analysis of

Table 3: Items on Institutional Trust from World Values Survey
 Figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1. very much confident" and "2. confident some what."

APVS	APVS										EAVS									
	2005 Beijing	2005 Shang- hai	2005 Hong Kong	2006 Taiwan	2006 USA	2006 South Korea	2007 Singa- pore	2007 Aust ralia	2008 India	2004 Japan A	2002 Japan	2002 Beijing	2002 Shang- hai	2003 Kumm ing	2002 Hang- zhou	2002 Hong Kong	2003 Taiwan	2003 South Korea	2004 Singa- pore	
Q.50a	24	32	60	66	69	46	84	48	90	15	12	20	29	24	24	59	64	49	82	
Q.50b	84	86	87	63	79	57	96	72	90	79	74	82	92	78	80	86	65	59	93	
Q.50c	61	66	46	32	44	59	81	32	82	74	74	57	71	55	60	41	37	60	82	
Q.50d	72	77	78	57	80	50	95	83	64	69	64	71	74	64	73	75	50	49	93	
Q.50e	81	85	63	42	45	29	92	46	58	41	41	84	88	71	81	56	42	30	89	
Q.50f	82	86	61	25	51	11	90	51	64	32	34	85	87	72	82	55	30	14	86	
Q.50g	40	46	64	40	65	31	70	74	69	45	55	36	53	39	48	59	38	41	76	
Q.50h	73	74	81	56	62	59	78	74	83	70	68	70	80	61	69	77	52	62	84	
Q.50i	59	59	65	46	55	58	74	59	75	56	62	59	62	45	56	63	50	50	71	
Q50j	96	94	88	73	87	75	93	88	93	76	73	97	97	95	90	84	76	78	87	

*1 Q.50j was added to the original 9 items on the WVS.

the same items in the EAVS was consistent with the present analysis for countries (areas) studied in both surveys.

In his cross-national analysis of institutional trust, Yoshino (2005) transformed those response data into standardized scores country by country to minimize the effects of general response tendencies particular to individual countries. Here I use a much easier way to reduce general response tendencies in countries. First, I re-categorize the original response categories to sum up the percentage of responses to positive categories ("1" & "2"). Secondly, I compare the percentages of positive responses item by item in each country. This yields a rank order of items in each country. Thirdly, I compare the rank orders of all countries (areas) involved. This procedure results in loss of some information from the original data, but provides more cross-national comparability. This is a trade-off that we have to make in order to secure cross-national comparability beyond a simple comparison of face values of the original data.

Table 3 includes data from both the APVS (2004–2008) and EAVS (2002–2005). I found consistent patterns in the countries (areas) participating in both surveys. For example, the item-by-item differences in percentages between the Japanese surveys in 2002 (EAVS) and 2004 (APVS) were within the margin of sampling error. The maximum difference was for NPO/NGO, i.e., 10%. Roughly the stability of data was confirmed. (I am not sure that in reality the decrease of 10% during the two years is significant at this point in the research. But it may be a result of the fact that activities of NPO/NGO have been increasing whereas some people disguised their groups as NPO/NGO to manage illegal businesses, which was one of the reasons that the Japanese laws on registered organizations are under substantial revisions.)

Except for India, Hong Kong, Taiwan, USA and Singapore, in all of the countries (areas) there was a low degree of confidence in religious organizations. Even in these five countries (areas), the relative degrees of confidence were not very high when compared with all of the other items for each country, except for India. Japan and Mainland China indicated remarkably negative attitudes towards religious organizations (The percent of positive responses among Japanese was lower than among Chinese.). Of the 10 items on Q.50, the percent of positive responses was lowest for religious organization among Chinese. It is known that most Japanese respect religions or the "religious heart/mind" even when they do not have a religious faith (see Hayashi in this issue), but they may be cautious about "religious organizations" because some religious groups such as the Ahm Shinri-Kyo (Aum religious cult) have caused serious problems. In China, the government has been very sensitive toward religious groups because in the long history of China occasionally religious groups have overthrown governments. In some countries, some religious groups might be considered closely linked to terrorism.

The percentages of responses that show confidence in authority such as the "police," "government" and "congress" may represent various patterns of attitudes, probably those concerning democracy. In this sense, a negative attitude does not necessarily mean negation of such authority and it may express a mature democracy as Dogan (2002) suggested. However, the percentage of negative responses may not be proportional to the degree of political maturity.

Singapore respondents indicated very high confidence in most of the items, but lower confidence in the UN. This response pattern might be related to a negative attitude towards global politics mainly led by Western nations.

As for the item on trust in science and technology, all the countries (areas) showed high confidence. Hayashi (1993) and Zheng & Yoshino (2001) have already presented cross-national analyses of data on science and technology from our seven-country survey. Hayashi concluded that the Japanese generally had positive attitudes toward science. However, they were negative regarding scientific approaches towards the understanding of the human heart and mind ("kokoro" in Japanese), solving social and economic problems, and the possibility of living in space stations in the near future (at the time of the survey in the 1980s). The response pattern of West Germans in 1987 was similar to that of Japanese in the sense that they were also more negative about science and technology than those in other Western countries. However, they were not as negative toward the contributions of science and technology to social problems as well as psychological problems of individuals as were the Japanese. These responses might remind us that the theories of Hegel and Marx and the scientific psychological theories of Freud originated in Germany and Austria.

As for data from the APVS, all of the countries (areas) were highly positive toward science and technology, with rates of positivity for that item highest among all items. In particular, the rates for Mainland China were remarkably close to 100% in both the APVS and EAVS. There may be several possible explanations for this. On one hand, the high rates may represent the fact that in the past decade China has been emphasizing the scientific reformation of governmental sections, military systems, and social systems as a priority in their social planning. On the other hand, until recently they have not paid much attention to the negative impact of science and technology that advanced industrial countries have experienced in the past. This is probably because they placed priority on economic development in the past two decades or so. This may explain the overly positive attitudes. After the Beijing Olympics in 2008 or even slightly before it, the Chinese government started paying some attention to the negative side of rapid economic and industrial development and began planning to improve environmental conditions, including air and water pollution, as well as giving attention to political issues such as the social gaps between urban and rural areas.

As a final comment in this section, it should be noted that Sasaki and Suzuki (2000, Ch.11) concluded in their study on trust in science and technology that "a single scale is not adequate to measure people's sense of trust in science and technology because people's attitudes differ from one issue to another within the fields of science and technology." Probably this is applicable to our study on people's sense of trust in general.

4.1.3 Basic Social Values

In this section, I show some data concerning people's basic social values: attitudes towards Confucian teachings, evaluations of degree of importance of various areas of daily life, and choices of Oriental versus Western values.

First, Table 4 shows the response distributions with regard to Confucian teachings of

Table 4: Confucian Teachings of the Asia-Pacific Values Survey (2004-08) & the East Asia Values Survey (2002-05)
 Figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1. strongly agree" & "2. agree to some extent". (Note: In USA, 2006 & Singapore 2007 surveys, the word "follow" was used in Q.9c and Q.9e by mistranslation.)

Survey Year	2005		2006		2007		2008			
	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore	Japan A	Australia	USA	India
Q.9a We should respect our ancestors	96	97	99	98	84	96	91	96	96	100
Q.9b The eldest son should look after his aging parents	70	61	76	66	45	55	32	44	45	77
Q.9c A wife should obey (follow) her husband	21	20	41	45	60	60	36	29	52	82
Q.9d Not to marry someone whom your parents object to	7	12	7	11	44	28	27	18	37	76
Q.9e We should obey (follow) older people	43	50	54	66	72	51	54	44	56	96
Q.9f It is important to have a son to keep the family line going	21	25	34	39	34	43	30	35	45	74
Q.9g Men should work outside and woman should tend to housekeeping	21	20	29	40	26	28	26	15	17	56

2002	2003		2004		2003		2004		2002	
	Beijing	Shanghai	Kunming	Hang-zhou	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore	Japan	Japan
96	97	93	94	97	100	88	96	92	92	92
50	51	51	59	64	67	45	41	31	31	31
12	11	15	14	40	55	64	65	32	32	32
3	6	5	6	7	18	32	25	22	22	22
37	40	30	32	49	68	62	46	43	43	43
15	11	15	17	30	53	41	42	28	28	28
12	14	16	12	25	46	35	29	23	23	23

2006 Taiwan		2004 Singapore			2007 Singapore				
Native Taiwanese	Chinese mainlanders	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Others	Chinese	Malay	Indian	Others
98	96	96	94	98	96	96	94	96	94
65	70	38	54	51	44	51	66	80	63
44	50	61	83	72	63	56	81	68	66
12	9	18	44	49	37	24	40	40	28
67	48	40	65	70	70	45	69	69	63
40	35	40	55	46	48	41	51	41	47
40	37	27	39	24	33	27	31	26	28

the APVS. The question asked is as follows.

Q.9. "How do you feel about each of the following traditional values?" (The response categories are "strongly agree," "agree to some extent," "disagree to some extent," and "disagree strongly.")

- a. We should respect our ancestors.
- b. The eldest son should look after his aging parents.
- c. A wife should obey (follow) her husband.
- d. Not to marry someone whom your parents object to.
- e. We should obey (follow) older people.
- f. It is important to have a son to keep the family line going.
- g. Men should work outside the home and woman should tend to housekeeping.

The results were consistent for the countries (areas) surveyed in both APVS and EAVS (Yoshino, 2005b). One may notice that the percentages of positive choices in the USA are larger than those of the Asian countries for some items. It could not be that Americans are more influenced by Confucian teachings than people in Asian countries, so we may confirm that the Asian countries have already departed from the literal teachings of Confucian philosophy, as mentioned in Yoshino (2005b)⁴.

More detailed analyses, however, show that there are national differences between, for example, China, Korea and Japan, as well as gender and age differences (see Zheng, 2005, for the analysis of the EAVS.). The Confucian philosophy originated in China around the fifth or sixth century B.C., but it has had a greater influence in Korea than in China since the end of 14th century A.D. It had a limited influence on the dominant class in Japan only in the Edo era ("samurai era" of 17–19 centuries). These historical differences may have led to national differences in response distributions of those items. On the other hand, under the present conditions people cannot follow the Confucian teaching literally. For example, one of the most significant issues is that the number of children is decreasing in almost all countries in East Asia. This will be a serious problem in the near future for the maintenance of social systems concerning health care and financial support. This naturally makes it difficult for elderly parents to be completely taken care of by their children, not to mention "by the eldest son."

In addition, it may be worthwhile to note that the unexpected combination of Confucian teachings and advanced medical technology has caused an ethics crisis in South Korea and Taiwan. As seen in the sentences of "b" and "f" of Q.9, there has been strong social pressure on women to bear a son under Confucian teaching, so wives had a hard time when they did not bear a son. In some cases, they adopted a boy from their relatives. Modern medicine has made it possible to bear a child by a "surrogate mother." As a result, in several cases rich Korean parents did not honor their responsibility to take care

⁴ A mistranslation was introduced by the survey company in the USA: "obey" should have been used in "c" and "e" where "follow" was used. But this mistake itself may show a lack of understanding concerning Confucian teachings in the USA. The mistranslation was left in the USA 2006 survey and Singapore 2007, but was corrected in the surveys of Australia 2007 and India 2008.

of the baby when they found that surrogate mothers (occasionally poor Chinese women) were to give birth to female babies. Another problem may be an unbalanced ratio of males and females in South Korea. This may be another piece of evidence against the “utility” of modern medicine without new ethics that are suitable to the time of modern science.

