JAPANESE/AMERICAN NATIONAL CHARACTER CONFERENCE

1991

JAPANESE/AMERICAN NATIONAL CHARACTER CONFERENCE

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

March 17-18, 1990

THE INSTITUTE OF STATISTICAL
MATHEMATICS

HOOVER INSTISUTION
ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

ii

CONTENTS

iv

Agenda for Conference on

Comparing Japanese and American National Character

Stauffer Auditorium, Hoover Memorial Building
Stanford University, Stanford, California

March 16-18, 1990

FRIDAY, MARCH 16

Participants Arriving

7:00 PM   Informal Reception at Palo Alto Holiday Inn
for Participants and Their Guests

SATURDAY, MARCH 17

8:45 AM   Hoover bus departs Holiday Inn for Hoover Institution

9:00   Continental Breakfast, Stauffer Auditorium

9:30   **CONFERENCE CONVENES**

Opening and Orienting Remarks by

Dr. Alex Inkeles
Dr. Chikio Hayashi

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES	**CHAIR**	**LEADERS**
10:30 Theoretical Issues in the Comparative Study of National Character	G. Almond	A. Inkeles C. Hayashi
11:15 Methodological Issues in the Study of National Character	H. Wilensky	T. Suzuki H. Schuman
12:00 Lunch served in the Stauffer Courtyard for Participants and Invited Observers		

SATURDAY AFTERNOON - DISCUSSION OF THEMES AND REALMS

	TOPIC	CHAIR	LEADERS
1:45	"Deep Culture" and National Character	T. Kataoka	G. DeVos M. Spiro
2:30	Politics and National Character	C. Hayashi	I. Miyake S. M. Lipset
3:15	National Character in Work and Economic Organizations	M. Sasaki	J. Raphael G. DeVos
4:15	Hoover bus returns to Holiday Inn		

SATURDAY EVENING

6:15	Hoover bus leaves for Inkeles Residence
6:30	Cocktails and Dinner at Inkeles Residence for Participants and Their Guests
10:00	Bus returns to Holiday Inn

SUNDAY, MARCH 18

8:15	Bus leaves Holiday Inn for Hoover Institution
8:30	Continental Breakfast at Stauffer Auditorium

DISCUSSION OF THEMES AND REALMS (cont'd)

	TOPIC	CHAIR	LEADERS
9:00	Family Patterns as an Expression of National Character	C. Lewis	J. Clausen C. Usui
9:45	Socialization in Family, School and Elsewhere	M. Sasaki	H. Stevenson R. Yoshino
10:45	Daily Life and Social Problems	C. Usui	T. Suzuki H. Wilensky

DISCUSSION OF THEMES AND REALMS (cont'd)

	TOPIC	CHAIR	LEADERS
11:30	Religion and National Character	C. Usui	M. Sasaki F. Hsu

12:15   Lunch at Stauffer for Participants and Invited Observers

SUNDAY AFTERNOON - DISCUSSION OF THEMES AND REALMS (cont'd)

1:30   Open Discussion

3:00   Setting the Agenda for the next steps

4:00   Conference ends

Japanese/American National Character Conference
Hoover Institution, Stanford University
March 17-18, 1990

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Gabriel Almond
4135 Old Trace Road
Palo Alto, CA 94306

Dr. John Clausen
Institute of Human Development
1203 Tolman Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720

Dr. George DeVos
Department of Anthropology
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720

Dr. Francis Hsu
61 Miland Drive
Mill Valley, CA

Dr. Alex Inkeles
Hoover Institution
Stanford, CA 94305-6010

Dr. Tetsuya Kataoka
Hoover Institution
Stanford, CA 94305-6010

Dr. Catherine Lewis
Department of Pediatrics
School of Medicine
University of California, S.F.
San Francisco, CA 94143

Dr. S. Martin Lipset
Hoover Institution
Stanford, CA 94305-6010

Dr. James H. Raphael
Director of Research
Northeast Asia/U.S. Forum
ISIS, 320 Galvez Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

Dr. Howard Schuman
Center for Social Research
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Dr. Melford Spiro
Department of Anthropology (C-001)
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093

Dr. Harold W. Stevenson
Center for Human Growth
  and Development
University of Michigan
300 N. Ingalls
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-0406

Dr. Chikako Usui
Department of Sociology
220 Newcomb Hall
Tulane University
New Orleans, LA 70118

Dr. Harold L. Wilensky
Department of Political Science
210 Barrows Hall
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720

Japanese/American National Character Conference
Hoover Institution, Stanford University
March 17-18, 1990

JAPANESE PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Chikio Hayashi
Professor, University of Air
c/o The Institute of Statistical Mathematics
        (Tokei-Suri Kenkyuzyo)
4-6-7 Minami-Azabu, Minato-ku,
Tokyo 106, Japan

Dr. Ichiro Miyake
Department of Law
Kobe University
Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku
Kobe, Japan

Dr. Tatsuzo Suzuki
Department of Interdisciplinary Statistics
The Institute of Statistical Mathematics
        (Tokei-Suri Kenkyuzyo)
4-6-7 Minami-Azabu, Minato-ku,
Tokyo 106, Japan

Dr. Masamichi Sasaki
Graduate Center
Hyogo Kyoiku University
Yashiro-cho, Kato-gun
Hyogo-ken, Japan

Dr. Ryozo Yoshino
Department of Interdisciplinary Statistics
The Institute of Statistical Mathematics
        (Tokei-Suri Kenkyuzyo)
4-6-7 Minami-Azabu, Minato-ku,
Tokyo 106, Japan

Dr. Fumi Hayashi
c/o Dr. Tatsuzo Suzuki
The Institute of Statistical Mathematics
        (Tokei-Suri Kenkyuzyo)
4-6-7 Minami-Azabu, Minato-ku,
Tokyo 106, Japan

Japanese/American National Character Conference
Hoover Institution, Stanford University
March 17-18, 1990

PAPERS CIRCULATED AT THE CONFERENCE

Almond, Gabriel A. 1983. "Communism and Political Culture Theory." *Comparative Politics*. 13(1).

Almond, Gabriel A. 1990. "The Study of Political Culture." In G. A. Almond, *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science*. Sage.

Clausen, John A. and Martin Gilens. Forthcoming. "Personality and Labor Force Participation across the Life Course: A Longitudinal Study of Women's Careers." *Sociological Forum*. Forthcoming: 1-37.

DeVos, George. 1990. "Confucian Hierarchy Versus Class Consciousness in Japan." Chapter 1.

Hayashi, Chikio. 1987. "Statistical Study on Japanese National Character." *Journal of the Japan Statistical Society; Special Issue*. Pp. 71-95.

Hayashi, Chikio and Tatsuzo Suzuki. 1974. "Quantitative Approach to Cross-Societal Research: A Comparative Study of Japanese Character, Part I." *Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics*. 26(3): 454-516.

Hayashi, Chikio and Tatsuzo Suzuki. 1975. "Quantitative Approach to Cross-Societal Research: A Comparative Study of Japanese Character, Part II." *Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics*. 27(1): 1-32.

Hsu, Francis L. K. 1971. "Filial Piety in Japan and China: Borrowing, Variation and Significance." *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*. Spring 1971: 67-74.

Hsu, Francis L. K. 1987. "Class, Caste and Caste-ism." In Paul Hockings (ed.), *Dimensions of Social Life: Essays in Honor of David Manda*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Pp. 601-615.

Inkeles, Alex. 1979. "Continuity and Change in the American National Character." In Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.), *The Third Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Pp. 390-454.

Inkeles, Alex. 1988. "National Character Revisited." Unpublished paper delivered at a Joint Meeting of the Sociological Associations of Austria, West Germany and Switzerland.

Inkeles, Alex and Daniel J. Levinson. "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Systems." In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology.* 2nd ed. Vol. IV. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley. Pp. 418-506.

Lewis, Catherine C. 1989. "From Indulgence to Internalization: Social Control in the Early School Years." *Journal of Japanese Studies.* 15(1): 139-157.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1986. "Historical Traditions and National Characteristics: A Comparative Analysis of Canada and the United States." *Canadian Journal of Sociology.* 11(2): 113-155.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1987. "Tradition and Modernity in Japan and the United States." *IHJ (International House of Japan) Bulletin.* 7(1).

Lipset, Seymour Martin. Forthcoming. "American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed." In Brian Shafer (ed.), *Is America Different? A New Look at American Exceptionalism.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. 61 pp.

Miyake, Ichiro. 1982. "Trust in Government and Political Cleavages: A Cross-National Comparison (1)." *The Doshisha Law Review.* No. 171.

Miyake, Ichiro. 1982. "Trust in Government and Political Cleavages: A Cross-National Comparison (2)." *The Doshisha Law Review.* No. 172.

Miyake, Ichiro. Forthcoming. "Agents of Partisan Socialization in Japan." In Scott Flanagan, Shinsaku Kohei and Bradley Richardson (eds.), *The Japanese Voter.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Chapter 5.

Miyake, Ichiro, J. Watanuki, T. Inoguchi and I. Kabashima. 1986. *Electoral Behavior in the 1983 Japanese Elections.* Tokyo: Institute of International Relations, Sophia University.

Sasaki, Masamichi and Tatsuzo Suzuki. 1987. "Changes in Religious Commitment in the United States, Holland, and Japan." *American Journal of Sociology.* 92(5): 1055-1076.

Sasaki, Masamichi and Tatsuzo Suzuki. 1989. "New Directions in the Study of General Social Attitudes: Trend and Cross-National Perspectives." *Behaviormetrika* 26: 9-30.

Schuman, Howard. 1990. "Recent Changes in American Social Attitudes." Appearing in a joint Japanese-American volume. 17 pp.

Schuman, Howard and Jacqueline Scott. 1989. "Generations and Collective Memories." *American Sociological Review.* 54(June): 359-381.

Suzuki, Tatsuzo. 1984. "Ways of Life and Social Milieus in Japan and the United States: A Comparative Study." *Behaviormetrika*. 15: 77-108.

Wilensky, Harold L. 1981. "Family Life Cycle, Work, and the Quality of Life: Reflections on the Roots of Happiness, Despair, and Indifference in Modern Society." In B. Gardell and G. Johansson (eds.), *Working Life*. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Pp. 236-265.

Wilensky, Harold L. 1984. "Preface to Japanese Edition." *The Welfare State and Equality*. Tokyo: Bokutakusha Publishing Co. Pp. 2-14.

Japanese/American National Character Conference
Hoover Institution, Stanford University
March 17-18, 1990

Opening Remarks of Prof. Inkeles

I would like to greet all of the people who have been kind enough to come to participate in this conference on the theme of Japanese and American National Character. These greetings are extended from Stanford University, the Hoover Institution, and from myself personally. Some of you have come a very considerable distance; we appreciate the sacrifice that is involved in that. Others who have not come from such a distance nevertheless are giving up a weekend. Several people tapped me on the shoulder during the last few days and said, "Alex, you and your people must be very serious—meeting on a weekend." I assured them that it was a very serious group, at least serious intellectually. I hope there will be a spirit of levity otherwise. Jokes about national character are definitely not ruled out. As a matter of fact, I am sorry that we do not have a paper on that theme because it might be one of the best ways to really get at the essence of a national character.

I would also like to take this opportunity to extend my thanks to Teresa Terry, and to thank Gloria Parks, my secretary; they have both done a great deal to keep the conference running smoothly.

Now, just a word about the mechanics of how we aim to operate. You all have a copy of the program. You should also have a list of the participants. We did not prepare a list of the observers, but I wish to extend my greetings and welcome to those who are here as observers.

The purpose of this conference is to do two things: the first is to explore the idea of "national character" because not everyone in this group has the same understanding, if they have any understanding at all, about what is meant by the term "national character." Part of what we are hoping to do is to clarify our understandings of this concept. When I say "clarify our understandings," that does not mean anyone has to accept the concept. Anyone who wishes to reject it completely is entirely free to do so, and that will undoubtedly enliven our discussions.

The second purpose of the conference is to plan or test the feasibility of conducting a full-scale conference which would go into more detail on many of the topics and themes we will be touching on. Therefore, the theme of feasibility is a very important one, and I am looking for guidance, as I know Prof. Hayashi is for the Japanese group, on how we might go about doing this. I think we will get into a good deal of depth in the course of this meeting, but there is still the open question of how we might proceed in the future.

I also want to mention that since some of you may not have an opportunity to say everything you want to say, in particular the observers, and since some of the observers may feel, as they hear the discussions, that they have a passion to join in the conversation, I have set the last session as an open one. Alternatively, I thought we might

concentrate on the topic of interpersonal relations. If the group wishes, I would appreciate some informal communication about this. But, if not, we have a large part of Sunday afternoon available for open discussion, meaning that people who have not had a chance to say what they would like to say, or who feel there is some central theme that we have grossly neglected, this will provide a suitable opportunity. And, on that occasion I hope it will be possible to invite the observers to join in the dialogue. Prior to that open session, however, I feel the need to restrict the exchange to those who have been defined as formal participants. Each session is planned for 45 minutes, the pattern for which is basically as follows.

We will not have formal papers. Indeed, I suspect a number of you who would not have come to this conference if you had to prepare a formal paper. So, each of the sessions will be introduced relatively briefly by a person designated as the "discussant." There are two discussants and the program indicates who they are for each session. It is the intention that the discussants set out a series of themes, problems and/or issues which they feel the group should address. These remarks should be followed by open discussion of those issues and anything else on that topic. In addition, to maintain order—although I hope we proceed informally—there will be a "chairperson" for each session (denoted in the program). To maintain reasonable order, if you have something to say, please signal the chairperson, who will put your name on a list to be called upon at the appropriate time. However, if you have something you most urgently want to say that is specific to the immediate topic, please speak up. The chairperson, in his or her wisdom, will then decide whether you are to go then or later. Each of the discussants will present five to ten minutes; their presentations setting the agenda. In addition, each of the discussants will have the opportunity to present a somewhat formal response at the end of the 45-minute session. So chairpersons should always allow about 10 minutes for the discussants to summarize the outcome of the session.

I have tried to assign people as discussion leaders on a topic where they are particularly well informed or have a special interest. And I generally have asked the chairperson to be someone who is not likely to feel frustrated being in the chair on that particular session. However, if a chairperson intervenes, that is alright, because we intend to keep everything very informal. Prof. DeVos, for example, probably has made comments on every conceivable topic concerning Japan, including all of those that we are dealing with. In any event, you will have second and third chances, because you can come back to any theme at a later session.

I should tell you that this conference is a result of a long process of negotiation and effort to bring it together, which has involved discussions between myself, Prof. Hayashi, Prof. Suzuki, and Prof. Sasaki over quite a few years. The difficulty of arranging it has come mainly because of my failure to raise the necessary resources rather than from any failure on their part, but we are all delighted that we have finally managed, by combining resources, to bring this about, and so I want to turn the podium over to Prof. Hayashi, who will speak words of welcome from the Japanese team. After that we will go directly into the program. Prof. Hayashi will keep his opening remarks to a minimum because he would like to allocate the extra time for the two substantive problems we are going to deal with this morning, namely theoretical issues and methodological issues.

Opening Remarks of Prof. Hayashi

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is with great pleasure that we attend this conference here at the Hoover Institution to discuss our experiences and the results of our national character studies, and to explore the possibilities for future collaboration in joint research in national character studies in both the United States and Japan. In addition, we should like to express our appreciation to Prof. Inkeles, his colleagues and staff members for organizing this conference.

Needless to say, knowledge of national character is instrumental to understanding national decision-making, particularly in the arena of international relations, and to facilitating mutual understanding of personal behaviors as expressed in human relations among the world's societies. This knowledge also contributes to the micro and macro aspects of the study of national character in interchronological and international comparative perspectives. Knowing more about the national character of a given country is vital to acquiring an ability to judge the quality and/or reliability of information about that country. In other words, without knowledge of other countries' national characters or ways of thinking, there is significant potential for overreaction to the information gathered about those countries.

The comparative study of national character between the United States and Japan is quite timely, not only from an academic point of view but also with respect to mutual policy implications. In both countries we see conflicts emerging which have economic and cultural characteristics. In the United States, there are opinions that the Japanese are inscrutable and unique, emphasizing Japan's particularism. By the same token, we see opinions in Japan that Americans' ways of thinking are obscure or difficult to comprehend. Obviously then it is especially important that we learn more about the national character of both nations before dealing with the various obstacles that seem to persist between the two.

There are many approaches to the study of national character in its broadest sense, and especially in the context of comparative research. Each approach has its own methods and characteristics. They reveal different cross-sections of a nation's reality. The various approaches are said to be complementary insofar as their methodology is made clear. I believe it is very useful and stimulating to exchange ideas and discuss problems. I expect that this conference will prove fruitful in this regard, through both its formal and informal communications.

**Theoretical Issues In
the Comparative Study
of National Character**

CHAIR

G. Almond

**DISCUSSION
LEADERS**
A. Inkeles
C. Hayashi

Presentation of Prof. Inkeles

In this first session, because there are many things that have not been clarified, we will be spending a little more time with discussants than I think will be characteristic of the later presentations.

First, by way of general orientation, this is my fulfillment of the minimum task: I have set out five theoretical issues that are my contribution. They are obviously not the only ones that might be discussed. I have also done some prioritizing as I am going to present in more detail some of the matters that I think are relevant under the first and second themes. I will not have time to get into the third, fourth and fifth themes.

The first question which is obviously on the minds of many people is quite well resolved in the minds of some people, but nonetheless it needs discussion. In what "content" should we consider the concept of national character? I think the importance of this question for the conference is very self-evident. The second question concerns the consideration of sharing values and modes of functioning, such as affective and cognitive modes, and certain selective behaviors. Obviously what one selects is a big issue. If you have the idea of "sharing," how far must they be shared? By whom must they be shared? And for how long must they be shared? I will elaborate on these points in much greater detail.

The next issue can be stated as: What are the origins of national character? For me, this is important in two very significant respects. In the first place, as an intellectual problem, it is not something anyone can escape, even though I would argue that it is not a necessary element of any effort to delineate a national character. It is a separate intellectual problem. Does or does it not exist? Can we delineate a distinct phenomenon that we can get agreement about? If so, then what is it that caused this phenomenon to arise? Obviously, a multiplicity of causes could operate to account for any kind of sharing that we observe. One of the most common sources, and probably what most often creates the greatest confusion, is the issue of socialization; the methods of raising the child, of inculcating values, orientations and behaviors in young children and even in adults. Some people, as you know, historically have used the socialization practices of people as means to identify the national character. However, I think there is a great deal of difficulty if one attempts to explain origins rather than character. On the other hand, there is no question but that by looking at how children are raised, you may find exemplifications of tendencies, which by some other method or procedure are identified as being essentially very much an expression of the national character.

The fourth issue is: What are the consequences of national character? Suppose we find some regularity, or do not find it. What difference does it make? Does it affect

politics? Will it determine whether nations go to war or not? Will it have an impact on productivity?

Finally, the fifth issue concerns long-term strengths and forces, which in a way comes back to the first two questions. This question is a very fundamental one. What has been seen in Japan throws much light on this question. What about the issue of change in stability? Is a national character something that is created more or less like a rock that gets located inside a lot of people and is basically unchangeable? Or is it something that is subject to change? And if subject to change, one must ask how far it can change before it is no longer what it was originally. A problem which exists at the individual level, not very different from what exists when you discuss a society, is how much change can occur in the United States or Russia, for example, where one can say that it is still basically the same system it was before these changes?

We have much the same problem dealing with national character; assuming that you do not interpret it in terms which involve no change. This would lead to a discussion of the issue of modernization. The data that has been observed in Japan and elsewhere suggest that there have been certain forces of change, that they seem to be similar, and that they may be the result of modernization. Then we have the question of convergence or continuing diversity. If indeed there is a worldwide process of social change and it is impinging upon existing national characters, does that in fact mean that in the end throughout the world we will find the distribution of the qualities of the person in every population to be basically alike? In which case we would have a truly world culture and a truly world personality. Or, is it the case that there are features of these combinations of shared values and modes of functioning which are either resistant to, or take unique forms in particular populations? so that whatever the degree of convergence that appears, if any at all, they will remain distinct core elements for each national population.

These, then, are the themes I would like to see discussed. I clearly cannot anticipate that they will all be discussed this morning, but I invite you in this first session to discuss any one of these that you feel ought especially to be dealt with. I should also like to say in this connection that it is apparent from things I have already said that the line between theoretical issues and methodological issues cannot be hard and fast. Many of the problems that come up that are called theoretical really become methodological, and vice versa. I am trying to maintain a general distinction because, once you get into the methodological issues, often they have a sufficiently complex and refined character of their own so that it is very difficult to continue to remember in fact that they do involve theoretical issues as well.

I would like to continue the discussion to provide a sense, in more detail, of what positions I think we might be taking with regard to the first two themes. Recall that I had the original set prioritized, so let us first take up the problem of "content." Referring to the list, note that some terms are placed in quotation marks, indicating a degree of uncertainty about the ideas themselves, thus possibly requiring a good deal of explication. In specifying content, the items on the list represent some of the issues we have to deal with, some of the ideas.

In the first place, presumably with national character, we must designate some geographically limited population that will pass for a nation. Obviously that immediately raises questions, like, Could you have a national character in a place like Belgium where you have a deep split between two communities? More so, can you have a national character in a place like Yugoslavia? I do not think anyone should press that issue too hard. One way of dealing with this is to say, you can re-delineate the populations that we are talking about so that we take into account major subgroups of what are nominally politically national entities. After all, many people who do not have a state consider themselves a nation. And many people who are a nation in one sense, that is, they have a state, in fact have no nation. So that is open to discussion. Presumably, in the case of Japan, particularly, and in the case of the United States, somewhat less so, we would not have a great deal of problem with that.

We are interested in things that are widely shared, and the problem—what is wide sharing?—requires much elaboration. While we have the idea that what we are talking about is relatively enduring and stable, we have many problems defining the criteria for what would be enduring and stable. We want these qualities to be fairly basic. But, what do we mean by basic? Not superficial or ephemeral. But this is a very important question—what we mean by basic. Whose theory will we use? If one is Freudian, then much of what we are studying will not matter at all. Whether these qualities have to be patterned or not raises the question: suppose we collect many questions, a hundred questions for Japan, and a hundred for the United States, and the responses are very different to many of these questions. Does that give them different national characters? or Would there be a national character only insofar as elements held together in some cohesive way that were unique to the two sets of countries? Thus, we have the pattern-ing issue. But all of these are qualifications of the idea, and this is the most critical element of our presentation, i.e., that we are talking about psycho-social attributes of individuals summed across some geographically limited populations. This is the basic source of the most fundamental disagreements, of course, about how one should approach the problem of measuring or dealing with the concept of national character. I will say a good deal more about this later.

How is information stored that is characteristic of a people? You might want to think in terms of collective memories, for example. What are the differences in our collective memories? that is, the images people have (which can mean all kinds of things), their idea systems, their beliefs, their values, their patterns in interpersonal relations, dominance and subordination, for example, and how that is approached, and their cognitive and affective modes of behavior; in other words, ways of thinking, of feeling, and of striving. And this is only a partial list, one which could obviously be much longer.

If one takes this approach, what is excluded? In the first place, certain forms of behavior are likely to be excluded. They do not have to be, but that is an interesting basis for discussion. For example, suppose you know that in the United States people tip their hats when they greet each other. Should that be considered part of national character? In Japan, when people greet each other, they bow. Would you include that behavior or not? These are open questions. Most forms of conventional and truly customary behavior which are used by everyone as such should be excluded as defining

characteristics. On the other hand, every one of these behaviors is subject to other kinds of interpretation, and consequently might be considered for some purpose.

A better example perhaps is sharing a language. What does it mean that you share Japanese or English as your language? Some will argue that if you study a language carefully, there are all sorts of nuances and structurings of relationships that are impossible to comprehend unless you use this language rather than others. I consider this quite relevant. On the other hand, the mere sharing of a language is, by itself, not an indicator of most aspects of psycho-social functioning. Looking at the evidence we have of the comparison of Japanese-Americans speaking Japanese in Hawaii and the Japanese speaking in Japan is a very good illustration of this. This is the kind of idea that is often reflected in ethnic relations. In the United States, for example, in black-white discussions, consider the notion of the "oreo." Blacks talk about some blacks who are black on the outside but white on the inside. What they mean is that their character has become indistinguishable from what they view as the character of white people in the United States. Even though they are black, presumably they cannot change their color and they may act in certain ways that meet the criteria of black, but not internally.

Another subject of great interest is the issue of variable estimates of objective conditions. I mean by this, for example, such things as whether or not you consider that next year the economy is going to improve or become worse, or whether you think that there is a high or a low probability of war in the foreseeable or even the immediate future. It seems to me that these kinds of estimates should not, by themselves, be considered—in fact cannot be considered—characterological. Rather, this is something where one does not need to understand someone's character to understand the positions they take, and it is sufficient to recognize that most people are reasonably well tuned in to what is happening. For example, suppose war were declared tomorrow, and I asked people, "Do you think that this year as against next year, a lot of people are going to lose their lives?" You do not have to be Japanese or American to recognize that since there is a war, there will be an event or phenomenon of that kind. This is an extreme example, but it is relevant and to the point. Judgements of this kind should not be considered part of national character.

Next, I will discuss one important reservation concerning the above after presenting an illustration. In this diagram, you will see the contrast between this and the next chart. This chart is an example of the people of the United States who were asked, from 1946 through 1980, "Do you think economically you are better off now than you were 12 months ago?" As you can see the responses jump all over the place; they are different every year. Sometimes people say it is going to be better; sometimes they say it is going to be worse. This is because this is the way economic conditions generally occur. But that, by itself, tells you nothing about the American national character. As a matter of fact I could show you charts for any country in the world that behave the same way. There will be enormous variation year by year, but these variations correlate with economic conditions or rumors of economic conditions.

This shows why these kinds of data and observations should be excluded. And there are a great many measures of this kind and they in fact constitute a very large part of what public opinion research deals with. Consider the book which compiled all the

survey studies which were conducted in the early years at the Michigan Center. About 80 percent of the questions in the book are of this type. So, if you want to understand the American character, you cannot get much help from that.

To return to the important reservation alluded to above, if it were true that whatever the economic conditions, Americans tended to expect them to improve much more—let us say, for every improvement in GNP in a given year, Americans became 10 percent more optimistic about the prospects for themselves, and people of other countries, with an equal 10 percent improvement in GNP became only 1 percent more favorable, and that this was manifested year by year—then you could say you may be tapping an underlying and deeper disposition, namely to moderate the extent to which you respond favorably or unfavorably to good economic news at a constant level. But that is a very different kind of analysis and much more difficult to do.

Returning to issues about content selection, should the ordinary count? What does this mean? People like myself, Prof. Sasaki, Prof. Hayashi, and Prof. Suzuki tend to focus a great deal on what I would call ordinary daily behavior. We ask about events of normal living or everyday life. There are some who feel that the only real test of national character can be obtained under special circumstances. For example, they would say, if you want to understand the attitude that the Japanese have about subordinates, see what they do in a war when they have captured people they do not have the highest regard for. Or, for the case of the United States, they would say, if you want to see what the American attitude toward valuing life is, take a look at the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I do not see any reason to exclude either of these. It is just that the world does not provide enough special occasions to build a good substantive empirical basis. And these special occasions are themselves very episodic. Nonetheless, I think it is important and interesting to relate the two. They may, in fact, correlate, or they may not. Who can question?

The second element here is, should we emphasize the general or the particular? There is some argument to be made that every item standing alone really must be confronted on its own terms. And, moreover, certain items may be so critical that the fact that they are single items is neither here nor there because they come closest to tapping the most fundamental issues. By contrast, by and large clusters and patterns should be emphasized, because this is how the degree to which the wording of a particular question can have so much influence on the pattern of responses. That is, only when we have obtained a variety of stimuli, all intended to tap the same underlying dimension, can we have confidence that we are really getting at something that, in fact, is a true aspect of a population's orientation.

This brings us to the issue of whether we focus only on the latent or the manifest. When we do public opinion research, we obviously are mainly focusing on the manifest, and we are very far from understanding what may be true with regard to the latent dimension. This is where anthropologists think that they are strongest, and they probably are. But not always. At the risk of running ahead of the story, I am tempted to point something out in this connection from the data displayed here. Consider *giri-ninjo*, the theme of obligation and commitment. One finds an excellent description of this Japanese theme in Prof. DeVos's paper. It is most interesting that the elements he

specified that are part of this core—and I do not believe he was in collaboration with Hayashi and company—are exactly the same as a set that they chose to measure. Given seven questions (with two combined) yielding a total possible score from 0 to 5, if you agree with all of the questions in the presumably traditional Japanese way, you would get a score of 5. If you agree with none of the Japanese answers, you would get a score of 0. Now, if you look at the American results, the prediction is perfect. Virtually every American overwhelmingly gives all of the answers in the non-Japanese style. On the other hand, if you look at the data with regard to Japan you get a very unpleasant surprise, because it is true that the Japanese, more than the Americans, favor the Japanese-style answer. But their typical score is one or two. In other words, less than 20 percent of the Japanese get a score of 3, 4 or 5 at the highest end of the range. So now one can say, well, that is just a problem in management, but, one might also say, perhaps the idea we have about what is Japanese is wrong, because there are some things where the Japanese all agree, and overwhelmingly time after time. However, they do not agree overwhelmingly about this, so perhaps we have made an interesting mistake; perhaps because we are busy studying this by emphasis on the manifest, because we are asking questions. If we really knew how to get at this, we would find that the latent tendency, the underlying tendency, is basically the one that is predicted by the theory. That constitutes a very interesting and substantial challenge on which we could spend much time.

Then there is the issue of depth psychology vs.—I do not know what to call the opposite—obviously I am not going to accept the term "superficial" psychology, so we must think of it differently. If it is not depth psychology, what is it? Perhaps the term "eclecticism" would be appropriate. I am open to any psychological theory that is reasonably convincing, that makes sense, about why one ought to study a particular attribute of a person. I do not insist on being deep. And I do not know how you can tell the difference between the deep and the non-deep. For example, do you need a projective test? Or do you get at tendencies just by asking questions? Perhaps we really do need to spend sixty years. The Berkeley study began in 1928, and they are now studying people from 1988, and continuously following their history. The investigators are still not sure they have gotten at the real character of these people. So from their point of view, what we are doing may seem chimerical.

And there is the question: Do you study only the core qualities, the things that are defined distinctively as traditional and pure, or do you take an open-ended attitude to what characterizes a people? The Japanese team has tended to focus on what they believe is the core of the traditional, but I would much prefer to keep an open mind about that; that is, to allow our impression of what is the core to emerge from the data with little predefining of the outcome. You may remember from their studies that they used little black moths to indicate and measure things they thought of as distinctively Japanese. If one looks at the distribution of these, it turns out that on many of the items with the moth in the black box, much less than the majority of the Japanese held that view. So this raises interesting questions about whether they are really picking this up as "core" Japanese, or only in a metaphorical sense that this is what they think was most Japanese at an earlier point in time, and they are testing to see how much change there is over time.

One other element with regard to content and then we will complete this particular theme. What is the status of related concepts? I will not elaborate on these but I think one can see their need for discussion. What is the difference between this approach to studying peoples which we call national character and anything that is the study of cultural orientations? What is the difference between this approach and anything which is an effort to study social structure? For example, is one-party rule a characteristic of national character? Is dictatorship a characteristic of national character? Is the fact that one is a socialist or a capitalist a characteristic of national character? In general, from the perspective with which we are working, and I believe the Japanese people would agree, this is a different matter. It is theoretically and empirically independent, and the interesting problem is to relate what is in the person and what these things in the person are like. This is not to assume that one can derive what is in the person from these things, or visa versa, that you can derive these things from the what is in the person. What is happening in Eastern Europe right now, for example, is an excellent illustration of this, something I found out a long, long time ago when I did my first studies of the Soviet Union. The question is, Is the Soviet system mainly a reflection of the Russian character, or—turn it the other way around—Has the Russian character been formed in a certain way by having more than seventy years of Communist control?

This brings us back to the issue of socialization practices, my position on which I previously stated. I think socialization practices may be the cause of national character. They reflect other attributes of national character, but in themselves are not national character. What about the question of the history of national actions? Let us take something like the frequency of wars as an example. Does the fact that a country goes to war more often than any 20-year period somehow reflect its national character? or Should this be related more to social structure and politics?

Finally, just a few words about the second theme which I promised to touch on, and then I will finish my presentation and yield to Prof. Hayashi. Again, the second of my five themes is what we mean by "share." What kind of a distribution across equals and over time is required to specify the existence of national character? We have indicated here some of the issues one has to deal with in this regard. This raises the question, Across the population or by number, what should be the rule? One response might be, it is not national character; you clearly do not mean what you are talking about; that is, that all or most people hold the same view or act in the same way. This is identified in Profs. Hayashi, Suzuki and Sasaki's work as a theme of homogeneity. I arbitrarily use something like a 75 percent rule. Unless 75 percent of the people hold the view, it is simply not part of national character.

This raises a very interesting question, which we cannot get into now. You noticed that in Japanese studies one of the things they considered to be distinctively part of the core of the Japanese problem is the choice of taking care of your obligation to the person who was your mentor vs. attending a corporate meeting of extreme importance. On that question, there is, generally—and over the years it has been unvarying—a 50-50 split. If you apply the 75 percent rule, going home to your mentor would not be considered scoring in the direction of being Japanese. While I believe this is a Japanese issue, I do not think that question taps what they think it taps. I think what the question shows is the dilemma. There is a deep-seated and permanent dilemma among the

Japanese, between their obligation to the family and their obligation to the benefactor, a part of which is extended to the workplace and the family. Prof. DeVos will comment on this extensively.