(Incidentally, adoption of children is different between Japan, China and Korea: the Japanese may adopt a child even if there is no blood relationship between the child and the parents, whereas the Chinese and Koreans adopt a child from among their relatives whenever possible.)

Next I show the response distributions of importance of various areas in daily life, which was used in the study of RPR in Section 2. Table 5 shows for each item and each country (area) the sum of percentages of positive categories 5, 6, and 7.

In all the countries (areas) we have surveyed, the degree of importance of “immediate family” was the highest among various aspects of daily life. The degree of importance of “relatives” was the second highest, but it may show variations compared to those of “immediate family”: the percentages of positive categories for relatives were closer to those of “immediate family” for Asian people as well as Japanese immigrants than for Western people (except Italians). These findings may be closely linked to national character. Thus we confirmed that all people think that the family and relatives are important among other aspects of daily life, disregarding differences between the East and the West.

As to the third highest choice, the percentages selecting “career,” “friends” and “free time” varied among countries. This seems related to economic conditions more than national character, so the percentages may vary more over time.

The seven country survey, EAVS, and APVS included the following item which asks respondents to choose two response categories from the four presented: two Oriental principles and two Western principles.

Q.33 [SHOW CARD 22] If you were asked to choose the two most important items listed on the card, which two would you choose? (Select two)

	<u>Selected</u>	<u>Not Selected</u>
a. Filial piety/ Love and respect for parents	1	2
b. Repaying people who have helped you in the past	1	2
c. Respect for the rights of the individual	1	2
d. Respect for the freedom of the individual	1	2

Six possible pairs can be selected among the four items. Table 6 shows the percentages of the selection of each of the possible pairs in the seven country survey and APVS⁵). Some countries, such as Japan and the USA, were surveyed in both the seven country survey and the APVS. The patterns selected in Japan are fairly consistent while those of the USA differ slightly. (The 1988 Japan survey and the 2004 Japan survey used the same sampling methods and field work company. For the 1988 USA survey and the 2006 USA

⁵) The patterns for EAVS and APVS are almost the same for the countries (areas) surveyed in both EAVS and APVS. See Yoshino [2005b] for further information.

Table 5: Degrees of Importance of Aspects of Daily Life
 Figures show the sum of percentages of positive categories 5, 6 & 7 in the 7-point scale.

APVS*	2004	2005	2005	2006	2006	2007	2008	2007	2006
	Japan A	Beijing	Shanghai	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore	India	Australia	USA
Q.18a Family	93	92	92	97	97	96	96	92	91
Q.18b Career	72	77	85	89	96	86	93	66	77
Q.18c Free time	70	59	69	85	94	87	68	80	82
Q.18d Friends	81	67	80	80	91	86	82	83	88
Q.18e Relatives	89	89	89	90	96	97	93	89	93
Q.18f Religion	21	14	28	31	47	69	81	36	68
Q.18g Politics	49	43	51	23	43	39	37	29	35

EAVS**	2002	2002	2002	2003	2002	2002	2003	2003	2004
	Japan	Beijing	Shanghai	Kimming	Hangzhou	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore
Q.18a Family	94	95	98	93	95	94	97	97	95
Q.18b Career	78	87	91	84	90	81	88	95	81
Q.18c Free time	77	68	74	70	78	74	84	93	88
Q.18d Friends	85	76	82	77	84	76	76	93	88
Q.18e Relatives	92	91	94	91	94	92	94	97	97
Q.18f Religion	24	11	18	17	24	28	43	49	72
Q.18g Politics	48	41	44	46	45	20	22	45	37

7 Country Survey	1988	1987	1987	1987	1987	1992	1993
	Japan-A	Japan-B	FRA	UK	FRG	ITA	HOL
Q.18a Family	95	94	93	96	87	98	94
Q.18b Career	85	83	85	57	51	75	62
Q.18c Free time	76	78	73	66	83	70	83
Q.18d Friends	87	85	73	76	84	80	88
Q.18e Relatives	91	91	83	83	81	93	86
Q.18f Religion	38	37	35	36	38	64	33
Q.18g Politics	54	53	23	26	40	28	32

Japanese Americans	1999	1988	1988	1991
	Japanese Americans	Hawaii	Non-Japanese	BRZ JB
	99	94	94	94
	66	77	73	80
	80	80	78	75
	91	83	87	80
	97	88	94	85
	58	55	61	58
	34	31	39	39

Japanese Brazilians	1988	1998	1991
	USA	JAWCS	BRZ JB
	98	93	94
	65	74	95
	74	83	63
	83	92	87
	90	96	96
	76	47	74
	46	26	49

* Asia-Pacific Values Survey

** East Asia Values Survey

survey, the fieldwork companies were different; the former used random-walk sampling and the latter used quota sampling based on age, gender and race.)

In all countries (areas) in Asia, the first choice was pair “a. Filial piety/Love and respect for parents” and “b. Repaying people who have helped you in the past.” On the other hand, even in Western countries, the choice of pair “c. the rights of individuals” and “d. the right of freedom” was not a majority choice. Only in France and West Germany (in 1988, i.e., before the unification) was the rate of selection of that pair higher than in the other countries, but at most it was 30% or so.

For all countries, “a. Filial piety/ Love and respect for parents” was the first choice; this is consistent with the previous observation from data in Table 4. That is, the degrees of importance of immediate family and relatives were the highest and the second highest, respectively, in all countries (areas). Throughout human history, “family and relatives” has formed the core for survival, whereas political human rights, such as rights of individuals or the right of freedom appeared only recently, although no one would deny the importance of human rights. Probably family and relatives are universally valued in both East and West, whereas rights of individuals and the right of freedom originated in the “modern west.” Thus, they may be differently viewed in the current political system of each country. This may mean that each country has its own way to develop democracy as well as economic prosperity; therefore, no country should impose its particular version on other countries but respect the others’ ways.

Table 6: Rates of Selection of Two Items from a List of Four Items

A (filial piety), B (pay back to a benefactor), C (rights of individuals), & D (right of freedom)

APVS	USA'06	Japan'04	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	Singapore	India	Australia
A&B	26	48	55	58	44	53	51	45	34	16
A&C	23	12	19	18	14	17	18	30	23	31
A&D	11	15	13	12	26	12	15	12	11	12
B&C	12	8	5	4	3	5	7	6	2	8
B&D	7	12	4	3	7	7	6	3	2	4
C&D	22	8	5	4	7	6	4	4	1	25

7 Country Survey	USA'88	Japan'88	Italy	France	W.Germany	Holland	UK
A&B	20	47	24	20	9	12	32
A&C	40	14	30	14	28	30	20
A&D	13	20	26	20	19	26	13
B&C	6	5	4	8	4	3	11
B&D	3	7	3	11	3	1	8
C&D	20	8	14	27	37	28	16

5. Sense of Trust among Japanese Immigrants and Multi-Ethnic Differences

First, I show more details of the survey data on Japanese immigrants in Hawaii (Yoshino [ed.], 2001b), Brazil (Yamamoto & Hayashi [ed.], 1993), and the U.S. West Coast (Yoshino [ed.], 2000, 2001a) to observe differences in regions or generations. Secondly, I study ethnic

differences (the Chinese, Malay and Indians) in Singapore in interpersonal trust. Thirdly, I compare native Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders in Taiwan.

Some analyses of our past surveys have already clarified similarities and dissimilarities between Japanese living in Japan and Japanese immigrants abroad. First, the Japanese tendency to avoid polar response categories and to prefer intermediate response categories in a questionnaire survey (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997) is not necessarily transmitted among Japanese immigrants in the same way (Hayashi et al., 1998, p.388). There are some variations in this tendency due to the social context of the host country. For example, immigrants need to make clear their intentions in order to communicate successfully in their host countries such as the USA (mainland). Otherwise they would be unable to get along with others as well as to protect their rights.

Secondly, we found that the Japanese style of interpersonal attitudes (Giri-Ninjo attitudes) or religious attitudes was preserved in immigrant Issei and Nisei (first & second generations) in the USA. The third generation and younger generations seem to have become more adapted to the country where they were born and now live. These observations have been explained by Hayashi (1993), Yamaoka (2000, Fig. 4 & Table 3), and Yoshino (2000, p.197; 2001b, p.52; 2002).

Here I reexamine those observations on the sense of trust among Japanese immigrants in Brazil, Hawaii, and the U.S. West Coast with results from our recent survey and analyses.

Generally, Brazilian Japanese showed a much lower degree of sense of trust for each of the three items (#2.12a, #2.12b, #2.12c) than most respondents in the seven countries mentioned in Section 4.1.1 (see also Hayashi et al., 1993, p.435). Furthermore, an even lower degree of trust was found in the third or younger generation than in the first and second generations⁶. As a whole, the pattern of sense of trust in Brazil appeared close to that of France (1987 survey) and Italy (1992 survey). As for the immigrants in Hawaii and the West Coast, they showed higher degrees of a sense of trust than most respondents in the seven countries, including Japan and the USA. (Unfortunately, the survey of the U.S. West Coast Japanese immigrants did not include #2.12b.) For an understanding of the generations of Japanese immigrants in the USA, there is a frame of comparison, as Kitano (1993, ch.13) showed. Namely, the first generation (Issei) were called "Japs" and were discriminated against as immigrants from Japan. The second generation (Nisei) represents Japanese Americans who have been constantly in search of their own identity between the USA and Japan (many of them voluntarily fought in WWII as American soldiers while their parents were placed in concentration camps by the American government). The third generation or younger are simply Americans of Japanese descent.

Fig. 8 of Yoshino (2002) showed that there was no significant difference between the Japanese Americans and the non-Japanese Americans among Honolulu residents with regard to trust (#2.12a, b & c). (In Hawaii, no ethnic group is the majority and Japanese Americans comprise the largest group among the minorities, except Caucasians.) Furthermore, Fig. 9 of Yoshino (2002) provided details of the cross-ethnic comparison among Hawaii residents (several races with a small sample size, e.g., less than 20, were omitted).

⁶) We should keep in mind that the economic condition of Brazil was bad in the year of survey.

We should be careful in our conclusion because the samples for each are too small.

Time series data sets are available for the Hawaii Resident Survey. Fig. 10 of Yoshino (2002) shows longitudinal changes among Japanese residents of Hawaii in terms of trust for each generation. There was no large difference between generations in over two decades, except for some differences between Nisei and Sansei in 1988. This may be explained by the many mixtures of ethnicities in Hawaii. Also, there was little change in the sense of interpersonal trust in each generation over these two decades. (It may be worthwhile noting that those with higher education have been increasing [Yoshino, 2002, p.67]. In most countries or regions that we surveyed, age and education level turned out to be negatively correlated, with younger residents having higher education levels.)

As for Japanese Americans on the West Coast, the survey questionnaire included only two items on trust (#2.12a & #2.12c). Data for the West Coast (Fig. 1 of Yoshino, 2002) showed a large difference between generations: the older generation seemed the more trustful. This was not seen in the Hawaii data. We should be very careful when interpreting the data, because there may be several compounding factors (such as age, generation, physical conditions, economic conditions, and residential area). However, there is a difference between Japanese Americans in Hawaii and Japanese Americans on the West Coast with regard to generational differences (compare Fig. 10 with Fig. 11 in Yoshino, 2002). This may be related to differences in their concepts of ethnicity. That is, Japanese Americans in the mainland would have no problem classifying themselves as Americans of Japanese descent. On the other hand, many Hawaiian residents are of highly mixed ethnicity in this multi-ethnic society, so that their perception of ethnicity is dependent upon *how they identify themselves* in the ethnic classification. In addition, the different conditions of Japanese Americans in Hawaii and on the West Coast during WWII may have had an effect on their attitudes and social values⁷⁾.

To conclude this section, let me summarize Yoshino's (2002) analysis of the relationships between trust and economic conditions. There are different perspectives on people's sense of trust, such as the historical perspective of Fukuyama (1995) or the economic perspective of Banfield (1958). Yoshino (2002) studied some relationships between people's sense of trust and their social class or income (both self-reported variables).

As for the relationship between trust and self-reported social class in the longitudinal survey of Japanese National Character, the result was consistent with Banfield's (1958) claim. More detailed analyses on the comparative data of seven countries showed some differences between countries. For example, West Germany was remarkably different from the others: the middle category (not necessarily "middle class") of social class was less trustful than the high and low categories. The pattern in the USA was opposite that of West Germany.

There were some differences among countries in the relationship between trust and self-reported income. For Britain and the USA, trust was almost linearly related to income categories: the higher the income, the more trustful. West Germany and Japan did not

⁷⁾ In Hawaii, there was no concentration camp, and Japanese American Nisei soldiers did not have as much emotional conflict with their Japanese parents. For more details, see Dowds, 1986; Kashima, 2003; Fugita & Fernandez, 2004; Miyamoto, 1984.

follow that pattern. Italy and France showed a much lower relationship of trust with social class and with income. Throughout all social classes, Italians consistently indicated the lowest degree of trust whereas in France social class was linearly related to trust. As to income, both Italy and France had a significant linear relationship with the degree of trust but the relationship was less pronounced than in the cases of Britain and the USA.

For reference, the correlation coefficients (Kendall's tau) between social classes and income (both 3-point ordered categories) were 0.47 in the Netherlands, 0.36 in USA, 0.34 in Britain, 0.30 in West Germany, 0.29 in Italy, 0.28 in France, and 0.24 in Japan. These patterns of correlation may represent some differences in social structure (or national character) between countries. For example, "income" or "education" may be more directly related to "social class" in the USA than in Japan, at least before the too rapid social reform of Japan in "the lost decade." Thus we need to consider social background and institutions for a better understanding of this matter.

6. Conclusions

In this paper I have presented people's sense of trust from social survey data. As a whole, this paper has shown some differences between countries, races, and generations regarding senses of interpersonal and institutional trust as well as other social values. We need to be cautious when we interpret the results because survey data on "trust" are often a compound of many variables including economic and political factors as well as people's general response tendencies. In addition, we should consider the items that are used for measuring trust. Scales may be used to measure some important dimensions related to trust, but there may be other important dimensions of trust. That is, "sense of trust" can be considered in various contexts, such as intra-personal or interpersonal relationships, inter-social groups, transactions, or moral philosophy. Nevertheless I believe that our survey data has clarified certain aspects of the differences among several countries or social groups in terms of trust and has also clarified certain aspects of the generational differences among Japanese immigrants abroad.

First, in order to facilitate a mutual understanding between East and West, we need to pay much attention to differences in social values. The study on the scale of trust (Yoshino, 2005b, 2006) may caution us on the applicability of a certain "single" scale invented in Western cultures to Eastern cultures, or vice versa. For example, it is not always the case in Asia that "distrust is a culture of poverty" as Banfield (1958) mentioned. A Chinese proverb says that "Fine manners need a full stomach" (or "The belly has no ears"), but another says "Be contented with honest poverty." Gallup (1977, p.461) reported that in their global survey they could not find very poor but still happy people. I think that they missed well-known observations. For example, Brazilians were very optimistic even when Brazil was the worst debtor nation in the 1980s (Inkeles, 1997). Inglehart reported a correlation of 0.57 between economic development and life satisfaction for some 20 countries surveyed in 1980s (Inkeles, 1997, pp.366-371). But life satisfaction in Japan in the 1980's was lower than around 2000, although Japan was prosperous in the 1980s but struggling with the recession around 2000. Thus, we need to measure various aspects of social values

in order to understand different cultures in the age of globalization.

Secondly, it is important to note that people's negative responses do not necessarily mean that they lack a sense of trust. As Dogan (2000, p.258) mentioned, there are several positive interpretations of people's sense of distrust. For example, people may express distrust or complaint toward the government or others, not because they lack intra-personal or interpersonal trust, but because they know that it is a way to improve their own country and eventually our world in a democratic way.

Thirdly, a comment is provided for the development of the framework of CULMAN (cultural manifold analysis). The last century was the time of expansion of western civilization. In this time of globalization, I think that world leaders should be knowledgeable about world geography and history and sensitive to the conditions of all countries and nations, if they wish to take seriously their responsibility to develop and maintain world peace. Differences between cultures or civilizations occasionally prevent us from deeply understanding each other. In studying world history as well as regional histories of different cultures and civilizations, however, we should remember that there are various ways of successful social development. Thus we should not impose our own social values on any other country or nation.

Some institutional systems or customs are changing, converging towards more universal ones under the influences of transnational exchange or trade. However, other systems are becoming more sensitive to cultural differences, as a reaction to globalization.

The last two decades have shown that, at least for the foreseeable future, globalization does not lead us to a single unified global culture or a single "superculture" on the earth (cf. Yoshino, 1992)⁸). As mentioned in the introductory paper in this issue, our survey team has been developing a methodology called "Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN)" for cross-national comparisons. I think it is possible to use CULMAN to develop a framework of policy making to bring about a gradual development of, so-to-speak, a Global Cultural Manifold (GCM) (Yoshino, 2008a).

The GCM is a set of hierarchical overlapping local charts, and each chart covers a certain area (region, country, national groups, civilization, etc.). In each chart, we may assume that people share a certain culture or social values: A larger chart corresponds to a less restrictive but to a more universal culture or social values. Thus, according to the size of the chart (area, region or social group), people may be able to consider the degree of rigidity in decision-making or the extent of regulations concerning various types of exchanges (e.g., contracts in transnational business or international trade within the members in the region). The charts of GCM must be dynamic. Therefore, each chart may be enlarged, shrunken, or disappear over time. Also, a new chart may appear. The EU may exemplify the concept of GCM. I expect that East Asia and the Asia-Pacific area will be another example in the near future. However, many people doubt such unification because of their too complicated diversity of races, languages, religions as well as political systems.

Weber (1904–05) argued in his theory on religion and capitalism that Asian countries

⁸) For a detailed review of the literature on "globalization" and cultures, see Guillen, 2001, pp.252–254.

would not be able to develop capitalism. Now we know of so many counter-examples (such as Japan, Korea, NIES, and China) that go against his argument. Some people argued that the Japanese adaptation of Confucian philosophy functioned as a substitute for the Protestant ethic and led Japan to successfully develop capitalism (Morishima, 1984). But the past decades have seen many examples to show that economic success is not necessarily linked to a particular ethic, ideology, or religion. Now we have more data to consider the relationships between economic development, social systems and social values. For example, in this paper, I have shown that Asian countries have already departed from the literal teaching of Confucian philosophy. In this time of globalization, I would like to emphasize the fact that there are various ways for successful social development. Therefore, we should not impose one's own social value on any other country if we intend to develop a peaceful world.

Experiencing severe political tension in the world in the aftermath of New York on September 11, 2001, some people made use of the farfetched argument "that this is a war between civilizations or religions such as Christianity and Islam" to further their political causes. And now, after the confusion of the last several years, we have finally come to discreetly see the reality. Mr. Barack Obama, newly elected president of the USA, seems a symbol of multi-perspective thinking for the new age. He was born and educated in Hawaii, a multi-ethnic society. Kuroda (2002) described Hawaii as "Rainbow model" in terms of harmony of various social values and ways of thinking.

It is my sincere hope that mutual understanding among the various cultures and civilizations will prevent unnecessary conflicts between nations and races and will lead us to a peaceful and prosperous world in the 21st century.

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SOCIAL VALUES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

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Few studies on international politics have examined people's values, especially through use of cross-national analysis, although a country's foreign policy may reflect the values held by the public. The present paper examines results of the Asia-Pacific Values Survey and analyzes Asia-Pacific people's attitudes and values regarding international politics. Our focus is on three sets of items regarding people's attitude toward Japan, confidence in the United Nations, and ideology. First, we analyze response data for those items separately. Then, by applying Hayashi's Quantification Method III, we show that countries/areas in the Asia-Pacific region may be classified into three clusters or cultural spheres. This result presents an illustration of cultural manifold analysis (CULMAN) of international politics.

1. Introduction

What values on international politics do people have in the Asia-Pacific region? The present paper analyzes Asia-Pacific people's attitudes and values regarding international politics by using data from our Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS).

This paper deals with some of the gaps left by the literature on international politics as follows. Firstly, many past studies of international politics have mainly focused on organizations such as the state, ministries and industry as the players. Even studies on individuals have mainly examined decision-makers such as presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers. Although the foreign policy of a country may reflect the values of the ordinary people of that country, these values have rarely been examined, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

Secondly, in past studies on international politics that analyzed survey data, the main concern was with variations within countries rather than between countries (Inoguchi et al., 2008). In order to understand nations' foreign policies, however, we must investigate variations among countries as well as within countries.

Thirdly, most existing studies of people's values regarding international politics have used simple statistical methods such as regression analysis where only a single item is taken as a dependent variable. In order to understand complicated international relations, however, we may need to apply multi-dimensional pattern analysis whereby some important dimensions may be extracted to show a total picture of international relations.

The present paper analyzes Asia-Pacific nations' attitudes and values reflected in data

Key Words and Phrases: cross-national comparison, attitudes toward Japan, confidence in the United Nations, ideology, cultural manifold analysis (CULMAN)

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from our Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS) using cross tabulations and Hayashi's Quantification Method III (Hayashi, 1993). To confirm the robustness of our findings obtained by those data, we also examine data from our East Asia Values Survey (EAVS) and the Asian Barometer Survey (Inoguchi et al., 2006), whenever available.