In the United States, the leaning is the other way. If you ask enough questions, most Americans feel they have to sacrifice their job for the family, but maybe not, and if not, then this is an interesting similarity. The second approach would be majority rule. If there is any set of questions or core which is consistently responded to by 50 percent of the population, then that is enough. The third approach involves a mobile pattern. I and Prof. Levinson proposed this a long time ago. What is meant by "mobile pattern"? This is a complex question. Basically, what we have in mind here is that there is a quality or attitude which is not held by most, not held by the majority, but is still a significant cluster in a given population. How do we know it is a significant cluster? Basically, the most obvious way is to look across nations. If you have a quality that is relatively rare in all human populations—let us say generally it only appears amongst two or three percent of the people—but in a given population this view or orientation is held by 25 or 30 percent of the people, then that is a very significant mode. This is why I say I believe this requires differentiation from other nations. But perhaps others have another way of approaching this problem of modes. The general issue is then raised: Is uniqueness required? One has failed to describe the national character unless one has shown us the way in which it is unique. My own view on this is that uniqueness should not be required; that there is no reason why the same character, broadly speaking, should not be shared by many people from different nations. If you have broad ideas of civilization, this is fairly obvious; for example, how much differentiation should you get if you take Europe as a whole and consider certain core values to be European? As against all the countries which are Confucian? Within those clusters you might find much more similarity than you find across countries. It could also be, however, that if in fact these characteristics are associated with certain things, like level of economic development, for example, there will not be uniqueness as a central interest but rather as a relationship between national character and level of economic development.

So, we have many issues of this kind to discuss. The second aspect of the problem has to do with what you do about sharing across time. Is it meaningful to say, "Look, I cannot bother with all the issues about the long-term and the permanent. I have a population out there to study and I want to study them, and I study them psychologically. My concern is like photography; I can hold a camera and take a picture at any moment in time, and whenever it is widely shared and meets my other criteria, I will say, 'okay, that is the national character as of now.' I make no assumptions about what it was yesterday or what it will be tomorrow." Few people will adopt this approach, but it must be considered. There is also the issue of having a minimum duration. One is not willing to accept the fact that something was there momentarily, but one wants to adopt a minimum duration. How long does it have to last? For example, suppose you go to Japan and you see most of the people at one point in time saying "The value I most want in life is to enjoy myself" as against an earlier time when people were saying "What I most want in life is to serve my country or my family." Now, suppose you start out with 70 percent of the Japanese people holding the latter view. Ten years later, how many people must still hold this position to say that it is still part of the core of the definition of the Japanese national character? Some people will say, "Look, if it is not still there in a

decade, I am not going to include it." Someone else might say, "Look, do not rush me; give me a generation. If it disappears in the next generation then it is no longer a part of their national character. So, let's do national character by generation."

One could also write rules. For example, one can specify the rate of change and say, "I will not accept this as part of the core if it changes plus or minus 7 percent per year." Why do I choose 7 percent? Because if you have plus or minus, gain or loss, steadily for 7 years, then in fact you either double or cut in half whatever you had to begin with. This is a nice rule of thumb you might want to consider when making an investment.

The other way of approaching this problem is looking across populations by categories. In other words, how much variation is allowed? In the first place, by gender. Suppose women and men do not have the same view of things; they do not respond in the same way, and they do not behave in the same way. What is the national character? Are there two national characters, a male national character and a female national character? Maybe there are, but this is a very challenging proposition. On the other hand, men and women may be very much in agreement. This, then, is one way of saying, "Look, from my point of view only if men and women are doing the same thing will I consider it part of national character. If the male-female approach is sufficiently split, that for me is not part of the national character—it is something else that is real and important."

There is an alternative way of going about this and I term this the issue of "typical polarities." One way to approach the problem is to say, "I will measure national character not in terms of an absolute position but rather in terms of polarity." One of those polarities was referred to above: the Japanese conflict between one's obligation to one's mentor and one's obligation to one's family. A long time ago Levinson and I termed this "classical dilemmas." We said every population has dilemmas around which much feeling and behavior is organized, with people pulling one way or the other. The gender question may be very much like this; it may be full of polarities, and thus the way to deal with gender is not to count numbers, but to ask what are the typical polarities, and to compare across countries; that is, to compare a set of countries in terms of their polarities around certain issues, including the most fundamental ones: Who does the housework? and Who raises the children?

Then we have subsequent questions about similarities by class or caste, by occupation and by education. It is certainly very rare to find a characteristic which is relatively invariant across all of these features. As an example of extreme stability, but also to show the extent to which it varies by social strata, perhaps the following point will serve. Ask the people of the United States how they feel about the military: are they good guys or bad guys? Now, whether or not this should be a part of the conception of national character is questionable. It is certainly not an objective circumstance. You are not asking, Are the military killing or not killing? You are asking, Are they good guys or bad guys? Now here we have as respondents natives of the United States from ages 64 to 78. As you can see, this is not perfect. Although one could see lines that are perfectly straight, it is pretty steady. Over time, approximately 75 percent of the American people, on average, say they consider the American military to be "pretty good guys."

There has been some long downturn and a few jiggles up and down. If one examines the bottom half of the table (dealing with educational differentiation), early on this attribute did not much matter. But, as time went on, the disagreement between the various groups enlarged considerably. I do not have an answer to this; one would, probably by empirical experience, have to set up a rule. Even given this much difference, however, would it not be appropriate to say that there still is a general national tendency? In this case one would probably say yes, because by experience this is a rather narrow range.

As another example, if one asks the question in the United States, "Do you think you are being treated equally with everybody else?" overwhelmingly Americans say yes, and they say the same thing year in and year out. But, if we ask blacks vs. whites, the overall line looks like that depicted in the illustration, with the black line actually looking like that depicted in the figure. Blacks disagree very much with whites, and the trend is toward increasing disagreement over time. In this case, then, it can be argued that while at one time this was a coherent national view, then by this time we are less confident of its coherence, and by yet another time it may be gone entirely. That is part of the phenomenon of change that we have been looking at.

This completes my presentation. I have placed a very large number of issues before the conference, and I hope we will have an opportunity to return to some of them. It was my intention to present you with a sense for the overall complexity so that no one would assume that we are more simple-minded than we actually are. Indeed, perhaps we are simple-minded enough; anyone who undertakes the study of national character in the full view of many people is putting themselves at very great risk.

Presentation of Prof. Hayashi

Prof. Inkeles' discussion was very interesting. I will address some of his points in my talk.

Interchronological study reveals dynamic features of national character with social change, while international comparative study reveals findings of particularism vs. universalism or similarity vs. dissimilarity among different cultural societies. There are many approaches to the study of national character. In its broadest sense, and especially in the context of comparative research, each approach has its own methods and characteristics. They reveal different cross-sections of a nation's reality. The various approaches are complementary insofar as their methodology is made clear. Among those scholars on Japanese national character, for example, we find such famous individuals as Ruth Benedict, Ezra Vogel, Edwin Reischauer, Chie Nakane, and Takeo Doi.

I stand on the quantitative approach. First, I define national character as this: Japanese national character is the belief systems, ways of thinking and emotional attitudes of the Japanese. This definition is very operational from my standpoint. That is, my approach is to reveal national character as defined by design of surveys and exploratory analysis of data with the present population. From my point of view of behaviormetrics, I speak of statistical, mathematical and behavioral analysis of behavioral

data. More specifically, this is represented by data structures and relative frequency distributions of opinions and emotional attitudes.

As Prof. Inkeles mentioned in his paper, "National Character Revisited," this exploratory approach is not theory-driven, but is data-driven. Further, this is quite similar to Prof. Schuman's idea of exploring hypotheses based on data. Systematic data collection means time-series data and international comparative data obtained by well-designed sampling surveys and well-designed questionnaire construction, as well as intensive data analysis under a defined approach.

First, on this, the Research Committee on the Study of National Character at the Institute of Statistical Mathematics began the first general social survey on national character in 1953. Prof. Suzuki and I have been involved with the survey from the beginning. These studies have been based on nationwide sample surveys using stratified three-stage random sampling. Sample spots range from 200 to 300, and the sample size is 3,000 to 4,000. The first survey was begun in 1953 and the surveys have been conducted every five years since, with the eighth and most recent survey having been conducted in 1988. Our questionnaires have included three types of questions: (a) those dealing directly with Japanese national character; for example, questions about actions and/or attitudes which specialists on the Japanese national character describe as being uniquely Japanese (cf. Doi, Nakane and Benedict); (b) questions drawn from counterpart foreign general social survey research; and (c) questions designed to yield data that can be compared with foreign studies.

In 1953, there were very few foreign studies on national character. Through statistical analysis of the time-series data, the consistent nature of the Japanese mind, and signs of the formation of a new Japanese belief system and way of thinking have emerged. Changes are shown as changes in frequency distributions of responses and as changes in data structures.

We carried out these national character surveys at five-year intervals, and in 1971 we also began adding cross-national surveys, using the same, or almost the same, questionnaires persistently. Indeed, our surveys are probably the only ones in the world which have used the same or almost the same questionnaire and survey system for over 35 years.

We understand that some surveys are now being conducted in a manner similar to ours, such as those at NORC in Chicago, at ZUMA in Mannheim, and at ZA in Koln in the Federal Republic of Germany. However, they have not used the same survey system each time. The principal reason why we began to conduct cross-national surveys in 1971 relates to the fact that after having conducted our national surveys four times, we recognized that it was quite difficult to make clear the Japanese national character without comparison to those of other countries. Thus, first, we conducted a survey in Hawaii. We selected Japanese-Americans living in Hawaii and used the same questionnaire which we had been using previously in Japan. From this survey, we found that some Japanese social and cultural values remain, at least partially, among the Japanese-Americans. Thus, we have developed comparative study by social surveys in a new light. That is, we

have become aware that it is very fruitful to reveal universality vs. particularity, or similarity vs. dissimilarity among the attitudes of peoples in different cultures.

The surveys in 1978 and 1983 for Honolulu residents, including Japanese-Americans, and the American survey in 1980, were conducted using the questions from the Japanese national character surveys and some new questions in comparative perspectives. In the process of data analysis, we found a new methodology, so-called "cultural-link analysis for comparative research." Through analysis of the data, we found that we could confirm the gradually changing pattern of opinion structures in the following groups: Japanese, Japanese-Americans in Honolulu, non-Japanese-Americans in Honolulu born In Hawaii, non-Japanese-Americans in Honolulu born on the U.S. mainland, and Americans on the U.S. mainland. The Japanese-Americans living in Hawaii represented linkage respondents for comparing both countries. In the construction of the questionnaire, we used the same idea. This cultural-link method is very useful for comparing and contrasting several nations to detect similarities and dissimilarities among nations. Concrete examples will be discussed by Prof. Suzuki later.

Using questions on the Japanese national character and other questions chosen for their comparative utility under the notion of cultural-link analysis, we conducted surveys in the United States, including Hawaii, as a special linkage region; Great Britain; the Federal Republic of Germany; France; and Japan, in 1987 and 1988. Analyses of these data are now in progress. This comparison of more than two or three nations has turned out to be much more informative. For example, the comparison between the United States and Japan becomes more informative if it is viewed in the context of comparisons among other countries.

I would like to talk about some fundamental ideas here, such as comparison of the dynamic features of national character In our study. This may address some of the issues raised in Prof. Inkeles' presentation. From the survey data, frequency distributions in total are very important, and frequency distributions on various breakdowns, comparing features shown by analysis, are significantly informant. The features of age difference in Japan, for example, are different from those of the United States, Germany, and France. Sex differences are also very notable.

The time-series data show that there are changes of several types: in one direction (i.e., unidirectional type), U-shaped types (i.e., valley-shaped), mountain-shaped type changes, a type represented by small changes, a type represented by no change, and a type represented by "other" forms of change. This is possible on several breakdowns and is a dynamic feature of dominant opinions. Prof. Inkeles always wants more than 75 percent, but, to us, a major predominant opinion means what is supported by not only more than two-thirds of the total sample, but also by more than two-thirds of all the breakdowns, by sex, age, and education. This means predominant opinion and analysis of age and time period, change in age and time period, change only by age but not time period, change by time period but not age, and change neither by age nor by time period. Comparative change can be analyzed by cohort analysis based on some mathematical model. An example will be explained by Prof. Suzuki later.

We have found, in our survey research experience, that when we compare the percentage of some responses to a given question, even if the percentage distributions of responses are similar between nations being compared, it does not necessarily follow that most compared nations are exhibiting similar attitudinal structures, unless the response structure is similar. In other words, comparison of marginal distributions as percentages cannot clarify the way of thinking or belief system which explicitly characterizes the view of life of various nations or cultures. We shall show a simple example.

Let us think about two nations, A and B, with populations of 1,000 each, and two questions, I and II, and two dichotomized responses, + and -, for each question. Suppose that the marginal distributions of responses + and - are 60 percent and 40 percent for both nations equally. (See Table 1.) In this case, Nations A and B would be seen as similar, and the response patterns for Questions I and II could be assumed to be similar. Now, let us say that the marginal response distributions for A and B are identical, for Question I, at 70 percent and 30 percent. But, for Question II, the marginal distributions differ. In Nation A the + response pattern is 70 percent and the - response pattern is 30 percent. In Nation B, on the other hand, the response pattern for + is 30 percent and that for - is 70 percent. In this case, although the logic is the same, the marginal response distributions for Question II between Nations A and B are different, indicating that Nations A and B are different. If the marginal response distributions for Question II were the same for both nations, it could be assumed that the two nations were the same. However, as can be seen in Table 2, if we create cross-tables of Nations A and B for Questions I and II, we see that the way of thinking for the two nations (i.e., the coherence of the response patterns for Questions I and II) are quite different. In Nation A the coherence of the way of thinking emerges in combinations of (+ +) and (−) between Questions I and II. In Nation B the coherence of the way of thinking emerges with the combinations of (+-) and (-+) between Questions I and II. Thus, the relationships of + and - for both Questions I and II are quite different. In other words, between Nations A and B the system of thought is different. Therefore, it would be difficult for members of each nation to understand the system of thought prevailing in the other nation. For Nation A, the combinations (+ +) and (−) are understandable. If a person of Nation B chose + for Question I, persons of Nation A would assume that persons of Nation B would then choose the + pattern for Question II. Also, for Nation A persons, if Nation B persons chose the - response pattern for Question I, then Nation A persons would assume that Nation B persons would choose the - response pattern. However, if these assumptions on the part of Nation A persons are incorrect, then, for them persons of Nation B have an odd or incomprehensible system of thought. Whether or not the system of thought is understandable or peculiar depends upon whether or not the coherence of the response patterns is the same. In other words, the differences in response patterns between the two questions reveal the differences in the systems of thought.

	I		II		Total
	+	-	+	-	
A	600	400	600	400	1000
B	600	400	600	400	1000

Table 1. Example of marginal distribution

A					B				
I II	+	-	Total		I II	+	-	Total	
+	500	100	600		+	200	400	600	
-	100	300	400		-	400	0	400	
Total	600	400	1000		Total	600	400	1000	

Table 2. An example of crosstabulation

Differences in the system of thought or way of thinking consequently result in a lack of communication and misinterpretations of evaluations of mutual understanding. In the case of differences of scale value distributions on the same attitudes and attitudinal structures, we can still understand each other as long as values are measurable on the same scale, while we can understand that others have different opinions insofar as the same scale exists. Those without measurable scales are beyond mutual understanding. This is the reason why we need new methodologies for comparative studies.

The belief system or way of thinking can be recognized through analysis of response patterns from many questions. We represented group data structures from attitude structures stemming from analysis of response patterns of many questions. In order to identify the relation among many questions, the factor analytic method must be applied, what we call "quantification of response pattern," and which was developed independently by Guttman, Benzecri, and myself. This method is a variation of principal component analysis based on qualitative data expressed by categorical responses, and it has been called the "third method of quantification" in Japan. In France, it is called "correspondence analysis."

I have diverged here to explain our study. Going back to the subject, I expect to hear of interesting findings by other approaches. As a consequence, I believe it is very useful and stimulating to exchange ideas and discuss problems. I expect that this conference will prove fruitful in this regard, through both its formal and informal communications.

Discussion

Prof. Wilensky

This question is addressed to Prof. Inkeles and others. It seems to me that in your concept of national character, you frequently include behavior as well as the ideational realm (values, beliefs, attitudes, symbols). There is a long tradition in social science of separating these two, for good reason. I would like to present a couple of examples of these good reasons.

If one thinks of social structure as patterns of interaction that persist across generations and comprise systems that are enduring (social systems, political systems and economic systems, as well as kinship systems), and one distinguishes these from values, beliefs and symbols, then one can relate the two. In your concept of national character, Prof. Inkeles, you say you include behavior—although I am not clear which kinds of behavior you exclude—does this not blot out the opportunity to relate these two phenomena? I find it very important to relate these two. Myrdahl, for example, in *American Dilemma* dealing with race relations, said, "You have discrimination; that is, a pattern of behavior when a bank refuses credit to a black, when an election official refuses the right to vote to a black. This is behavior; it is institutional; it is patterned. On the other hand, you have prejudice, which is in the minds of people. It is their stereotypes." Separating these two, we did an analysis of race relations in America that suggested that the patterns of discrimination would gradually erode because of the ideology in people's heads, especially the white elite, who, in presidential speeches, in rotary club speeches, kept invoking the American creed of liberty and equality. You do not have the problem that Myrdahl had if you conflate the two, and he was perhaps correct in his theory that the white man's guilt about the ideology he espoused in relation to the practices he engaged in would create a strain toward change.

If you take labor relations, you can make a proposition like this: political ideology will account for labor militancy. Concretely, syndicalist ideology will predict strike rates. It turns out this is probably true. In Italy, France, Spain and other places, syndicalist ideology was conterminous with high strike rates, very high strike rates, and great labor militancy. If you conflate the two, you have nothing to study. Would you address yourself to this? I think there is a merit in separating the two and not including everything in the behavioral realm, or anything in the behavioral realm, in the concept of national character.

Prof. Lipset

I would like to pose a question to Prof. Hayashi that will suffice as applied to Professor Inkeles' talk. You are aware that I agree completely that the study of national character and its differences must be conducted comparatively. In fact, I have a formula: that a person who only knows one country knows no country; that one cannot understand a country by itself; that it can only be understood comparatively. This then raises the question: which countries do you compare?

One can compare all countries or one can compare two countries, and, in fact, as some have pointed out, if one compares many countries, this emphasizes the similarity among countries. If one compares two countries with each other, even if they are very similar, as I have done with Canada and the United States, this type of comparison emphasizes differences. In your survey comparisons you included the United States and some European countries. While that is very important and the results are very interesting, I think it would also be important to compare these with some Asian countries which have some, though far from all, cultural similarities. In fact, I have thought the unit of China, Korea and Japan could be an extremely fruitful comparative frame because, as you know, China and Japan are actually very, very different countries. In fact, my impression is that the Chinese and the Japanese differ much more from each other than, say, Norwegians do from Sicilians, and that Korea comes in the middle. Indeed, I would say that Korea is the Canada of the Orient because it has some Japanese characteristics structurally and some Chinese. I think you would get some interesting analytic differences by looking at the three. In any case, what I am suggesting, and perhaps you have done this in other contexts, is that you include Korea in your next comparative framework. If you cannot include mainland China, perhaps you can look at Taiwan, Hong Kong and/or Singapore to determine to what extent people talk of a Confucian ethic.

I would like to make one other point in relation to this, regarding the linguistic pattern. As you know, there is a worldwide comparative value study being administered by Gallup. They presently have about 25 countries and are hoping, next time around, to have about 50. One of their interesting findings is a pattern of linguistic similarity. That is, the English-speaking countries, England, the United States, English Canada and Australia, have a very common pattern. The French-speaking countries also have a common pattern. The Scandinavian countries, with one significant exception, have one too. This raises an interesting idea; that perhaps there is a common English-language culture and a French-language culture, and that these are really the units which should be examined. It could also be that translation and language itself have important impacts. I believe these findings point out the need for further study of this comparative frame and the question of language.

Prof. Wilensky

How frequently does something have to appear in a population to be considered a characteristic? Realize that one cannot make any judgment about this except by finding absences in other populations.

Prof. Lipset

In looking at Canada, if you find that one country shows 30 percent on something and another country shows 10 percent, while it is not the majority, it does say something about the nature of the differences between the two, although the absolute numbers, I believe, often do not mean anything. They are an artifact of the way the question was asked. It is these relative differences, though, which are important.

Prof. Wilensky

That is my point exactly.

Prof. Hayashi

I shall reply to your question. Your points are correct. Korean and Chinese surveys are important, but they are impossible to conduct. I am very interested in carrying out such surveys as part of our cultural-link analysis. Based on our experiences using Hawaii as a linkage point between the U.S. and Japan, our intention is to conduct cross-national studies between the U.S. and China, using Hawaii as a linkage point for Chinese-Americans who live in Hawaii. By the same token, we plan to do cross-national surveys between Korea and the U.S. by using Korean-Americans who live in Hawaii. In the future, it would be ideal to carry out surveys among French-Canadians to compare Canada and France, and among English-Canadians for comparing Canada and England.

There are serious translation problems, from Japanese to English, from English to German, and from English to French. Therefore, the response rate will reflect these translation difficulties. It is difficult to clarify whether or not these response rate differences are due to translation problems or something else. We must find a strategy to account for these translation difficulties.

Methodological Issues In the Study of National Character	CHAIR H. Wilensky	DISCUSSION LEADERS T. Suzuki H. Schuman

Remarks of Prof. Wilensky

Our two discussants have spent many long, hard hours doing what not a lot of social scientists have done; namely, trying to track attitudes over time from survey data. If one can track attitudes over time, then perhaps one can overcome some of the problems that were raised earlier today; namely, that one may just be dealing with political, electoral or business cycles or crises of one kind or another. And, the longer the time span one can use the better off one will be in distinguishing those enduring attitudes, values and beliefs from those that are linked to these cycles in the real world, the real world of change. Thus, it is very good that we have such wonderful data sets as those we have just heard about from Prof. Hayashi. Prof. Schuman, as well, has been at this for two decades, gathering data in the Detroit area study at the Institute for Social Research.

Presentation of Prof. Suzuki

Today, I would like to discuss correspondence analysis and cohort analysis and their relation to our national character studies, with particular emphasis on cross-national studies. For the technical aspects of both analyses, see the sources listed. I will not go into detail about technical issues here. Rather, I want to explain how to apply these analyses and to describe their differences with respect to their use for studies of national character.

Correspondence analysis is very useful for detecting response structures, as Professor Hayashi mentioned earlier. He also pointed out that simple comparisons of percentages of response distributions are not enough to conclude that nations are similar or dissimilar with regard to specific responses. Correspondence analysis is a method to express visually in Euclidean space the fact that similar opinions are closely located while differing opinions are distantly located.

To take this a step further, if we set up an axis or axes and the response rate for a certain question is high, then that question is located close to the point of origin. In other words, the higher the response rate, the closer the point to the origin. I will provide some examples later.

When comparing several nations, if the response patterns using cross-tables based on nations are similar between two nations, then the two nations are located close to one another in Euclidean space. Additionally, if we use longitudinal data, we can determine how the opinion has changed over time.

The first example involves a question worded as follows: "There are all sorts of attitudes toward life. Which one of the following statements would you say comes closest to your way of life?"

1. Work hard and get rich.
2. Study honestly and make a name for yourself.
3. Don't think about money or fame; just live a life that suits your own taste.
4. Live each day as it comes cheerfully and without worrying.
5. Resist all evils in the world and live a pure and just life.
6. Never think of yourself; give everything in service of society.

These questions apply to studies in certain countries. Using these cross-tables based on nations, we characterize correspondence by so-called correspondence or response pattern analysis.

These analyses compared two surveys, one conducted by Gallup International in 1979 on 13 nations' social values, and the other a trend survey of the Japanese National Character Study. Here we compared the cross-sectional data, i.e., the Japanese national character studies in 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1973 and 1978. On the lower right-hand side one finds the 13 countries from the 1979 study, such as Australia, Canada, the U.S., Italy and Japan. On the upper right-hand side we see the U.S. in 1978, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France. On the lower left-hand side, we see Philippines, and Singapore, while on the upper left-hand side we see Brazil and South Korea. South Korea held the summer Olympic Games just a few years ago. Interestingly, South Korea's economic situation is similar to that of Japan in 1964, when they held the summer Olympic Games.

"Here are some of the things people usually take into account in relation to their work. Which one would you personally place first?"

1. Good salary so that you do not have any worries about money.
2. Safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment.
3. Working with people you like.
4. Doing an important job which gives you a feeling of accomplishment.
5. Other
6. Don't know

This is West Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg Netherlands, Denmark, the U.S., and Japan. Referring to the chart, this is a good salary, no risk of unemployment, working with people you like, and a feeling of accomplishment. The sources are the European Committee's Survey of 1973 and 1978 and the survey on the Japanese National Character by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics. The result of correspondence analysis is like this: Japan is here, the United States is here, and all other European countries here.

Based on the 13-country studies, using 100 questions, we locate all response patterns. Japan is here and the U.S. is here. So, the response patterns between the two

Figure 1 Positioning of each nation with respect to the "way of life" by means of the quantification of crosstable method

NOTE:All except Japan's 1953 and 1978 data and the United States'1978 data represent the results of value attitude surveys among 13 nations.

SOURCES:European Community Survey of 1973; Japanese National Character Survey of 1978. Institute of Statistical Mathematics

Figure 2   Positioning of each nation based on the Value Attitude
            Survey among 13 nations by means of the quantification
            of crosstable method

#5. 1 d   3.

Important virtues   Respecting individual rights

< HYPER-PARAMETERS AND ABIC >	HYPER-PARAMETER	SQR OF M.S.D.	RANGE OF P.V.		HYPER-PARAMETER	SQR OF M.S.D.	RANGE OF P.V.
PERIOD =	1.0000	.191	.639	PERIOD =	2.0000	.250	.775
AGE =	1.0000	.159	.925	AGE =	.0313	.008	.043
COHORT =	.5000	.087	.528	COHORT =	2.0000	.215	1.983
ABIC =	88.5285	(SIGMA=0.040642)		ABIC =	87.5590	(SIGMA=0.037126)	

< GRAND MEAN >   < GRAND MEAN >

         -.2788   -.6096
       (43.07)   (35.22)

< PERIOD >   -2.0   -1.0   .0   1.0   2.0 -2.0   -1.0   .0   1.0   2.0   < PERIOD >

KS3 63	.3288		.4374	1963
KS4 68	.1166		.0786	1968
KS5 73	.0828		.0795	1973
KS6 78	-.2185		-.2584	1978
KS7 83	-.3097		-.3371	1983

< AGE >   < AGE >

20-24	.5751		.0268	20-24
25-29	.1918		.0130	25-29
30-34	.1324		.0071	30-34
35-39	.0576		.0077	35-39
40-44	-.0105		-.0064	40-44
45-49	.0281		-.0025	45-49
50-54	-.1575		-.0115	50-54
55-59	-.2067		-.0081	55-59
60-64	-.3501		-.0098	60-64
65-69	-.2603		-.0163	65-69

< COHORT >   < COHORT >

N26-N30	-.2519		-1.2987	1893-97
N31-N35	-.2061		-.9503	1898-02
N36-N40	-.0963		-.6765	1903-07
N41-T 1	-.0396		-.6176	1908-12
T 2-T 6	-.0042		-.2212	1913-17
T 7-T11	-.0064		-.1390	1918-22
T12-S 2	.0380		.1181	1923-27
S 3-S 7	.1522		.1429	1928-32
S 8-S12	.2765		.5181	1933-37
S13-S17	.2369		.6119	1938-42
S18-S22	.0794		.6010	1943-47
S23-S27	.0514		.6509	1948-52
S28-S32	-.0764		.5762	1953-57
S33-S37	-.1535		.6841	1958-62

(A) FOR MALES   (B) FOR FEMALES

countries are not similar. Australia and Canada are very similar so far as response patterns are concerned.

The first dimension separates West and East. The second dimension separates new and old; new continents and old continents.

Referring to Figure 2, this is the U.S., Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Countries which were underdeveloped at the time of the surveys include the Philippines, Singapore, and Brazil. We have all kinds of cross-tabulation tables, but with 100 questions it is difficult to understand the characteristics of the response patterns at a glance. Therefore, this is an easy way to interpret many tables at one time.

With regard to cohort analysis, methodologically, we believe if we have data covering cohorts, survey periods and age distributions, it is quite difficult to partition all three effects of cohort, age and time period, to determine the existence, and if it exists, as well as the persistence of any given effect. I will provide some examples, although there are no data as yet.

Which effect or effects have a significant impact on the development of dental cavities? Cavities could be a function of age and/or a function of increased sugar consumption during specific time periods, and/or a function of cohort sugar consumption. In earlier life stages, like the World War II period, of which I was a part, in Japan there were significant sugar shortages, so, although my teeth are not so good now, in my earlier years, my teeth were quite healthy.

By the same token, we can apply a similar argument about these three effects to voting behavior, religiosity, or other kinds of issues. Religiosity will be explained by Prof. Sasaki tomorrow. If we speak about voting behavior, people become conservative with age or time period; that is, social or historical events or experiences such as war or depression at an earlier life stage may have made them conservative in later life. Recently, the Bayesian approach was suggested to determine the best way to partition each effect properly. We have applied this method to several issues.

Question: "If you were asked to choose the two most important items listed on this card, which two would you choose?"

1. Filial piety; respect for parents
2. Repaying obligations to benefactors
3. Respect for the rights of the individual
4. Respect for the freedom of the individual
5. Other
6. Don't know

This chart shows the results of the cohort analysis for this question. This is for period effect, age effect, and cohort effect. This is for males and this is for females. The survey periods were from 1963 to 1968, 1968 to 1973, and so on. Age is 20-24, 25-29, to 65-69. Cohorts represent those who were born in 1893 through 1897, those who were born in 1958 through 1962.

We applied Bayesian cohort analysis to this question. The results are shown in Figure 1. For response category (3), "respect for the rights of the individual," cohort has a significant effect only for Japanese females; that is, Japanese females who received education immediately after World War II, during the American occupation, exhibited a significant cohort effect with regard to respecting the rights of individual in their later life stages. These data support the proverb that the child is father to the man, or in this case that the child is mother to the woman.

The cohort analysis methodology is very effective for research on socialization and, finally, it is quite interesting that we can identify impacts from the American occupation of Japan on subsequent Japanese social and cultural values.

Presentation of Prof. Schuman

In studying national character, I start from the two positions that Prof. Inkeles and Daniel Levinson stated very clearly in their 1954 chapter, a paper which helped shape this entire field. These positions were reiterated by Prof. Inkeles in his 1988 paper and then just earlier today.

First, national character is most usefully conceptualized at the level of individuals, which means that we must attempt to measure individual attitudes, dispositions, values, and other characteristics. I would also include behavior. I will return to the point that Prof. Wilensky made shortly. Since we are always studying behavior, our inferences, i.e., whatever we say about attitudes, are inferences from behavior, be it a response to a questionnaire or an observed behavior. Secondly, this means that we should think in terms of samples, good samples, of well-defined populations; either national populations or subpopulations that are structured in terms of region or role or some other social unit.

This raises a question which was brought up earlier: "What happens if we find that the Japanese and Americans differ significantly and substantially, and yet the difference is, say, 5 percent for one country on some dimension, and 25 percent for the other country on the dimension?" Then we are clearly not dealing with national character, if by that we mean that most or all of a population is characterized in some way. This is an interesting issue. The way this was approached in the Inkeles and Levinson essay was not to talk so much in terms of national character but of "modal personality," and to allow for the fact that there indeed could be more than one modal personality within a single geographic population. In fact, it is even possible that the most interesting differences are—and this is theoretically possible—that the United States has several different personality constellations and that Japan has more homogeneity, with the variation among those, or the differences in the amount of variation in the two countries, turning out to be important. In any case, if one focuses on individuals and one begins with the assumption of drawing samples from natural populations, then this leads most naturally to the use of the survey method, sample interview surveys, but this is by no means an inevitable method. I believe we should not assume that we should always use interview surveys with questions and answers.

I once heard Prof. Inkeles describe in the most colorful terms what he thinks would happen if a person took a slightly oversized package into a post office in two different countries. In England, he suggested that the Postmaster would be very sympathetic, would try to fit the package in somehow, and, if necessary, even get another box to put it in that would be a little smaller. In France, the Postmaster would look at the person, laugh at them, rebuke them, perhaps even take the package and throw it at the person, and push them out the door! I do not know if these are true, and I do not think that Prof. Inkeles was necessarily assuming that they were true, but it has always occurred to me that it would be interesting to draw a sample of post offices in France and England, and perhaps in Japan also, and have people go in with packages in order to see what would happen across a wide sample of post offices in the several countries. One might want to vary the age, sex and social status of the person delivering the package to the post office to see if these had an effect. This is a kind of a survey; it just is not an interview survey. Nonetheless, I believe the behavior revealed here could be very valuable.

Indeed, there have been some such experiments. The classic one was carried out by Stanley Milgrem many years ago. He used an Ashe-type experiment (cf. Solomon Ashe on conformity) and I believe it was conducted in France and Norway. He found that Norwegians tended to conform much more than did the French. He did not have good samples of the populations, so in that sense it was defective, but if we assume that one would get the same results with good samples of the populations, then it seems to me the results in terms of differences in national conformity tendencies would be quite important and revealing, whatever their cause.

This gets back to what we want to think of as personality; however, I would favor not limiting that term too quickly to something one gets only through projective tests or some other artificial instrument. So, I do not assume we have to use interview surveys, but nevertheless most of us have a commitment to the survey method, the interview survey method, and so that is what we have been talking about. I believe all the examples given so far have come out of sample interview surveys. In trying to use them in a comparative way, it seems to me we put the survey, the interview survey, to its most severe test—indeed, a paradoxical one—because surveys depend on language; they depend on how people understand questions and answers; they depend on interactions between interviewers and respondents; and these, perhaps, are all determined by or are reflections of national character. Thus, we are asking the survey to do a somewhat strange thing: to reveal differences in national character when it itself may be affected by those differences.