The questionnaire used in the APVS included three sets of items on international politics. Those concerned the attitude toward Japan, confidence in an international organization (United Nations (UN)) and ideology. By analyzing response data for these items, we show that countries/areas in the Asia Pacific region may be classified into three clusters or cultural spheres.

In section 2, we give a short literature review on international politics. In section 3, we examine response data on the three sets of items on people's attitudes toward Japan, the UN, and ideology, one by one. In section 4, we apply multi-dimensional pattern analyses to the response data on the three sets of items in order to understand cross-national differences in international politics in the Asia Pacific countries/areas.

2. Literature Review

Previous studies on international politics have focused mostly on organizations such as the state, ministries and industry rather than on individuals. Waltz (1959, 1979) argued that in explaining international politics, especially causes of war, there are three levels of analysis: international system, state, and individual¹). Among the three levels, he emphasized the importance of the international system. Beginning around 1990, a growing number of studies have focused on the state level. The democratic peace theory, arguing that democratic countries do not go to war with each other, is one of the most prevailing arguments based on the state level (Russett 1993, Fearon 1994). On the other hand, although some studies have explored factors related to individuals, they have been concerned mainly with decision-makers such as presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers rather than with the public.

Thus, few studies on foreign policy have focused on the public, especially in cross-national analyses, although policies of a democratic country, even those on foreign policy, may be expected to reflect values held by the public. Nevertheless, few studies have been based on data from social surveys (public opinion polls) (e.g., Chang & Park [2007] and Inoguchi et al. [2008] for analyses of social survey data on domestic politics in the Asia-Pacific region). As an exception, one can name studies on trade policy using survey data such as the ISSP Survey and World Value Survey (e.g., Mayda & Rodrik 2005; Beaulieu 2002; Gabel 1998; Baker 2003; Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006). They, however, focus on attitudes toward trade policy, and most do not examine Asian nations.

In a study of people's values concerning international politics in the Asia-Pacific region, Johnson (2007) argued that the peoples' attitude toward an international organization,

¹) Morgenthau (1978), in one of the most important classics in the literature on international politics, touches on the effect of national character on foreign policy in chapter 9. For instance, he describes German national character as representing collectivism, which led to dictatorship and facilitated the mobilization of national resources for war.

the World Bank, was closely linked with their attitude toward the U.S. In examining this relationship, she employed regression analysis to explore individual-level phenomena. Similarly, Inoguchi (2003) analyzed confidence in domestic and international organizations mainly at individual levels.

On the other hand, our main interest in analyzing peoples' values is on the nation level. This is because we think that understanding variations in foreign policy between countries requires analysis of variations in values between nations more than variations within nations.

3. Public Attitudes towards Japan, the UN and Ideology

In this section, we examine the public attitude toward Japan, the UN, and ideology in Asia-Pacific nations one by one.

3.1 Attitude toward Japan

There is a common stereotype that Chinese and South Koreans have negative attitudes toward Japan. In fact, in Japan, a number of books have been published with titles of "anti-Japan (han-nichi)". Also, this stereotype was strengthened by the occurrence of a skirmish between Chinese and Japanese spectators during an international soccer game held in China, for instance. We analyze this stereotype from viewpoints that are different from the usual.

The APVS includes two items regarding the attitude toward Japan, Q.2 and Q.3.

Q.2 Which one of the following countries or regions would you like to see develop the friendliest relationship for our own national interest?

With regard to a simple tabulation of responses to Q.2 and Q.3, see p.141 of Yoshino (2008). Since Q.2 uses the concept "national interest," respondents were supposed to give the answer that reflected their attitude toward foreign countries in terms of a diplomatic relationship, at least to some extent. From what country/area did respondents consider Japan as the most important diplomatic partner for their country? Table 1 shows dichotomization of responses into the categories "Japan" and "Others," meaning other countries or areas.

Table 1: Rates of Choice of Japan or Another Nations (Q.2 Development of Friendliest Relationship)

Survey Country and Area \ Response Category	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	USA	Singapore	Australia	Total
"Japan"	3%	7%	8%	13%	3%	12%	7%	9%	7%
"Other"	97%	93%	92%	87%	97%	88%	93%	91%	93%

Data rounded off to integral numbers.

Even though the largest percentage for the choice of Japan was not very high, 13%, there was considerable variation in percentages of those who selected Japan. People in Taiwan, the U.S., and Australia relatively regarded the relationship with Japan as important, whereas people in Beijing and South Korea did not. The differences in the percentages of the choice of Japan among cities in China (Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong) should be noted. The percentage was lowest in Beijing, the center of politics. The response patterns described here are consistent with those of the EAVS.

Fig. 1 shows which country/area people in the respondent countries/areas selected as desiring the friendliest relationship for national interest. The figure does not include Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong because of differences in choice categories: those respondents cannot choose "China" (their own country) in the question.




Figure 1: Desiring Friendliest Relations for National Interest (Q.2)

As shown in Fig. 1, for the people in Taiwan and Australia, Japan is the third and fourth choice, respectively. The percentage of the choice of Japan by these nations was about half to a third of that for the choice of China. For people in the U.S., the percentage for the choice of Japan was about a third of that for the choice of China and exactly the same as for the choice of South Korea. These results suggest that Japan's influence on international politics is limited even in the Asia-Pacific region.

Fig. 2 shows variations in the percentages of the choice of Japan among age groups, which may show the attitudes of people from these countries/areas toward Japan from the viewpoint of age. Few people in Beijing and Shanghai selected Japan, regardless of age. In contrast, in Taiwan, about 16% of people under 30 years old chose Japan, which was the largest percentage among all age groups or countries/regions surveyed. In Hong Kong and Singapore, more responders under 30 years of age chose Japan than those of other age groups (15.7% and 12.7%, respectively). Because almost all of these tendencies in East Asia countries or areas were observed in EAVS also, these results may be considered robust.

Here, we do not give details of rates for those in age groups that chose countries other

than Japan. See Yoshino [2007], and Yoshino & Matsumoto [2008]. However, in the U.S., younger people chose Japan or Australia more than older people. The percentage of people under 40 years old in the U.S. that chose Japan or Australia exceeded the percentage of those who chose the European Union. In addition, China is the country most frequently chosen by those surveyed in the U.S. These findings suggest that Americans have come to think that the Asia Pacific region is more important than the European Union. A greater percentage of Australians under the age of 50 years chose Japan than those aged 50 or older. In contrast to Australian current foreign policy, the younger the respondent, the fewer who selected China. Among people under 30 years old, a lower percentage chose China than the U.S. or the European Union.

Overall, although the percentage of people who selected Japan in Q.2 is low, younger rather than older people chose Japan in the Asia Pacific nations. This may imply that although the relative national power of Japan might decline from now on in terms of the economy, its influence in international politics might not. As Nye (2005) argues, people might not think that materialistic power is the only source of a country's influence.




Figure 2: Rates of Choice of Japan for National Interest According to Age Group (Q.2)

Next, we analyze response distribution of Q.3 as follows.

Q.3 If you could be born again, which one of the following Asian or Pacific countries or area(s) would you like be born in, with the exception of (your own country or area)?

Although Q.2 is a sort of stereotyped question to induce stereotyped responses, Q.3 is supposed to reveal respondents' actual opinions of certain countries/regions from a different point of view. Fig. 3 shows that Japan is the first choice among Taiwanese and Australians. More than half of responders in Taiwan selected Japan and about one quarter in Australia and Hong Kong selected Japan. South Korea's first choice was Japan in the EAVS, but in the APVS its first choice was Australia and its second choice was Japan. This difference is due to differences in response categories, as the EAVS does not include the choice of Australia, which was the first choice in the APVS for most of the




Figure 3: Rates of Countries/Areas Respondents Preferred to be Born In (Q.3)
Please note the difference in categories between Figure 1 and Figure 3




Figure 4: Rates of Choice of Japan to be Born In (Q.3)

countries/areas.

Overall, the responses to Q.3 indicate that the stereotyped “anti-Japan” attitudes of Korea and China may have become reduced.

Fig. 4 shows percentages according to age group of respondents for the choice of Japan as the preferred birth country with the exception of their own country (Q.3). Except for Beijing, Shanghai, and the U.S., the younger generation seemed more positive toward Japan.

Fig. 5 shows variations in attitudes toward Japan and China as defined by responses to Q.2 and Q.3. with respect to age groups. Variations between an older age group (40 years or more) and a younger age group (under 40 years) were very clear. Both in responses to Q.2 and Q.3, the younger generation in the surveyed countries/areas seems more positive toward Japan. Because here we use Fig. 5 to compare attitudes toward Japan and those toward Mainland China, it does not include response data from Japan,

Beijing and Shanghai. (In the Hong Kong survey, there was no choice of “China” in Q.2. See Yoshino [2005c] and Yoshino [2006] for the details.) In contrast, in response to Q.2, the younger generation was the less positive toward China with the exception of South Korea. Responses to Q.3 indicated that the younger generation was less positive toward China with the exception of Australia and the USA.




Figure 5: Variations in the attitude toward Japan and China between age groups

In summary, people in the Asia Pacific countries/areas do not seem to consider Japan as diplomatically important (Q.2). However, people in countries/areas in the Asia Pacific region showed a much more positive attitude toward Japan when asked by way of Q.3. Even China and South Korea showed much less “anti-Japanese” attitudes than in Q.2. Moreover, more people in younger age groups have positive attitudes toward Japan than those in older age groups.

3.2 Confidence in the United Nations

In the literature on international politics, in many studies it has been argued that international organizations promote stability in international politics (e.g., Keohane 1984;

Chayes and Chayes 1998; Russett & Oneal 2001; Dorussen & Ward 2008). The function of international organizations, however, must depend on member countries' support, which eventually depends on peoples' support within the member countries. The APVS includes an item about confidence in social institutions such as the UN, the most important international security organization in the sense that it has the authority to decide whether and how international society should deal with an incident such as North Korea's nuclear tests. The item is as follows.

Q.50 How much confidence do you have in the following? Are you very confident, somewhat confident, not confident, or not confident at all?

i. The United Nations

(There are other sub-items but these are omitted here.)

A scholar of international politics may form a hypothesis on this item. The hypothesis might be that people in major powers, in terms of the military and the economy, are less confident of international organizations. This is because, generally, major powers do not prefer international organizations. Without an international organization, countries would have to bargain to decide how to cooperate every time a problem emerges. Results of bargaining tend to favor major powers due to their bargaining power. In contrast, with an international organization, countries are supposed to cooperate according to the rules decided upon through the international organization *ex ante*, where the bargaining power of major powers is useless (e.g., Mearsheimer 1994). Accordingly, people in major powers are thought not to prefer international organizations that restrain the use of bargaining power.

With regard to the simple tabulation of responses to Q.50, please see page 141 of Yoshino (2008). Table 2 shows the response distribution of confidence in the UN. In the table, the responses "very confident" and "somewhat confident" are merged as a positive response "Confident," and the responses "not confident" and "not confident at all" are merged as the negative response "Not Confident." More people in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore seem to trust the UN than in Taiwan, South Korea and the U.S., although the majority in each country/area revealed a positive attitude. The pattern is consistent with that of the EAVS. We, however, should be careful in taking this result at face value. As Yoshino (2005b) made it clear, it is possible that there is variation among countries/areas in the general tendency of people to express confidence in organizations.

While Table 2 shows that Singaporeans were more confident in the UN than people in any other countries/areas, Table 3 shows that the percentage of Singaporeans that expressed confidence in the UN was lower than for most of the other organizations listed.

Table 2: Confidence in the United Nations (% within countries and areas) (Q.50)

	Japan	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	USA	Singapore	Australia	Total
Confident	65%	62%	70%	68%	53%	61%	57%	78%	62%	65%
Not Confident	35%	38%	31%	32%	47%	39%	43%	22%	39%	35%

Data rounded off to be integral numbers.

Table 3: Standardized Score within Each Country or Area (Q.50)

	Japan	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	Korea	USA	Singapore	Australia
Religious Organizations	-2.03	-1.86	-1.97	-0.68	0.56	-0.38	0.18	-0.23	-0.82
The Law and the Legal system	0.77	0.77	0.79	0.99	0.37	0.10	0.69	1.07	0.29
The Press and Television	0.49	-0.25	-0.31	-1.71	-1.37	0.21	-1.40	-0.51	-1.67
The Police	0.25	0.23	0.19	0.36	-0.02	-0.24	0.73	0.91	0.81
National Government Bureaucracy	-0.89	0.70	0.83	-0.48	-0.77	-1.31	-1.30	0.70	-0.91
National Assembly (Congress)	1.32	1.41	1.28	1.64	2.11	2.16	1.76	1.23	1.57
Non-Governmental Organization	-0.45	-1.11	-0.93	-0.42	-0.75	-1.10	0.05	-1.53	0.51
Social Welfare Facilities	0.47	0.32	0.32	0.58	0.12	0.25	-0.20	-0.74	0.44
The United Nations	0.07	-0.21	-0.20	-0.26	-0.26	0.30	-0.60	-0.91	-0.22

Considering general response tendency, we take the percentage of responses "very confident" and "somewhat confident" to all the responses except "Don't Know." Then, we transform the percentage into a standardized score within each country (average: 0.00, Standard deviation: 1.00).

In contrast, South Koreans expressed less confidence in the UN than people in any other countries/areas except the U.S. and Taiwan (Table 2), but the percentage of South Koreans that were confident in the UN was higher than for any of the other organizations with the exception of the Diet (Table 3). Thus, one has to be careful in analyzing the data²⁾.

With regard to the U.S. and Taiwan, it might be safe to state that they are less confident in the UN than any of the other countries surveyed, as Table 2 shows. Table 3 also indicates that the percentages of those confident in the UN in both the U.S. and Taiwan are lower than the average of confidence in the other organizations listed. This low level of confidence held by the people is convincing when we think of international political history. The U.S.'s distrust towards the UN may be reflected by its repeated nonpayment of UN dues. In addition, because Taiwan lost its UN membership to the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971, Taiwan naturally has little confidence in the UN.

Overall, the result does not necessarily support the previously mentioned hypothesis drawn from the literature on international politics. Low confidence held by the Americans can be understood by the hypothesis. However, the possibility of high confidence held by Shanghai and low confidence by South Korea are contradictory to the hypothesis. There are at least two possible reasons why the hypothesis fails. First, the attitude toward the UN held by the governments may be different from that held by the public. Secondly, determinants of that attitude are not only based on international factors but on domestic

²⁾ Asian-Barometer Survey data (2006; question 29) also shows that, relatively speaking, Singaporeans trust the UN whereas South Koreans and Taiwanese do not.

factors. The considerable variation in the attitude among the cities in China (Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong) may illustrate this³⁾.

3.3 Ideology

In this subsection, we analyze some items on ideology, which must be related to attitudes toward Japan and confidence in the UN. It is well known that xenophobia is related to ideology. Further, a governmental party's ideology must be one of the strongest factors that determine, e.g., whether the country prioritizes a bilateral relationship or multilateral relationships through international organizations⁴⁾. The APVS included two items related to ideology, Q.26 and Q.30 as follows.

Q.26 Some people say that if we get outstanding political leaders, the best way to improve the country is for the people to leave everything to them rather than for the people to discuss things among themselves. Do you agree with this, or disagree?
 1. Agree, 2. Disagree, 3. Undecided

Fig. 6 shows the response distribution of "disagree" in five age groups. The percentages of those selecting "disagree" were lower in Beijing, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea than in Japan, the U.S., and Australia.

This pattern might remind you of Huntington (1999): People in countries democratized earlier (in the first and second wave of democracy) disagree more than people in countries democratized later (in the third wave of democracy). Fig. 6 is consistent with this argument. According to Miyake's analysis of our Seven Country Survey (Hayashi et al., 1998, ch.7), however, the percentages of those disagreeing in France and Italy were




Figure 6: Percentages of "disagree" to Q.26 (APVS)

³⁾ Similar variation among the cities in China is observed in EAVS.

⁴⁾ Recall recent foreign policies of the U.S., Australia, and Japan. The left parties in these countries emphasized the importance of international organization whereas the right parties prioritized bilateral relationships.




Figure 7: Percentages of "disagree" to Q.17 (EAVS)

46% and 37%, respectively. The percentage for Italy was lower than those of Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. It might be, thus, misleading to associate responses to this question directly to people's attitudes toward democracy.

Hayashi (1992) showed in the Japanese National Character Survey that younger Japanese disagree more than older Japanese. He concluded that this was due to neither a cohort-effect nor time-effect but to an age-effect. Miyake also found that among seven countries (our Seven Country Survey), the percentages of responses of "disagree" were lower for older people in all countries but the U.S.

As for age differences in percentage of "disagree" responses among Asia-Pacific countries/areas, we should note several points in Fig. 6. Firstly, not only was there no age difference in percentage of "disagree" responses among U.S. responders but also among those from Australia. Secondly, as for Japan, the age difference seems missing in both the APVS and EAVS (Fig. 7). We should note that most of the Japanese respondents in both surveys were born after World War II. Thirdly, in Beijing, where political control must be severe⁵⁾, the majority of people under 40 years old selected "disagree." (The percentage of "disagree" in Beijing was lower in the EAVS, but it was still about 40%⁶⁾.)

The APVS included another item on ideology, Q.30, as follows.

Q.30 Please choose from among the following statements the one with which you agree most.

1. If individuals are made happy, then and only then will the country as a whole im-

⁵⁾ Chinese government is still sensitive to concepts such as democratization and human rights. When North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) executed bombing of Serbia in 1999 for a humanitarian purpose, the Chinese government condemned NATO for "new interventionism." It took a similar attitude toward the Myanmar problem.

⁶⁾ One reason why the percentage was high among young people in Beijing may be that the proportion of the sample with high education was very high. Of 273 respondents under 30 years old in Beijing, 199 were classified into the higher education category (university/college or graduate school).

prove.

2. If the country as a whole improves, then and only then can individuals be made happy.
3. Improving the country and making individuals happy are the same thing.

This item is related to ideology in terms of individualism or collectivism. Table 4 shows that Japan, South Korea, the U.S., Singapore, and Australia prioritize individuals whereas Beijing and Shanghai prioritize country. The percentages of selection of "If the country as a whole improves, then and only then can individuals be made happy" by responders from Beijing and Shanghai was high (46% and 54%, respectively). Although a former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, is one of the political leaders who emphasized "Asian values," which prioritizes group interests over individual interests, current Singaporeans do not seem to hold "Asian values." The percentage of Singaporeans who prioritize country (34%) was even less than that of Americans (36%).

Table 4: Prioritizing Individual or Country (Q.30)

	Japan	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	South Korea	USA	Singapore	Australia	Total
1. Individual	27%	5%	12%	8%	13%	38%	33%	26%	33%	21%
2. Country	25%	46%	54%	23%	29%	28%	36%	34%	26%	34%
3. Same	48%	50%	34%	69%	59%	34%	32%	40%	41%	45%

Data rounded off to integral numbers.

4. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

In the previous sections, we analyzed response data item by item. In this section, in order to grasp the total picture of cross-national comparisons, we apply multi-dimensional data analyses (Hayashi's Quantification Method III, [Hayashi, 1993]) to the set of items.

This section consists of two subsections. The first subsection shows pattern analysis of attitudes toward Japan, confidence in the UN, and ideology, excluding Japanese data. The second subsection shows pattern analyses with respect to ideology and confidence in the UN, including Japanese data.

4.1 Multi-Dimensional Analysis of International Relationships (1)

We analyzed responses to seven items: an item on nation, two items regarding attitudes toward Japan (Q.2 and Q.3), two items regarding confidence in the UN and in governmental bureaucracy (Q.50e & Q.50i), and two items on ideology (Q.26 and Q.30). We included the item on confidence in governmental bureaucracy as well as that in the UN because these are considered to be related to "ideology."

As shown in Fig. 8, confidence in the UN and that in government show similar patterns. This result may not seem to be consistent with the findings by Matsumoto (2006), which

suggested that confidence in the UN and in government reflected different kinds of confidence in organizations. This difference may be due to differences in the items used in the analyses. Unlike Matsumoto (2006), we analyzed confidence in organizations with other factors such as ideology, which led to similar patterns between the two types of confidence. In Fig. 8, the attitude as to whether prioritizing the country as a whole or the individual and confidence in organizations overlapped with each other. Also, these two kinds of values (confidence and ideology) and the attitude toward Japan are of independent dimensions.

Furthermore, Fig. 8 shows clustering of three groups of countries/areas. The first group consists of Beijing, Shanghai, and Singapore. People in this group are confident in the UN, prioritize country as a whole, and do not have a positive attitude toward Japan. The second group consists of Hong Kong and Taiwan. People in these countries/areas think that “improving the country and making individuals happy are the same things,” and have a positive attitude toward Japan. And the third group consists of the U.S., Australia, and South Korea. People in these countries have low confidence in the UN, prioritize individuals, and disagree with “leaving everything to political leaders.” Cities in China may not be comparable to the other countries/areas because the people in these cities do not have a choice of “China” among the items on the attitude toward Japan. The patterns found above, however, were the same even when we conducted the same pattern analysis excluding data on Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong.

These patterns suggest the following. First, we can classify Asia Pacific countries/areas into a Chinese cultural sphere and a non-Chinese cultural sphere. This pattern seems robust because it does not change even when we conduct the same pattern analysis excluding the data on Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. Secondly, people in Hong Kong and Taiwan are distinct in terms of a positive attitude toward Japan.




Figure 8: Hayashi's Quantification Method III of Q.2, Q.3, Q.26, Q.30, and Q.50

4.2 Multi-Dimensional Analysis of International Relationships (2)

In this subsection, we put responses to three items into the analysis: nation and the two items on ideology (Q.26 and Q.30). Fig. 9 shows three clusters of countries/areas. One consists of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Beijing, and Shanghai (i.e., Chinese group). People in these countries/areas agree with the opinion “leaving everything to political leaders” and “prioritize country as a whole” or think that “improving the country and making individuals happy are the same things.” Another cluster consists of the U.S., Australia, Japan, and South Korea, whose response pattern is opposite to that of the Chinese group. Singapore does not belong to either group and makes up the third cluster as a single country. This distinct location of Singapore coincides with the analysis by Matsumoto (2005).