Here, it seems to me a distinction made in a paper by Profs. Hayashi and Suzuki between what they called "hard modes" and "soft modes" of study is important. The "hard modes" are analytic methods; the types exemplified in the previous diagrams and descriptions of analyses. I believe these do not involve this problem of the national character itself affecting the method. One can use such methods with any form of data. On the other hand, the "soft mode" aspect of doing surveys, namely problems of language, interviewing, the meanings of questions and the like, are themselves directly influenced, or at least theoretically we should admit they may be influenced, by national differences. Because of this, I believe it is useful to supplement the typical survey in two

ways: the first is to build into it experiments–what I have often called survey-based experiments–where we deliberately vary such things as the sex of the interviewer; in the United States, the race of the interviewer; the order of the questions; or the extent to which people are encouraged to say "Don't Know" if that is their tendency or discouraged and indeed prevented from saying "Don't Know," which often happens in surveys. We should build these experiments in because we should not assume that surveys simply reveal pre-existing attitudes and values. They shape those attitudes and values as well, and whatever we obtain in a survey is some mixture of what the situation calls for and what the person brings to the situation. This is dramatically shown by the very large effects of the race of the interviewer on responses in the United States. Blacks and whites both express very different attitudes, if we want to call these attitudes, to black interviewers than they do to white interviewers. This can be seen as a problem, as an obstacle to carrying out a study, but it is also a substantive result. The reason blacks and whites respond differently to different race interviewers is because blacks and whites respond differently to blacks and whites in American society. So this is not simply a methodological problem or artifact; it reflects the reality of our society.

In answer to Prof. Wilensky's question about whether this applies across subjects, other than race, I should point out that it is mostly focused on race, but let me provide a very interesting example. If black respondents are asked to name their favorite entertainers and actors, with nothing about race in the question and they have not been asked any questions about race previously, they will give mostly black entertainers and actors if the interviewer is black; they will give mostly white entertainers and actors if the interviewer is white. They may not even be aware that they are doing this. We have done this experiment where we simply write down the names that they have given; we take them back, we code the names in terms of the race of the entertainer or actor, and there are very large differences. Now, there is nothing inherently racial here. It is not clear that the respondents are aware of what they are doing, nor is there any basis to assume that we are being misled, but somehow the situation calls for a different way of thinking because of the interviewer, or perhaps the frame of reference that the interviewer provides.

Thus, I believe it is useful, as we think of doing surveys to study national character, if we try to build experimental variations into those surveys; in the questions, in the type of interviewing; perhaps in the setting of the interview (work, home or wherever). So these built-in experiments represent one kind of supplement.

The second type of supplement I would hope to build in is to make more use of open-ended questions, especially questions that ask people why they have given the responses they have. For example, in Prof. Inkeles' paper, he talks about differences in happiness–in reports of happiness–across societies. These are very interesting differences that are meaningful. Even if we have doubts, I believe it would be useful if these surveys were to ask people, after first asking "How happy are you?" on whatever scale there is, "In what way are you happy?" or "What do you mean when you say you are happy or unhappy?" From this, we should learn a great deal. In fact, we did something like this long ago in the studies that resulted in the book by Inkeles and Smith called *Becoming Modern*, where, in at least one country, we followed up a selected set of questions–it could not be done across every question–by asking people why they had

said what they said. For example, in what was then East Pakistan and is now Bangla-desh, one of the questions tried to get at differences between purely material answers and more spiritual answers. We were dealing with a devout Islamic population and the idea was to see to what extent people thought of the spiritual world as important. The question, which was asked only of males, was worded something like this: "In addition to food and clothes and so forth, man depends on something beyond those for his happiness." We obtained a distribution which looked as though many people were talking in spiritual terms and not simply in material terms. But, the follow-up questions were quite revealing when we asked people what they meant by their answers. Indeed, the typical response was not at all spiritual. There were responses such as "A man cannot be happy unless he has a good wife" or "A man who does not have children to carry on his name will not be happy." They were not the kinds of religiously motivated responses that we thought we were going to get. Instead, there was a different response, but a quite meaningful one. Again, it was not that there was some artifact revealed, but rather that we learned the meaning of the question. Many times we ask questions which we start off thinking mean one thing but we often discover mean something else, either through the kinds of analysis that have been talked about or through open follow-up questions.

In the end, it seems to me that when we study national character differences, or when we study anything for that matter, that we are really after meaning and that having in people's own words their explanations of their responses is useful. Therefore, I suggest methodologically that we should proceed not only through standard surveys, valuable as they are, but with these two additions: the survey-based experiment which builds in variation and looks at it in a randomized way and the open follow-up questions that can give us better understanding of how the world looks to respondents.

We are focusing here on national differences and that is valuable. But there is another kind of study that Prof. Inkeles pioneered which is exactly the opposite. His interest was in the universal ways in which people give responses or act. In two very important pieces, one called "Industrial Man" and the other "Variations in Occupational Prestige," he showed that the same kinds of things can occur across societies. This is very important for us to keep in mind. Indeed, we should try to do both of these things at the same time; to look not only at differences but also at what is universal.

As Prof. Inkeles mentioned, I have been doing studies of collective memory or collective memories. While I do not know if this comes under "national character" or not, it is difficult for me to see how one cannot say that the memories that a people have are not important to their national character. Although we first did this in the United States, we have recently obtained data from Lithuania; a large sample of people from Lithuania which includes not only Lithuanians but also Russians living in Lithuania and Poles living there. We have been particularly interested in the relation of age—the age at which events occur—to memories of those events. We have found in Lithuania, as we did in the United States, that older people tend to remember events from their adolescence and that younger people also tend to remember events from their adolescence. If one looks at the memories people report in Lithuania, there are two significant events. One is the occupation of Lithuania by the Russians just before and then after World War II, and the other is what is happening today, the attempt to liberate Lithuania from Russian

occupation. Almost all Lithuanians, those who are ethnically Lithuanian, give one or the other of these events which are essentially the same. Older Lithuanians report "We were occupied by the Russians," "Our leadership was sent to Siberia," and so forth. The other report is "Today we are throwing off Russian occupation." Both these are really the same thing. For older people the emphasis is on what happened in 1940, and again in 1945 when the Russians came back in; for younger people, it is about what is happening today. There is also a very interesting difference between the older Russian and the older Lithuanian memories. They both talk about the 1940 and 1945 periods; however, for the Russians it is all about World War II. For the Lithuanians there is really no mention of World War II. Rather, their reported memories are about the Russian occupation just prior to the war and the Russian re-occupation at the close of the war. Thus, there are variations here that are interesting, but they are variations on a universal theme. I hope, as we go on, that we can keep the universal in mind in addition to national character differences.

Discussion

Prof. Inkeles

Let me take up the question of behavior. In the first place, let me say that any approach to national character depends upon a definitional propensity. There is no God-given definition of "national character." What is critical is that you make clear the basis on which you are operating. It is a matter of preference that some people have chosen to focus especially on attitudes, values and mental structures—what you refer to when you point to your head. However, I see no reason to exclude behavior so long as one is careful of what behaviors one selects; that is, one must have some principles for making these selections. For instance, filling out a questionnaire or responding to an interview is itself a behavior. So long as one uses this method, one will never have escaped the issue of behavior. Even though one has arbitrarily said "This kind of behavior is acceptable for my definition and another kind is not," this is perfectly all right. There is a relevant element, however, and that is that there are some things that cannot be gotten at or cannot be conveniently gotten at without actually getting people to do something. Consequently, if one cuts oneself off from behavior, one eliminates that kind of phenomenon. One can try to do this through questions. For example, one could say to someone, to use the example of the post office, "Suppose I brought a package to the post office and it was the wrong size according to the postal regulations. What would you think the postmaster would do?" Or, alternatively, one could say, "You are playing the postmaster, someone has done this, what would you do?" In this case, one does not need the actual behavior. For certain questions, if one wishes to relate the actual behaviors to the attitudes, one must omit the behaviors from the measurement. For instance, if one wants to relate social structure to national character, one cannot do the same kind of conflation. The problem of conflation is real, but the fact that one relies on behavior does not automatically mean that one has conflated. One has only conflated if one has relied exclusively on the one or the other that excludes doing the comparison. There is no absolute reason why one cannot draw the circle so that one includes elements of behavior.

Prof. Wilensky

Could you say a few words on the question of what behavior you exclude from national character in your definition because you did say, when you were presenting the definition and its implications, that you would include some behaviors and some you would not. I was not clear what your criteria are.

Prof. Inkeles

I earlier gave the example of tipping one's hat. If I know about this behavior, following the description that Prof. Schuman gave, from that I can make a meaningful interpretation of what people are doing about rule violations and rigidity about norms. That is the kind of interpretation I would make. And feeling for the other person when they have made a mistake within a rule. All of this could be derived from the kinds of things he said. Knowing that a person tips his hat, I cannot tell what that means.

Prof. Almond

Pursuing this question of the relationship of character behavior, unless one makes it very clear what is in the heads of people and how that relates to what they do, one has lost a fundamental aspect of the whole field of explanation which is occurring. Unless one makes this distinction clear, whether one wants to call it national character or whatever, both what people think and what they do, or whether one wants to restrict this to say what they think, and call what they do something else, that is really the fundamental question that we are dealing with.

Prof. Inkeles

You are taking basically the same position that I think was taken by Prof. Schuman, and it is a perfectly reasonable position if your intention is to compare certain behaviors with certain qualities in the head. On the other hand, if you are trying to construct a generalized image of the national character, you may include some behaviors and you are not conflating things if the behaviors you have built into the national character generalization are not redundant with the behaviors you are predicting. Here you must introduce the notion of redundancy. In other words, you can predict from one behavior to another behavior; you can predict from one attitude to another attitude; and you can predict from one attitude to a particular behavior. None of these violates your rules so long as it is not the same entity that you are involved with. However, you are quite right that you run the risk of that kind of redundancy when you build into your general measure things which are more or less analogues or things which are very close to the behavior you are going to predict. For that reason, under those circumstances, you might adopt one rule and under other circumstances another rule. This is a very real risk that people run; that they will do their comparisons in such a way that they have built an unhappy redundancy into the comparison. It is only by screening a particular study and by considering its purposes that you can tell whether that is sensible or not sensible.

Prof. Hsu

The detailed studies of who does what, whether it is that a belief is the same as a behavior, or how different and so on, require some supplement. Every society has a continuity. Do not forget this. For example, right now we are impressed by the East European revolt against the Communist rule. Also consider Martin Luther, when he started Protestantism. Today, we find the world has more Protestants than Catholics. In China, we find that although the Chinese population is only about one percent or less Christian as of 1949, after 1949 there were actually ten times as many Catholics than Protestants. The Chinese simply did not protest. Contrast China's case with that of Japan. Japan's population has one-tenth of one percent Christians, whereas China has one percent Christians. No matter what one says, this is a difference. Thus, when one is impressed by immediate events, one should consider the long term.

Prof. Clausen

First of all, I want to say that when we talk about "modal personality" it gives me great problems because I see in our longitudinal data that people's personalities change enormously over the course of their lives. We might say that with regard to national character, we are looking for certain salient aspects of personality that show up more in one group than in another. But, if one were to take the whole constellation of personality, then it seems to me these may not be, by any means, the most important elements in personality.

This brings me to a methodological suggestion: what we need in this field is something similar to the international pilot project on schizophrenia, in which an attempt was made to discover, around the world, how people were diagnosing schizophrenia. Explicit criteria were set up. Teams of representatives of two or three countries knowing the given language came together and attempted to make diagnoses and checked on why they were differing.

It seems to me that obviously if you are going to take a national sample, you cannot do this kind of study, but perhaps before you take national samples, it would be feasible to do much more intensive work to see if we cannot get around this translation and terminology business. Perhaps we could have people in a given society take a standardized language for describing personality, such as a personality cue sort, and sort what they consider a typical desirable member of that society. For example, we might do this for a typical psychologically healthy individual and then compare others with that result. We could compare each nation's sorts. Again, however, we still must deal with the question of language, and therefore it would be desirable to have people represented who have come from different backgrounds doing the sort in a given language and then comparing what they come up with.

Prof. Lipset

Some of this difference might be resolved or handled in the old-fashioned notion of the independent vs. the dependent variable. It can be either. It can be structure or behavior or it can be attitudes. For example, I have done much work in Canada and the United States, and there is substantial evidence from the survey data that Canadians are more law-abiding and rule-conforming. Although no one has done the statistics, we find comments about the comparison; that if we compare people facing a red light when no one is around and no cars are coming, the Canadians will stand and wait for the red light to change and Americans will not. There was also an interesting international experiment: both the United States and Canada adopted the metric system at the same time, telling the peoples of both countries to 'go metric' over a period of ten years. The Canadians are on the metric system. In the U.S., the government gave up because no one paid any attention to the fact that the government said 'go metric.' The Canadians paid attention. Consider the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights produces litigiousness. The United States is a very litigious country. The Canadians adopted a Bill of Rights in 1982 and suddenly they are becoming very litigious because the structure calls for it.

On the other hand, I once did some work on trade union statistics. Gallup has asked the question, "Do you approve of trade unions?" repeatedly from 1936 to the present. Since about 1953, the proportion approving has been going down steadily. I correlated this with changes in trade union membership and obtained a correlation of 0.8. Here the evidence that people have changed their attitudes on trade unions is associated with changes in membership in unions, something labor economists and others do not want to admit. In terms of surveys, Phil Converse pointed out a long time ago, in *Relation Ideology*, that the ideology of consistency of response (i.e., that one response will predict many responses) works best for the better educated. It does not work as well for the less educated because here there is quite a bit of randomness in their responses. The same thing is true in national character. I find, when comparing Canadians and Americans, that surveys of elites show large differences. Surveys of the mass population show much smaller differences, in part because even though one is dealing with an entire population, when one is surveying a mass population, much of the response is noise. Hence the differences decrease. On the other hand, since there is a large range of variation in opinion between elites and the masses, one therefore knows that some things are common to elites in all countries and not to the mass. This points to the fact that there are many problems.

Prof. Hayashi

Precise statistical methods of analysis are not suitable in comparative study. The robust methods are preferable. There are two reasons for this; one is sampling. The sampling systems are not always consistent. For instance, in some countries random samples are used, while in other countries quota samples are used. The second problem is questionnaire translation. We had our original Japanese questionnaires translated into English, and then from English into French or German. We then tried back-translations and compared the original and the retranslations. The resulting contents were not always consistent. But, we must draw our information from these

questionnaires. However, I think it is attitudinal structures, i.e., data structures, that are the most important thing. Even though the questions may be different, the structures may be consistent.

With regard to open-ended questions, we have tried some experiments in Japan. We have used two questions: "What is the single most important thing in life for your? Please tell me one thing—only one" and "What first comes to your mind when you think of American culture and Japanese culture? Please tell me as many things as you can." Qualitative analysis yields very interesting and important information over quantitative analysis. For example, from the German culture, we observe names like Geothe, Schiller, and Beethoven. In France, the responses relate to art, music, and so on. The Japanese responses are like those of the French. For Americans, the responses tend to concentrate on terms like democracy, freedom, and so on.

"Deep Culture" and National Character	CHAIR	DISCUSSION LEADERS
	T. Kataoka	G. DeVos
		M. Spiro

Presentation of Prof. DeVos

First of all, I would like to reply briefly to Prof. Inkeles' discussion this morning. I would like to turn this around and say that perhaps in looking at national character we are caught with ethnocentrism, i.e. talking about the individual as the unit of analysis. Unfortunately, the person who caused me to have some conversion experiences about this is not here this afternoon–Prof. Hsu–who has been preaching a kind of interactionism, Chinese style, at me for many years. Since he is not here, I will try to take his part in this and suggest that perhaps what we are looking at in national character sometimes are abiding concerns. And, these concerns are how people are caught between behavioral patterns or attitudes that are directed in social relationships in one way or another. An example of this would be *giri-ninjo*, i.e., a Japanese national character pattern where people are caught with something that is not resolved. If you resolve issues, maybe you do not think about them anymore, or you do not have them.

I have been working on Belgian national character, using projective tests since 1947. To report briefly about a study completed two years ago by a person getting his doctorate in education, he compared six junior high schools in Japan with six in the San Francisco Bay Area. He used three measures which come up frequently in terms of questions about whether one can you use tests cross-culturally. One of these was a translation of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) of Harrison Goff, which is replete with ethnocentric items. However, the CPI does work cross-culturally. That is, when you scale enough items, the cultural problems with specific items more or less drop out if the scale has any ultimate validity. Even though some items are very inappropriate and lose meaning, it becomes a question of the cumulative effect of a scale, and this is again the question in national character. It is configurations–not particular items and their difficulty–that have to be addressed, because, of course, we will have translation and other problems. Nonetheless, the point is that the effects one is getting at may be cumulatively extracted from particular measures.

He also used a measure that Witken used, which is considered very basic or "deep"; I suppose this is where the term "deep items" derives. This is a cognitive measure which refers to field dependence vs. field independence. Supposedly, individualistic societies are high on field independence. I will not go into the details of this measure here, but suffice it to say that one would think that a highly individualistic society such as the American society would show higher scores on this measure. On the contrary, the Japanese have higher scores on field independence, indicating they are cognitively independent thinkers rather than simply conformist thinkers. But, what is mixed up here is cognitive independence and social conformity. In American psychology we mix these up all the time. We think that because someone behaves in a conformist fashion that they are thinking in a conformist fashion. Thus, there is a great deal of difference between what is going on inside a Japanese and how they are behaving

socially or what they are attending to socially in their behavior. So this phenomenon is something that one must accept.

With regard to the TAT, I should report that William Caudel first worked with *issei* and *nissei* in Chicago in 1947. I used the test from 1953 to 1955 as part of a large-scale study at McGraw University. One of the major preoccupations I had in looking at the results were achievement concerns and how the Japanese think about achievement motivation. In Curtis Vaughn's 1987 sample, the results look almost the same as they did in the early 1950s in Japan. That is, the Japanese are preoccupied with achievement and in the same way at both points in time. For example, the little boy with the violin is looking at the violin wondering how he can play it and worried about not doing too well; but thinking that if he works hard at it, he eventually will become successful. The American story on this card is a little boy is looking at the violin and his mother is making him play it. Now, if he is middle-class, he knuckles under and plays the violin; if he is lower-class, as soon as mother is gone, he goes out and plays baseball. These stories are quite abiding in the American scene and I assure you that if you test college students today with the TAT, the mother is making the little boy play the violin. She is still there. As an aside, we have gotten some sad stories recently, such as, the boy is wondering how to play, but there is nobody there to teach him. That is a more recent story.

The point about national character is that it is continuous, and disturbingly continuous because you look at things changing on the outside, and yet, when you get at patterns that are not directly elicited, there are some problems with surveys from the standpoint that people sometimes know what the right answers are or what they should be giving for answers. For example, again in 1953, in some surveys that were being done about the advisability of arranged marriage vs. free marriage in Japan, young people would say they were in favor of a free marriage. But, when one looked at the percentage of individuals having arranged marriages vs. free marriages, one found that there were many more having arranged marriages while saying they were in favor of free marriages. This is another pattern that I believe has continued in Japan. Of course, what is called an arranged marriage gets changed, but the legitimacy of the arranged marriage is maintained as a positive pattern.

To conclude, I would say, first of all, that national character may be found more in abiding dilemmas than in simple attitudes seen as generalizations, and these dilemmas are in patterns of interaction that have status and other characteristics. Secondly, from my TAT experience, and this is also a point Prof. Inkeles brought up, what percentage of answers to an item do you consider as indicative of an abiding pattern in a group? For example, *seppuku* was a pattern in Japan, but not everyone committed suicide. I would say that in looking at national character you must look at the orientation toward patterns of the elite. That is, people do not behave this way but they are continually oriented toward a certain way of idealizing or anticipating. So their actual behavior may fall far short of this pattern, but there are abiding orientations in culture that continue despite radical differences in social structure and the like.

Presentation of Prof. Spiro

In the first place, let me state that I do not know what I am doing here because I neither study national character nor do I know anything about Japan, except that every now and then Prof. DeVos brings me to a conference in Japan. Nor do I know what "deep culture" means. However, let me just say one or two things responding to what I think that notion might mean, as well as perhaps to some of the ideas that have been talked about.

Some years ago, as a graduate student, I was intrigued with Max Weber's idea that—reading his book on the religions of India—if you have a society such as ancient India when it was still Buddhist (and presumably contemporary Buddhist societies), with such notions as *nirvana*, and such notions as 'there is no self' (*annata* in Buddhist terms), then you would expect to find certain consequences of those notions; that is, social and psychological consequences that you would not find in Western societies where those notions are totally absent. Indeed, this intrigued me and was one of the reasons I went to Burma. I believe that Weber's suggestion is a very interesting one, but to get to Prof. Inkeles' point about "deep culture," notions of *nirvana* and non-self can affect behavior only to the extent that they are—to use a word that Prof. Inkeles used in his 1954 paper—"internalized." If you have cultural notions that are not internalized, then to the extent that they are found in a society, they will only be "cultural clichés," as we call them, and their effect either on thinking, emotions, motivations, let alone on behavior, will be practically absent.

I must preface the following remarks by saying that I am an outsider; I am very suspicious about surveys tapping "national character." This is not to say that I do not think surveys are important. I think what they are probably tapping more than national character are culturally expected responses, which is not to say they are not important. Indeed, I think they are, and if one is interested in national differences, those are important. But, whether surveys are indeed tapping characterological variables, as Prof. Inkeles I believe rightly says, I think that when one talks about national character, one is talking about character as exemplified in individuals. And, if we are talking about character, then we must have some notion about character and I think here we are talking about perduring aspects; perduring motivational dispositions, perduring cognitive orientations. We are tapping something about what we mean by character, particularly if we also include—and here the business not only of "deep culture" but of depth psychology comes in—unconscious as well as conscious motivational dispositions, and so on.

Now, if such notions as *nirvana*, or the notion that there is no self, are to affect behavior, as Weber for example thought, then they would have to be internalized as part of the motivational dispositions of the actors themselves. So, if one were to do a survey in Burma, as I did (not in all Burma, just in my village—we anthropologists, as you know, are very provincial—in upper Burma, outside of Mandalay, the ancient capital of the country), by asking 100 percent of the village—easy, there are only 250 people—"Do you believe in *nirvana*?" one would find that everyone says "Yes." And to the question, "Do you believe in *annata* (i.e., there is no self)?" everyone also says "Yes." Terrific! Then perhaps it is the case that many of the political and economic patterns that Weber

pointed to are indeed, as he argued, a function of those two concepts. *Nirvana*, in Subana Buddhism, means that at death you are extinguished. There is no further rebirth and of course there is no heaven or hell. You are extinguished. When I asked, "Would you tell me what *nirvana* means?" about 40 percent said it means "extinction." About 60 percent said it means—and they would give me a sort of picture of—a glorified "super heaven," because, in Buddhism, as in Hinduism, if a rebirth continues then you can be reborn not only in this world but you can be reborn in one of the heavens. *Nirvana*, for that 40 percent of them who believed in it, was a "super heaven." Now, the others, for whom it was actually as described in the Buddhist doctrine, extinction, said, "But we do not want that" (like St. Augustus who said, "Lord make me celibate, but not yet."). These people said "Well, of course we want *nirvana*, but not yet; i.e., for the next two hundred or three hundred incarnations we want to be reborn as rich people and then after that we want to have *nirvana*."

In short, to conclude, these concepts are not internalized; they are not "deep culture"; they are not even characterological. In my judgment, if we were going to talk about Burmese national character, then they would have to be "deep culture." Finally, on a simple methodological point, one would not know these things simply by a survey alone. What is required, to coin the expression, is some rather intense ethnographic observations and interviewing.

Discussion

Prof. Schuman

Prof. DeVos, is it not possible that on your TAT card the Japanese were responding with regard to achievement with the violin because, again, that was something they felt was expected? The fact that they give it in their own words rather than by choosing a response does not mean that it somehow represents a motive. It can represent a norm. But, I do not see anything wrong with that. It seems to me to get us back to several issues, there are norms, there is behavior, and presumably there is something called motives.

Prof. DeVos

The virtue of a projective test is that people do not know what you are expecting.

Prof. Schuman

But their culture tells them what you are expecting, and that is normative.

Prof. DeVos

I could use some other cards. Take, for example, the man on the rope, is he going up or down? That is in their body; in other words, it is an attitude that is responded to in such a way that you have to have the body postured to go in the right direction, you might say. In other words, when you see a man on a rope, there is no way of knowing what your culture expects you to do with that. I just took the boy with the violin as an example, but remember that you present a series of these cards. I defy you to say that your culture knows exactly what you are supposed to do with these cards. It just does not work that way. That is the whole point of it, because when you ask someone a question requiring a yes or no, the culture does indeed tell them what is expected in that situation, whereas in the projective tests, one does not know what is expected. I also used the Rorschach and I defy you to look at ink blots and tell what your culture expects of you.

Prof. Clausen

The question that has been bothering me is: What kind of coherence in attitudes, values, and affects is sustained by evidence in national populations? What is the evidential status of this thing, national character, that we are talking about?

There is a generally established proposition about American attitudes–principally toward internal and external politics–that one can predict a whole set of attitudes and feelings and the like from the position that an individual takes on the U.S.S.R. It is an economical question to ask. One can assume, with a high degree of agreement, that one would get a kind of syndrome of attitudes from asking this single question. To those of you who continue to do work in this field, what is your view of the evidential status of this concept? That is, with what justification are you using this concept of national character which assumes some kind of cohesive structures?

Prof. DeVos

I think this is where we differ. I think the survey method (and I believe Prof. Spiro and I are on the same side on this issue–being very suspicious of surveys) is targeting face validity. That is, the answer to the question is what one is seeking. Whereas, if one is looking at this in a configurational way, one is looking at how things fit together in some kind of pattern, rather than making any assumption on the basis of single items. I believe this is a basic difference in what we are seeking. Secondly, where we would be in accord, we are not just looking for conscious patterns. We are looking at patterns that may be there that are not in the direct awareness of the people that have them. Thus, one can have unconscious patterns. If one is a sociologist and one is looking at social structure, one finds that there may be patterns in the society of which the people living these patterns are not directly aware. Therefore, on a psychological level, people are not always directly aware of the kind of patterning of their behavior which may be generationally passed on. I believe what is passed on–and this is the point I would make again–very often are forms of conflict rather than patterns that are resolved, and it is the

irresolution of some of these patterns that you might say is abiding for a particular culture. In the Japanese instance, again, the *giri-ninjo* dilemma is something that is not resolved. Consider also the relationship toward the Japanese wife; something which is more resolved these days. However, the relationship between the status positions of wife and husband's mother in a family is a very difficult thing to resolve in Japan; it continues there all the time and it is being resolved in a more nuclear kind of family situation, but it is still a part of what is going on. The man's relationship with his mother in Japan is an abiding pattern, and I would say that how that pattern continues is part of Japanese national character. So that is what I would look for as a pattern.

Prof. Inkeles

I once spoke with a very prominent man from Libya and he had in fact once saved Khadafi's life. Consequently, he was told, and it was known to everyone, that if you did anything to him it was the same as doing it to Khadafi; that they were blood brothers. So he was able to do many things that people in his community could not do, including giving parties at which a lot of alcohol was consumed. But, he was the head of a major subgroup of the society and also a very active social scientist. We were together at a conference not so different from this one. So I asked him, "What are your main duties as head of this family?" This was like a clan, a large group. He said, "Oh, it's not too hard, I can manage." I wondered how he could also be an acting social scientist. "Not too hard," he said, "I can go around everywhere; they call me when necessary. There are certain critical things. If someone dies I must be there to bury them. Not personally, by hand, but especially if they are an important person. And, if they get married, I have to decide who marries them. Who marries whom." Now he had said to me earlier that he had lots of young women who were now attending college–they could not go outside of the Arab world, so they went to Cairo–but in Cairo there were lots of influences that would lead a young woman not to be prepared to marry just anyone he told her to. So I said to him, "You mean to tell me that even with these young women who were going off to college in Cairo, you are telling them whom to marry? You are arranging their marriages?" He said, "Yes, but it takes a little twist." I said, "What is the twist?" He said, "Well, I look around and I have spies everywhere; they tell me which boys are looking at which girl's eyes and are getting a response. I insist they get married. So, that is how we deal with arranged marriages and maternity amongst women."

This is a very interesting kind of compromise and it has to do with the theme–one which keeps coming up–of "dynamism." We must keep in mind that while national character may engender some core elements that persist a long time, it is also a dynamic phenomenon, undergoing processes of change. We do have the problem of saying at what point has it changed so much that it has moved from Type A to Type B or where something will or will not predict behavior. Nonetheless, we should never lose sight of that element of dynamism, and this is part of the problem that many people have with the anthropological perspective for two reasons.

In the first place, despite the recent discussion about the projective tests, in general the anthropological methods, unless one is a very exceptional anthropologist,

yield the people's sense of the formal system. They treat you like a baby. The anthropologists are trying to explain the fundamental rules that will give one some grasp of the culture, but that is precisely what causes one to lose many of the nuances and the variations that are very situational. I believe that this is part of the problem. Now, it could also work the other way. Let us say we were to use the test about *nirvana* and we were to score the Burmese as very high. But we also found many other people who supported the concept of *nirvana*, where, in fact, the meaning of *nirvana* to them was different. Now, of course, one way we try to find this out, and this has to do with the problem of evidential status, is reflected in much of the work that is being done by the Japanese.

Prof. Schuman made the point very well. We are constantly trying to understand what the answer to a question really means; you cannot tell from the surface. Now, what it really means, generally, is determined by its relationship to many other questions and answers. Two of my assistants are here and they will testify to the extent that every time they bring me a correlation I say that I am not sure that I understand the meaning of this because I cannot put myself in the position of this person. So I ask, well, how does it relate to some other things? Of course, it could be that I do not understand these other things as well, in which case the task is hopeless, but I think human behavior is not like that. One of the things that was not stressed by our colleagues from Japan, but it is found in their papers, is that they have found, over and over again, the syndrome of characteristics; not the frequency distribution of that syndrome, but that which attitudes go with which tended to be the same amongst Americans as it was amongst the Japanese. It might be a minority component in the United States and a majority component in Japan, but giving a certain type of answer increases the probability that one gives another type of answer.

A severe test of this occurred in my work on modernization. I dealt with six profoundly different cultures. Most people said it could not possibly be, but it turned out to be, that basically the same forty or fifty questions had the same structure of intercorrelation across each of the six countries. We did a factor analysis of the items in each of the countries and they basically clustered together. The frequencies of modernity in the different populations were different. And not every item could be counted on to be part of the syndrome.

We have a problem here which we might couch in terms of chemistry and physical chemistry. We have sets of atoms and molecules that go together and every once in a while a given country tacks on a molecule or an atom that is totally different from what has been tacked on everywhere else. That does not mean that the original set of items does not still hang together. This raises an interesting question if one pushes this analogy all the way. If one tacks something on that is quite different to a set that holds together, is the new thing a totally new material? In chemistry that often tends to be true. It makes no sense anymore to treat the material like itself, although from another structural point of view they are still very closely related, and we simply have much to learn about this kind of thing.

I believe the kind of work that is being done in Japan is very much oriented towards discovering this. In my own reading, although there are some relatively unique syndromes, the human being does not go in every conceivable direction. Not all

combinations, at a psychologically sophisticated level at least, are possible. If they are possible, they are not common. One can get all kinds of deviants, but most human beings, if they take one position, tend to take positions that are related at some psychological level, even though it is not obvious at the cultural level. This is what makes it possible to do the kind of work that has been done here. My only regret is that more often when these syndromes were created by our Japanese colleagues, they did not show us the distribution of those syndromes across the countries that they were looking at. Perhaps later on they will have an opportunity to give us more illustrations like the one on *giri-ninjo*, where it is quite clear that you have all the Americans concentrated on scores of 0 and 1 and most of the Japanese concentrated on scores of 2 and 3. On some of the other scales, they did not provide that type of distribution so they could place the nations with regard to these common syndromes.

Prof. Spiro

Prof. Inkeles, if you were suggesting that I was suggesting that Prof. DeVos was suggesting that the anthropological method is the method for ascertaining national character, let me state that that would be absurd. The anthropological method cannot do that. Margaret Mead at one time claimed that if one knew how to choose—and she claimed that she did—one person from a society, and that person would be so situated structurally, culturally and so on, that from an intensive study of that one person, one could understand the national character of that cultural group. That is obviously absurd. There is always a Type A and a Type B error. The Type A error, from my point of view, is to assume that from survey data one can get, without any question, at national character. A Type B error, which is the anthropological error, is to assume that from very small samples one can obtain a national character. It seems to me that what we need is a combination of the two. As Prof. Inkeles has pointed out, and it has been pointed out before, this requires a lot of money. What do I mean by a combination of the two? If one gets patterns that are ascertainable by large surveys, why not then take a subsample to be studied intensively to see whether the psychological differences were drawn from simple opinions and culturally structured responses, i.e., to determine whether they are characterological. However, even this requires a lot of money. But, rather than say, "This requires money, let's not do it," I would say, since it requires money, let's put forth a great deal of effort to obtain the money and do it.

Prof. DeVos

May I just answer Prof. Inkeles on the syndrome issue and the business of adding another molecule. Some studies, such as those on depression, do find that there are differences in recognized psychiatric syndromes that are cross-cultural differences. Although one still has the syndrome that one started with, not all the parts are essential to it. For example, the kind of self-punitive, self-derogation that exists in the West as part of depression does not appear in some countries. Thus, rather than say that this is an essential part of depression, one must say that this is a cultural part of depression in some cultures and that the syndrome is going to be different elsewhere. I believe the idea of the syndrome is essential with any kind of testing because one cannot depend

on single items; one must have some kind of configuration that goes together, and in all good surveys, there is an attempt to see what hangs together. I mentioned the CPI before. The reason that test works is that it does not depend at all on face validity. What items go together, and have consistently gone together in ascertaining certain of the things that Goff is looking for, be they dominance behavior or some kind of psychological mindedness, is a statistical artifact. The test takes a series of questions together, and some of these drop out for some people, but the configuration, i.e., the overall use of these items, is what differentiates individuals. I believe this is what we must look at—these differentiating effects of configurations—if we are going to look at national character. It is in the syndrome that we find national character, if there is such a thing.

Prof. Kataoka

I would like to get back to the question of "deep culture." When one begins to talk about syndromes, frequency distributions and so on, one is clearly not talking about, for example, Confucian text or Hindu religion. What is the status of these ideal type products of a great civilization?

Prof. Inkeles

I am guilty of introducing the word "deep" because there is something out there that people do and I did not have a good handle on it, so I used "deep culture" and I think people understand a little bit at least of what I had in mind. In the first place, one of the ideas is that there are some ways of doing things that are very pervasive, so whatever situations one gets into, one tends to transform the relationship so that it fits the model. Prof. DeVos's paper talks about this. For example, everywhere one goes one tends to convert any kind of relationship into a superior/subordinate relationship or into a relationship that is close to familial rather than something else. It does not matter where it came from and how it is defined in the standard books; one still subverts it or converts it to that purpose. That is one sense of "deep culture"; that kind of pervasiveness.

Another sense of "deep culture" is that it is those elements which may be unconscious, which is not necessarily a separate but could be an overlapping category the first time. But the first time might be conscious too. The people might know what they are doing. They just like it that way. They will tell you, "See, I'm not happy with it, I can't live with it that way, we've got to make it this way." So a boss and a person working with him will have a discussion and the person will make it clear or the boss will make it clear that that is the conscious level; but if they do it the other way, it is unconscious. There are a lot of elements that are unconscious, probably again what is meant by "deep culture."

The third idea is one that is related to personality; that is, the idea of a core. The status of this is very uncertain empirically, so it can only be discussed at the theoretical level for the moment. By a core we mean something that tends to be determinative of many other things. It has a force. Again, if one thinks of physical models, it is a sort of

particle that has the ability to influence a lot of other particles, so that when you insert it, it will influence many other things that happen. Another way of thinking of this is in terms of coherence. If you take this out of the person, the person will disintegrate, and the same thing can be argued about a culture. Now a culture is not going to disintegrate in the same sense that a person will, but many times historically people have said, "things fall apart." What do they mean by that? They mean partly that one does not go with the other, but also that without a center there is no thing anymore; without this, you do not know what you are. I believe there is an element of that kind to be explored. I refer to it as the "core" and I call it "centrality"; one can call it "determinative power"; one can give it lots of names. Its empirical status is not well established but I think something like this is meant.

What I was trying to do, in other words, is to give room to the kind of contribution that is made by the sort of analyses that Profs. Spiro and DeVos do, even though they can and do do other kinds of analyses, because there are things that are up to the moment not captured by the kind of analysis that is done by people like myself, who are asking questions. In fact, there is more interaction than may be apparent. For example, I mentioned that there is a very substantial amount of overlap between the way in which these gentlemen try to discuss *giri-ninjo* and the kind of discussion of it in Prof. DeVos' manuscript. Perhaps they influenced each other. I do not know. But I find it quite remarkable that the things he put down substantively as representing this concept apparently worked, I think independently, thinking of the very same questions. That in itself tells one quite a lot.

I would like to make one other point that is very important to this general discussion. It is not so much on "deep culture." It is more like the notion: What is the depth of a concept? Prof. DeVos talked about this. I had a lot of experience with this in my efforts to measure modernity. In working with modernity we took many many different realms and situations and each one was thought of as a separate realm. We had twenty themes like this. For example, orientation to time. You could also have orientation to achievement, although we did not have that one. We had the sense of personal efficacy which is like locus of control. Each of these was itself a little realm, and then there was the question, would the realms, in the first place, if one uses the same question, hold together as a subscale as one goes from culture to culture? By and large, they tended to. Then one has the question, will they relate to each other as one goes from culture to culture? Now you can take out all these intervening lines, however, and you can look at the problem this way. This is basically what we found. At least in our case—I am not saying this is generally the case—we were tapping a general universe. Prof. Guttman would understand this. Each of these realms was in some small way measuring that larger general universe. So that meant that they all were relatively intercorrelated with each other and that the level of intercorrelation, not the exact pattern, amongst them or between them was basically the same across all the countries; but only basically the same. There were some items that we thought were part of the syndrome but it turned out they fell on the outside somewhere. It was also true that if one tried to say, for Country A as against Country B, what does their syndrome look like? they often had this character. Thus, for one country all of these things were there for both of the countries but for this country there were a few things that were tacked on. They were in Country A (white represents Country A), and they were in Country B, (blue represents

Country B); with the dotted line representing Country C, one might find in Country C that the way it looks is like this. Some items that were out here were incorporated in the syndrome for Country C. They were not part of what was true for the syndrome for Country A but they were still sharing about 97 percent of the same elements, so that allows one to deal with both of the phenomena. It means that there is a certain underlying set of things that go together in human beings and that going together is the same in many, many countries, but not necessarily all. However, in each of these countries the populations we are dealing with will have accreted some elements that would be seen as alien or foreign in the next country. Now if one keeps keep doing this, of course, one may get to the point where one eats away the circle. I do not know whether this would work for a hundred countries. I know I was able to make it work for six.

I think there is evidence that certain tests, of which the locus of control test is an example, probably can be shown to work for most countries, if not all. And that puts us in a different position. It means, for the first time, because of technological advances in a sense, we are in a position, i.e. we have a ruler (previously we had no common ruler) whereby we can measure the people in one place as against another, in psychological and social terms. By technical advances, including the kind that our Japanese colleagues are working on, we are putting ourselves in a relative position to do these kinds of measurements on the socio-psychological level across countries. Therefore, theoretically we could place all countries, at least with regard to some dimensions which we think have a lot of meaning.

If we were then challenged by the kind of findings that Prof. Spiro has, this is part of the business of doing research. Then one has to say, "Well, isn't the fact that Country A was in this syndrome spurious?" because the meaning of these items can be shown for these people to have been quite different even though they cohere statistically. Of course with *nirvana* and that other concept, it is more likely they will cohere statistically. In this case, the content was so varied that it was very difficult to prove that some culturally standard stable response produced a coherence. It seems to me that one has to be pushed into the direction of arguing that the coherence comes from the fact that there is something about the human being; that if they take one attitude in one place, they are more likely to take a comparable or similar attitude in another place. It is tricky to determine what these are, but I believe it is within the realm of possibility.

This, then, is a partial answer to Prof. Almond regarding the issue of evidential status that what we are working on. But it is also the program; I mean, it is an announcement of a position. It can be challenged. It may be wrong, but it is where we stand. We stand on the assumption that we have quite a bit of evidence already accumulated that there are syndromes, that is to say, clusters of attitudes and values—not simple-minded ones—that often involve complex ideas like, What would you choose in a boss? or What would you choose in a life goal? These coherent, relatively meaningful and consistent ways cohere in the same way across countries, and they therefore can be used to place populations on a relatively standardized scale in the same sense that we could measure average height and average weight. That is the extreme form of the program.

Prof. Inkeles

In other words, the United States and all of the West European countries are very similar in that their peak is very much on the lower side compared to Japan. So this is a case where Japan is not only different, but it may also be described as almost distinctive, or even unique.

Prof. Wilensky

I am still a bit confused about the uses to which these factors will be put. I understand factor analysis and I am very impressed with the quality of the data here and with the time perspective that it brings, but I still am puzzled by this. If factor analysis is to give us underlying values that are coherent, that brings a lot of these different items together in a theme, as apparently it does, and if these themes are independent of one another, that is good—my understanding is then to use them to predict or explain something. What are we explaining with the national character data that we have before us?

Prof. DeVos

We have not had a chance to get into, you might say, content, but certainly the working relationships, for example, have a certain quality in Japan that is different from the United States. Therefore, we should, in a sense, be able to say something specific about why these attitudes in the workplace are one way in Japan as contrasted to the United States. In other words, we can get into some specific content, which time does not afford.

Prof. Kataoka

In that case, are you not inferring the cause from the effect? Aren't these the same thing?

Prof. DeVos

We are caught here again—we find correspondences and we are making inferences—and what Prof. Spiro was happily espousing is that we need money to study these things. It has been my experience, systematically, that there are a lot of presumptions in the academic environment as to the legitimacy of some of these studies, particularly in the area of national character, or with some of the methods, so we have not been able to study some of these things. With regard to the empirical method in the social sciences—to go out and study and look for these correspondences and not make too many ready presumptions about causality going one way or another—hopefully the time will come again when we can obtain sufficient funds to put forth some systematic effort. It is encouraging in Japan that such research has been supported over the years, which

is rather contrary to some of our work. Prof. Stevenson will be talking about this later on. Fortunately he has been working back and forth for some years now with Japanese researchers on some very specific items related to socialization, and so forth.

Prof. Sasaki

Prof. Hayashi just answered that correspondence analysis explains what are the stable structures and what are the unstable structures.

Prof. Kataoka

The National Character Study affirms simply what is, by positing something called national character behind it. One thing that has always puzzled me is this use of Confucianism. It was very popular, in the 1950s and 1960s, to blame lack of development on Confucianism. These days Confucianism has a very good name. We say that in all the countries of Asia their development and organization are due to Confucianism, and this is precisely the point.

Politics and National Character	CHAIR	DISCUSSION LEADERS
	C. Hayashi	I. Miyake
		S.M. Lipset

Presentation of Prof. Miyake

I have presented three papers on political partisanship in Japan for this conference. I will discuss two chapters from our forthcoming book, *Japanese Voter*, being published next year, by Yale University Press. My co-author is Prof. Flanagan at Florida State University.

These two papers are based on data from the 1976 general election. The third subject concerns data from the 1983 general election. In Japan, we do not have an institute like ISR in Michigan, and we have only three nationwide election surveys so far studied by academicians as opposed to commercial pollers. The first one was in 1967, where the election data was evaluated by scholars from Michigan's ISR. Following that were studies of two nationwide election surveys in 1976 and 1983. These studies are independent of the work on national character by Prof. Hayashi and his colleagues.

What I want to show you in these papers are the following points:

1. Japanese political partisanship is very weak and unstable.
2. Party image is negative rather than positive.
3. Party support and attitudes toward the party affect voters' political attitudes and behaviors.

I will not elaborate on these points. Instead I would like to make a short comment on the data from the most recent national elections in Japan.

Regarding the first election results, Table 1 shows the number of seats won in the Upper House election. The LDP suffered serious defeat in the Upper House election. The LDP lost the majority; not in this particular re-election, but in the total distribution of seats. The number of seats for the LDP for re-election was 69, but the LDP won only 54 seats out of 69 (the number of seats which would have made the LDP the ruling party in the Upper House). The next election, the Lower House election, on February 18, 1990, was the latest nationwide election in Japan. This time the LDP was in better shape. The LDP had a comfortable majority. Pro-LDP seats numbered 290, with opposition seats numbering 222. The Socialist Party increased their seats from 83 to 136, which was a very good showing. But the opposition as a whole could not obtain the majority, which is 257 seats. Socialist Party Chairman Doi said it was a" half victory" for them.

Figure 1 shows the percentages of votes won by party. The percentages are computed on the basis of total electorate, not the total vote. In the Upper House elections, the LDP lost many votes, but in the general elections, which are the Lower House elections, the LDP got almost as many votes as in the last election (1986) in which

the LDP got more than 300 seats. This provides a brief introduction to the results of the election.

Why did the LDP fail to win in the 1989 Upper House election? The issues are very important, of course. You see in Figure 2 a percentage of those who intended to vote with consideration of the issues. Two issues were cited: the Consumption Tax and the Recruiting Scandal. I think you are familiar with these issues so I do not need to comment further. The figures show that more than half the respondents answered that they would make their voting decisions giving consideration to the Recruiting Scandal and the Consumption Tax. Regarding government unpopularity: popular support for the Takeshita cabinet was very low in March, unusually low, at only nine percent. Figure 3 shows that at the end of the Takeshita cabinet, the percentage of popular support for the cabinet was only 9 percent, with non-support as high as 63 percent, which is unusually high.

Figure 4 depicts the dissatisfaction rate for politics. In July 1989, there was a pre-election survey conducted by Mainichi Press. Seventy-six percent of the respondents said they were dissatisfied with politics and only twenty percent said they were satisfied.

At the end of the Takeshita cabinet, many LDP supporters, who were conservative voters, picked the LDP to be independent. Figure 5 shows trends regarding support for political parties. The support rate of the LDP went down from 44 percent at the beginning of the Takeshita Cabinet to 28 percent at the end of the Takeshita Cabinet. Support for independents increased and the percentage of support for Socialists also increased a little bit. Moreover, the defection rate of LDP voters amounted to 30 percent. The defection rate means that percentage of voters who said they support the LDP but did not intend to vote for the LDP. Therefore, of the conservative voters, who represent about 42 to 45 percent of the electorate, about 15 percent left the LDP, and of the remaining 28 percent, about 10 percent defected from voting LDP. This is the process by which the LDP lost the majority in the Upper House election.

The general election was held on February 18, 1990. Many people expected that the opposition might have a majority in the election, but this was not true. First, the cabinet changed. After Prime Minister Uno resigned and Kaifu replaced him, he named two men to his cabinet and the LDP government regained some of its popularity, although by just a few percentage points.

Referring to Figure 3 again, the support percentage increased a little bit, and the non-support percentage decreased, with the support ratio being a little greater than the non-support ratio. Kaifu is not particularly popular but is much more so than Takeshita or Uno.

All the political issues are still alive, but to smaller degrees. Kaifu pledged to consider modification of the 3 percent consumption tax, exempting, for instance, fresh food from the tax. Though this modification did not increase his popularity, it succeeded in providing a set of alternatives for the issues. (The older set of alternatives had been to repeal or not to repeal.) The new set of alternatives was modification or repeal. People preferred modification over repeal of the tax—45 percent for modification to 40

percent for repeal; not too big a gap, but substantially in favor of Kaifu. This increased government popularity and consequently political dissatisfaction decreased by 10 percent, a small amount but nonetheless a decrease, as shown in Figure 4.

Party support of the LDP returned to a normal level, which ranges from 40 to 45 percent. Support for the Socialists decreased about 5 percent. One of the most important issues in this election was whether the LDP or the opposition coalition was more competent. The LDP government was not positively supported in this, but neither were the Socialists.

To conclude, the old issues are still alive, but voters do not see the Socialist Party as more competent or more trustworthy than the LDP. Differences in campaign styles between the two elections are also important. The traditional style of campaigning is effective for the Lower House election. The differences in the electoral systems for both elections also are important.

Presentation of Prof. Lipset

I am pleased to take part in this conference which Prof. Inkeles is running. We have known each other more years than I think we want to remember. We have been colleagues at two universities. But I cannot resist telling a story related to something which happened many years ago. In 1955, we were both at the Behavioral Sciences Center up at Stanford University, and Prof. Inkeles, then as now, has not changed. He once made a comment back in 1955 that "some people think I'm authoritarian, but I'm not, I'm just passionate." I think this is fortunately still true. Prof. Inkeles is very passionate.

To go on, apropos of national character and politics, there were two nations, or two peoples, who were most affected negatively by World War II. One faced the atom bomb and all the destruction of the bomb and fire bombing and the other had a third of its population, the Jews, wiped out by the Holocaust. Forty years later, one country is known for its military prowess and the other for its business achievement. If there had been a Rip Van Winkle who went to sleep in 1945 and came back today and was told this about these two countries, his reaction might very well be, "My God, is Japan really re-armed and leading the world, and so on?" Things can change in countries. And, we see this of course right now in what is the most dramatic event of our time, of this century, the changes which are occurring in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where all sorts of generalizations about the nature of authoritarian patterns seem to be upset by events—but that is another story.

I would like to note that we think of the Japanese, we in the West or in America, at least in the past, as having been a very nationalistic people. But, it is curious to know, apropos of survey data, that in recent decades when peoples in different countries have been asked questions about patriotism and nationalism, such as "I'm proud to be an American," "I'm proud to be a Frenchman," "I'm proud to be a Japanese," the Japanese turn out to be very low on the international scale. That is, a lower percentage of the Japanese say "I'm proud to be a Japanese," than I think is true for any other country in

which this question has been asked. Conversely, Americans, and of course this fits the stereotypes, show up as intensely patriotic and more proud to be themselves and think more of their country than one finds in any other countries. And, of course, we know about waving the flag. It might be noted, parenthetically, that the Germans, though higher than the Japanese, tend also to be relatively low. This may reflect the change induced by World War II, but perhaps it raises questions about translation and use of surveys, i.e., in Japanese culture, it is not considered proper to boast, and if you are asked whether you are proud to be something, you do not say "I'm proud"; whereas Americans are not ashamed of boasting. Hence the two questions may mean something different.

The images of these societies change. We in the West view Japan as a traditional society—a society which still, in spite of having modernized, industrialized and urbanized with university education, etc., retains more of what seem to be the traditional, pre-modern feudal elements than other countries. Whereas, the United States, as a host of observers such as de Tocqueville, Frederick Engels, and Weber have noted, was born modern. It is a country without a feudal past; it was Protestant. And, as many people have noted, it is the most pure bourgeois society, the least affected by these traditional pasts, whereas Japan is the most recently post-feudal, hierarchical, group-centered, obligation-oriented society. But if one looks at certain patterns, and I have discussed this in my paper on the U.S. and Japan, the United States may be regarded as an extremely traditional society, even, in fact, as the most traditional industrialized society. More traditional than Japan, given the continued strength of traditional religion in this country. Religion is a traditional institution and the U.S., with its evangelical Protestantism and the belief of it institutionally, as well as in survey data about belief in God, belief in the existence of angels, the devil, heaven and hell, the divinity of Jesus, the ten command-ments—on all of these kinds of items, Americans are more traditional; that is, more accepting of these beliefs than any other peoples in Christendom by far, except for the Irish and the Poles. And, the Irish and the Poles are neither as industrialized and their Catholicism is very much interlinked with nationalism. Thus, one has this tremendous strength of very traditional Protestant sectarianism in the United States. Whereas, in Japan with the Buddhist and the Shintoist pattern, the strength of religion and the traditional, is much weaker. I think this affects the larger scale within which the politics of the countries take place. Religion plays a major role in American politics. Religion plays somewhat of a role in Japan, but I think much less so than in American politics, even though traditional values seemingly are more important in Japan.

Structurally, the two countries vary in their political systems in ways which affect the differences in them and in the ways their constitutional electoral systems vary. In Japan, the electoral system is very different from ours. It is a parliamentary system for one thing. I will point up some of its other implications in a moment. On the electoral level, the Japanese have a system which is relatively unique—of multi-candidate constitu-encies—where there are from three to seven or eight—vs. the single-member district system which we have for Congress. What is unique to the United States are the separation of powers, the Presidential system and the like. Consequently, the Japanese have a multi-party system; whereas we have a two-party system, and the multi-party system occurring in the context of their almost unique electoral system, can only work, particularly for the major parties—the LDP and the Socialists—with effective party

mobilization. I am always astonished at the extent to which, in say a constituency of seven, the LDP can have its vote divided up so it gets three seats. And, you get a kind of proportional representation out of the Japanese system, but not because you have proportional representation but because with the factions and the discipline, they somehow do not waste that many votes, whereas you would expect a tremendous amount of wasted votes in the system. The smaller parties waste—I think the Communists ironically—more votes than anybody else because they cannot get more than one seat anyplace.

Another difference between the societies is reflected in their attitudes towards hierarchy in government. Japan is an infinitely more law-abiding society than the United States. It has far fewer police, and so on. It also is very low on litigiousness. It has very few lawyers and to some extent, and maybe to a major extent, this can be related to what may be called national character. However, I must confess that I prefer to talk about national differences and introduce the aspect of character. The Japanese constitutional structure does not encourage litigiousness; the American system does produce litigiousness and an emphasis on lawyers. As an interesting observation, the Canadians went to a new Constitution and a Bill of Rights like ours in 1982 and they have had an enormous increase in litigiousness which seemed to be an un-Canadian characteristic until they changed their Constitution. But, at any rate, they still have clearly much more respect for the State.

The United States is the most anti-State country in the West; anywhere. The American Revolution set in motion a set of values which views the State as suspect, views the State as a source of problems, and therefore we institutionalized from the beginning, this whole checks and balances system with different houses of Congress and the President, all elected at different times, all designed to make the State inefficient—to make the government inefficient. It was a very conscious effort on the part of our founding fathers to produce an inefficient government. And they succeeded, but if they were to come back now, they might not like it; but they would not be surprised. But, this suspicion of the State, this antagonism to the State, this emphasis on laissez-faire, is something which continues, as compared to other countries. It has changed, of course, where we have a much bigger State now than we did in 1789, but we have much less of it than other countries and we are much more antagonistic to the State and much more suspicious of the State than any other country, whereas the Japanese do not have the same—from my reading of both behavior and data—kind of suspicious antagonism to the State and this has certain consequences which I will get to in a moment. But, even though these generalizations between the two polities seem to be true, I wonder about how one explains some of the aspects of extremism in Japanese politics, both before World War II with the role of the military and others and then the whole pattern of student extremism in the 1960s. The U.S., of course, has plenty of extremism and I am not sure one could weigh which was greater, but the Japanese were certainly not law-abiding or disciplined in the university pattern in relation to the government and that is, in one sense, un-Japanese behavior; certainly not law-abiding.

Another pattern of differentiation between our societies and their political behavior can be found in participation patterns. As you know, the United States has the lowest level of participation, that is, voting, of any democratic country. In our last election for

President, it was about 50 percent. Actually, if one looks at the elections for Congress in the off-year, such as in 1990, only about 40 percent vote for Congress. If one looks at local elections, that number goes down further, and the same for primaries. Whereas, in Japan, for the parliamentary elections, about 70 percent vote, which is considerably higher than the U.S., and yet there are some European countries which are even higher than Japan. Curiously, there are other data on which I do not know the figures for Japan, but I know them for some of the European countries, where the U.S. is high. If you ask people "How interested are you in politics?" or "How interested are you in the outcome of this election?" Americans turn out to be very interested, and a lot of people seemingly say, "I am very interested in this election," but they do not vote. If you ask this question in Europe you find that the levels of people who say "I am very interested" is lower in a number of countries than it is in the U.S. So one sees this anomaly among Americans—in fact, the numbers who watch the TV debates, which is a form of political activity, are higher than those who vote.

What does this mean? Do the people in this country think fundamentally that it does not make any difference who wins? or is this again part of a system where one does not conform? Americans are less conformist to what they are expected to do. If a substantial percentage of Germans vote, it is not necessarily because they are interested, but because they do what they are told to do or what they are expected to do. Whether the Japanese rate of voting reflects this greater sort of respect for what is expected of one, as against interest, I do not know. Nonetheless, this is a curious anomaly in terms of attitudes and behavior as related to political kinds of behavior.

Another politically relevant issue between our countries is the degree of ethnocentrism. America has had an emphasis on openness—on being open to others—on inviting in foreigners. It is an immigrant society and it prides itself on that, and it identifies itself, not in terms of a common history, but in terms of an ideology. Many people have noted that Americanism is an ideology in the same sense as Socialism or Communism or liberalism, and consequently one can join the party. In fact, the way I put it, before 1917, Washington was Moscow. Washington was the center of the world democratic revolution. Perhaps it still is. Certainly Moscow now thinks it is. Part of this is that one can join, and Americans have welcomed the idea that people emigrate to the U.S. In fact, many foreign travelers have come to the U.S.—more often in the past than recently—and mention to Americans acquaintances that they are returning home. This puzzles the Americans: "How could you possibly go home when you have reached *nirvana*—when you have come to the Utopia—to the Great Society?" as the rest of the world was seen as reactionary, autocratic, and so on.

Japan, like most European countries, is not an ideological country; it is an historic country. That is what characterizes Japan as having a common history. And, of course, Japan prides itself in a longer common history than most countries. In this context, even more so than in many other countries, one cannot become Japanese. One can become American, but one cannot become Japanese. The Koreans, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, and others who have come to Japan are outsiders. Based on what I have been told by some of the leaders of the country, the Japanese tend to look on the heterogeneous character of the United States as a weakness of the society. Japan tends to see its own homogeneity as a source of strength. Many more Japanese know about the United

States than the average American knows about Japan, or many other countries for that matter. However, the Americans who do know about Japan often see the homogeneity of the country, its lack of immigration, as a potential source of weakness, because these Americans believe that the U.S. is refurbished by foreign immigration; that every country as it gets wealthy and prosperous gets soft and that what it needs, therefore, is an influx of people from the outside who will do the job. The most recent influx we have been seeing are Asians, and most Americans see this as a very positive thing because the Asians who have come to the U.S. work harder, more aggressively and more ambitiously and so on. This is a pattern which has been repeated in American history, so, in this context, one might argue that although it is certainly not true now, in the future, Japanese homogeneity could become a weakness.

Another aspect of difference is that the Japanese and their politics—and this was brought up by Prof. Miyake in his discussion of the current elections—do not emphasize charisma. Only the Emperor is charismatic. Only he has some extraordinary quality above the average human. And, the Emperor, of course, in the Japanese system, is the source of authority and always has been; not the agent of authority, for the Japanese have, even more so than in other nations, separated the source of authority, the Emperor, from the agent of authority. The agent of authority used to be the Shogun, and now it is the Prime Minister, so it is possible for one to feel that the agent of authority is doing a poor job, but that the source of authority is doing a good job, and it is only the source of authority that is charismatic.

However, in the U.S., as I have noted earlier, government is suspect; we are anti-State; we have this system of checks and balances. One aspect of this, which I think most non-Americans do not realize, and also a lot of Americans do not realize, when talking about the "Imperial Presidency," is that the executive office in this country is a very weak office. The President proposes. He is just the super legislature. And the President, in order to affect policy, must try to be charismatic. He must try to influence the public and Congress because he does not have authority over them. On the other hand, in a parliamentary system, what the cabinet decides generally gets passed by the parliament. In many other countries, where the prime ministerial office is stronger than in Japan, the prime minister is clearly stronger than an American President, institutionally stronger. In Japan, the cabinet is institutionally stronger. In America, it is weak. Therefore, we must have this emphasis on the personality of the Presidency. Our current President (George Bush) does not illustrate this point. However, everything has been breaking well with him so that he, so far, is very popular, but he is certainly not charismatic. I believe a prototypical example of what I have in mind can be seen in Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, and Ronald Reagan understood this. We tend, if we do not like people, to describe them as dumb and not knowing what is going on. Ronald Reagan used to compare himself to Roosevelt, not ideologically, but in the way he handled the Presidency—mainly that he handled the politics and his assistants handled the policy—which is the way the American Presidency has to operate. This is inherent in the fact that the government is weak and that we have this whole checks and balances, anti-State system. Thus, this emphasis on leadership here, and lack of similar emphasis in Japan, comes more from structure than it does from characteristics.

On the other hand, one could argue that the lack of charisma in the Japanese Prime Ministerial office, and even the fact that he only stays in for two or three years, is related to the strong emphasis on the group rather than the individual in Japan. Japan is the least individualistic country and given that, one does not want a leader who stands out. Whereas, in America, the structure calls for a leader who stands out, and our Presidents, unless some disaster occurs, tend to be re-elected. In the Japanese system, of course, the Prime Ministers tend to stay in for a shorter period of time. This is also true in other places, and there is often a sense that it does not really matter who is Prime Minister—the office is more or less interchangeable; whereas, in America, it matters very much who is President, precisely because the President does not have power, has to develop power, has to become charismatic, and so forth.

Discussion

Prof. DeVos

I would like to ask Prof. Miyake whether the polls got at the gender question as an issue in the campaign or whether they simply did not ask this question, because you said that the issues were the consumption or value-added tax and the recruiting scandal. Since Doi was a woman and must have tapped a great number of young urban women, particularly with regard to sentiments about gender equality or shifts in family structure, was this an issue which was targeted in the polls? and How did it affect Japan as well as other countries? Did the polls ask the question so that the results would show the salience of it as equal to or less important than the tax issue or the recruiting scandal?

Prof. Miyake

Gender gap questions are very popular in many polls, but in relation to this election, so far as I know, there was no such question.

Prof. Hayashi

My comment relates to the matter of translation when asking one whether or not they are patriotic. If you use the term "patriotism," then the image among the Japanese is very negative—the term itself implies anti-liberalism, pro-militarism or forced loyalties. In my experience, if one asks, "Do you love your country?" or "Are you proud of Japanese tradition and abilities?" the positive response rate is very high. Therefore, this is a matter of translation and semantics.

Prof. Lipset

This question raises some of the issues we have underlined with respect to our methodological problems; sometimes a direct translation is not suitable.

Prof. Kataoka

In response to Prof. Lipset's discussion, we often tend to speak of national character or culture as if it were stable, but it really turns out to be politically determined. My study of post-war Japanese politics shows that among the conservatives there was a major struggle between 1951, when Japan became independent, and 1960, a struggle which was capped by the massive demonstration in Tokyo against Eisenhower's visit. That settled the conservative power struggle in favor of Yoshida. Yoshida was in league with the people I called "the Reischauer crowd," who provided a kind of official ideology for Japan through the concept of modernization. Thus, Japanese politicians today are censured for going to the Yasakuni shrine, Japan's Arlington. However, it is quite all right to talk about cultural tradition—some milder affirmation of Japan is all right by this Reischauer tradition, but nationalism as such is frowned upon, and this is a result of a definite political settlement, but it is wrong to talk about the consequence of this decision as if it were a part of culture. This has only been since 1960.

Consensus is another thing. I hear people talking about consensus as if this were a cultural trait of the Japanese, but Japanese politics before 1960 were anything but consensual. We had Socialists, Communists running rampant, and the country was deeply torn. Thus it is true by what is seen today as a culture and tradition being permissible, but this is merely a short-term phenomenon since 1960.

Prof. DeVos

In terms of a defense of "deep structures," when one sees what is reported in the press related to political decisions, certain undercurrents that are unmentionables continue to be unmentioned in Japan. Consider two instances. First, in the recruiting scandal, where it is fairly common knowledge that one of the individuals involved was an outcast, this fact was never revealed by the Japanese press. Thus, there are a number of such issues that are sub-currents of themes that are not to be mentioned publicly in Japan. This part of Japanese culture might be called *honne* and *tatamae*; that is, there are some things you can talk about overtly, and there are other topics that you simply do not mention or bring up in polite society. I believe this is an abiding situation in Japan. Although the Japanese press in recent years has actually brought up the fact that there are perhaps 2,500,000 outcasts in Japan, this nonetheless remains a part of the society that is unmentionable, and wherever it appears, it is ignored publicly.

Prof. Inkeles

I am going to try here to return us to one of our themes—about the interpretation of survey data. In my view, and I think I would get agreement from Prof. Miyake, variations in whether or not people are satisfied or dissatisfied with politics by themselves cannot be taken as an indicator of national character. These go up and down just like the judgments about "Were you better off or worse off economically last year?" These issues mainly reflect interactions between persons and such things as whether there are

political scandals, whether the economy is improving or not improving, whether political parties are getting along or not getting along, and so on.

On the other hand, there is the theme that Prof. Lipset raises, and that may possibly be a relative constant. I do not have any evidence to prove this and in that regard I would be very interested in Prof. Miyake's comments. For example, suppose we had some way, or suppose we had succeeded in finding ways to ask the question, "By and large do you think that you have a right to challenge the government's decisions in matters that affect you in a general, personal way?" For instance, suppose you disagree with the government about your taxes. Suppose you disagree with the government about your social security. Suppose you disagree with the government about whether or not they should put a road through a certain place. What would be the relative tendency of one population—let us say the Americans—as against the Japanese population—with regard to such a series of questions? I do not know the answer. But, I make an assumption and it runs something like this: if one asks, "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your government?" what one will find, with regard to politics, in the United States would be a good deal of movement like that depicted in this chart. In Japan, I do not know if it would be a higher level or a lower level, but one would find a similar pattern. Now, suppose one asks a question about disagreeing with the government. My prediction is that in Japan, given a scale from 0 to 100, one would find that the idea of fighting the government as an individual would be located somewhere down here and would be a relative constant, although it might go up slightly with the younger generation. My assumption about the United States is that it would be located somewhere up here and would also be relatively constant. That is, it does not matter whether you are asking about 1870, 1970, 1850; Americans would say "I have a right to fight the government." This is an effort to link certain deeper lying dispositions with the political pattern. I think this is very similar to the phenomenon with happiness. The happiness figures also tend to look like this. They are relative constants over time for a given population. Whether you were better off or worse off last year tends to look more like this. So, what I am hoping Prof. Miyake will do in the next stage of his analysis, will be to link more of his information in the political realm to these types of dispositions and determine whether they have any effect on this kind of an outcome.

Prof. Wilensky

Prof. Miyake has participated in major comparative investigations of just those themes and he would have that kind of information over time. I am referring to the specific cultural studies and studies of political participation.

Prof. Miyake

When you ask the Japanese people to answer, I do not think they say they will fight against the government, but they do respond that they will take some action. Then you ask what kind of action they would take. Most will answer "voting," i.e., they vote for the party they support, and so on. They would be much less inclined to answer that they would take a stand to strike; this would not be a usual answer.

Prof. DeVos

I would like to comment about this theme. Prof. Lipset said that the Japanese are law-abiding, and I am inclined to believe that is so, but I am not sure it has a steady, underlying cultural cause. I had a Japanese student in a seminar two years ago, and he took the trouble to ride around in Oakland with the squad cars of our police department. He took the further trouble of counting the number of police in relation to population. Then he compared this with Tokyo. I cannot remember the exact figures, but it was between five and ten times as many police in Tokyo as in Oakland. Perhaps this has something to do with preventing violence. Also, we should not lose sight of Prof. Kataoka's comment that there was a considerable amount of conflict and violence in Japan in various periods in its history, and not so long ago. For example, the 1950s labor conflicts and the polarization of politics would not match the consensus that we see now. Thus, while I believe the values may be somewhat different, I would caution us to watch out for the organizational structure of all this. How many Japanese police, how they are organized; they are consensus takers; they are social workers; they are all these things that the American police are not.

Prof. Lipset

No, I raised that question that it was more violent. But, on the police, you are wrong. We have more police, nationally. Perhaps Tokyo has more.

Prof. Wilensky

You must look at specific urban areas.

National Character in Work and Economic Organizations	CHAIR M. Sasaki	DISCUSSION LEADERS G. DeVos J. Raphael

Presentation of Prof. Raphael

I was delighted to learn that Prof. DeVos was joining me in this discussion since I am more of a consumer of literature on national character than a producer, and in keeping with what Prof. Inkeles suggested at the beginning of the day, of exploring the possibilities of where to take a potential study of national character from here, what I will do is ask several questions that might be relevant for future exploration either here today or as this project moves forward, and perhaps Prof. DeVos can answer some of the questions or add some additional insights.