Thus, the distinctive clustering of a Chinese cultural sphere and a non-Chinese cultural sphere is clear. The majority of Singaporeans are Chinese, but the political system and the international relationships are between the two spheres. Thus, Singapore is located in the middle, between the spheres, as if it were bridging over the two spheres.




Figure 9: Hayashi's Quantification Method III of Q.26 and Q.30 [Ideology]

Next, we added the items regarding confidence in the UN and in governmental bureaucracy (Q.50) into our analysis. Fig. 10 shows four clusters of countries/areas. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Beijing and Shanghai make a cluster. People in these countries/areas agree with the opinion “leaving everything to political leaders” and think that “improving the country and making individuals happy are the same things.” The U.S. and Australia make up another cluster, where people disagree with the opinion “leaving everything to political leaders” and prioritize individuals. Japan and South Korea make up the third cluster, where people are more critical of the UN and their own governments. And Singapore




Figure 10: Hayashi's Quantification Method III of Q.26, Q.30, Q.50e, and Q.50i [Ideology and Confidence in UN & Government Bureaucracy]

comprises the fourth cluster as a single country.

Again, Singapore is located in the middle between the Chinese cultural sphere and the non-Chinese cultural sphere. These pattern analyses illustrate a cultural manifold analysis (CULMAN) (Yoshino, 2005a). We analyzed the patterns among countries/areas with respect to the three variables in the previous subsection to get three clusters. Here, we increased the number of variables and got four clusters, where the non-Chinese cultural group (U.S., Australia, Japan, and South Korea) in the previous analysis was divided into the two sub-clusters (Anglo-Saxon group and Asian group). This exemplifies that “a set of charts may construct a sort of hierarchical structure, where each level of charts may correspond to an extent of coverage: the larger chart, the higher level.” (See Yoshino, Nikaido & Fujita, this issue).

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have analyzed people's values on international politics in the Asia Pacific countries/areas, focusing on attitudes toward Japan, confidence in the UN, and ideology.

As for the attitudes toward Japan, Japan did not seem to be considered as the most important country in terms of diplomatic relationships by the people in the Asia Pacific countries/areas under investigation. Even in the U.S., few people chose Japan as the first choice with which to develop friendliest relationships. However, when asked in concrete and personal terms, many more people in many countries/areas showed a positive attitude toward Japan. Moreover, younger age groups in many countries/areas had more positive attitudes toward Japan, but the less positive toward China.

Regarding attitudes toward the UN, people in Taiwan and the U.S. were less confident in the UN than people in the other countries/areas. In addition, low confidence by South

Koreans and high confidence by the people in Shanghai were observed. Although we should be careful in interpreting these results, it might be difficult to gain an understanding of them by following the literature on international politics.

With regard to ideology, we analyzed two items. The item on whether people agree with the opinion "leaving everything to political leaders" separates those countries/areas into two clusters; the U.S, Australia and Japan on the one hand and cities in China, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea on the other. Although the Japanese persistently have shown an age effect (the older the group, the more people "agree" (Hayashi 1992)), it seems that younger Japanese "disagree" less than senior Japanese. Moreover, it is worth noting that more than half of the young people in Beijing in 2005 and in Shanghai in 2002 "disagree."

By analyzing these three kinds of items by Hayashi's Quantification Method III, there emerged clusters of a Chinese cultural sphere and a non-Chinese cultural sphere. Moreover, by conducting analyses with different sets of items, we observed a structure that can be understood well by cultural manifold analysis (CULMAN).

Let us make some comments drawn from the present analyses. Firstly, the analyses in this paper imply that analyzing people's values is important for understanding foreign policy and international politics. In past studies, countries have been classified by the size of national power, stage of economic development or degree of democratization. These criteria, however, may not be suitable for analysis beyond the nation-state. Therefore, our analysis focused on people's attitudes and values and found, for instance, that confidence in the UN is related to confidence in national government. People's values on international politics were similar between the U.S. and Australia. Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Taiwan were classified into the same cluster of a Chinese cultural sphere. Thus, analysis of people's values will be an important agenda for international politics.

Secondly, this paper implies that people's attitudes toward a foreign country are influenced by so-called soft power as well as by hard power. According to Nye (2004), soft power is the ability to attract others, to get others to want the outcomes that you want, and to co-opt people rather than coerce them. Relatively, China could be expected to rise and Japan to decline in their national power of economy and politics. In addition, young people could develop an image of China as being a more developed and liberal country than senior people⁷⁾. Nevertheless, the younger the age group, the more people showed positive attitudes toward Japan and less positive attitudes toward China in the surveys. This contrast might reflect the differences in soft power between the countries. It might also be that Japan will maintain its influence with its soft power in international politics than is currently expected.

Thirdly and lastly, in order to gain a more robust understanding of people's values in the Asia Pacific region, we need to continue to perform surveys and analyses. We observed some variations in response patterns among age groups on the attitude toward Japan and ideology. By continuing surveys and analyses, we would be able to confirm whether the variations among age groups are due to a cohort-effect, age-effect, or time-effect. It is

⁷⁾ Lampton (2001) argues that many kinds of actors outside the government have come to have influence on Chinese foreign policy such as think tanks, business, civil organizations, and the public.

important to understand the deeper structure of peoples' values on international politics in order to foresee its dynamic changes in the near future.

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RELIGIOUS FAITH AND RELIGIOUS FEELINGS IN JAPAN: ANALYSES OF CROSS-CULTURAL AND LONGITUDINAL SURVEYS

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In the present paper, we focused on religion and religiosity using data that had been obtained from the Seven Nations Comparative Survey, the East Asia Values Survey, and the Asia and Pacific Values Survey. In Japan, only about 30% of the population have a religious faith, and this percentage is the lowest among developed countries. On the other hand, 70% think that having a religious mind is important. If we presume that people who either claim to have a specific religious faith or say that religious mind in a generic sense is important as being more or less positive to religion, then we could say that the proportion of people who feel positively about religion in Japan is comparable to that in most other countries. While attempts have been made to investigate the meaning of the term “religious mind” with relatively small data sets in Japan (Hayashi, F. 2007), it is also true that “religiosity” — which carries a different meaning than “religion” as an object of worship — is now being debated in Western countries, too. In this paper, we analyze whether the “religious mind” is a distinctive property of the Japanese or if there is a similar sort of attitude in the West using an international and comparative data set.

1. Introduction: Religious Faith and ‘Religious Heart/Mind’ in Japan

According to the East Asia Values Survey project (Yoshino, 2005), the cartography of religious faith in Japan is such that 23% of the population believe in Buddhism, and every other faith attracts less than 3%. It is said that Islam, Hindu, Christianity and Buddhism constitute the world’s four great religions; yet, among them, there are a countless number of denominations. As far as denominational distinctions in the context of international comparative research are concerned, researchers attempt to list a set of sects and denominations relevant to a particular locality as response categories based on pre-existing information, and then record open-ended answers in case there is any other type of religion. In the Asia and Pacific Values Survey project (Yoshino, 2009), responses on religious faith have been coded into 20 categories for the countries or areas included in the project, which were Japan, South Korea, Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Australia, and the United States. However, many other religions that do not fit into one of these 20 categories have also been named. There are other complexities in constructing an appropriate categorization of various denominational faiths. In the 7-Nation Survey of Japan, Europe and the USA, people very rarely identified themselves as Christians – instead, they made a firm distinction between Protestantism and Catholicism. In contrast, in Japan people tend to identify themselves as Christians without specifying the difference between Protestant and Catholic (Tokei Suri Kenkyujo Kokuminsei Kokusai Chosa Iinkai, 1998).

Key Words and Phrases: Religion, Religiosity, The Japanese National Character, The East Asia Value Survey, The Asia and Pacific Values Survey

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It should be noted that in the Asia and Pacific Values Survey, the response patterns in Singapore appear to be quite close to those in Japan.

The proportion of those who profess some sort of religious faith in Japan is exceedingly low compared to other developed countries. In the era of scientific research based on sample surveys conducted after the end of World War II until contemporary times, that proportion has consistently hovered around 30% (Tokei Suri Kenkyujo Kokuminsei Chosa Iinkai, 1992). Breakdown by age showed that throughout the 60 years concerned, younger people are less likely to have a faith, while the older the respondents are, the more likely that they express a religious faith. Further, cohort analysis empirically verified that this phenomenon has to do with the age effect. That is, as people grow older, they become more likely to believe in a religious faith. In Western Europe, the proportion of those who have some religious faith is higher among older people – but there are no longitudinal data whose time span is as long as some data sets in Japan are. However, according to an analysis based on a shorter length of time, the observed phenomenon is due to the period effect (Sasaki & Suzuki, 1996). For this reason, it is alleged that it is one of the unique qualities of the Japanese character that people tend to be more faithful as they age.

Additionally, we would like to note that regarding the recent trend of increasing loss of popularity of traditional religious faith in Western Europe, such phenomenon is often associated with the idea of “freedom to be free of certain specific denominational faith”. This indicates that culturally, in the older days in Western Europe it was accepted as simply natural that people would have some religious faith, and that those who did not were regarded as loony.

On the other hand, with respect to faith in Buddhism which is prevalent among the Japanese, some people see this form of religiosity in a critical light. They often claim that many people identify as Buddhists in a merely formal sense – due, for instance, to the gift-offering system based on parish in the Edo period, and to the custom of ancestral worship because graveyards usually happen to be around Buddhist temples in Japan.

In any event, if we are to assume that religion represents something fundamental about the human species as a creature that had begun to develop on its unique path through the habit of thinking, then we can say the presence of some sort of religion is universal even if the specific types of faith and denomination vary. In this research, the phrase “religious mind” includes not only faith in a traditional or a “new” organized religion but rather various forms of feelings and moods that may be seen as religious in a broad sense.


2. The Relationship between Faith and the Religious Mind

The Study on the Japanese National Character series, which is a comprehensive attitudinal survey encompassing questions on various topics, has been administered every 5 years since 1953. For 5 times from 1958 to 1978, a question asking whether respondents had any religious faith and another item asking whether they thought “a religious mind” was important or not to those who said they did not have any religious faith, were included. Since 1983, the religious mind question was also asked of the respondents who professed a certain religious faith; only about 2% or so answered “Not Important” or

“Don’t Know” (thereafter DK) to the religious mind question while expressing belief in a religious faith (Researcher Committee on the Study of the Japanese National Character, 2004).

Figure 1 shows changes in the proportions of people reporting a religious faith by age group between 1958 and 2003. Over the 45-year period, people in their 20s consistently had a low rate of belief in a religious faith. The older the respondent was, the more likely that he or she reported having a religious faith.