It strikes me, in looking at this whole question of national character in the workplace and in economic organizations, that we need to get back to some of the comments that were made this morning with respect to the relationship between attitudes and social structures and organizations. Particularly in the case of work, it is important to look at the relationship between individual attitudes and the institutional framework in which those attitudes are embedded and reinforced. I have always found it somewhat paradoxical in the Japanese case that there are several things that, on the surface at least, seem difficult to explain.

One of these lies in the ideal Japanese work organization; the set of institutional arrangements which Americans would typically think of as potentially counter-productive. One has the seniority system; one has permanent lifetime employment; and it would strike one that these are institutional arrangements which would not necessarily lend themselves to the creation of a motivated, hard-working labor force. Thus, one of the questions that I would like to see explored a little further is the extent to which attitudes toward work, either in Japan or cross-culturally, are institutionally determined and the extent to which they are culturally determined. Does the fact that a young Japanese worker, or any Japanese worker for that matter, stays in the workplace until 7:00 at night reflect a basic attitude toward work, or is this simply based on a set of institutional arrangements in which he or she is, in fact, by virtue of peer pressure, and the pressure of the employer who is also staying in the office until that hour, creating a situation that may be a superficial indication of work ethic as opposed to a genuine attitude toward work?

There is also a question that has been alluded to several times today. One would have expected, as Japan became more affluent, that the Japanese would begin to exemplify and show more of the symptoms of the so-called "American disease" about which the Japanese typically point to Americans. That is, attitudes toward the work ethic would potentially diminish over time and would be replaced by other values. I do not think, based on the statistics I have seen, that there has been a significant change in attitudes toward work in Japan. Japan watchers continue to ask, "When is the other shoe going to fall?" and to date that has not been the case. Will that, in fact, occur?

Another series of interesting questions regarding work in Japan relates to exploring the future of women in the workplace. As Japan becomes an increasingly labor-short economy, and women are beginning to play increasingly different roles (where we are seeing increased professionalization of the female labor force), what will be the ultimate impact on the work values themselves? Will there be a gradual shift away from the values that Prof. DeVos has described as the frame group, to a more family orientation with women beginning to occupy a larger place in the work force? and Will these values begin to show tension, as has been the case in the American situation? Related to this is the question of what happens ultimately to the socialization process in Japan. As the nature of the labor force changes, as more women enter the workplace, what impact will these have on the younger generations of children with respect to socializing them for achievement?

There also are some structural questions with respect to the permanent employment system in Japan that people are beginning to talk about as labor shortages begin to occur throughout the country. Will the permanent employment system continue to play the same institutional role in Japanese economic organizations, as it has at least since the 1920s and 1930s? And, if there are significant changes—if, for example, one begins to see the freeing up of certain types of professional groups and increasing labor mobility—what will be the impact on such things as worker attitudes of loyalty toward the firm and firm attitudes of paternalism toward the workers? Looking at some of the statistics, there are indications already that in critically short professional areas, e.g., software engineering, there now is considerable mobility in the Japanese workplace. I believe the embeddedness of the institutional arrangements with attitudes toward work in Japan will potentially undergo some changes. How quickly and how far these will go are interesting topics to explore.

Finally, there is a whole set of issues raised with respect to attitudes towards work, i.e., how those attitudes are formed within an institutional framework in a Japanese firm, and what is happening globally. In this respect, I believe what one is seeing in the workplace in Japan is an increased use, at the lower wage levels, of migrant workers, a number of them illegal aliens. Will this, over time, begin to have a spillover effect in terms of general work attitudes and work arrangements in Japan? and, conversely, As Japanese companies continue to move globally overseas—in particular in terms of white-collar labor forces, how will these phenomena affect changes in attitudes toward work? I am not aware of studies that have been done with respect to attitudes toward work, number of hours worked, or however these things want to be measured with respect to Japanese employees sent overseas as opposed to in the home companies, but as these companies become globalized, it would be interesting to see how easily or uneasily Japanese companies can internationalize their labor forces and their work structures. What impact will these events have on the traditional attitudes toward work that perhaps are caricatures, but which we typically think of in terms of a so-called Japanese national character with respect to work in the workplace?

Presentation of Prof. DeVos

Prof. Raphael raised a number of points and it will be difficult to touch on them all. First of all I want to make a general statement and to disagree a bit with Prof. Wilensky because I worked about nine years with the police and can give statistics about conformity or lack thereof in the area of crime. There is no doubt that Japan is more law-abiding compared with the United States, and that police authority is respected in Japan—not always liked—but if one talks about social attitudes, the attitude toward the police in Japan is vastly different from that in the United States, and this is cultural, not simply institutional.

I believe there is an historical drift in Japan concerning work and unions and so on. I believe we should look at this. We find a kind of U-shape in some of this—that there were periods in Japanese history where there was a great deal of labor unrest, during which the earlier entrepreneurs in some of the Japanese industries applied Western practices reflecting rather impersonal attitudes and so on. However, what we see recently are the ideas of worker stability, life employment and the like. The mythology says that this has been continuous, but it has not. Underneath all this is something that American economists have tended to ignore, i.e., the position throughout the Japanese economy of small firms of less than ten workers and the kinds of employment practices applied in these firms, which are different from those applied in large factories. It is in these small firms, of course, that you see the old apprenticeship system and entrepreneurial. attitudes that are considered Japanese. I was looking at data on petty merchants and artisans. Looking at the older economic statistics, I found that rickshaw drivers were listed as entrepreneurs. Well, people immediately looking at that say, "What a weird way of thinking about a rickshaw driver in Japan"; that is, how do they classify people? Well, the point of the classification was that the rickshaw driver was operating a machine and maximizing profit on it; that it was his machine and he had an entrepreneurial spirit. Indeed, we found this spirit in the attitudes about work hours among these petty merchants and artisans. They were maximizing the operation of machines to obtain maximum profits, meaning they worked long hours on them but they did not think of themselves as working by the hour. This, too, then, is a part of the Japanese economy, and, for that matter, a part of the Japanese culture which has continued and comes out of the old merchant/artisan traditions that were there before the factories and the like.

The interesting development is that many of these attitudes of worker loyalty, etc. have been grafted on, reinterpreted and brought over to the contemporary labor scene. In a sense one can see the history of the labor movement as moving toward company unions, for example. Of course, labor is losing out in the United States and we see that it has lost out over time in Japan. Labor is less restive now than it was in an earlier period.

Mentorship is another feature which goes back a long ways. In my paper, I wrote a great deal about age grading, something which I believe is an essential "deep" pattern in Japanese society and in Japanese thought in interpersonal relationships. Age makes a difference, and that is very automatically Japanese. In America, when someone is 21 years old, he or she is equal to everyone else and age does not make a bit of difference

psychologically. For the Japanese, however, there is an attitude about age grading that comes out of the Confucian ideology of the past, although it is not phrased that way anymore. This pattern of loyalty has to do with internal mentorship within concerns; that is, someone is brought in young, and, to some extent, educated within the job by someone older. There is a personal relationship here that is meaningful and does not get cut off, and this is what the survey materials discussed here suggest very strongly; that someone with a personal relationship is of more value than someone else who is impersonal (which is the Western pattern, being impersonal about jobs).

Another attitude about work is the impreciseness of job designation in the Japanese setting, something which would horrify people in the American setting, where jobs are defined very precisely. In Japan people defuse from one job to another, covering for other people, etc. in a manner that would never be acceptable in the American scene. I found the ultimate example of the American attitude in a Soviet joke. This is supposedly a true story. A fellow was staying at a hotel in the Soviet Union. He looked out the window about 8:30 in the morning and a truck pulled up. A fellow got out with a shovel and started digging a hole and then moved over about five feet and started a second hole. Meanwhile, another fellow got out of the truck and covered in the first hole. This process went on down the street. Bemused, the foreigner, who fortunately spoke Russian, went down and asked the fellow, "What are you guys doing here?" and the fellow said, "Oh, we are planting trees, but the fellow who puts the tree in the ground is hung over on vodka and we are doing our job whether he is here or not." This kind of attitude would not be Japanese—someone would cover for the guy who is hung over and do his job for him.

There is an experiment in Japanese management going on in Fremont, California in a combined General Motors/Toyota plant. American labor seems to like it, which is interesting and which might put things in Durkheimian terms; that is, that much of the loyalty aspects of a job are ritualized in Japan. People get up for morning rituals, go through a little song and dance together—giving them spirit and morale in the morning. One can witness this in establishments in Japan; seeing this morning ritual going on, one can see that there is something personal about jobs. The Japanese are the opposite of the predictions of Marx regarding the alienation of labor. Rather than workers being alienated, in large part they are ritualized; brought in, incorporated, and made to feel a part of an organization.

What I am speaking about here should all be considered more or less relative, because one can find many other kinds of patterns in Japan; it is a question of proportion. For example, about women working, there are reports in Japan about key children; women going out on jobs and not taking care of their children. This is seen with a certain horror among the Japanese. The question here is one of proportion. That is, how many women are producing key children with all the attendant problems? I doubt very much that women will penetrate into certain organizations. Although women can and do have careers, these careers are only in certain areas where their role is considered acceptable. The role definitions of men and women are being maintained more in Japan than in other places; something which can be related to women's self-concept. American women looking at Japanese women see them, perhaps, as having less liberty or fewer rights. If the American woman were in the Japanese setting, she would feel a

total lack of empowerment. However, the question is, "Do Japanese women feel this way?" I would say that Japanese women do not give evidence that they lack power or efficacy or roles in the society. If one is looking at the inner definitions of what it is to be a Japanese woman, there is a certain continuity, which is different from the sense of problems that American women have about themselves and about their society.

In conclusion, the apprenticeship role is still extant in Japan, in some form, as it is in Germany. It is a concept that is pretty much lacking in the American workplace. One does not go to the workplace to have a mentor.

Discussion

Prof. Inkeles

Many of the issues which have been raised by both of our discussants very much merit further exploration. Let us take first a basic question; whether or not we are seeing mainly the impact of structure or whether or not we are seeing personal dispositions. That is a very fundamental question in the case of the Japanese work ethic. I remember, when I first came in contact with Abegglen's argument about the Japanese factory, I did not believe it. Indeed, when I talked with various people in Japan, they said, "Well, how can this be a deep-seated Japanese characteristic when we only instituted it a very short while ago, and the main reason we instituted it was because Japan was suffering an enormous labor shortage?" Manufacturers therefore had the problem of how to secure the long-term commitment of their labor so that they would not drift everywhere in the labor market according to opportunity. They solved the problem by adopting this procedure. That was the argument I wanted to hear, and I believed it. Now I am no longer so sure, and this is one reason why I would appreciate more systematic effort in this realm. Take staying at work late at night. Obviously, there is a great deal pressure on a person to stay late at night in Japan. However, this is also true in the American firms on Wall Street. Everyone stays late at night there too. It is clear, in this case, that this is a response either to pressure from the firm—or to show how committed one is. It is also true that one cannot earn one's commissions unless one works late. On the other hand, probably most Americans who do work late do not like to do so. In Japan, the argument is—although I do not know whether this is true—that workers stay late because they have identified with the firm and they see this as a natural extension of their underlying commitment to the job as a part of a family relationship. This issue very much deserves to be systematically explored.

Prof. DeVos

One point here that is apropos is that somewhere, when one is exploring these issues, one looks at psychopathology. A very evident form of psychopathology in Japan is "Sunday neurosis"; that when the Japanese are not working, they feel very uneasy. One finds a number of individuals who have a kind of unease about leisure time, indicating that something has been internalized, even to a point of being labeled neurotic; something about having to work is in the system, and people do catch this disease.

Prof. Inkeles

Let me state why I changed my mind. Two issues. One, I am influenced by Prof. DeVos' argument, although I would like to hear the counter-argument. Second, and this is anticipating what is coming, I believe no objective outside observer could fail to be enormously impressed with the degree of structural similarity, the analogue of the argument made by Prof. DeVos. A totally independent set of observations made by Prof. Lewis, sitting in a classroom, regarding what is expected of one in an interpersonal situation, is also relevant, as the classroom is another place where one is broadly doing one's work. Students do their work in a school. This is the work of schooling. And factory workers work in a productive enterprise. One is producing self-knowledge and the other is producing a good. The degree of similarity in the way in which interpersonal and group relations are structured in these environments, is to me quite extraordinary. That is why I am prepared to bring this question up.

I also believe we have a similar problem in politics about consensus. Now there we may have a solution, because the solution may be, on the consensus side, that the Japanese try to find out what one's circle is. Once one knows one's circle, one operates with consensus inside the circle, but one may be very strongly opposed to those who have a different circle that does not overlap one's own. This could be used to explain the fact that there were times when Japan was enormously ridden with factionalism and strife, without contradicting the principle about consensus within the circle. You could simply argue that the circle was re-drawn in different ways, which begs an interesting question as to how that happened. Whether we can have the same resolution about the relationship between the objective and the internalized personal factors in the labor camp, I do not know, but I think it is worth exploring.

Prof. Wilensky

I would like to join this discussion about the causation problem—the explanation problem—because I do not disagree with much of what Prof. DeVos has said about the police, about work or anything else. There are large differences in the behaviors of the Japanese and the Americans—no doubt about it. The question is, is it because of underlying values and beliefs which we are calling national character today, or is it because of something else?

Let me provide the case for believing it is something else. Take the Nuumi joint venture between General Motors and Toyota. From this plant, we have had one Ph.D. dissertation as well as two other projects, and people are visiting the plant so often that I do not know how they get any work done. There are so many Berkeley social scientists down at that plant, although they do have rules about keeping us out, that things are known about that plant. It is a wonderful natural experiment because if you say that is national character, i.e., that the Japanese should be deferential to authority, they should be loyal to the firm, that they should work hard and be thrifty, and all of that, then you are missing the point, because here is a group of Americans who are as militant as you can get. They were the typical unruly American work force only ten years ago. Now those same people, they are the same people, wait a minute... they are not the same people

because they have been laid off and have suffered two years of unemployment... but over half of the labor force are....

Prof. Inkeles

They did screen, so they eliminated the most disturbing element....

Prof. Wilensky

No, no, they did not....

Prof. Inkeles

For example, they have no drug taking anymore because they checked everyone's drug record, and they only re-employed the people who did not take drugs.

Prof. Wilensky

Name for name, they got some union activists who went out on strike and will tell you personally they were wrong in the past and that they now know; that they have seen the light. Why have they shown up and gone through the athletic and singing rituals in the morning, singing a company song, Japanese style? The answer is that they have been given an assurance they will not be fired. They have been given lifetime jobs, if you will, insofar as the auto industry in the United States can afford it, and they have been given training, a lot of training, Japanese style. But, there are many American firms which have been doing this for decades; therefore, I do not see this as having anything to do with national character or values or beliefs, because we have a natural experiment. Over half of these people were there two years ago behaving in an unruly fashion. Now they are behaving in a Japanese fashion? I would not call it Japanese—I would just call it sensible management that has organized the technical and social part of the work so that people are motivated to work.

With regard to the police, I agree with everything that Prof. DeVos has said. Of course, the police are different in Japan. They are trained differently. They are organized differently. They have different functions, in addition to deterring crime. In the United States, the police do not have these functions. Further, there are more police in Tokyo than there are in Oakland, California. Oakland is a big city, so we are not comparing some trivial town and Tokyo. The question is, Why is the citizen relationship to the police different in Japan and the United States? It has to do with numbers. It has to do—not with a lack of history of violence, as the Japanese population at times has been violent, though now they are not—it has to do with something which one must explain in terms other than enduring culture.

Prof. Lipset

Regarding lifetime employment and for that matter a number of these issues, they clearly require statistics, which either are available or could be relatively easily secured (given the money). With regard to changes, in the book that Bendix and I did on social mobility in 1959, we had data on intra-career job shifts for Japan and the United States during the 1950s. From that data, we saw that the Japanese were high, or at least comparable, the point being that the Japanese were not that different; that most Japanese had had a number of job shifts from their first job to when they were inter-viewed. The lifetime employment issue relates only to the big companies, and there are two things about the big companies in Japan that differ structurally. One is the bonus system. In the U.S., if things do not go well, companies lay people off. In Japan, salaries are only a part of total income. If the company is not making money, if the number of cars, for instance, goes down, the company gives a lower bonus, but keeps the person employed. This cannot be done in the American system. The other aspect of lifetime employment relates to the conglomerate structure. A company like Mitsubishi can close down its shipyards because they can shift people to other parts of the system, something which is less feasible in the United States.

On the other hand, in terms of the auto plant, I saw something recently which suggested that the plant may be closed; that the cars are not selling and that there is some discussion of closing it down.

Prof. Wilensky

They are going to change the line.

Prof. Lipset

Years ago there was an article in *Atlantic Monthly* in which Mr. Morita of Sony stated that Sony had a plant in San Diego that made TVs, and, at that time, that 60 percent of all the Sony television sets sold in the U.S. were actually made in San Diego. His contention was that the workers in San Diego were as efficient as the workers in Japan, but he attributed this to differences in management. That is, they had Japanese managers in San Diego, and he said, in effect, that American managers were no good. What he described was a kind of Taylorism out of the 1920s, inferring that the quality control issue and the personalizing of relationships all actually began in the United States. The Japanese got the ideas from what they read in American management textbooks; things, which, at the time, did not work in the United States. That is, American workers supposedly did not respond to this kind of pseudo-*gemeinschaft*–of remembering their birthdays and their kids and so on, whereas Japanese workers supposedly did.

Prof. Wilensky

I would like to direct a point to Prof. Lipset. I do not want to get away from the statistics issue. In your book with Bendix, you also described some other interesting statistics about social mobility, which showed that there was actually as much social mobility in Europe as there was in the U.S. That is, in the U.S. there is an illusion of mobility. In Japan, there is an illusion of stability. That is, not everyone in Japan has lifetime employment, nonetheless it is a kind of illusory system people believe in, even though the statistics tell us otherwise. On the American scene, there is an optimism about social mobility, which is not the case in Europe. Again, we see illusion vs. reality in these situations.

Prof. Lipset

On the matter of leisure time and work, I would like to see some hard statistics. One thing which has impressed me whenever I have been in Japan is that, as compared to Americans, the Japanese are sports-happy. One can see 50,000 people watching volleyball. Every possible sport has extraordinary numbers of players. Even if a team is in last place, all the baseball games are sold out. People clearly want to watch sports, and they are not working when they are doing this.

With regard to women, and perhaps Prof. Usui can enlighten us, I have had many Japanese women, both in Japan and here, tell me that they do not like the treatment they receive from Japanese men. They make no bones about it to foreigners, about incidents and relationships, including behavior at academic meetings like this. Although this is very un-statistical, my impression is that they are not very happy about this.

Prof. Spiro

I want to reiterate Prof. Wilensky's point. To me, there is little question about these differences across nations, across groups, but the question still remains whether these are to be explained culturally, structurally or characterologically. How do the arrows go, if they go at all? Let me introduce some other comparative data.

There are today in Los Angeles approximately 50,000 children from the kibbutz movement, who are now adults and who have left the kibbutz. They concentrated in Los Angeles for many reasons which are not relevant at the moment. I studied these children in their schools. It drove me crazy because it was not work, nor was it play. There was no discipline. They would run around the school. The teacher would say, "Now, we must come to order." They absolutely refused. While I am somewhat of a democratic type, that was chaos. It was not democracy. In comparing those who are now in Los Angeles with those who remain in the kibbutz, and I know them personally (and this does get to the structural, cultural vs. characterological argument)–those who remain in the kibbutz are not achievers. They say, "We want a higher quality of life; we cannot get a higher quality of life; regardless of how much we achieve, regardless of how strenuously we work, we are going to end up the same way as those who do not work hard–what is the

point?" Those who are now in Los Angeles are people who work 16 to 18 hours a day. They had the same education, the same culture, and the same structure. The opportunity now for their effort paying off for them personally is substantial, which is all the more interesting because they were raised not for personal payoff but for the benefit of the group. For the benefit of the group they worked their eight hours a day and went back to their rooms. When the payoff is personal, they work 16 to 18 hours a day. Some of the most important real estate people in Los Angeles, millionaires, are these kids from the kibbutz. The difference, obviously, is not characterological--unless we might want to say that there was some kind of selective immigration, which is conceivable, but we do not know that.

Prof. Usui

There are some issues that I and Prof. Suzuki would like to address.

First of all, Prof. Suzuki feels that in the area of work, and especially whether or not the Japanese are different from Americans in terms of their commitment to and attitudes toward work, this is probably one of the areas where the two countries are most similar; that is, where one finds the least differences. Referring to a questionnaire which was used in surveys administered to both American and Japanese workers in the 1970s and 1980s, the questions asked included inquiries about their preferences as to what kind of bosses they liked to work for; if they had enough money to live on; whether they should continue working or stop working and then retire; and so on. The results show a stability of response over the two decades and substantially similar response patterns for both the Japanese and American workers. Thus, the common assertion that Japanese workers are very different from American workers may be a myth.

The second point relates to work commitment--why Japanese workers work so hard as opposed to Americans. We have been debating whether this has to do with national character or organizational arrangements. If Americans are put into similar work arrangements, they behave much as the Japanese do, which is the point made from the Nuumi studies. Prof. Suzuki feels that organizational arrangements are very important, but that we must also think about family relations; otherwise this issue may not be entirely resolved. For example, in the U.S. if a man wants to work until late at night, he must make a tremendous sacrifice in terms of his position in the family. His wife will not let him work late every day, because, in the U.S. the place of the family is very important. The man must decide whether to work late or go home and spend time with his wife and family. In Japan, the wife lets him do this; therefore, the Japanese can work late. One must consider these very different family relations in the two countries.

The third remark concerns labor mobility. We tend to think that in Japan there is an illusion of labor stability, while in the U.S. there is an illusion of very high labor mobility. However, according to statistics with which Prof. Suzuki is very familiar, the reality is, in fact, the opposite. Japan has the higher labor instability. This can be explained in terms of the dual economic structure Japan has; that is, only about 15 to 25 percent of the entire Japanese labor force are employed by the big companies. In other

words, 75 to 80 percent of the Japanese working population are employed by small- or medium-sized firms, where there is a considerable degree of labor mobility.

Prof. Hayashi

I would like to introduce a Performance (P)/Maintenance (M) theory developed by Prof. Misumi at Osaka University. Prof. Misumi proposed four P-M leadership patterns. P-M refers to a concept of group functioning. As elucidated by many previous small group and behavioral studies in organizations, group functions can be divided into at least two dimensions. The first, "P," is a group's goal achievement, or the problem-solving oriented function. The other, "M," is a function oriented to the group's self-preservation, i.e., the maintenance and strengthening of the group process itself. "Leadership" is defined as the role behavior of a group member who exercises some kind of greater continuing influence on these group functions than does the rest of the group members. Prof. Misumi's hypothesis is that varying degrees of both the P and M functional dimensions are contained in all kinds of leadership behavior. Figure 1 was prepared by introducing a scale with varying degrees of intensity of the P and M dimensions. As shown in this diagram, the P and M dimensions are subdivided into two parts, thus creating quadrants PM, Pm, pM, and pm. Prof. Misumi's field work shows that the PM type is the most superior with respect to productivity, minimum accidents and minimum job change rates, while the pm type is the worst for productivity and these other two rates. Following PM, pM is ranked second and Pm is ranked third. Interestingly, in Japan, M is considered quite important for its strong maintenance implications—indeed, more important than P.

M S c a l e	pM	PM
	pm	Pm
	P Scale	

Figure 1. Conceptual representation of four patterns of P-M leadership

Prof. Lewis

When you are talking about performance, are you talking about an emphasis on output? And when you are talking about maintenance are you talking about an emphasis on social relations?

Prof. Hayashi

Yes. We have done many, many surveys in companies that are profitable institutions. We are talking about middle management and lower management, and groups of 30 to 50. Perhaps the mode of performance and maintenance is different between Japan and America.

Prof. DeVos

Perhaps this is where Prof. Wilensky and I can reconcile a little bit, because it is a question of management, not of labor. This is cultural. The attitude of being responsible towards subordinates is part of the old system. Whereas the Western system has been class-conscious, and middle-class individuals simply do not easily relate with the lower class, this is the alienation of the workers that Marx talked about because Western society was a class society. Japanese society was a hierarchical society that went from feudalism into the modern age, not through mercantilism and the impersonal development of the bourgeoisie. Thus, it is management that does not relate to workers in the Western situation. In the Japanese situation, management takes responsibility for workers.

There was a Kurasao film that impressed me because I could not conceive of it ever being made in the United States. It was about a Japanese fellow who was afraid of the atomic bomb; an older man. He was a factory owner and he had a friend from Brazil. He was very anxious, maybe unjustifiably so, about a recurrence of war, so much so that he wanted to exchange factories with his Brazilian Japanese friend. Everyone—his mistress, his entire family—thought this fellow was crazy and they literally tried to have him committed. He got extremely angry. He burned down his factory. And, there, in the smoldering ruins of his factory, in a disheveled *ukata*, he is approached by the foreman of his workers, who says, "What about us? What are we going to do?" In this scene, this capitalist drops to his knees and asks his workers for forgiveness. Can you imagine seeing that in an American film? I doubt it. But it made sense to a Japanese audience. In other words, he did forget about his workers.

Prof. Inkeles

While I have been mostly agreeing with Prof. DeVos, I think at this point I must depart somewhat in order to do full justice to Prof. Wilensky's point. Prof. Wilensky, there is of course no question but that structures determine, or at least sharply influence, behavior. The stronger and clearer the structure, the greater its ability to influence behavior, though not necessarily always in the direction intended. For example, how a prison wants its prisoners to behave may not be the main way in which they react. They may counter-react to the milieu. Therefore, when we are focusing on behavioral outcomes, we must recognize that what we will see will be a result of some kind of interaction between the elements that the people bring to the environment and what the environment tries to get out of them. This is a typical, multi-variant problem. There is no

question about this, and anyone who fails to recognize this, or who thinks that national character determines everything, must undoubtedly be wrong.

The question, therefore, is: How much influence is each factor exerting under different circumstances with different strengths of the inputs? The answer gets to be a fairly complicated design. Some time ago, Prof. Levinson and I, in the article that was referred to earlier, tried to provide a little model of this. We applied it to politics as well as to work. A situation can have very strong imperatives built into the structure of the work. For example, if you work on a newspaper you are going to have a lot of trouble if you do not understand and meet deadlines. This, of course, can be occupationally variable, because if you work in the Building Department, the fact that it is a newspaper is irrelevant, i.e., the fact that every day the paper must come out. But, if you are a reporter, and you cannot handle deadlines, you are going to have a very real problem. There are people in the world who are very compulsive and have no problem with deadlines. Unfortunately, if you are not like that, you have a difficult time in academic life. That may be one way we screen people out. Of course, one always has the possibility of different combinations of these situations with different consequences. For instance, one may have a very clear structure and very clear personality types which go together very happily. On the other hand, one may have a very clear structure but with the wrong kind of a person in the situation. In this instance, then, one is bound to experience certain kinds of tension, which may go one way or another. This could even go the way of the structure being strong enough so that it converts the people, as a learning experience, to their disposition. But, it can also be tension-ridden. The people can then transform the structure, which often happens. The structure does not have to transform the people. The structure may be obliged to adapt to the character of the people.

Let me provide an example from an experience I had in Israel. I was interviewing in a factory which was very traditional. The father had founded it, a Mr. Friedman. The symbol of the factory was a big man holding two little children, one on each arm; that was Mr. Friedman. Mr. Friedman had died, but the sons were carrying forth the business. After they helped me interview in the factory, they said "Now you have to help us," and I said, "Fine, I'll try." They said, "We have a labor problem." I said, "I am not an expert in labor relations, but tell me what your problem is." They said, "Well, we cannot get on with these Jews." They, themselves, were Jews, of course. I said, "What do you mean?" They said, "They do not understand time. Jews do not understand time." I said, "Why is that a big issue?" and "How long have you been living with this problem?" They said, "We never had a problem before." I said, "What happened? Why do you have one now?" They said, "Because before everybody worked at making individual units. You worked at your own speed and then they were all brought together and assembled, but it did not matter because all the pieces were more or less alike." (They made Prima stoves; someone made the screen, someone made the pump, and eventually the stove was assembled.) But the factory had shifted over to making refrigerators and they were using an overhead production line. On this line, if you were not at work, then that refrigerator did not get a door, or it did not get a compressor, so it became terribly important that everyone was there on time. Well, the people were not used to that. So, he asked of the workers, "Okay, why can't you get here on time?" They said, "Well, the kid was sick... the buses do not operate fast enough." They said, "Okay, I have been asking you to come at 8:00–come at 8:30." They said, "Oh, wonderful." At 8:30, half of

them were still missing, so they called them all together and they scolded them again. The workers said, "Well, the children were sick and the buses did not run on time." The owners said, "I gave you half an hour." They said, "Make it 9:00." They made it 9:00; they still did not come on time. They went to 9:30; and still they did not come on time. This time the owners closed the gates of the factory and put up a big sign which said, "If you can read this sign, you are so late you are fired." And then they had a big strike on their hands and they wanted me to advise them how to get out of this situation. Here one has all the elements; one has the dispositions; one has the social structure; and one has the insight of management–all interacting in a complex way.

Most of the situations we are interested in we cannot make sense of unless we have the ability to incorporate in our analysis–if we want a high level of explanation–all of these elements. One must understand what kind of structure one is putting people in; one has to understand what kind of people are involved; and one must understand what kind of management is trying to discover how to link the two. The story of the factory in Fremont is not yet over, and it is only one factory. Indeed, there is very real question whether this can be introduced into any other American factory. Thus, I make no claim one way or the other about this, other than to say that I believe we are quite right about structure. If one creates certain kinds of structures, and if one then screens the people–meaning one takes only some and not others, being very careful about whom one chooses and why–then through their psychological testing they were apparently quite successful. Perhaps it is mainly the structure. Perhaps they got the right people. To sum up, I do not think we know the answer in this case and I do not think we know the answer in many cases without a relatively deep study of all these elements.

Prof. Spiro

I would like to ask one more question, perhaps directed to the Japanese delegation. Getting back to this question of the interaction of structure and basic cultural determinants of attitudes with respect to work, given the facts that you do have (a) a wide range of work institutions in Japan with 15 to 25 percent of employees in high-level companies that have permanent employment and all the things that are characterized as symptomatic of the Japanese work system; (b) the fact that you have other organizations that do not have these qualities; and (c) the fact that labor mobility in Japan may be more common throughout the whole work force than in the U.S–have there been studies which have been able to isolate these types of structural variables with respect to attitudes toward work?

Prof. Suzuki

Large patronage in Japan means more than 1,000 workers.

Prof. Spiro

I am not so much interested in the size of the institutions, necessarily, but rather these other structural factors that make up its composition. For example, the differentiation between plants or organizations or workers who are under permanent employment as opposed to workers who are not.

Family Patterns as an   **CHAIR**   **DISCUSSION**
Expression of National   **LEADERS**
Character   **C. Lewis**   **J. Clausen**
                                                                       C. Usui

Presentation of Prof. Clausen

National character seems to be reflected to some extent in the family, although I do not see that any particular constellation of national character necessarily entails a particular type of family; however, since the family is a means of transmission—through socialization of values, basic ways of life, expectations, culture—then the interrelationships between the two should be a major focus of any efforts to study national character. If national character is to be more than a few salient aspects of personality that differentiate one country from another, if it really has coherence, then it should influence the identities that people build up. Identity, defined here as the sense of who and what one is, is, of course, a tremendously difficult thing to get at, but presumably identity tends to be initially formed in the family. Identity further implies to whom one is related, what one stands for, where one gets one's source of support, where one gets one's satisfactions.

Looking at the family, first of all, we would want to consider the expectations that one builds up prior to starting a family of one's own; expectations that obviously come from family appropriation. Lineage can have relative importance; it appears that lineage is far more important in Japan than it is in the United States, depending upon where one's forefathers came from. For many people that I know, lineage was meaningless to them because it was totally unknown back in Europe. For others, family traditions go way back. One of my sons is married to a young woman whose father came from one of the founding families of Virginia, and all over the wall you see charts of the family since the early 1600s. Expectations of how the family is formed, choice of mate, arranged marriage; what constellation of expectations goes with these? I do not know how much thought is given to the kind of spouse, the kind of husband, let us say, that a woman wants in Japan. When we asked our longitudinal subjects, we found, and this was one of the relatively few places where highly competent women differed from less competent women, that they had some idea of the kind of person they wanted to marry. What are the images that people have? Does the culture provide a means whereby these images can be realized? What are the prevailing expectations of the relationship between husband and wife? When I suggested to my Japanese student who is doing his dissertation with me that in the United States being best friends was fairly typical of a lot of academic couples I knew, he thought that was quite incredible; that husbands and wives simply are not best friends. What kinds of activities does one envision that the family unit will engage in?

Then we move from expectations to experience; the things that could not be predicted. With my longitudinal subjects, born in the 1920s, most of the women indicated that they had given no consideration to anything but marriage. I assume that this still tends to be the case in Japan today. To these subjects' daughters, to a very large extent, the consideration is still of marriage and career, or at least marriage and work and

family. However, family certainly no longer has the same connotations and indeed now a significant proportion do not plan to marry. Many women do not see any need to marry. We have more single-parent families. What happens when social change occurs, such as occurred for women in the United States with the women's movement, particularly in the 1960s? Opportunities existed, family priorities changed somewhat, and by the time the subjects got to their late 50s, a significant proportion of them felt that their identities were lodged in their jobs.

An even bigger surprise than the above findings was that, for men, fully 40 percent said—in answer to the question, "What would you say are the most important influences on your sense of who you are and what you are?"—"My wife, or my wife and children would be most important in shaping my sense of who and what I am." The professional respondents (e.g., physicians, lawyers, etc.) tended to say "Well, I guess my job and then my wife and kids would be second." I do not know how these findings would compare with Japan, as it is my understanding that the family has a rather different meaning.

Another question related to the functions that the family serve. Periodically we have asked, "Which of these aspects of family life is most important and which is least important?" We have the respondents rank such things as companionship, having a comfortable home, sexual relationships, having children, mutual understanding. Interestingly, these change considerably over the years but it is also interesting that understanding was chosen primarily by upper middle-class people and was chosen more often in the later years than in the earlier years. Mutual understanding was tremendously important. Thus, it occurred to me that a question like that might be useful in surveys in which one attempts to get at facets of the family that are important. Sexual relationships, of course, in the United States now, no longer would rate very high because sexuality is so rampant that marriage is no longer seen as a requirement. But 40 or 50 years ago, it was.

Another issue relates to generational priorities. Where does one take one's obligations most seriously? If they are in conflict, which generation takes priority? Certainly in the United States, it seems to me that it is parents who are more concerned about their children than the children are about their parents; not that children do not care about their parents, but their own identities again are lodged more in their children and how their children have turned out.

I have said a few words about what might happen if more women get into the labor market in Japan and begin to be less available to their husbands and children, so that dependency on the wife would become less feasible. People have told me this is probably not going to be a problem in Japan. What was a problem for more than 50 percent of the women in our study, and this was acknowledged by their husbands, was that the husband was unavailable to the family at critical times. This led to tension. Sometimes it led to the breakup of the family; often to extreme conflict. I was told that such unavailability is no problem; it is accepted in Japan. However, in research done in Shizuoka, in which men were studied but there was inclusion of a small number of the wives, it was surprising how many wives were acutely dissatisfied with their lives. The only reason they did not seek divorce, they said, was that there was really no feasible way for them to get by, and if they thought of remarrying, they might get the same kind

of man all over again, so what was the point of it. The fact that they were so blunt about this was rather striking.

Presentation of Prof. Usui

Rather than raising the conceptual issues Prof. Clausen raised, I would like to go over some data and discuss what they may mean.

Table 1 is concerned with the lives of older people, aged 60 and over, in the United States, Japan, Italy and Denmark in 1986. This survey was conducted by the Japanese Prime Minister's Office and was published in 1987. In each country about 1,000 people were interviewed.

Essentially, what is presented here is overall involvement by different types of activities concerned with some aspect of family life, including work life, involvement with housework or household chores, what people do in their leisure time, and in what kinds of social or political or religious activities they are involved. For some tables, there are breakdowns between men and women.

To provide some very brief background information, in these four countries the age distributions of the samples were rather similar. The Japanese respondents were slightly younger, given that Japanese society, in terms of age distribution, has a lower percentage of elderly persons.

With respect to educational attainment, the United States had a slightly higher level of attainment, but the remaining three countries, in terms of distribution, were very comparable.

In terms of household arrangement—the kinds of living arrangements these older people have in different countries—as might be expected, the U.S. and Denmark are rather similar in that about 80 to 85 percent of their elderly were either living alone or were living alone as couples. In Japan, about 50 percent of the elderly interviewed were living with children, either married or unmarried children. Another 25 percent were living alone as couples, or with relatives or non-relatives; and less than 10 percent were living alone. Italy stood somewhat in between these two patterns. That is, about 30 percent of them were living as couples, 35 or 36 percent were living with married or unmarried children, and about 20 percent were living alone.

Given this background information, refer to Table 1, which describes how frequently these elderly subjects maintain a relationship with their children who are living outside of their household. Ordinarily, one might assume that if one is living alone one may try to have more contact with children, but actually the patterns in these countries were rather different. In the United States, regardless of the type of living arrangement, the older people show quite a high level of family contact. However, among couples, the frequency of contacts is lowest, perhaps indicating the couple-centeredness of the American family.

To explain how the data are presented, Table 1 shows the percentages of respondents having frequent contact with their children who are not living in the same household—by household structure. On the left-hand side, the household structure indicates the kind of living arrangement each of the older persons has (i.e., whether they are living alone, living alone as a couple, living with unmarried children, living in a three-generation household, or other—which includes living in rest homes). The percentages indicate whether these people have almost daily contact or contact more than once a week with their children who are not living with them.

Prof. DeVos

Prof. Usui, the most striking thing here are the Ns; that 40 percent of the Americans are living alone as against less than 10 percent of the Japanese, and that roughly 35 percent of the Japanese are living in three-generation households against no Americans. This is very, very striking.

Prof. Usui

Correct. As background information, I pointed out that 40 percent of the Americans are either living alone or living alone as a couple, similar to Denmark.

Prof. Wilensky

Table 1 is somewhat misleading as to what it implies because under living alone you have percentages of 55 and 51 percent, and it looks like they are comparable, but the actual numbers are so much less that the implication is skewed as to what proportion are living alone. In other words, the bulk of the people are living in three-generation households in the Japanese sample compared with the American sample, where that number is only 5. That is the notable thing in the table.

Prof. Usui

Yes, that is one thing that is notable and that is why I wanted to provide the background information in terms of living arrangements. Table 1 is attempting to assess how one's living arrangement makes a difference in terms of what kind of contact one maintains with one's children.

Prof. Inkeles

The point being made, just in terms of general presentation, is that the most dramatic element of Table 1 is the living arrangements. Thus, what people are proposing is that your Table 1 should be a breakdown by living arrangements to highlight the contrasts between three-generational households in Japan and married couples in the

Prof. Lewis

Family size also has influence?

Prof. Usui

When this question was raised, they were fully aware that if you are living with the children, you have daily contact with them, which is not included here. That there is a drop among Japanese respondents living in three-generation households was explained. But, it does not necessarily drop among Italians, for example.

Prof. Lewis

Could this not be due to a larger family size, meaning if you have more children, you are more likely to have more contact with other children you are not living with?

Prof. Usui

In the Note to Table 1, the percentages of persons with no sons or daughters are listed as follows: United States, 16.3; Japan, 6.1; Italy, 13.7; and Denmark, 14.3. Thus, it is actually quite high for Americans and Italians.

Prof. Lewis

What if you are living with one of your children and you have only one child?

Prof. Usui

That very well may be for Italians. It cannot be determined from these data.

Prof. Usui

Prof. Suzuki feels the reason the frequencies of contact among the Italians are so high is because of Italy's geographic proximity; there, children often live nearby, facilitating the maintenance of higher frequencies of contact.

Prof. Lewis

Prof. Clausen raised a couple of very interesting issues and challenges with respect to work and family. One of them was that the family might have a different meaning in Japan and the United States. This is a theme that has been recurring; that

Americans may place more value on family. This raises a challenge, because if Americans are placing so much more value on family vs. work, why is the American family in such trouble relative to the Japanese family?

The second is this issue of latent dissatisfaction that does not appear in things like divorce. What is the nature of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with family roles? It would be interesting to hear the Japanese participants respond to these two important issues on work/family relationships. And, is this something that could be expected to change?

Prof. Kataoka

This may not answer your point directly, but I am always struck by the enormous weight that women carry in the Japanese household. Indeed, if I were running the U.S. government, dealing with the Japanese market opening up, I would try to seduce Japanese women. The woman in the Japanese household has had all the educational problems, manages the house, manages the finances, and is tremendously important; whereas, the husband is very incidental to a household. He just comes home late at night and hands over the paycheck. Undoubtedly, they are all living under tremendous stress, but somehow Japanese women are very patient and perform their roles well. Is there a disincentive against not doing it or do they find some emotional gratification from what they are doing? Whatever the answer, it is very, very important. It is really the hinge on which the entire Japanese family hangs. And, if you unscrew it, the whole thing might just come unstuck. It is that important.

Prof. DeVos

On the dissatisfaction issue, we did surveys with wives, rather intensive ones, and some people were very surprised by the alacrity Japanese women have of expressing dissatisfaction with their husbands. However, that does not extend over into behavior. Although they role play their husbands, when someone asks them about their husbands, they will tell you all the graphic details about how inadequate the man is and how dissatisfied they are with them. But this does not mean that they break up or even think about breaking up. As you said, the chances of getting anyone better are slim, and that seems to be a very standard attitude among Japanese women; they resign themselves to the bad material that they are working with as a spouse.

And it does not work the other way around; the men are opaque. They do not express dissatisfaction with their wives, generally.

Prof. Usui

Related to that, regarding the data Prof. Clausen presented, the Shizuoka sample, when was the survey conducted and what age groups of women were interviewed? That may have something to do with the results. There is a survey conducted every decade since 1958 for the last forty years and the question is "If you were born again and could

live your life one more time, would you like to be born a male or female?" Over the forty-year time span, about 90 percent of the men wanted to come back as a male again. For women, as one might expect, the percentage who wanted to be reborn female used to be very low, about 27 percent in 1958. But it has been increasing. In 1988, 59 percent of the women said they would prefer to be born female again, as opposed to 34 percent preferring to be born male. Thus, the younger generation seems to be exhibiting a very different attitude and ideas about gender roles. The older generation, people born in the 1920s who grew up as teenagers during World War II and spent their adulthood right after World War II, may have very different experiences which may explain the high dissatisfaction.

More recently, among Japanese couples, there are increasing dependencies of the husbands on their wives. The women are getting stronger. They control aspects of family life. The divorce rate is also rising among late middle-aged couples because husbands become entirely devoted to work. The women, on the other hand, have run the household, educated the children and themselves (by going to cultural centers), and when they finish child rearing, and the children have left home, then the husband and wife sit together and realize they do not have anything to talk about. This gives wives who initiate divorce.

Prof. Lipset

Regarding control of data and hiring other samples, Table 6, for the Americans, appears very peculiar. That is, it shows 50 percent of a national sample of the aged in gardening and fishing/sports. On the other hand, Table 8, which is "How often?" makes more sense and suggests some contradictory results, because, on the sporting activities, for example, 15 percent of the Americans say they engage often, and 7 or 8 percent say sometimes. But, under "How do you enjoy your free time?" 53 percent are coded under fishing/sport. There seems to be some kind of contradiction. Perhaps somehow the translation or the way the question was worded produced some peculiar results. Eighty percent say they enjoy music in the American case. Maybe they can enjoy gardening even if they do not do it. Perhaps that is the answer.

Prof. Sasaki

With regard to Table 1—percentages of respondents having frequent contact with children, this table does not make much sense because it does not clarify the means of contact. Is it by telephone, by conversation, by letters, or other means? This figure indicates that Japan has the lowest percentage for all items.

| Socialization in Family, School and Elsewhere | CHAIR

M. Sasaki | DISCUSSION LEADERS H. Stevenson R. Yoshino |

Presentation of Prof. Stevenson

Presumably socialization has a great deal to do with the ultimate development of national character, but what is very surprising is that we have very little data about socialization, comparative data about the socialization of children in Japan and the United States. Thus it is difficult to look back in a child's life in an effort to determine how some of these differences might emerge. I will discuss three issues here: language, methodology, and conceptualization, and also a bit about our results.

I am very concerned about the methods that are used in the studies that we are talking about, particularly those which involve much translation. This last example is a perfectly good one. If the question was Nanio shite imasuka?–"What are you doing?"–that is very different if one translates it into English as "What do you enjoy in your free time?" We face real difficulty in this area because many people who are doing comparative studies are people who have had backgrounds in comparative studies in European and American systems, and the conceptualization that exists within most European languages, and even languages such as Russian or Eastern European languages and English, is much greater than it is between Japanese, Chinese, the Asian languages. Language reflects culture, and the cultures of Asia are very different in their origins and emphases than the cultures of the West. In the studies that we have been doing, one of our most difficult problems lies in the area of language.

We were talking yesterday about a particular example where there is real confusion. In studying children, we wanted to know about children who stay in school and children who do not. There is a term in Japanese, ochikobore. If one asks for the best translation of ochikobore, it will be "school drop-out." One can back-translate it, forward-translate it, and still get ochikobore, meaning "school drop-out" (if you have learned the meaning of ochikobore in the West). I was totally confused a couple of years ago, though, because we were in school and the teacher pointed out that a certain child was ochikobore. I thought "Well, that does not make any sense–this child is in school, but he is a drop-out." The teacher said, "Oh, yes, that means 'inattentive.'" Thus, here we have a case where we can translate back and forth all we want, but if we do not understand what ochikobore means in terms of being inattentive vs. being not in school, what is the value of all the questionnaires or interviews that have been conducted? Of further interest, Prof. Lewis learned ochikobore in Japan and saw it as meaning "inattentive," whereas I learned ochikobore here and I saw it as meaning a school "drop-out." Therefore, the entire language issue is vastly more complex than anyone here has emphasized.

As another example, we tried to translate the words "pressure" or "stress." What does one do in Japanese for the word "stress"? The only approximation for "stress" is

sutoresu. Does one actually feel stress in the "Japanization" of the word "stress"? Taking another example, we wanted to ask about "learning disabilities." The best approximation in Japanese is *nandokusho*. Unfortunately, *nandokusho* does not mean learning disabilities in any of the ways that we consider learning disabilities. So, here are two examples of terms that are readily translated so someone can do a study of learning disabilities in children. The translation is *nandokusho*; however, no Japanese teachers will understand what you are talking about; what you are trying to get at.

A final example comes from a recent study we are doing. We tried to use the term "tension patterns" with Chinese participants. When we introduced the word, there were absolute blanks. What do you mean "tension patterns"? Well, for example, children who twist their hair. Total blank. Why would a child twist his hair? Or a child who rocks back and forth. Why would a child do that? These represent an entire system of concepts that simply do not exist within the typical Chinese mind or in terms of Chinese words. Therefore, what we have to do is operationalize it and talk about. Do you do this? Do you do that? with some of the things that the Chinese suggested might be "tension patterns" that we would not use, and we also suggested tension patterns that they might use. I would like someone to give me a good translation of the Japanese word *amae*. If one does not understand the Japanese system, how can one take a single word such as "nurturance"—seeking nurturance, putting oneself in the passive role of being nurtured—and translate it?

What is the resolution of this? Clearly, from the descriptions of the research that we have been listening to here, this issue begs further exploration from which we could all well benefit. I see no solution, except to have people making up the materials be familiar with both languages. Unless one understands the cultural system and the language, the likelihood of obtaining materials that are meaningful and which can be interpreted with real sensibility is very low. From my perspective, this is one of the major weaknesses in our discussions. Perhaps one can never make up materials, in Japanese for instance, and expect them to be translated clearly into English, or vice versa, if one does not have solid understanding of the two languages and the cultural systems. Of course, what we have been doing is using people who are native Chinese speakers, native Japanese speakers, native English speakers, with everyone knowing at least two of the languages to accomplish this kind of checking back and forth.

The second point I would like to make about our discussions here is that we keep imposing American conceptual systems upon all this. We talk about national character. In the West we seek consistency and unity. It is very important to us that we have consistency. In the study of personality, for example, it is now coming out pretty clearly that the important thing to the Japanese child or young adult is the appropriateness of the response for the situation in which the individual finds him or herself. To us, that is "copping out." That is, one is supposed to be consistent across situations. One is not supposed to have this inconsistency which results when you are adapting constantly to different situations. So, to us in the West, consistency is a very important characteristic of the individual and of society. Thus, if one talks about national character, this is forcing the issue with the Japanese or the Chinese. We should be talking about national characters. What are the characters that are necessary for adaptation to different kinds of situations? I feel that this is going to lead us down blind alleys if we really talk about

an effort to get a national character of the Japanese. We are not going to find it. We are going to find a series of characters which is perfectly healthy and wholesome, but, from our Western point of view, it will not be satisfactory because we expect to find coherence and consistency. Thus we are mistaken to lead these discussions vis-à-vis concepts that come from the West instead of concepts that come from Japan, China and other cultures. Americans have certain characteristics which are relatively pervasive and thus there is a tendency not to look at the other culture for the conceptualization but to impose the Western conceptualization on the other cultures.

The third issue relates to the question, "How do you define national character?" I have little interest in that. What interests me is the question, "Are there differences between these cultures that have explanatory value for certain kinds of things that we are trying to understand?" One of the things that we are trying to understand as developmental psychologists is why it is that Japanese and Chinese children are so remarkably effective in the acquisition of information and skills. When we do this, we ask a series of questions which clearly differentiates the Japanese, Chinese and American cultures. This is quite different from the effort involved in saying, "Well, this is the national character, and therefore you are going to have high achievement motivation or something." In looking at some of these differences, we find that some of them have very powerful effects. For example, Americans consistently give higher ratings to positive characteristics and lower ratings to negative characteristics than do Japanese mothers or children. That is, according to the American child and the American mother, the child is more effective as a learner; they have better memory; they do better in math; they do better in reading than does the Japanese child. This is incorrect; i.e., that the American child, from the international perspective, does better. Both sets of parents, that is, Japanese parents and American parents, are equally sensitive to how well their child does, but the American parents tend to give a more positive, optimistic evaluation, while the Japanese parents tend to give more negative evaluations. The Japanese evaluations also tend to be more realistic; that is, their ratings are more in accord with what the children actually do. For instance, if you are ask them to compare to average children, the Japanese mother will give an average rating, indeed hundreds of Japanese mothers will give average ratings, or ratings much nearer the average than will the American mother. If one is evaluating a large representative sample of children, then obviously the average rating should be average if one is asking, "How does your child compare to other children on this characteristic?" One of the characteristics that we come up with, then, is the eternal optimism of the Americans; everything is fine; excessive positive evaluation. Whereas the Japanese are much less likely to be positive in their evaluations, even though each of these sets of parents is equally sensitive to the differences among their children. That is, the American mother is effective in evaluating who is good and who is bad, and so is the Japanese mother; it is just that the levels are different. So one does get that kind of consistency.

Another type of consistency is what parents are satisfied with. That is, if one asked Japanese mothers, "How satisfied are you with how your child is doing in school?" fewer than 10 percent will say, "very satisfied." Conversely, 40 to 60 percent of American mothers will say they are "very satisfied." Thus, American mothers are much less critical of their children than are Japanese mothers. This has very strong ramifications. If you evaluate your child as being very smart, very effective, doing well in school, then where

is the motivation for the child to improve? If the mother is more critical and more demanding, then there is room for some motivation for the child to improve.

Another fascinating topic is attributions. Here we often find consistent, strong differences, independently of the way the questions may be asked, as they can be asked in a number of different ways. When you ask the mother "Why do you think your child is doing well in school?" what happens is that the Japanese mother will give much more relative emphasis to effort than to ability while the American mother will give much greater emphasis to ability related to effort. Even at early childhood ages, one can ask this in the form, "How will your child do in college?" and again we find the American mother predicting success from an early age. You can ask, "Was your child born with his reading ability?" and the American mother will be more positive in responding than will the Japanese mother. Again, unless you approach the question from different angles and get consistent responses, then it could always be a bias in a particular question.

Thus, in attitudes and beliefs there are, at least in the socialization of children, very strong differences between Japan and the United States; ones which we also find between Chinese families and Japanese families and between Chinese families and American families. Therefore, in beliefs, there are differences. As for behaviors, I believe that neither the Japanese nor the Westerners have studied as well what goes on in schools and what goes on in the behavior of families, at least not until recently. There are a few studies, and Prof. Lewis' work is among the most interesting. Instead of my discussing some of the differences found in the behavioral domain, we should hear from Prof. Lewis about some of the major differences she has found and which others have substantiated since she worked on this; on the subject, for example, of how teachers work in the guidance of children vs. the lecturing of children.

Remarks of Prof. Lewis

Let me preface my remarks by saying that I have been doing research in pre-schools and first-grade classrooms over the last ten years in Japan. This is really a hobby, an avocation. I was trained as a developmental psychologist, an experimentalist, and there is no research that I have done that any of my peers would consider research at all. What I have done is sit in Japanese pre-schools and first-grade classrooms for a total of about six months, simply watching what goes on and describing it. Methodologically, this does not come up to the standards of most of what we are talking about.

My observations, which began with pre-schools and went on to first grade, were initiated by a paradox in the literature on Japan, i.e., that people talk about early child-rearing as being extremely indulgent and not focusing on rules, not focusing on discipline. Yet, when you observe Japanese children in later school settings, they are extremely self-disciplined and extremely well-controlled. The paradox, then, was, "How do you get from this indulgent child-rearing to these children who seem to be so self-controlled?" I thought that somehow the boom was lowered in pre-school. Therefore, I felt that this would be the level to observe. But, when I spent time in pre-schools, there was nothing like a lowering of the boom, but there were some very interesting socialization strategies going on. I will just mention them briefly.

I observed 13 pre-schools, mainly in Tokyo, but also around the country. I asked for places as different as possible because I was trying to set up observation categories. I wanted to get as much divergence as I could in the types of pre-schools, so they were public and private; various religions; various socio-economic groups. I found that in virtually all of the pre-schools and all of the first grades as well, in the later observations, small groups were used. At the pre-school level these small groups were very enduring. They were chosen usually around the children's natural friendship networks and they were a place that was the unit for a variety of activities; multi-purpose, quasi-academic activities as well as non-academic activities, like lunch and so forth. There were many activities designed to foster communication and cooperation within these groups and to very consciously build social skills. Teachers set up these groups taking into account the personality characteristics of the children. For example, if they had a very difficult to manage child, they would put that child with someone who loved to take care of others; a very shy child would be put with someone who was very outgoing. The idea was to build in an environment where each child had access to other ways of behaving in the world, and also access to other skills. For instance, the children who were best able to ride tricycles were spread among the groups; the children who were very good at drawing pictures were spread among the groups. In first grade, academic abilities were spread. I never saw, at the first-grade level, ability grouping. In fact, when I asked about that, a teacher said, "This is compulsory education; we could not group children by ability" as if that were a somewhat interesting idea, but one that was totally irrelevant to what was going on. These small groups are the units for much of what goes on and for a very conscious teaching of how to get along and as a way of managing classrooms.

A second striking aspect of the observations was that teachers had a very low profile as authority figures, at both the first-grade and nursery school levels. Emphasis was placed on trying to get the children to assume responsibility, to see the classroom as their place. If problems occurred, even physical fights, teachers would try to get the children to manage them. Often this would take much, much longer than the teacher managing it herself or himself. The teachers would say, "I could step in and stop this fight in one minute, but that is not the point; the children have to learn to control fighting themselves and they have to learn to bring the class to order." By a few months into first grade, one gets this feeling of, as Lois Peaks described it, "the teacher being an invited specialist in the classroom." It is recess time; the kids look at the clock; they call each other in from recess. One child says to the other who is, in order, the child who is responsible for that day, "Okay, everyone has to quiet down; it is time for the teacher to come in. Okay, it is time for math; get out your math notebooks." And then the teacher walks into a quiet classroom. And, the child says to the children, "All right, let us greet the teacher," and the children stand up and greet the teacher. So you really get a feeling that the children are running the classroom. I will not go into lots of specific examples, but when a crisis occurs, the teacher might set aside Math or English for that day and spend the whole day talking about the crisis, or two whole hours, talking about the crisis and how they as a class are going to deal with it.

Finally, there is a tremendous emphasis on the whole child, and this comes out in several ways. One is in a philosophy of learning that emphasizes the involvement of the whole child in learning. For example, a typical science activity I saw at two schools involved children decorating bottles, plastic bottles, as boats. They spent several days

decorating these in very elaborate fashion, and they put sand in them. The teacher would tell them in the beginning, "Think about how to decorate your boat—think about how much sand you want to put in it, because we are going to try to float these and they may sink if you put too much sand in it or if you decorate it in the wrong way." The final part of the science lesson would be taking the boat and floating it. Some of the children who had spent hours and hours decorating their boats in an elaborate fashion would see them sink right to the bottom because they put too much sand in them. That is just one example and is a typical type of science lesson. I saw many activities in math centering around measurement that had that same quality of involving the whole child; using a concrete experience and having the learning occur in a very active fashion by the child. Imagine the difference between that sort of lesson and a lesson where a teacher diagrams on the board what makes something sink or float. That is quite a different experience. Thus, there is an implicit idea about learning that includes active engagement on the part of the child. I never saw a reward or a punishment for good behavior of the sort that are endemic, at least in California schools. There is an idea of motivation that is quite different; the idea that the reward for learning is learning. The reward for learning is not a sticker or a seal when you have completed your worksheet.

Finally, a strong part of the learning emphasis is self-criticism, which relates to much of what has been said today about how highly we rate ourselves. A typical end for any classroom lesson is to talk about how it went, to reflect on performance. And there are a number of other ways in which self-criticism is brought in. In the daily morning meetings and evening meetings, students would be encouraged to reflect on anything particularly nice they had done that day, anything particularly bad they had done that day, and all the students had identified goals for the semester. The goals might be stopping hitting their baby sister at home, or it might be eating all their lunch, or it might be swimming laps, or it might be memorizing their characters, but they had goals that they identified themselves, and they would chart these each week and discuss if they had made any progress towards their goals, and, if they had, they would choose a new goal for themselves.

So that provides a sort of flavor. What I began to see was not a sudden "lowering of the boom," where one is talking about external authority, but rather a series of very sophisticated strategies for getting children to care about what goes on in the classroom, to feel that it is their responsibility, to develop, in a very systematic way, the skills that children need to be responsible class members, and gauging instruction in ways that would be motivating and involving, building on the children's intrinsic desire to make sense of the world as opposed to kinds of instruction that require external incentives.

Discussion

Prof. Yoshino

I prepared my talk about mathematical techniques for social survey research, but I thought perhaps this was not the place to talk about mathematical formulas, so I asked

Prof. Lewis to talk about her work in Japan. So, I will comment on Prof. Lewis' and Prof. Stevenson's discussions.

Prof. Stevenson and Prof. Lewis have talked about Japanese education from two different point of views. I read Prof. Lewis' paper, "From Indulgence to Internalization," and my impression was that she observed just the good side of Japanese education, i.e., under certain restricted conditions.

Let me give you a simple story of my own experience as an elementary school boy. Sometimes our Ministry of Education sends observers or supervisors to see what is going on in each elementary school. I remember, one day, my teacher looked very busy preparing for something. I did not know the reason. The following day, an observer from the Ministry of Education visited the school. I was surprised. Her teaching was totally different than usual. She was very nice to us. I, myself, behaved in order not to be scolded. The teachers usually behaved as "gods" in elementary school and in high school. So, I usually behaved myself in order not to be scolded or to be "struck by god." When the observer visited our school, it was very nice. Nobody was scolded; nobody was struck.

Professor Lewis, did you observe elementary schools through some official arrangement or was it through your friends?

Prof. Lewis

It was mainly through teachers. The first two I made through a researcher to a teacher and then I got teacher-to-teacher introductions. There was no official component to it.

Prof. Yoshino

Yes, but you did not know them very well?

Prof. Lewis

No, I did not, and I think you are raising a critical issue. What I am trying to do is arrange a long-term observation. I do see that my observations do not differ very much from people like Lois Peak and Nancy Sato, who spent very long periods in a single classroom. They observed essentially the same kinds of socialization strategies. And, although I think that I did observe model behavior, to some extent, it was not the same model behavior that one would observe in the United States.

Prof. Inkeles

You were in the first grade. Prof. Yoshino went all through the Japanese schools and, at some point, there is probably some large change.

Prof. Lewis

Yes, I think you are probably right.

Prof. Yoshino

Let me give you a simple example. Sometimes our Ministry of Education sets up special schools, elementary schools or high schools, to provide special educational programs. In Japan, we usually start learning to read English in high school, but sometimes there is a special school where younger children can learn a foreign language or some other subject. From reading your paper, Prof. Lewis, in the schools in which you observed, you apparently found highly motivated teachers, very nice ones, and highly motivated students. Not all schools in Japan are like that. In Japan, there are 15,080 pre-schools and 24,852 elementary schools. Perhaps you just picked up a small number of pre-schools which are not necessarily representative of all Japanese schools.

Also, with regard to Professor Stevenson's talk, his observation is much closer to the truth.

Prof. Stevenson

What we found was very similar to what Prof. Lewis has found. We have observed 600 hours in first grades and 600 hours in fifth grades in Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. (representative samples of 20 classrooms in each grade).

Prof. Yoshino

Yes, but I am not just talking about number of samples.

Prof. Stevenson

Yes, but if you do that, I do not find anything that is discrepant from what Prof. Lewis says.

Prof. Wilensky

What about our other Japanese participants? Prof. Usui, what is your view?

Prof. Inkeles

What is your view? Was it closer to Prof. Yoshino's or was it closer to Prof. Lewis'?

Prof. Usui

I encountered more militant teachers when I was in junior high school.

Prof. Lewis

Yes, I think there is a change in junior high.

Prof. Usui

But, in elementary school, it is very consistent with what Prof. Lewis described.

Prof. Lewis

I am somewhat uncomfortable with this discussion because I feel we should not generalize about Japanese schools. What interests me is a vision of human development and an understanding of how children grow and learn. This is very challenging to Americans. One could, no doubt, find that same vision among a subset of American teachers. What interests me about this whole area of research is that cross-cultural comparison can provide a kind of window on one's own thinking. I do not believe there is anything in this research that is interesting to the Japanese. This is really a challenge to Americans, and I am uncomfortable talking about generalizations.

Prof. Almond

What are the norms in the pedagogic literature in Japan?

Prof. Stevenson

This is what is so exciting about this research; it is a totally different approach to leading young children than anything we have seen in the West.

Prof. Inkeles

What is taught in the teacher training schools is what Prof. Almond is asking about.

Prof. Stevenson

What is taught is how to teach.

Prof. Almond

Does it embody these norms?

Prof. Stevenson

Yes, and it is basically a theory of modeling. That is the way you become a better teacher.

Prof. Almond

What you are saying is that your examination of this case, clinically, confirms these formal norms.

Prof. Lewis

Yes, but it is difficult to know what is important; whether, for example in this country, there is a great variety of teacher education. There is in Japan also. There are entire journals that deal with these very issues of how you build a small group in your classroom. Interestingly, although there are Japanese educational philosophers who come into these discussions, largely they are talking about Dewey and they are talking about Pestilosy and Strobel. There are times when I think the big difference between Japanese and American classrooms is that Japanese teachers know about John Dewey.

Prof. Stevenson

It is wrong to say that this is just Japanese; it is really Asian. One will find the same things in classrooms in Taiwan and China. It is a different conceptualization about the role of the teacher and the adult in relationship to the child.

Prof. Stevenson

We have a very good videotape available.

Prof. Lipset

One of the things that struck me when you were talking, Prof. Stevenson, was this question of a kind of cultural gestalt. You were talking about the self-deprecation. It is not simply a matter of language and translation, because, when you inquire of Japanese adults, there is often a form of self-deprecating answers; that they never do enough. Take, for example, a question on work. If you ask, "Do you work hard?" Americans are much more likely to say they work hard. Sixty or seventy percent of Americans say they work hard. Whereas with the Japanese, it is roughly 30 percent. How can this be? The Japanese conception—and this is partly derived from the reference group—may involve seeing people around them working harder. Also, this notion of hard work as an abstraction for the Japanese is something much more significant to them than it is for Americans. The numbers do not tell us this. This starts in childhood and goes through into the entire culture.

Prof. Yoshino

Let me make a quick comment to Professor Stevenson's problem, the problem of translation of questions. I agree with him that there is no complete solution to the problem, but let me quickly explain what we are doing in our institute. As was stated, there is a problem with back translation. We create Question A in Japanese and we let someone who is very good in English translate it to English. And then we get others to translate that one and we compare the previous one to check that for consistency. Then we repeat this process. It takes much time and money, but, to the extent possible, we repeat that process.

Prof. DeVos

I think we are really getting to the nitty gritty about national character in this discussion, and the controversy that prevails here relates to the fact that what is being reported is entirely consistent with material coming from different sources. Let us go back to an early observer of Japan, Lapcadio Hearn, who tried to distinguish between the Germans and the Japanese. He said, "Well, you both have hierarchical authoritarian systems, but the German system has the one over the many and the Japanese system has the many over the one." What you are reporting here is something that is ignored to a great extent in research and education in the United States: the function of the peer group and how the peer group sanctions and socializes as opposed to an authority figure. Everything goes along with this. The mother, for example, does not take an authoritarian role. Some of the other material that Prof. Stevenson reports in other contexts goes along with this, i.e., the method of teaching causality is not an authoritarian scheme of an opposition of wills. Instead, there is a deflection of the idea that someone is in authority. Now, that is idealized. One does find strict teachers, as Prof. Yoshino is reporting, and that is inner experience. The point is that when you compare two cultures such as Japan and the United States and you go into the classroom, you are seeing two different forms of collective experience going on in these situations. In the Japanese scene you have peer groups from very early on functioning in some way that is consummate with education, and in the American scene, although this depends on what group,

and some minority groups more than others, the peer group is a very difficult obstacle for the teacher to contend with in the educational scene.

Returning to the boy with the violin, in the American experience, the mother is there as an authority figure, trying to impose learning the violin on the child. In the Japanese scene, the mother has disappeared, and is not in evidence as a source of motivation. The motivation has to some extent been internalized. That, I believe, is national character. That is, one has an internalization of an achievement motivation which has been sanctioned in and is consonant with the primary family, the peer group, etc., as well as the continued collective experience. This does not mean there are not dissident thoughts in Japan or centrifugal tendencies in individuals. Absolutely, they are there, but they are not able to assert themselves behaviorally to the extent that you find in the United States.

Prof. Lipset

How does this jibe with the hierarchy? This is just from observations in Japan. The people who are lower status or who are younger do not contradict the people above them. Of course they disagree, but it just is not appropriate. Even at conferences, sitting around this table, there are young Japanese scholars who will not challenge views that they think are ridiculous.

Prof. DeVos

For two years I have observed how things operate within a hierarchical system in Japan. You have three forms of authority positions. You have an active-dominant person; you have a submissive-passive person; and in Japan you very often have it the other way around. You have got a passive person in a dominant position; and active initiators in subordinate positions. In other words, there are means in the hierarchy for initiative to come from below. There are systems in commercial organizations, and so on, which are ways to get communication coming up from the bottom, from younger people. This is an age-graded structure; one does not wait until one is an old person to take some initiative within the organization. There are means in a sense to cause something to happen from underneath in this kind of hierarchal structure.

Prof. Lipset

Yes, but I think in interpersonal relations, from the description you have of the children, you would think that they would talk up, but what I observed at different levels is this kind of not contradicting.