One should also be able to infer that this largely results from the cohort effect such that individuals became more likely to have a certain religious faith as they became older. While the proportion of people who do profess a religious faith has consistently been about 30% since World War II to this day, one can also see that generally the proportion of people with faith has declined within each age group in this figure. The proportion of people with a religious faith in the overall population has not greatly changed because of the changing composition of different age groups.



Source: A Study of the Japanese National Character, 1958–2003.

Figure 1: Changes in the Proportion of People with a Religious Faith by Age.

Figure 2 shows the proportion of individuals who report a religious faith as well as those who do not report a religious faith but who say that a “religious mind” is important between 1958 and 2003. In each age group, the proportions of such individuals generally decreased. The trend was especially marked among the younger groups after 1988.

Figure 3 looks at the pattern of the relationship between having a religious faith and whether the respondent thinks having a religious mind is important or not. It traces the cohort who were in their 20s in 1958 in terms of the changes with respect to these two variables.

Through the 10 installments of the Japanese National Character Survey up to 2003, we can observe that the proportion of those with a religious faith barely changed over the years, and also that the proportion of those who state that having a religious mind is not




Figure 2: Changes in the Proportion of People Who Report a Religious Faith or Say a Religious Mind Is Important by Age Group.





Figure 3: Changes in Views on Religious Faith and the Importance of Having a Religious Mind Due to Aging, for People Who Were in Their 20s in 1963.

important among the religiously faithful has been consistently low. However, we do need to be careful of the fact that it is generally difficult to capture any change there might have been among the young, because of both the changing demographic composition in Japan as well as the fact that the response rate tends to be higher among older people.

Figure 4 summarizes the results from the Seven Nations Comparative Survey, the East Asia Values Survey, and the Asia and Pacific Values Survey. A part of the results had already been presented (Hayashi, 2006, 2007). It may perhaps be possible to interpret the results from the surveys in 1988, 2003 and 2004 in Japan as a decline in religious faith. On the other hand, the results from the surveys in Shanghai in 2002 and 2006 and in Taiwan



Note: (Q.1) Do you have any personal religious faith? Yes (F), No (nF).
 (Q.2) Without reference to any of the established religions, do you think having a religious mind is important or not important? Important (IM), Not Important (nIM)

Figure 4: Relationship Between Having a Religious Faith and Whether One Thinks Having a Religious Mind Is Important or Not in Different Countries.


in 2003 and 2006 show that the proportion of those with a faith increased markedly in these two locations – however, it is possible that these sorts of variations occurred due to a combination of sampling errors as well as a series of non-sampling errors having to do with the specific circumstances under which these surveys were conducted. Generally speaking, we can say that the tendency of people to nearly always say that having a religious mind is important if they have a religious faith – a pattern alleged to be one of the defining traits of the nature of religiosity in Japan – is most pronounced in Japan as well as South Korea. It is also the case that these two countries share the pattern that a relatively large proportion of those without a faith reported that having a religious mind is nevertheless important. We can also see that the proportion of individuals with belief in a religious faith increased in Beijing and Shanghai, and it may perhaps be appropriate to interpret this as associated with a certain change in policy by the Chinese Communist Party. Such interpretation is rendered more plausible by the observation that whereas in

all other locations except China the proportion of those with a faith is higher among the older people, in China the religiously faithful are more commonly found among younger people.

So far, we have focused on comparison of different regions and countries. Now, this paper aims to take a look at the same issue from the perspective of race and ethnicity. In particular, in order to ascertain whether some sort of uniqueness is to be credited to Japan, we need to think of cases such as those of Japanese descent living in the USA or Brazil. With regard to Japanese emigrants, several surveys have been conducted on Japanese-Hawaiians starting from 1971, followed by a survey of Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast of mainland USA (Yoshino, et al. 2000), and a survey of Japanese-Brazilians (Yamamoto, K. & Mori, K. (eds.), 1993). Summaries of the results of these surveys are presented in Figure 5. Hawaii is among the more distinctively identifiable places in the USA, and it is generally true that its population in general – not restricted to just the Japanese-Hawaiians – evinces traits that are different from those in the mainland USA. One of these characteristics is the fact that the proportion of those without a religious faith is higher in Hawaii than on the mainland. Japanese-Americans, meanwhile, are much closer to Americans than to the Japanese in terms of the proportion of those with a religious faith, but the proportion of those who state that having a religious mind is important is high among the non-faithful. A major difference between these people and Americans in general or those who are not of Japanese descent, is that Buddhism is the most popular form of faith among Japanese-Americans. Overall, we might conclude that Japanese-Hawaiians have retained some of the distinctively Japanese qualities.

In the Japanese National Character Survey, it should be noted that until 1978, the question of whether they thought having a religious mind was important or not was asked only to respondents who did not report a religious faith. Since 1983, we re-evaluated our position and determined that not everyone who claims to have a faith would say that having a religious mind as such is important, so the above question was separated from the question on religious faith. It turned out that those who do not think that having a religious mind is important among people who do identify a particular faith are more commonly found in Hawaii than in Japan – in fact, this proportion is higher than that in the mainland USA. It may perhaps be surmised that in Japan those who identify a faith do so out of conviction in the sense that they do it based on the “religious mind”, while Japanese-Hawaiians ended up expressing a belief in faith according to the customs of a society that is generally more pious. The Japanese-Americans on the West Coast (JAWCS) were similar to non-Japanese-Americans in Hawaii. In this sense, the particular type of faith they have may not correspond well to the idea of having a religious mind as measured here.

On the other hand, we found that among the Japanese-Brazilians, 85% identified themselves as having a religious faith, 90% said that having a religious mind was important, and the proportion of people who answered yes to either of the questions was as high as 95%. We see that Japanese-Brazilians are a highly religious people. Looking over the composition of the different denominational faiths among Japanese-Brazilians, we find that Catholics are of the majority, and a little less than 20% of the respondents selected Bud-



Note: cf. Note for Figure 4.

JAH – Japanese-Americans in Hawaii

NJAH – Non-Japanese-Americans in Hawaii

JAWCS – Japanese-Americans in West Coast Survey

Also note that in the installments inside the parentheses, the question of whether one thought having a religious mind was important or not was not asked to respondents who reported having a religious faith.

Figure 5: Religious Beliefs Among Japanese-Hawaiians, Americans in General and Japanese-Brazilians.

dhism or its related offshoots. Overall, we can conclude that the respective results for the Japanese-Brazilians and Japanese-Hawaiians show that each group is strongly influenced by the traits of the native people living in the regions they inhabit.

3. What Is a Religious Mind?

Most Japanese people seem to intuitively know what the term “religious mind” means, and the use of this phrase is rarely seen as problematic in the context of a research survey. In the methodology adopted in such a survey, exactly what the term refers to is not specified *a priori* but rather we let each respondent answer the question based on his or her own understanding. On the other hand, after the fieldwork is completed, we attempt to more concretely grasp what the term might mean sociologically by analyzing the pattern of association between the term itself and any given thing in social life. The “Explorations of Structure in Ways of Thinking” survey conducted from 1976 to 1978 (in Tokyo and Yonezawa, also known as the “spook survey”), the survey on Views on Nature of the Japanese conducted in 1996 (nationwide survey, conducted by the Institute of Nuclear Safety System), and the survey research project conducted in 4 wards of Yokohama City in 2006, have all been guided by this type of methodology (Hayashi, C. et al. 1979; Hayashi, F. et al. 1996; Hayashi, F. 2007). While we believe that the terminology may

Table 1: How People in Different Countries Feel About Religion and Other Wondrous Things (%).

	Japan	South Korea	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	Singapore	Australia	USA
Survey year	2004	2006	2005	2005	2006	2006	2007	2007	2006
Sample size	1139	1030	1053	1062	849	603	1032	700	901
Have a religious faith	28	54	14	28	38	65	79	54	80
Religious mind is important	72	78	39	33	64	78	74	53	76
Having a religious faith and/or religious mind is important	73	81	44	43	71	85	86	66	86
God, gods or Buddha exists	40	26	18	18	43	47	72	49	71
may exist	41	28	25	38	33	42	20	29	21
Life after death exists	19	23	9	7	32	35	53	37	50
may exist	45	28	21	31	33	45	28	36	33
A soul or a spirit exists	32	26	17	10	42	41	56	53	64
may exist	43	34	23	34	29	45	29	31	27
Supernatural power or psychokinesis*	57	58	50	43	55	66	62	59	48
UFO or alien*	53	45	58	50	47	59	43	52	42
Specter or ogre*	47	34	25	31	55	71	47	21	23
Ghost or apparition, curse*	62	42	25	29	55	71	69	57	46


Note: For items marked with an asterisk (*), the numbers indicate the summed proportions of all responses that are construed as showing interest. That is, they include 'Exist', 'would like to be', 'Interesting, amusing', 'Dreadful, scary' and 'Would not like to be'. The other possible responses were "Boring", "Nonsense, does not exist", "Not scary, not dreadful", and "Other".

be replaced by something like the primordial religious emotion, we presume that substantively the concept subsumes elements as the views on religion based on natural history, lore handed down through word of mouth communication and superstition, reflections on supernatural matters, perspectives on health and mortality, and so on.

In the Asia and Pacific Values Survey that we have been conducting since 2005, several questions regarding the aforementioned matters were included. Specifically, they delved into people's views on the existence of "god, gods or Buddha", "life after death", and "a soul or a spirit", as well as their views on "ghosts", "goblins" or "specter".

For the questions asking whether the respondent believes that "god, gods or Buddha", "life after death", and "a soul or a spirit" exist or not, we decided to offer three response choices of "exists", "may exist", and "does not exist". The response category of "may exist" was left deliberately vague, in order to capture any feeling certain people might harbor such that they would be hesitant to declare its non-existence. As we predicted, we can observe from the results that in Japan the "may exist" category was more likely to be selected than in other countries or areas. In addition, it is interesting that the Taiwanese were about as likely to say "may exist" as the Japanese (Table 1).

We attempted to analyze whether people's views about the existence or non-existence of "god, gods or Buddha" is associated with identification with a religious faith or not (Fig. 6). In Japan, in spite of the fact that the proportion of those who have a specific religious faith is low, 40% of the respondents chose "God, gods or Buddha exists", which



Note: The y-axis represents the percentage of people with a religious faith, and the x-axis represents the difference in the percentages of people who do or do not believe in the existence of God, Gods or Buddha.

Figure 6: Relationship Between Having a Religious Faith and the Answer to "Do You Believe in the Existence of God, Gods or Buddha?" in Different Countries and Regions.

is considerably more than the 15% who said they do not exist. In all countries except Japan and South Korea, when analyzed at the aggregate level of the country or region as a whole, the strength of the association between the difference of "exist" and "does not exist" and identification with a religious faith is linearly proportionate. While this is a rather interesting observation, Japan and South Korea are two outliers that deviate from this pattern of the linear association between the views on the existence of god, gods or Buddha, and identification with a religious faith. Furthermore, the pattern of association is actually the other way around in South Korea than it is in Japan, so that while the proportion of those with a religious faith was considerably higher in South Korea, people were more likely to say that they did not believe in the existence of god, gods or Buddha than to say that they exist. This indicates that the meaning of faith is different in Japan and Korea. That is, while we argued in Section 1 that a commonality between Japan and Korea is that both have low rates of the combination of having a religious faith and saying that having a religious mind is not important (in other words, those who express a religious faith are most likely to say that having a religious mind is important), from some other angles we can observe differences between the two countries.