Prof. DeVos

Yes, but in Japan you do not do things by confronting. There is a famous film, *Ikiru* by Kurasao again, in which a man wants to build a playground. The man has cancer, so he knows he is going to die, so he is fearless. No one can intimidate him. The ironic last remark of the movie is, "Do you have to get cancer to live?" because the title of the picture is *Ikiru*. This man does not confront anyone; he bows his way implacably into getting what he wants, exactly how many women operate in the family. One defers to formal authority but is still running the show. This is the Japanese way of indirect decision making. You do not confront the official authority. You find means to operate within this system to get what you want, and you are implacable and you will wait out the opposition. Thus, there is a concept of endurance and long-lasting goal orientation which may take some time but eventually one gets what one wants. And, that kind of attitude is something that Americans do not understand. We understand that if someone is in authority, that person is directing and active, etc. The idea of a passive authority, a person who does not act, is foreign to Americans. Look at the political scene: the politicians who are appreciated in Japan are ineffectual speakers. In the American scene these persons would not get to first base. But in Japan, you can be ineffectual, bumbling, etc., as a speaker, and that makes no difference. In other words, the concept of authority and how authority operates is different in this system. And you cannot look at official authority to know what decision making is going on. That is the problem. In the school, the peer group, we are talking in very positive terms, can be atrociously hazing of deviant kids. There are constant reports of kids who do not fit in getting killed or badly hurt in some way during hazing. So there are some very negative features to this kind of sanctioning system that is going on. But, if one looks at it positively, it is a very effective instrument to see that education goes on in the schools.

Prof. Schuman

Earlier it was stated that in the later school years there was a real change. The teacher became a clearer target. That does not quite fit. Is there, then, lowering of the boom at a later point? We hear about the great competitiveness in the exams they take, so is there a gradual change?

Prof. Stevenson

It is fairly abrupt after sixth grade. Then, it begins to fall off at the end of sixth grade and they enter junior high school thinking this is something new; this will be another opportunity. But, then a host of negative features comes into play and motivation declines. When they enter high school, motivation increases again, but then it drops because of the competitiveness. Therefore, elementary schools, in my view, in Japan and Asia, are wonderful. But, secondary schools and universities are not.

Prof. Schuman

Does the role of the teacher change dramatically from elementary school?

· Prof. Wilensky

I am curious about your last remark; that secondary schools are not good because...?

Prof. Stevenson

The secondary schools are highly demanding. The intense pressure is a high school and late junior high school phenomenon, not an elementary school phenomenon. Although I did not realize it, entrance into the university is solely through the exam, hence nothing makes any difference except that exam.

Prof. Inkeles

We have not discussed the university at all. Now it sounds as if Americans want to be in the elementary schools, but the Japanese feel they do not want to go to Japanese universities. They much favor American universities because they say initiative, imagination, and innovation are qualities that the American school system teaches at the upper levels, qualities which they perceive as lacking in the Japanese college and university system. Thus, there are very complex tradeoffs.

Prof. Almond

You are limiting your criterion of performance to mathematics, science, and music; to that kind of academic performance. The secondary schools in Japan are not good, while the elementary schools are good.

Prof. Wilensky

You said, the secondary school in Japan is not good.

Prof. Stevenson

Well, no, it is good.

Prof. Wilensky

And the elementary school is.

Prof. Stevenson

They produce from kindergarten. That is, they are superior from the time they are five years old, and that is maintained.

Prof. Wilensky

Then your theory is that the secondary school is not adding to the student's performance in the academic sector?

Prof. Stevenson

No, what we are saying is that there are two components. One is the outcome, i.e., the level of knowledge in these areas, and this remains high throughout the entire educational experience. The second one could be labeled by such terms as healthiness, enthusiasm and excitement.

Prof. Lipset

I have two questions. First, from what I understand of the Japanese universities, they are very easy once one gets in; that everyone gets good grades; that students do not work. Thus, I wonder how they learn, if this is true at the university level. The other thing relates to what we keep referring to as the Asian pattern. My impression is that the Chinese are totally different from the Japanese, not in education, but in personality patterns, and that they are much more like Americans. They are much more individual-istic, much less group-oriented (though very familial) and thus, if there is this difference between the Chinese and the Japanese on one level, why does it not appear on the educational level?

Prof. Stevenson

Students generally enter the university after being hired by a firm. Thus, the university is perceived as a holiday. With regard to these comparisons, the Chinese are in the middle between the Japanese and the Americans. The Japanese and the Americans show the greatest differences, and the Chinese are right in the middle. In terms of what Prof. Lewis was talking about, we shot a film in Chinese and Japanese elementary schools, and the complaint we got was that we did not label, down in the corner, whether any given sequence was shot in a Japanese or Chinese elementary school.

Prof. Lipset

They were that similar?

Prof. Stevenson

Yes.

Prof. Schuman

There are such discontinuities in moving from sixth grade to high school. And the university is very different. Is there some explanation?

Prof. Stevenson

By the end of sixth grade, Japanese students are beginning to realize that they face the oppressive prospect of taking these exams. Until then, however, this is not a part of the daily worries of the children.

Prof. Schuman

I think it is something larger. Why has the society created this kind of discontinuity through this exam structure? Getting back to John Dewey, John Dewey would not have had these kinds of exams.

Prof. Lewis

There is a substantial conflict between the native Japanese theory of education and the demands of the examination system. On the one hand, we all know the minuses of the exam system, but on the other hand, it truly creates a meritocracy; it is a counter to nepotism. It chooses people solely on the basis of an objective exam.

Prof. Stevenson

This is not just Japanese. It goes back in China for a thousand years.

Prof. Lewis

It is a typical European pattern too.

Prof. Schuman

There seem to be inconsistencies in the gestalt system.

Prof. DeVos

Yes, I think the morale factor is what Prof. Yoshino hints at. There is a great deal of internal thought going on in these children that may not be part of the behavioral pattern externally. The morale factor does fluctuate in these children, and many of them are very disturbed by the pressure they are put under. Thus far, we have only talked about the regular system; however, there is also the system of *juku*, or "after school tutoring," which is grafted onto the Japanese system and is very time-consuming. The children do not have much time to prepare for the exams and therefore the pressure gets more and more intense. Nonetheless, this is seen as traditional in Japan. Ruth Benedict described a U-shaped curve in which paradise is located at both ends, but, as you get into the middle, the pressure is greater and greater. As one gets older, one is more and more aware of the pressure that one is under in this system, and it gets worse and worse as one becomes more and more aware that one must "make it." For many children, this is very heavy and unrelenting pressure.

Prof. Stevenson

This is not just a Japanese phenomenon. The *Bushiban* in Taiwan are just as oppressive. Interestingly, in China, just recently the Ministry of Education passed a rule that there can be no homework during the first few elementary years; that the amount of homework should increase only gradually. The rationale was that they were seeing the same kinds of pressure building in their children that you read so much about in Japanese children.

Daily Life and Social Problems	CHAIR	DISCUSSION LEADERS
	C. Usui	T. Suzuki
		H. Wilensky

Presentation of Prof. Suzuki

I will present some interesting models on tradition vs. modernity. First of all, please refer to Figures 1a through 1i. The process of social change has significant impact on the way of thinking of people. To formulate ideas about the process of change in the way of thinking as accompanying social change in Japan, we cannot ignore influences from outside Japan; for example, from Europe and the United States. Here, based on materials regarding similarities and differences between the United States and Japan, we will discuss the results of correspondence analysis. Although we have already discussed correspondence analysis, let me simply repeat that correspondence analysis is very useful for detecting response structures, as Professor Hayashi mentioned in his opening remarks. He also pointed out that simple comparisons of response distributions are not sufficient to conclude that two nations are similar or dissimilar with regard to specific responses.

Correspondence analyses are methods to express visually in Euclidean space, the fact that similar opinions are closely related while differing opinions are distantly located. To take this further, we set up axes—X and Y—and, if the response rate for a certain question is high, then that question is located close to the origin. In other words, the higher the response rate the closer the point to the origin. In comparing several nations, if the response patterns are similar between two nations, then the two nations are located close to one another in Euclidean space. Additionally, if we use longitudinal data we can determine how opinions change over time.

The process of change in attitude structures which accompanies social change in a given society in general will reflect new and different phenomena if the relative relations between that society and the other societies which influence it undergo some change. Therefore, the process of change in the way of thinking in Japan can be seen as one of these specific examples. Using models, classified by the following stages of change, let us determine what kinds of situations will arise regarding the way of thinking corresponding to each stage, using the results of correspondence analysis. The stages of the process of change are as follows.

Stage 1: Suppose a given society has no outside influence at the initial time point. Almost all members of the society have a certain, common way of thinking. In this case, the opinion which everyone has is located as a "core" opinion in the center of the origin (while other minority opinions opposing this majority lie around the core). In other words, as can be seen in Figure 1a, traditional opinion gathers as a core around the origin.

Stage 2 involves some factors, some type of influence being exerted by others, and thus it is here that the process of change begins. While this influence may spread to various areas, if we look at the most common aspects of the way of thinking, we find

that these influences do take some directional form. Therefore, if we can skillfully construct sets of questions to get at these common aspects, in a survey, then we can show the process of change in visual form. In Stage 2/1, even though the process of change has begun in earlier stages, the social attributes of the receivers of the influence begin to take on some variety, as do those of the people who previously had a less traditional way of thinking. Thus, opposing opinions no longer form a cluster at a certain place; rather, they scatter around the core. (See Figure 1b.)

In Stage 3, due to continuing influence from other societies, the way of thinking receives greater and greater impact. The stratum of persons who derive their way of thinking from outside the country expands, and, though it may not develop to a level of actual social stratification, these people do develop a certain collectivity with respect to the mutual relationship between opinions. As a result of the correspondence analysis, two loose clusters then emerge. One is composed of "traditional opinions," while the other is the opposite. (See Figure 1c.)

Stage 4 sees the influences from outside the country accelerating, not only through contact with other cultures or information input from other countries, but also by certain organizational activities, such as education, or associations. It is usually assumed, too, that the younger age strata more easily receive, or are more receptive to and flexible about, influence from other countries' ways of thinking. The highly educated strata have more frequent opportunities for contact with the ways of thinking of other societies. Therefore, there are social strata which are more likely to observe outside influences or outside countries' ways of thinking, particularly through educational and occupational avenues. In other words, social strata come to exist which accept new ways of thinking as groups. As a consequence of these developing strata, the results of correspondence analysis now exhibit two separate axes. The first axis partitions traditional vs. non-traditional and the second partitions new opinions vs. neutral opinions. (See Figure 1d.)

In Stage 5, the number of people in a given social stratum who have new ways of thinking, or at least non-traditional opinions (i.e., modern opinions), grow, and these new ways of thinking spread into other social strata. Thus, a trend which was once clear, based on classification of social attributes, becomes unclear, because social attitudes no longer serve to classify trends. At the same time, the number of people with a traditional way of thinking decreases and these people tend to concentrate in specific social strata. It is at this stage that the confrontation begins between traditional and modern, and this represents the climax of the entire pattern. With regard to ways of thinking, of course, these changes will not all occur at the same speed in every area of opinion. Some show rapid change and some come later. Also, among the processes of change during this period and afterwards, there are two types:

In Stage 5/1, in certain opinion areas the strata which have new ways of thinking come to occupy the majority and thus the clustering of modern opinions becomes clear. At the same time, the traditional opinion cluster loosens. (See Figure 1c.)

The next stage is Stage 5/2. Here, too, in certain opinion areas, the traditional way of thinking and the new way of thinking coexist within strata, and the usual separa-

tion of old and new no longer fits the social reality; for example, the strata of post-modernization. In such areas the significance of any opposition between traditional and modern opinions becomes secondary. Using correspondence analysis as a first axis, this takes the form of separation whether or not we assume traditional vs. modern should be regarded as opposing concepts. In this respect, on the second axis, we can partition traditional vs. modern. Here, it is reasonable to assume that the concept of a confrontation between traditional and modern has become old-fashioned. (See Figure 1f.)

We come now to Stage 6. If the process of change in the way of thinking advances to this point, then the following cases are conceivable:

Stage 6/1—As mentioned before, the strata of people who have new ways of thinking in a certain opinion area increase and modern opinions cluster together densely, while the cluster of traditional opinion loosens. At the same time, if the way of thinking develops as mentioned above, then the conventional significance of a separation between traditional and modern ways of thinking weakens, and the strata of persons who have a way of thinking which includes an awareness of the good and bad points about both the traditional and modern begin to grow in size. Here, the separation of traditional, modern and neutral becomes vague and the degree of relationship between the classification of opinions and the social stratifications supporting these opinions weakens. Therefore, in correspondence analysis the classifications of opinions are intermixed. No clear configuration exists and an axis cannot be established to partition traditional vs. modern as a conceptualization of confrontation. In other words, in questions which have been used for analysis to track the process of change, it becomes impossible to illustrate properly the process of change through clustering. Thus, in this stage, one culture acquires influence from outside and incorporates it toward an integration which promotes a new culture. Eventually, this takes the form of advancement to one integrated culture. (See Figure 1g.) This marks the end of the circle which describes the process of change.

We now move on to Stage 6/2. As in Stage 5/1 above, the collectivity of new opinions becomes more explicit. At the same time, in cases of continuous, strong and direct outside influence, the strata of people with the new way of thinking become the majority. To restate this, if the strata of people who have only a traditional way of thinking and the strata of people who look at both sides are both limited, then those with the new way of thinking become the majority and are located in the center of the origin as a new "core," while the conventional, "traditional" ways of thinking leave quasi-clusters in the periphery. (See Figure 1h.)

Stage 6/3: In cases where outside influence continues to exist strongly at the organizational level, such as in education, only newly "core" opinions are located at the center of the origin as a majority, with others scattering in the periphery. In this case, it becomes impossible to pass the conventional, traditional culture on to another generation, and the tradition previously implied by it is destroyed. (See Figure 1i and Table 7.)

So far, by looking at the process of change in the way of thinking in Japan we have shown, through a series of models, how change occurs. We have also discussed the results of correspondence analysis. However, to actually establish these models of the process of change, two pre-conditions are required. For a new way of thinking to

develop as a cluster, the society must have a flexible mind set towards a new way of thinking. It is also necessary to the promotion of the process of change that we assume that each culture is mutually equal. No one culture can be superior to another. Only in certain instances might it be incidental that the impact on one culture occurs unidimensionally, such as water seeking its lowest level.

Let us look at some concrete examples. The questionnaire used is presented as Table 7. Table 8 presents the marginal distributions of the National Character Surveys in Japan from 1953 to 1988. Based on the individual responses, we constructed a correspondence analysis, the results of which for 1953 are shown in Table 12, and those for 1983 in Table 13. The circles represent modern responses, the circles with the slashed lines represent traditional responses, and triangles represent neutral responses. So, the cluster moved from the 1953 results to the 1983 results.

By looking at Table 14, we can see the change in the clusters which occurred from 1953 to 1983. It is moving in a counterclockwise direction, which means the first axis partitions traditional vs. non-traditional in 1953. In 1983, a stage has developed.

Referring to Table 15, a survey of Japanese National Character in 1953, modern is moving in this direction, traditional is on the left-hand side, and the intermediate or neutral is on the lower right-hand side.

Thus, we can apply this method not only to Japanese society but also to American and other societies with respect to such things as social and natural environmental movements (for example, The Green Party in Germany).

Referring to Table 12, traditional, modern and neutral values can be seen. Modern has been moving gradually in this direction since 1953.

Prof. Usui

Prof. Suzuki, in the several types of societies like Stage 5 or 6/1 and 6/2, could you tell us exactly from which type to which type the Japanese society in this data has moved from. Is it from Stage 5 to 6/2?

Prof. Suzuki

Yes, this corresponds to Stage 5/1. The next one corresponds to 5/2.

Prof. Usui

So it moves from 5/1 to 5/2.

Figure 1   A model and an example of the change process in the "way of thinking" by mutual interference of differing cultures: the process of change in Japan

Figure 1   A model and an example of the change process in the "way of thinking" by mutual
interference of differing cultures: the process of change in Japan

Figure 1   A model and an example of the change process in the "way of thinking" by mutual
interference of differing cultures: the process of change in Japan

Presentation of Prof. Wilensky

For the last 15 years I have been working on a 19-country comparison of rich democracies with a million or more population. This universe of rich democracies includes Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand; the poorest of the rich are Israel and Ireland. I am interested in the interplay of social structure, culture and politics. I have a large number of dependent variables with which I will not burden you, but I would like to use my study and its results to reflect on the usefulness and limits of the concept of national character. To avoid repeating what I have previously written, please refer to my "Family Life Cycle Work" and "The Quality of Life" articles, and, above all, the Preface to the Japanese edition of *Welfare State and Equality*, which is my effort to place Japan in the 19-country comparison in explaining the development of the welfare state and its effects.

A concept like national character is only as good as its capacity to explain some pattern of national behavior or changes in that behavior. I should say at the outset, I am impressed with the quality of the data that we have before us from the Japanese, as well as from reading Prof. Inkeles over the years. The Japanese database is a very significant database for tracking changes in values, beliefs, symbols, attitudes—what I call the ideational realm, as we should distinguish it from patterns of behavior that we describe under labels like "economic organization," "political organization," and "kinship organization."

As one reads these findings, one might ask oneself, "Would these differences in items and the results like the ones discussed here and in Prof. Inkeles' work—the values and beliefs he taps under the label of modernization—aid us in explaining the differences between Japan and the United States; differences in social structure, public policy, and national performance that I have been trying to explain in my own study?" I am interested in bargaining arrangements between labor, management and government; I am interested in levels and types of taxing and spending; more generally, what governments do. For example, there is a value-added tax which was passed recently in Japan and there are value-added taxes in many countries. The United States does not have one. Will this help invoke national character? Public policies like fiscal and monetary policies, industrial policies, family policies, child care arrangements, government finance—social policy generally would help explain this. Looking at the output side, i.e., national differences in economic performance, Japan is very good, while the United States is not so great anymore, although it is not at the bottom of the list. Looking at political performance, for example, can the government extract taxes from the population? The Japanese have a low tax rate; the U.S. has a relatively low tax rate. But the U.S. is having great difficulty extracting taxes and dealing with certain social problems. Will this help us to explain differences in capacity to cope with major social problems? Will this help us to explain differences in equality, for example, gender equality? Will it explain differences in income distribution? Will it explain the fate of minority groups? These are non-trivial items and many social scientists have dealt with them over many years.

I would answer these questions as follows. It is a good theoretical strategy not to write off culture, national character and so on, but to start with more limited things.

I concentrate first on structures. I map particular attributes of economic structures and political structures, organizations, and then I see how far I can go with it. Then, if structure (i.e., economic organization, political organization) will not explain these things, then I try to specify the attributes of culture that might explain them, including the kinds of items that we have on these questionnaires. Regarding questionnaires, this is very difficult. We have heard from Prof. Stevenson and Prof. Schuman, both of whom know these surveys very well, and they have pointed out how difficult it is to interpret the meaning of these items; how difficult it is to do so cross-nationally. Prof. Stevenson is eloquent on this point. What do these words mean in cross-national research? Of course, one has the same problems if one deals with economic and political structures. The data must be made comparable. The meaning of the data must be interpreted. However, consider the problem I have compared to the problem that you have got dealing with national character in the translation of meanings across different countries. Whereas I can say, the increase in the labor force participation of women is X in this country or that country, and I will not be far from wrong and I will not have any translation problems. I can say that a given country has an aging population and another does not, something which, as it turns out, counts in many respects. For instance, Japan has eight percent of its population over 65 and in that, it is just like the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; whereas Sweden, Germany, Austria, and the rest have very old populations, with double that figure. Therefore, this fact will make a great deal of difference in everything I am interested in. But, this fact was easily determined. It is not bad data. Thus, I am saying, in part, that I am driven to structure because I can measure it more easily—demographic structure, economic and political organization—and because I think it is important.

The Preface to the Japanese edition of my *Welfare State and Equality* provides a short summary of the structural approach. There, I attempt to explain the similarities and differences among 19 countries in welfare state spending, taxing and the political effects and administrative variations. There are very large differences in welfare state development and spending. The data show that Japan is moving toward European patterns of spending and taxing, because of industrialization and its demographic and bureaucratic outcomes—principally the aging of the population. However, its differences from most rich countries put it in a different category, though it is not unique. That category encompasses the low social spenders and includes the United States and several other countries. What does Japan share with this category of countries that would explain the nature of its welfare state? Japan is accelerating very fast, like the United States—what might this invoke? It turns out that high rates of occupational and educational mobility will take us some distance, a stratification order, with expanding opportunity. With ten percent growth in Japan for many years, and perhaps five to eight percent in recent years, that puts it into a category where large numbers of people are experiencing expanding opportunities. Whatever their seniority system, most everyone is moving up. This was true until recently in the United States. Indeed, if we compare the United States and Japan at the appropriate level of economic development—so that Japan today would be compared with the United States in the 1960s or the 1950s—then we would find very similar expanding opportunities. There is a fragmented and decentralized labor movement in the United States, in Australia, and in Japan. Private benefits for workers fortunate enough to have stable jobs in large growing firms are something Japan shares with the United States. Japan is unique in its continuing, very

strong family system. Page 7 of my mimeographed handout provides a summary of some data that fits everything presented in this conference today. The data is about three-generation families and what is most interesting is the rapidity with which the three-generational household is fading away in the urban, vanguard populations. Prof. Kataoka, for example, was extraordinarily eloquent regarding the strains of educated urban women. They go home and they do all the housework. They are aggressive with the education of their children. They are putting in 55-hour weeks. And, the labor force participation of these same women is soaring. That system is under huge strain. It will change. Everything that we know about these countries is that they share these phenomena. It turns out that Japan is no different with respect to the direction in which it is moving; although the big differences based on the other differences of the past, still survive and, under the onslaught of industrialization as demographic and organizational correlates, clearly it will move fast in the direction that the other countries have moved, including Italy.

Where do values and beliefs fit in? Let us take the welfare state. Briefly, the ideology—collectivistic vs. individualistic, measured any way it can be measured—of the elites will not help much in predicting gross differences in levels of spending and taxing for the welfare state. With regard to pensions, health insurance, and the other features of the welfare state, there is a uniform adoption of about seven or eight programs in the last hundred years in all these countries. One can go pretty far with just that, industrial-ization and its correlates. One has to bring in, if one is going to talk about the timing, then one will have to go to a little bit different explanation; one will have to say the timing of industrialization counts. Japan is a latecomer; Germany is a latecomer. They will show different characteristics from the early industrializers, like the United States, England and so on. Generally, it will not help much to explain the current differences by invoking collectivistic vs. individualistic ideologies of elites.

There are some public opinion surveys similar to others presented during this conference which were done by a student of mine, Richard Coglin, covering forty years of polls on such matters as economic individualism. The polls were trying to measure such things as the views of national populations regarding minimum government, private property, and the market; i.e., whether these are good or bad and whether or not we need government intervention. On the ideological abstraction side, the polls included questions such as, "Should government intervene in markets to assure everyone a good standard of living, or should citizens be left to get ahead on their own?" This taps something like economic individualism vs. collectivism. There were about twelve questions altogether. The countries studied were large welfare spenders like Denmark, Germany, and France; medium spenders like the United Kingdom and Canada; and low spenders like the United States and Australia.

What were the differences on such abstract ideological issues as government intervention in the economic life of the country to do things that are good for the population—collectivism vs. individualism? There were not large differences; on the order of ten percent. But there were differences. In Germany, France and Denmark, the large spenders, the population felt that the big spending and government intervention were good ideas. There was an enthusiasm for economic collectivism. However, economic collectivism and economic individualism were about equally matched, with economic

collectivism showing a majority in all these countries. The mixture of individualism grew as one moved from the big spenders, through the middle spenders (the United Kingdom and Canada had middle level scores). Keep in mind, though, that in every country studied the majority was always pro-welfare state or pro-collectivistic, so, if anything, the mass populations are collectivistic. The individualistic components came in at a higher rate as one got to the United States and Australia. This is consistent with what everyone says about individualistic America. But, it is important not to exaggerate these data. The differences are only on the order of ten percent to fifteen percent at most, depending upon the question, of course.

Different results emerge when one explores business issues and specific attitudes like, "How do you feel about spending more money on pensions if it is going to cost you taxes?" Respondents will agree to some increased taxes. "How do you feel about health insurance, family allowances, job injury insurance, unemployment compensation and welfare, or, as the United States labels it, 'miscellaneous aid to the poor, the handicapped and the downtrodden'?" Sweden, Denmark, the United States and Canada are brothers and sisters under their ideological skins; in all these countries pensions are hugely popular. About 80 to 90 percent of respondents say, "We want more, more, more." Health insurance is only slightly less popular. Enthusiasm for health insurance, including the United States, is very significant and is reflected by a vast majority of populations everywhere. Reagan lowered that fraction just a little, but it is bouncing back up again as Congress debates further health insurance. The countries are somewhat mixed up about family allowances. In fact, there are only four countries where the issue came up in the surveys, because it simply was not an issue in the remainder of the countries. It turns out that only Britain stands out by having a non-majority in favor of spending more on child allowances. This is because they think that the Irish might have too many children, and the Protestant British do not like that idea. These data are derived from a 30- to 35-, and sometimes even 40-year time span ending in the late 1970s. These data were derived from a variety of polls, including Gallup polls; any poll Prof. Coglin could find for his Ph.D. thesis, which has been published as a book.

With regard to unemployment compensation and miscellaneous aid to the poor, it turns out that these countries, again, are ideological brothers and sisters under the skin, because these forms of welfare are not popular. There is a notion in all these countries, whether they are large spenders or lean spenders, and whatever their individualistic components in the abstract ideology, that it is not a good idea to give too much to the undeserving poor. Therefore, we have a structural uniformity. What can we say, then, about the huge differences in actual spending, actual taxes, actual administration, generosity, or universal categorical benefits? The answer is that one cannot invoke the structure of public opinion, because it is too uniform across these countries. One must look for structures that differ.

I just indicated the usefulness and limitations of indicators of values and beliefs in survey data when I talked about the welfare state. Elite ideology will not get you far either. So that is directly relevant.

If one looks at family work in the media as social problems, in all these countries one sees the family structure changing in the same direction, i.e., more divorce rates,

push for gender equality, lower fertility, increased labor force participation by women. What I have been looking at is government responses to this universally defined problem.

Specifically, the problem is family breakup and its effect on children. All governments are conscious of this, but their behaviors are hugely different. I have argued that there have been three massive changes in child care arrangements in the past 40 or 50 years. First, they include—and governments are very different in their responses to these—family policies, like child care provision, parental leave (those who have read about Sweden know what extraordinary numbers of family policies that country has). I have measured these. In the U.S. and in Japan, along with Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and Ireland, government does very little.

The second is education and training, especially of teenagers and young adults, which we heard about from Prof. Lewis and others this morning. With regard to the education and training of teenagers and young adults, we did an eight-country comparison. These will affect many things. They will affect young people and single parents, and they will also affect displaced workers of all kinds. Sweden, Germany and Japan rank at the top of the list of countries that shine in their training and educational systems insofar as we can tell from the output. The U.S. and the United Kingdom are at the bottom of this list. Training and education will strongly shape the socialization of the young; what a young child can expect when he is a teenager and what the family sees coming for a teenager, what they see as entry jobs and what they see as the occupational fate will mightily determine what they will do with their children. Thus, it is affecting the family. Training and education will also affect delinquency and crime rates, because if the children are hanging out outside of school, out of school, out of work, they will get into trouble, as in the United States; and productivity rates will, of course, be affected by what one does with these children. This will strongly shape the socialization of the young, but one cannot say that broad, national differences have much to do with this.

There are other structures that count a great deal. Our explanation for why one cannot say it is structure is this: Sweden, Germany, and Japan have somewhat different systems of values. Is the United States a country that somehow does not pay attention to education? Education was a religion in this country in the 19th century; indeed, it was from the founding fathers on, because we did not have a state religion. We did not have an aristocratic past; we had to spend our time talking about our schools. We put our money where our mouth was. Just 40 years ago, what has been described of secondary schools and schools generally in Japan was true in most American schools. There was discipline in the classroom. I went to such schools. My children did not go to such schools, because they went in the 1960s when the authority of the schools had collapsed. One must look at something other than basic values because America has not changed its basic values in 40 years. I see the training and education systems as explained much better by the structure of government. Is there a centralized system or not? How do labor and management interact? How does one get training, re-training? How are jobs created? Japan has a labor market board that is effective; the U.S. does not. Political parties also have an impact.

The biggest time consumer in American family life is television. Is it American individualism that accounts for the enormous number of hours our children log on

television as compared with the number logged in Japan? I do not think so. Look at the control structure of the media and then you will get Japan compared with the right countries. For example, here are the differences. In the U.K., the BBC, a public broadcasting system, has 50 percent of the audience. There is a similar structure in Japan. All over Europe, it is not just the control structure but also the number of hours broadcast. Consider the Norwegian television schedule. At 9:00 a.m., it goes on with educational TV for children, and also programs for the elderly. Between 11:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., there is no TV at all. At 6:00 p.m., it comes back on again. Can you imagine this? This is like Mars! 6:00 to 6:30, children's TV—7:30 to 8:00 news, youth and religious or old people's programs—8:00 to 11:00 three hours of variety, drama and movies. At 11:00 they come on and say, "Time for bed, folks." This is true all over Europe. There is more educational and cultural content, there are bunched commercials instead of 25 percent interspersed, and much more restriction on campaign uses of television. These are structural differences that have to do with who controls television, how commercial it is, and what kind of a board is set up to do it. I do not think, given the uniform patterns across many European countries and the differences and the similarities between Japan and Britain on this, that one can invoke culture to explain this. One must invoke politics and economic organization.

Discussion

Prof. Almond

I would like to react to the theme that Prof. Wilensky has so eloquently advanced regarding the very limited explanatory power that one can get from cultural variables. He made a very strong case for that, very powerfully backed up by a lot of very persuasive evidence. I wonder how he would deal with this problem—this body of evidence:

The Communist experience. Here we have a natural historical experiment, a movement that took power in a part of the world and developed a set of instrumentalities designed to effect changes in attitudes of a very fundamental kind; the goal of creating a "socialist man." They had monopolies, organizational monopolies, structural instruments of the most powerful kind. Beginning with the very small child and continuing into adult life, they had an extremely penetrative, effective, coercive apparatus establishing a risk/cost ratio that tended to invite people to accept what it was, such as kinds of attitudes, that they were being told to accept, particularly with their control over the media and communications. If one looks at this a generation later, and in the Eastern European countries two generations later, one sees popping out what seems to be very close to the kinds of cultures that these peoples went into this system with. And, in some cases, the kinds of political attitudes they emerged with really were quite different from the ones that they entertained. I would ask Prof. Wilensky how he would deal with this body of evidence.

Prof. Wilensky

First, a "cop-out" is that I deal with 19 rich democracies; I cannot deal with the whole world. It has taken me 15 years to get this stuff together and I am not about to study Communists. I started dealing with the category of rich countries, which included the U.S.S.R. in gross national product, per capita, in 1966. It was more or less rich—at the low end of rich. And, Czechoslovakia and East Germany were too. I began with them in the sample. I hired a Czech to translate material, but I gave up. It was just not good, comparable data, so I gave up. Nonetheless, along the way, one can see that industrialization and its demographic and organizational correlates can explain some differences because, for example, Czechoslovakia, under the Communists as well as their previous rulers, and East Germany both had highly developed welfare states. Whereas, the Soviet Union, being much poorer and much more rural, along with other Eastern European countries, did not have a highly developed welfare state. So that fits some portion of the scheme. That is, the values are remarkably stable, although the regimes and lifestyles have changed.

For example, during the Gomulka regime and later, the Poles did occupational prestige surveys in Warsaw. "Party Official" was put on the list of some 35 occupations, and it came out at the bottom. Professors, lawyers, and others came out on top, just like they do everywhere else. In the middle, there were small changes. White-collar prestige sunk and upper-skilled blue-collar went up. Even though they had an aggressive proletarian ideology, the sublimity of the proletariat—the regimes were constantly saying that—it did not change the popular ranking very much. With regard to church and religion, did these people suddenly become religious? The answer is, they always were. The Communists, for two generations, were not very successful, although I would not carry that argument too far—they were successful to some degree—so I see continuity in the cultures of these places and discontinuity in all the things that I am studying, like economic performance, political legitimacy, family policies, etc.

Prof. DeVos

I think there is a very important variable that you have not considered, and that is the role of minorities in each of these countries. I think this is a hidden agenda related to attitudes toward welfare, and, I think it is having an effect on the pros and cons of attitudes toward welfare and the so-called poor. For example, in Japan, if one looks at the welfare statistics, the *burakumin* are getting about 65 to 70 percent of Japan's welfare funds. This is known and not known by the authorities. Welfare does not extend to the minority Koreans in Japan, because they are technically not citizens. There is much hidden agenda on attitudes toward welfare; for example, in the United States, who are the minorities? Thus, when one looks at countries, one must see the attitudes toward minorities hidden in the welfare legislation.

Prof. Wilensky

I am conscious of the fate of minority groups and their importance, but the problem in dealing with 19 countries is the ethnic, linguistic, racial and religious cleavages. Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, the U.S. and Canada are very high here, as well as Israel. But, these countries differ greatly in the way they deal with these things. For example, regarding universal categorical benefits and no means testing, there is not a lot of fuss about "the welfare population" or "welfare mothers" in Belgium and the Netherlands. However, Switzerland does not pay much attention to any of this in its welfare system.

Prof. DeVos

It is changing in Belgium because the population is now aware of the permanent new minorities that they have in the population that are neither Waloon or Fleming.

Prof. Almond

I just wanted to remind people of the research that Cohen and Schooler have done in the United States, Italy, Poland and Japan on the relationships between occupational attributes and such things as intellectual flexibility and attitudes toward authority. Within the Communist nations, as within the capitalist nations, the relationships are remarkably similar in terms of the values that parents want for their children; the higher the demand of the job, the substantive complexity of the job, the more likely the parents are to want their children to be self-directed; the less the demands of the job, or the higher the authority, the closer the supervision, the more parents want more conformity from their children. The remarkable thing is that the social structure seems to work the same way in all of these countries.