Also, while the above-mentioned analysis ignored the middle category of "may exist", the South Koreans were the third most likely to say "do not exist" behind denizens of Beijing and Shanghai, so that the ambivalent category of "may exist" was not chosen frequently. We might say that this is a distinctive trait of Koreans.

Next, we categorized the samples into three groups: Group A: "religious faith - yes", Group B: "religious faith - no + having a religious mind is important", and Group C: "re-

religious faith – no + having a religious mind is not important”. We analyzed each group’s respective relationships to other indicators of attitudes and feelings.

With regard to the relationship with the variable of whether respondents “respect ancestors or not”, as predicted, this variable was associated with religion and the religious mind in Japan. We observed that the proportion of those who respect ancestors in Group A was higher than that in Group B or C. While our hypothesis was that this pattern of association with the respect-for-ancestors variable might be a distinctive quality of Asian countries, the analysis showed that with the exception of a slight association in Singapore, no clear pattern of association between religion or the religious mind and respect for ancestors was observed in Asian regions except Japan. On the other hand, in the six Western European countries, in a manner similar to that in Singapore, religion and respect for ancestors were associated, albeit not to the degree that they were in Japan.

With regard to the pattern of association of the three groups with the belief in life after death, a stronger association was observed in Hong Kong, South Korea, the USA, Singapore and Australia than in Japan. A similar pattern was also found with respect to the belief in a soul or a spirit. The implication is that Japan appears to show a distinctive pattern in terms of the relationship between religiosity and the belief in life after death, or in a soul or a spirit (Hayashi & Kotani, 2008).

In general, this classification in terms of religion and the religious mind can be observed to reveal certain patterns of association with many other things. However, since they are also strongly associated with age, it is difficult to tell whether the key influence comes from age or religiosity. Still, we believe that it is not meaningless to keep in mind that this may be an association that incorporates, and not excludes, the effect of age.

In Japan, there were a series of survey projects that tapped into the “religious mind” in the 1970s. Things like religious sentiments based on views of natural history, quotidian moral parables and sayings, emotions and feelings on something mystical or supernatural, and the understanding of eschatology, were probed into as components of the underlying structure in ways of thinking. These things were conceived of as essentially being the “spooky things”, and so the project was nicknamed the “spook research” (Hayashi, C., 1972). It was later found that in general, people’s thoughts and feelings about these “spooky things” were not related to religious faith. Nevertheless, we would like to discuss some of the questions included in this research as they are relevant in understanding the significance of the contrast between rationality and non-rationality. These questions did not merely ask whether respondents thought 12 selected types of “spooky presence” such as the Yeti (also known as the Abominable Snowman) existed or did not exist, but rather offered multiple response categories as “would like to see”, “would not like to see”, “scary”, “fun”, and so on, in order to tap into just what kinds of expressions come closest to the respondents’ feelings in a more nuanced manner. Summing the proportions of people who selected response categories that involve some sort of mental interest, we found that the older, rather than the younger, and the more highly educated individuals were more likely to report such interest (Table 2). It may be said that this group of people are ones who tend to not be constricted by the narrow scope of “rationality”. It is also possible that the location of people on such a dimension of the rationality – non-rationality continuum

Table 2: People's Views on Religion, Supernatural Power and Other Matters in Different Countries (Asia and Pacific Values Survey).

		Japan	Korea	Beijing	Shanghai	Hong Kong	Taiwan	Singapore	Australia	USA
Age (yr)		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Religious Faith	20-49	19	50	16	25	35	61	77	56	77
	50 and over	35	63	11	31	46	75	84	55	84
No religious faith and Religious mind important	20-49	46	29	32	19	36	23	8	12	7
	50 and over	44	22	26	12	26	14	5	12	7
God, gods or Buddha	20-49	82	54	52	57	82	90	92	76	90
	50 and over	81	54	28	53	67	88	93	79	93
Life after death	20-49	75	53	39	39	74	83	81	77	83
	50 and over	56	46	15	35	47	75	80	66	82
A soul or a spirit	20-49	83	62	49	48	78	88	86	85	92
	50 and over	70	56	26	39	56	81	86	80	91
Supernatural power or psychokinesis	20-49	71	63	56	46	62	71	67	63	52
	50 and over	48	47	41	40	41	52	48	52	42
UFO or alien	20-49	69	51	64	52	56	66	48	54	41
	50 and over	42	33	47	47	30	38	32	49	42
Specter or ogre	20-49	61	37	30	33	63	76	49	25	24
	50 and over	37	25	16	27	40	57	41	15	21
Ghost or apparition, curse	20-49	77	46	28	32	62	75	71	64	49
	50 and over	52	33	18	26	41	58	64	47	37

Note: For "God, gods or Buddha", "Life after death", and "A soul or a spirit", the numbers indicate the summed proportions of the "exist" and "may exist" responses. For the other items, the numbers indicate the summed proportions of all words that are construed as showing interest (cf. Note for Table 1).

has something to do with attitudes toward various issues that exist in society.

A similar kind of measurement instrument was used based on the above-mentioned kind of thinking in the survey on people's views on the safety of nuclear technology, conducted by the Institute of Nuclear Safety System in Japan in the 1990s. Further, associations between the above-mentioned "rationality - non-rationality" dimension and people's attitudes toward informing patients of terminal cancer were explored, and attempts were made to construct an instrument that would be able to distinguish those who would benefit from being informed from those who cannot be anticipated to benefit. That is, in some cases we would not necessarily be able to find out what the real feelings are by directly asking people whether they would like to be informed of such crisis situation or not. The point is that it might be possible to reduce the errors in judgment by knowing people's personalities in terms of the rationality- non-rationality dimension.

4. About the "Mind"

The phrase "religious mind" appears to be intuitively quite concrete and sensible for nearly everyone in Japan. However, in many other countries, especially in the West, it is

Table 3: Questions Used to Measure Views on Science.

I. Using the answers on this card, would you tell me how much you agree or disagree with each one of the following statements?	
(1. Strongly agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Disagree to some extent 4. Strongly disagree)	
A. Some day science will permit the complete understanding of the functioning of the human mind.	
B. Most of the social and economic problems we face today will be resolved by the advancement of science and technology.	
C. At some point in the future, we can live on Mars as we live on the earth today.	
II. How likely do you think that each of the following will be realized within the next 25 years or so? (1. Very likely 2. Possible 3. Not at all likely)	
D. Safe method for nuclear wastes disposal	E. Cure for cancer
F. Cure for senility	G. Living at the space station

Table 3a: Views on Science (1) (Seven Nation Comparative Survey)

	Italy '92 N=1048	France '88 N=1013	West Germany '87 N=1000	HOL '93 N=1083	UK '87 N=1043	USA '88 N=1563	Japan '88 N=2265
A Strongly agree	15.5	26.8	9.1	11.1	12.4	18.6	2.5
Agree to some extent	36.8	37.9	25.3	20.9	37.3	39.2	11.3
B Strongly agree	13.5	15.5	7.3	7.7	9.5	12.2	2.7
Agree to some extent	38.8	33.8	36.7	27.5	33.3	34.7	12.4
C ———	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
D Very likely	34.3	28.4	17.1	24.3	33.7	32.2	33.4
E Very likely	62.2	68.3	36.5	44.0	63.5	61.9	65.1
F Very likely	24.6	23.4	16.8	26.8	11.7	25.0	28.7
G Very likely	12.1	23.4	35.6	20.7	32.7	41.3	19.3

Note: The percentages of subjects who had the indicated responses are shown. Statement C was not included in the Seven Nation Comparative Survey.

Table 3b: Views on Science (2) (Asia and Pacific Values Survey)

	Japan '04 N=1139	Beijing '06 N=1053	Shanghai '06 N=1062	Hong Kong '06 N=849	Taiwan '06 N=603	South Korea '06 N=1030	USA '06 N=901	Singapore '07 N=1032	Australia '07 N=700
A Strongly agree	1.5	4.4	8.3	3.1	4.5	3.7	16.8	9.8	18.7
Agree to some extent	9.5	36.1	28.5	31.8	37.5	24.9	46.5	54.9	46.6
B Strongly agree	0.9	9.3	9.5	3.7	6.0	4.6	9.4	8.6	7.3
Agree to some extent	10.3	46.2	39.7	36.3	47.4	38.4	38.5	52.4	33.6
C Strongly agree	1.6	6.5	8.9	3.1	4.0	3.0	5.5	4.7	3.3
Agree to some extent	23.8	42.4	37.7	44.2	42.3	41.4	19.3	41.1	28.0

Note: The percentages of subjects with the indicated responses are shown.

difficult to even arrive at a fixed translation to capture the intent. It may perhaps just be that the word "mind" conjures up something quite different in Japan than it does most everywhere else. Such inference is hinted at by the results from survey questions tapping into views on the nature of science and its possibilities.

Table 3 shows relevant questions on people's views of the role of science in civilization. Selected results from the Seven Nation Comparative Survey and the Asia and Pacific Values Survey are shown in Tables 3a and 3b, respectively.

We can observe that the Japanese have about the same level of optimism with regard to Statements C, D, E, and F as people living in most other countries or regions, but a greater number of people in Japan tend to think that issues of the "mind" and social and economic problems cannot be solved by science alone as represented in Statement A or B, respectively. With regard to Statement A, a greater percentage of people in Western countries "strongly agree" than do those in Asian countries, and so we can observe the presence of some "Europe vs. Asia" contrast as well. On the other hand, the Japanese response patterns with respect to Statements A and B characteristically show smaller percentages of people who "agree" than in other countries. It can be said that the Japanese tend to harbor sentiments that are quite unique in relation to the thinking on the "mind" among the countries and regions studied. It is perhaps also possible to interpret this as a difference that has to do with the thinking about "scientific technology", and further research is needed in order to delve more deeply into this theme.

When we speak of the "religious mind", we should be careful in interpreting the results of a survey research with an awareness of the implications of the meaning of the "mind". On the other hand, this does not necessarily mean that it is as simple as saying that the "religious mind" is uniquely Japanese in concept just because the meaning of the "mind" is unusual in Japan.

5. Conclusion

It is of great significance that the Japanese National Character Survey has been able to grasp the "religious mind" consistently, given that in recent years the issue of religion in Japan is increasingly being thought of as an issue that needs to be considered. It is all the more so as it is not possible to retroactively offer an empirical verification through research.

In Japan, while those who have a specific faith are few in number, not a small proportion of people believe that the religious mind is important and that god or Buddha exists. It is likely the case that individuals become increasingly likely to have a faith due to aging because of such a sociological foundation. We can also surmise that the ways of thinking about the "mind" may be quite unique in some yet unspecified way.

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