Prof. Lipset

I would like to make a methodological point on this entire enterprise. There are different questions and different methods which produce different answers and require different hypotheses. In some part, depending often on our own theoretical inclinations, we pick the areas that most illustrate what we are inclined to show or believe. On one level, many years ago, I discovered that one American magazine, in translation, outsold every magazine published in native languages. It was the *Reader's Digest*. The *Reader's Digest* in Tagalog outsold everything in the Philippines. The *Reader's Digest* in Arabic outsells everything written by Arabs, in Finnish, etc. This is true in developed countries, underdeveloped countries, democratic countries, and authoritarian countries. There is a common taste at one level which is international, and the American mass media is most successful with it. Consider Mickey Mouse and so forth being popular everywhere. One can trace through a whole set of behavior patterns which operate everywhere, in rich countries, poor countries, developed countries, underdeveloped countries. That is one level.

On another level, if one starts correlating, and we have data here we could put together on 150 countries, one gets all sorts of correlations when one introduces 150 countries, and inherently one gets many things which correlate with economic variables. The rich and poor countries are different in all kinds of systematic ways. I have done some of this on political behavior. One also gets a kind of pattern which I just found in doing a book on Canada and the United States. If one does a two-by-two comparison, this accentuates all kinds of cultural differences. For example, Canada and the United States have a hundred different things where they differ significantly, including health care, family allowances, and child rearing. But, on many of these structural variables, when one introduces a statistical thing, they are identical. Thus, the question is: how significant, how important and for what purposes does one look at them? Each way one approaches them seemingly produces evidence or results which argue for one thing or another, and these are all useful and valid ways of approaching the question of national differences. It is not that one demonstrates that it is largely structural and the other demonstrates it is largely cultural; it is both. It almost becomes a matter of taste, or personal inclination, to decide that one way is more important or better than the other.

Religion and National
Character

CHAIR

C. Usui

DISCUSSION
LEADERS
M. Sasaki
F. Hsu

Presentation of Prof. Sasaki

I would like to discuss cross-national analysis of religiosity by means of cohort analysis. In comparative studies of people who live in different societies, questions related to religiosity are among those which are the most difficult to compare. Prof. Rodney Stark states that the indicators of religiosity are most often unrelated to actual religious practices, religious beliefs, knowledge, and experience. While religious outlooks and behaviors may be relatively easy to understand, while unique characteristics related to religion can be observed in societies, and while it is possible to carry out surveys using common questions, there are problems obtaining comparability and interpreting the results of such analyses.

For example, in the case of the survey on the topic of whether or not one has religious faith in Japan, about one-third of the respondents said they have religious faith. We can partition this stratum which say they have religious faith from those who do not and we can analyze and investigate such things as trends classified by age. However, in the case of the United States, more than 90 percent of respondents say they have religious faith. In America's social environment, saying one does not believe in God seems to provoke negative images. Thus, it is nearly impossible to acquire any meaningful results by asking this question. Setting an assumption and modifying the content of the question, we asked, "What is your religious background: Protestant, Catholic, Jewish or Greek Orthodox?"

In the comparative survey between the United States and Japan, carried out by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics, (the results of which are shown in Table 1), over 90 percent of the American respondents said they had some kind of religion; i.e., a religious belief or denomination. From Table 1, it is possible to determine whether respondents believe in religion, and the differences in religious environments between the United States and Japan are obvious. Thus, it is necessary to consider the details of comparison from a variety of perspectives, each taking into account the differences in the social environments. In other words, at least for religion, it is unwise to stay with common questions and attempt to investigate by comparison.

There are several longitudinal surveys on religion, especially in the United States and among European countries, where the principal religion is Christianity. Here, it is taken for granted that there is widespread religious belief, such as belief in God. Thus, to get at the respondent's more basic religious attributes, questions about religious background, e.g., "What is your religious denomination?" or about church/synagogue attendance, e.g., "Attend regularly, seldom, never," are indicated. Here, basic material can be derived to investigate changes comparatively over time in each society by applying cohort analysis (which Profs. Suzuki and Hayashi explained yesterday) to the

results of cross-tabulation tables, classified by age strata based on consecutive survey data.

In the case of Japan, the following questions with respect to religious faith have been included in the consecutive national character surveys conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics. The primary question used is, "Do you have any religious faith?" The ratio of respondents who said "Yes" is shown in Table 2, which is based on classifications of survey periods and age strata. From this table it can be seen that both males and females show positive relationships between aging and having religious faith, regardless of differences in survey periods. The percentage figures have an almost parallel relationship to the response ratios between age strata and having religious faith. In other words, for those in their 20s, the response rates are below 20 percent; for those in their 30s, the response rate is about 30 percent; and for those above 60, the response rate runs about 60 percent. In addition, when we performed cohort analysis, as shown in Figure 1, for males we observed the existence of a period effect to a certain degree, and a substantial age effect. The older the person becomes the higher the ratio having religious faith. On the other hand, we do not observe the existence of a cohort effect. In the case of females, like the males, the main effect is that of age. However, we can also observe the existence of a cohort effect to a certain degree. This finding indicates that the proportion of those who have religious faith is a little low, centering around those generations who received compulsory education during and after a period of drastic change. However, it is also indicated that the proportion of those in recent generations who have religious faith is returning to the original level, which demonstrates an interesting result with respect to the tendencies seen with other questions.

In the case of the United States, as previously mentioned, we use a question about church/synagogue attendance. This question has been included in consecutive surveys on social attitudes conducted every two years by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, where Prof. Schuman is the Director. From 1952 to 1983, only the 1954 data are missing. Table 3 shows the ratios of those who selected as their response "Go to church/synagogue regularly," classified by survey period and age strata. After the 1970 survey, the question was changed from "Going to church/synagogue regularly" to "Going to church/synagogue almost every week." If we examine these data from the perspective of age strata, although in a recent survey it was observed that there is a tendency for the higher age strata to attend church/synagogue increasing more regularly, on the whole throughout the survey period, this tendency is not particularly strong.

The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 2. From this figure, we observe almost no period effect, nor do we see any impact from the modification of the question. Also, we see almost no age effect, but we can clearly observe the existence of a cohort effect; i.e., a tendency for the more recent cohort groups to decrease in their proportion of regular church/synagogue attendance. For those generations born before 1900 and 1930, the cohort effect is stable, but among those generations born after 1930, there is a decrease in the tendency to attend church/synagogue regularly. This finding is identical to the European case.

With regard to the cohort analysis results for the case of Japan, the age effect plays a major role. In the case of females, we observe the existence of a cohort effect which seems to reflect the impact of the post-World War II period (see Figure 1).

The tendency to return toward the original condition among recent cohort groups indicates that the general stream of time obtained so far is a reflection of it. Therefore, in the case of Japan, aging and religious faith have a positive relationship. In other words, the older the person becomes, the more religious the person gradually becomes. This relationship has not changed much in any period so far. Thus, by thinking from the perspective of an individual's life cycle, those who thought that having religious faith was odd when they were young do not mind sometimes visiting a shrine at the beginning of the year or occasionally visiting a temple.

It has frequently been claimed that the external religiosity of the Japanese exhibited by visiting a shrine at the beginning of the year, by carrying an amulet, or by going to a temple to see a Buddhist image, is not related to internal religiosity. However, if we look at the results of cohort analysis (see Table 6), this claim is only partially supported as an element of social reality in Japan, while overlooking an individual's overall social life. As people gradually age, the proportion of those who have religious faith increases, and among the older age strata, more than half, 61 percent and 56 percent of those 60 years and older, have religious faith in the 1978 and 1983 surveys, respectively. It is interesting to note that these high ratios resemble the response ratios for such behaviors as "visit a shrine at the beginning of the year" or "participate in a temple festival and fair"; "have an amulet" and "could only hope in God when one is hard up"; "visit a shrine or look at the Buddhist image in a temple" or "by listening to Buddhist scriptures composing oneself and having formal feelings" (see Table 6).

From the above perspective, it is not true that religiosity has nothing to do with the younger age strata, but rather they are potential religious believers. Based on the results of the cohort analysis we can identify the features of the social environment whereby the aging process tends to influence the Japanese people to be progressively more religious. Therefore, it is natural to expect that young Japanese are potential religious believers even though the percentage of believers is only one-third, as seen in the previous table. Because of the relatively large number who visit shrines, participate in religious festivals, or otherwise visit religious facilities (cf. Table 6), it is understandable that even though they do not have religious faith, they still, for example, attach amulets to their cars for traffic safety.

In addition, when we ask whether or not the religious mind is important to those who responded that they do not have any religious faith, many responded, "Yes, it is important." If we combine those who have religious faith and those who think the religious mind is important, the response ratio is over 80 percent, regardless of survey period.

From these findings, it can be seen that simply comparing the ratios of those having religious faith does not make sense for international comparison.

Presentation of Prof. Hsu

So far I have heard only details–head counting. This is highly interesting; namely, who is doing what, when, where and how. But, my problem is that such head counting cannot cover enough ground in several ways. One is that you have never counted one village, one town, one group of professionals--many factual details are missing, i.e., what profession, what cost, who lives where, and so on.

Think about *Romeo and Juliet*. How do you feel? The one dies, the other has to die. From a realistic point of view, Romeo and Juliet both are good looking people who could easily find some other arrangements, but they prefer to die. Now think about another extreme, the movie *Midnight Cowboy*. Here is a man who goes around from one place to another having sex for money. Here is a role, while Romeo and Juliet represent affect. Affect is something you cannot explain or study scientifically. Another kind of affect would be how you feel toward your father, i.e., what you should do. There are some people who feel "I want nothing to do with the old man," while other people would say, "If he wants me to die I have to die." Here are two extreme differences. From this point of view, I am always interested in the larger picture; in the continuity of things.

Yesterday I said that what is happening in Eastern Europe is not unlike Martin Luther's prophetism. You may think I was making a joke. I was not. Think about what is happening with the Catholic church and what is happening with the Protestant church. Christianity is primarily a Western phenomenon. Asians have very little of it. And, the number of Europeans who are Protestants is much larger than the number who are Catholics. The Chinese and the Japanese do not have this. They pretend now, with their economic development, to be Western in one way or another, but fundamentally they are not. They do not have the history–the tradition of revolt against the system. They have individual revolt to get rid of one particular ruler, but then the new ruler will do exactly what the previous ruler did. There is no idea about changing the system.

Returning to the notion of continuity, if one looks at the Japanese military leader during World War II, for instance, he committed suicide, but only after retiring. Can you imagine General Douglas McArthur committing suicide after Truman died? It is impossible. Think, in modern times, of Japanese writer Yukio Mashima. He committed suicide in public as a way of letting the Japanese know that they had gotten too far away from the traditional ways. Can you imagine any American doing that? Only a short while before he died, *Esquire* magazine in the United States published a large article about Yukio Mashima, showing him leading a big Siberian horse and showing his beautiful wife. No Chinese have ever been portrayed like that. Consider, too, prolific Japanese women writers, beginning with Genji Monogatari. One does not find any Chinese doing this. One finds Kageroonikki, and all kinds of Japanese women writers. I presume Chinese women did have some talents, but they did not do anything like that.

Consider that the Japanese got Buddhism from China via Korea. What are the spectacular differences? When I wrote my first edition of *Americans-Chinese*, I used the word *Chan* to describe Zen Buddhism. *Chan* is the Chinese word for it. Montgomery Broaded, of the University of Pennsylvania, after reading it, said "You should use the word Zen." I asked, "Why Zen?" "Zen is better known in the Western world." The

Japanese learned Zen from China, but made it much better. Today, when one talks about the well-known Zen Buddhists, one does not talk about Hong Chu or any other Chinese, rather one talks about Daisetsu Suzuki. He is the better known. In China one finds many schools and temples, and they have many festivals and other types of activities. The Japanese have the Institution of *Danka*; the Chinese do not have anything like this. The *Danka* is very different from Western religion. The Western is oriented to the individual, i.e., "I belong to this church." *Danka* represents an entire family; the family is either *Jyodoshinshu* or *Shinshu* or what not. The Chinese do not have this, either. One goes go to this temple; one simply does not belong to any temple. For the Japanese, *Danka* is different as it can also be *shinto*. One can be a member of this *shinto* church or that *shinto* church.

Consider the ways in which the Chinese and Japanese use foreign words. The Chinese practically never use foreign words. They always find a Chinese translation. The Japanese like to use transliteration, so that they have "democracy," "taxi," "dictator," and so on. The Chinese never use these. In Canton, one finds some streets that have taxis—they call them *takushi* there—but in the vast majority of Chinese places one never sees anything called *takushi*. They have "metered cars" in Chinese. They call trains "fire carts." The Japanese would use transliterations, not only in scientific studies but also in ordinary usage. The Chinese will say—"Give up Chinese?"—"No, never." Yet the Japanese use the Chinese. Under McArthur, the Japanese reduced the number of Chinese words to 1,850—called *Tōyokanji*—the commonly used Chinese characters. Now they have 1,900. They really should give up the Chinese characters. There is nothing that cannot be written in Japanese in the *kana*. They keep adding foreign words to it.

The Japanese have adopted the four Chinese divisions: scholars, farmers, laborers, and merchants, except the Japanese have added *shi* or *bushi* for the *samarai*. Also in Japan, and this is much more rigid than in China, one sees the *Eta*, although now it is called *Shinheimin* or *Burakumin*. They are physically not distinguished from the rest of the Japanese. They do not have a different language, and yet one finds in Japan, for example, a novel called *Hakai* by Shimazaki Toson, in which a man, a *Burakumin*, pretended not to be a *Burakumin* and he has the difficulty of how to overcome this psychological problem. This is the same as the Sinclair Lewis novel in the United States. There is a black man who has been taken as a white man, and he is somewhat white, but in the United States if you have even a little bit of black blood you are black, and he has a white wife. The novel ends having he and his wife defending their house against someone who wants to lynch them. One does not have this in Chinese at all. The Chinese had slavery. The Chinese had despised classes and these despised class were not allowed to take the Imperial Examination for three generations. However, after three generations, in China one does not see a group of people marked out as being untouchables, as in Japan. Nonetheless, the Chinese have very clear distinctions. I invented the term *caste-ism*, in an article I wrote about class, caste, and *caste-ism*. In Japan, they have *caste-ism*, while in India they have a full caste system.

Neither Japan nor China have a missionary spirit, i.e., wanting to convert other people. The Japanese used the *Shinto* in Taiwan, on the Caroline islands and in Korea. The Chinese did not even do that. But, once the Japanese lost their colonial power, then Japan forgot about it. The Japanese as a nation are not interested in missionary work.

This is in sharp contrast to many European countries like Belgium, Holland, Spain, and Portugal, who lost their colonies but still continued to do missionary work. The Chinese in this regard are even more different. For example, at one time, 1,500 Chinese monks, according to Prof. Fu Shu, went to India on foot via the Himalayan Silk Road. They did not go to preach Chinese ideas. They went to bring back to China the true teachings of Buddha, along with all the classic Indian scriptures. At that time, India had one kind of Buddhism, *Hinayana*, for the common people, and another kind, *Mahayana*, for the high class people. At one time the King of Tibet asked the Tau Emperor for 40,000 Chinese classics, so that they could be educated. Can you imagine? The Chinese Emperor refused. So the King of Tibet marched a force of 200,000 soldiers to Cheng Nang, which was the capital of China at the time, and conquered it. For about ten years afterward they demanded annual tribute from China to Tibet. The Chinese idea is that if you want to learn, you come to learn; you are not given any books—that is your problem!

I am talking about larger patterns. We may think we are interested in changes; this has been changed, that has been changed, technology has changed everything, rapid communication has changed everything. There are some things that do not change. They *affect* things, which has to do with what human beings really feel as a large group. I do not mean that there are not some single Chinese who will go Western completely. But a majority of them simply will not do that. If one thinks about today's situation in Eastern Europe, there has been drastic change in terms of political systems. The Chinese have yet to budge, despite significant American pressure and other kinds of pressure. You may think this is only temporary, that they are going to change, but I doubt it. I feel that even given another thousand years the Chinese will not go for Christianity.

Prof. Saso, from the University of Hawaii, went to Taiwan to study Chinese Buddhism. He says that the Chinese Buddhists do not have just one Buddhism. They actually have five sects, five different kinds of Buddhism. How did he find this out? He found this in the secret containers of the Taiwan Buddhist church. Western Christians did not have to wait for a foreigner to come to a Christian church to find the differences. For the Chinese these differences do not mean anything. That is why the information has been kept in their files; yet Prof. Saso considered this very important.

Consider the differences that have divided various European Christians. For example, in the 18th century there was a Russian archpriest, Avaakum, who insisted that he and his cohorts were all believers in the orthodox. The Russian tsars had the regular Greek orthodox. Now their main difference was that the old believers did not shave and they made the sign of the cross with two fingers, while the orthodox used three fingers. For these differences the archpriest Avaakum was sent to Siberia together with his cohorts. They were all sent to Siberia. They insisted they were different, and that all others were sinners. Eventually he and his people were put on the stake and killed. This is the European style. Consider the Inquisition and the number of people who were burned at the stake. Galileo was almost burned at the stake, but at the last minute he publicly said, "I retract what I said." After he was released and went away he said, "I still think I was right." That is western stuff—it is not Chinese or Japanese.

When Prof. Wilensky says that the individual cannot be absolute, one way or the other, depending on the circumstances—this describes the Japanese and the Chinese attitudes perfectly.

Finally, I want to mention the great variety of Western literature. For example, you have *Moby Dick*, *Agamemnon*, *Odyssey*, *The Old Man and the Sea*, *Les Miserables*, *On the Road*. *Les Miserables* is a great book. The sergeant is so obsessed by the person who committed the crime of stealing bread that he must track him down. These are all best sellers, even the older ones. All kinds of studies have been done of these great works. There are no Japanese or Chinese novels of this kind. So, what am I saying? I not saying that this head counting is wrong; I am not saying that at all. I am a Chinese. I am not so monotheistic to say that this one way should absolutely replace all other ways. I am saying that you should use the other ways to supplement what you are doing.

Open Discussion

Prof. Inkeles

I know a number of you have important things you wanted to say but did not get a chance to say and there are some very fundamental issues that we have only touched on. I think Prof. DeVos has some of those on his mind.

As I see it there are two divisions. I am not going to make a Euclidean space out of it, but there are issues about methodology which the Japanese team is especially interested in, while other people are only interested in substance, so that is one of the divisions. Another division involves the complex pattern. There is a set of people who think one gets a lot of significance through something like the survey method, and there are others who are more convinced that one has to do the kind of analysis that is involved in the depth perception of cultures, which would be Prof. DeVos' style or even more Prof. Hsu's style, for whom it is very problematic what the relations between those things are and the conceptions of national character. This is a very open and interesting question. Then there are others who are more preoccupied with social structure rather than with culture. Prof. Wilensky especially represents that point of view, and I myself have spent a lot of time making the case for how structure shapes the person and therefore is itself a very powerful determinant of individual behavior, and probably a determinant of personality, at least to a certain extent as shown by the Kohn studies and some of my own. To put all these strands together is difficult, but I think it would be worth doing some exploration of them; that is, restating positions with regard to these issues.

I tend to be an eclectic in these matters. I think there are a lot of contributions to be made to knowledge and knowledge is a kind of complex mosaic and not a completely uniform substance. Consequently I see room for these contributions. I mentioned the importance of jokes. When you talk about what goes with what, it is terribly important—and this is predictive power—to consider what you are predicting and what your predictor is. The fact that you can show that in one case something that is seemingly very powerful does not predict does not give you any way of knowing whether it might be a very strong predictor in another context. We have not yet worked out to an adequate degree in the social sciences just what these relationships are. That is what we are in the process of learning.

As I see it, this is one of the things that this kind of national character research enables one to do; that is, after you get a set of measures, assuming you get a good set of measures, then you can have Prof. Wilensky say, "Let me relate that to another variable, namely national patterns of investment in Social Security programs, and see whether or not the fact that you are kindhearted and worry about the poor has very much impact on what happens." Of course, the answer might partly be that he has not measured the right subordinate measures on the psychological side, and that is what keeps the whole process going.

A story I am thinking of is a very modern one in a way, although you will see that I have not caught up with inflation in telling it. It is a story of a woman whose sink is clogged and will not work, so she calls a plumber and the plumber goes underneath the sink with a wrench. She does not see what he is doing, but she hears three bangs. This takes about ten seconds, and then he comes up and says "Okay, Ma'am, it works now." She says, "Will it?" He says, "Yes, try it." She turns the faucet and the water runs right down. So she says, "Oh, that's marvelous. I have been so suffering from this clogged sink. Now I'm delighted. How much do I owe you?" It used to be $5.50; now taking into account inflation at today's rate in Palo Alto, he would say $50.50. So the woman is greatly shocked. She says, "$50.50! Look, for tapping 3 times, maybe it's worth 50 cents, but where is the $50.00?" He says, "Well, madame, I think you are right—tapping three times is only worth 50 cents—it's knowing where to tap that's worth $50.00." We have the same problem with social research; a lot depends on knowing where to tap. Only, some of us do not know yet, and we are kind of blindly thrashing around in there to try to find out.

We have a great many things we can take up. I would like to suggest two things left over from the last discussion, and then give others a chance. First, I want to pick up on what I think I heard in the presentation from Prof. Suzuki, as he showed the locations over time of the syndromes that he was interested in. He kept stressing external influences; that is to say, the elements that were new ideas. I do not mean that this was his only position; I just want to stress that that was all I heard him say. These are new ideas, in other words, foreign things, like the American occupation, for example, or when Japanese go abroad for the first time and encounter new cultures. They learn about Gucci bags in Paris or something of that kind. They see different relations, at conferences, for instance, between husbands and wives, and so on. These are the foreign elements.

This same kind of movement can be argued for the transformation of national character. If this occurs through time, it can be produced, not by externally introduced ideas, but by spontaneous regeneration of certain ideas within each society more or less independently as a result of common structural forces. In that respect, Prof. Wilensky and I would be thinking alike when we say that in order to understand the investment in Social Security you have to consider what the age of the population is. Changes in that have a large impact on whether you spend money on old-age programs. You also have to consider the sheer fact of the age of a program. It seems to be an iron law: the older the program the more money is spent on it, and that is something that cannot be explained by reference to a national character because it happens everywhere at about the same speed. On the other hand, something that Prof. Wilensky did not mention is that there are five or seven programs everyone can adopt. Now why should everyone adopt these programs in the same sequence? If you have five different programs and you make XXXXX, XXXXO, and you keep going, you could have hundreds and even thousands of ways of introducing these programs—you put old age first or you put child benefits first.

In fact, there is a very strong pattern that occurs in this respect. Most countries adopt programs in pretty much the same sequence. You can make something like a very clear-cut scale out of it. Prof. Usui and I have worked on this and it is very striking.

Probably, in this case, the main cause of change is that people were following their leaders. But there definitely is also the phenomenon of cultural clustering, which has come up a number of times. Why do certain countries go together? They go together both in attitudes and often in institutions. There are several ways of dealing with this; one is the cultural explanation that makes a lot of sense, although it may have to do with origins too. Britain, Australia, the United States, the English part of Canada—they all show very marked similarities. They show it both in structure and speed of adoption of programs—they also show it in attitudes and values. On the other hand, inheritance can take quite a different form. I can arrange the former colonies in Africa into two categories, those which were originally French and those which were originally British. I can give you two measures on which not only are they slightly different but they are totally polarized. The British former states are either very slow or do not at all adopt child-support programs. The French colonies automatically adopt child-support programs. I believe this is largely the influence of the fact that they merely copied the French emphasis. Another striking difference, if you look at their constitutions, is the pattern guaranteeing personal civil rights. Count the frequency with which due process rights are granted in the two sets of constitutions. The average number of such civil rights granted in the constitutions which came down from the French line is 1.2, and the average in those which came down from the British line is 8.7 (given a maximum is 14). So there is an enormous difference between the two and you can cluster the states of Africa on this basis. My own impression of the states of Africa is that they are sufficiently diverse in their cultures that this particular clustering cannot be explained on the grounds of any commonality in cultural pattern. It would have to be explained by reference to historical transmission and structural terms.

This gives some sense of the complexity of the problem, and our basic task, therefore, is that since we have a universe with multiple elements in it that we have intellectually distinguished, we must establish the empirical reality of the existence of each of these phenomena, and then we must have some theory which explains their pattern of interrelationship. In order to do that we must have measures of all of the relevant elements, and then we must face the intellectual problem of putting to work the different theories that we have about how they actually function. Prof. Wilensky has presented one clear-cut line where one needs attitude and value data to say, "Can you predict from that what the structures will be?" He has not tried to turn it around, which would be interesting. How long after you adopt a certain program in a given country do the attitudes and values of the people come into line with the kind of program that they have? That is, how far did the Americans become spontaneously welfare-minded or how far did the Americans become welfare-minded as a result of living with a Social Security system that they found worked? One could argue that it is against the American character to believe in all this kind of government support. How did we come to believe in it?

Those are examples of the kinds of things that I would like to see worked on in different contexts. We could take the family, religion, and each of these, and approach them in that way. One related question that I would have in that context is—and this goes back to the original problem of definition and I think I am probably arbitrary about this in my mind, but as I several times told Prof. Miyake, I would not classify changes in voting behavior as part of national character. They seem to me like the changes in the economic estimates of whether things are getting better or worse. But, the elements of

what make up political culture I would include in the characterological realm. Now that is just a position I would take on two sets of data. In the case of every set of data that we look at we have the possibility of putting something in or out of that box or on one side or the other side of the box. This is really maybe only a way of restating the general problem; how much is character and how much is social structure? Because much of what we call social structure really is the summation of a lot of individual actions. And a lot of individual actions, as we have said several times, come about merely because all you have to assume is that people are rule-abiding. If they are rule-abiding, then once you know the rules you are going to be able to predict their behavior. You need not know anything about their personality other than their disposition or readiness to follow a rule. Not that characterological differences cannot result from that.

For example, I think someone did mention an instance—my own story of the same kind has to do with Copenhagen—where the people are considered very rule-abiding. There was a giant snow in Copenhagen; such an unusual, huge snow that no vehicles of any kind could move. No trucks, no buses, no automobiles; everything had absolutely stopped. Only people were walking and everybody knew that because you could look around and there were no vehicles moving anywhere. When the people of Copenhagen—the traffic lights were still working—came to the corners they all stood and waited until the light changed to green before they crossed over. Now is that national character or is that just rule behavior? There are a lot of countries in the world where I can assure you it would not be like that. As a matter of fact as you know, quite the contrary; it does not matter whether the light is green or red, everybody is going according to his own individual conception.

Another case which I think is very good involves a joke that is a little harder to get, but I think you will get it. In Israel there is a type of person called a *yaka*. The word *yaka* comes from jacket. Who are the *yakas*? The *yakas* are the people who came to Israel from Germany. The original settlers you know were pioneers of a very different type. When the events involving the Nazis of Germany began to mount, many Jews sought to escape from what they saw as upcoming Holocaust. They were the lucky ones, having anticipated and gotten out. They went to Israel, but they introduced a wholly new personality type compared to what was there. And so there are many stories in Israel to try to explain what a *yaka* is like and what they do. And the characteristic story is the following one: apart from wearing a jacket in a climate where it is very hot, they wear a jacket, a tie; everyone else is in open collar and short sleeves and shorts. These people go around, no matter how hot it is, with their jacket, hence *yaka*. The story is told that one of these men used to get sick if he rode on a train going backwards. He could only sit in a seat facing the same direction the train was going—forward. Now there used to be a train—Israel is a tiny country—from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. It took an hour to make this ride and it was crazy to keep it going because it was completely uneconomical. The Arabs used to throw stones across the border because it ran right along the border. I think the Israelis kept it partly for symbolic reasons; it proved that they also could handle the mechanical world and partly, I think, in defiance against the Arabs throwing rocks. So this man goes to the train office and says, "I insist you must give me a ticket in a reserved seat so I am facing the way the train is going." He got such a ticket. His friend met him at the other end of the line and the man was pale. He said, "You know I was sick on the train and I'm feeling terrible." His friend said, "What's the matter?" He said,

"Well, you know I can only ride comfortably if I ride the same direction the train is going, and I took a lot of pains to get a seat so I would be facing forward. The man made a mistake when he filled out my ticket. He put me in a seat where I had to ride backwards, and so I got upset and I'm sick. I can't ride that way." His friend said to him "Why didn't you ask the person sitting across from you to change seats with you, maybe they would not have minded riding backwards." And the *yaka* said, "That's my problem." The friend said, "What do you mean that's your problem?" The *yaka* said, "There was no one in the seat across from me." His ticket said *this* seat. So that is a *yaka*.

Maybe these are trivial aspects of behavior, but I would like to suggest that some of these dispositions influence non-trivial things, and that is what I think Profs. DeVos and Hsu have been talking about, so those are a few of the things I had on my mind and a couple of jokes I wanted to tell.

Prof. DeVos

I would like to respond to Prof. Hsu's discussion of affect and role. One of the problems, if you are an anthropologist, is that people will give you the formal system, i.e., they will tell you what the formal system of inheritance is, and why people behave a certain way because of the system. More recently, we have had women anthropologists going out studying some of the same groups that have been reported on by men, and they come out with much different results. For example, in Taiwan, Marjorie Wolf came out with a different look at Confucianism, from the woman's point of view. I am sort of an old hand at that and being a clinical psychologist in my previous incarnation I am on my way to *nirvana*. I came back as an anthropologist so I am going in the right direction I think.

We asked some questions back in 1953 related to succession and we asked why as well as what one would do. One of the questions we asked, which were very similar to the questions Prof. Hayashi and his group are asking, involved setting up a problem situation: a father dies and a young man who is very successful working away from home is asked to come back and take over and succeed the house; in other words he is in line. What does he do? and Why? The interesting thing, of course, was that most individuals, when asked that question, would say come back, but the thing that was surprising to me was the reason. Very few made any mention of succession; they said they came back to take care of mother. Now that is affect, not role, and I think that is affect in the Japanese system. In other words, the thought that comes spontaneously to mind in a question of this kind is when you ask why. On another part of the sample we used another question in which we made the situation that of a second son who is asked to come back. Of course we had lots of refusals because a second son was not about to come back and inherit the house; he has not been set up to do it. He has not received the special attention to do it, etc. in the Japanese eyes. There would come immediately to mind that a first son has had special treatment because in the system of primogeniture, the effect of expectations was that he would be the inheritor and of course, that is very Japanese; primogeniture is part of structure, etc., but it is also part of affect because it influences how children are treated. First sons, Bill Claudel found, are statistically over-represented in mental hospitals. Why? Well, being a first son there is a lot of heavy

responsibility placed on you in anticipation. Your role is different, but it is a role that you are set up for and that you internalize and it causes you certain forms of stress, which we brought up before, and conflict. That is different from the Chinese system where there is equal inheritance, so that a Japanese first son would be in a status position which would have special stress. Also, and I do not know if this held up or not, youngest daughters tended to be over-represented. Why youngest daughters in a family? We do not have large families anymore; the youngest daughter very often was anticipated as taking care of the parents or being used in that capacity in the older culture. I do not think that is true anymore, but there was that kind of anticipation, so that was a kind of stressful status position in the family.

When we did our delinquency study we looked at sibling position in the family related to the appearance of delinquency in a son. It was not a large study but we did a very intensive study where we went back one generation. We found that even with the small number of cases we had, second sons were over-represented as the fathers of delinquents, so there is something attitudinal that is related to status position in the family that has certain forms of communication or what happens to a particular person in that position in a family that sets up some kind of way of being in Japan.

We are not talking about national character; we are talking about individual situations and social roles, etc. This is going back to the point that I introduced in the beginning, that perhaps a lot of questions on national character are located in the interaction, not in the person, or what happens when you are put in a particular status position which causes certain forms of interaction to be expected of you. Thus, by defining yourself you are defining yourself in interaction. This is what I accused Prof. Hsu of acculturating me to by exposing me to his opinions about Chinese culture over the years. Somehow that idea has stuck with me, that the role concept is an interactional one, that we always think of the self—and in psychology and I can cite you chapter and verse—as located in the individual; that is, we do not think of the self as located in a series of anticipated relationships with others which is where the sense of what one does comes from. Now, Japanese are supposed to be situational rather than generalizing about who one is, and that may be its consonant; that if we are individualistic we think of ourselves as being ourselves regardless of circumstance. That is one way of being or one way of inhabiting experience, whereas if one is Japanese one thinks of oneself contextually in what the relationship is that is going on when one is being oneself.

Prof. Inkeles

Prof. DeVos, I have a question at this point. Is this something which you could not capture by questions?

Prof. DeVos

I think, I am not pessimistic about it.

Prof. Inkeles

Could we get Prof. Schuman to write a series of questions that would test this?

Prof. DeVos

Well maybe if we can get him to know where to hit with his wrench; that wrench has certain utility, in other words, I think there is nothing wrong with any of these tools. The question is: can we get him focused on certain subjects, or can we hit certain subjects that we did not even think about as part of what we are trying to get at, or investigate?

Prof. Schuman

Before going on, I have a question. Actually I have a problem with your Israeli, but my question is to Harold Stevenson, who is not here. I wonder if I can legitimately ask it. He said he doubted the value of the concept of national character, as I recall, because for Americans you can think of a personality type or some such thing, but the Japanese tend to vary from situation to situation and therefore he does not understand it.

Prof. DeVos

But he is being very American, by saying it that way.

Prof. Schuman

Right, it seems to me that is exactly the value of the concept of national character, to get at this larger frame of reference, and if one learns to adapt to different situations in different ways without feeling guilty—about being inconsistent, that is where the question lies—then that is a form of national character. Why one could not ask questions would get at each of these situational things very well. Perhaps one could by simulating it. But, one would guess that there would be more feelings about guilt or some sense of tension over the fact that I was this way here and that way there. It might not be so clear in a Japanese situation and one might ask questions of that sort.

Prof. Inkeles

This also relates to a point that Prof. Clausen made. One of the items on his list was "What is your sense of identity?" I think that is basically the general category that we are talking about and it does not seem to me so subtle as to be inaccessible to most of us. It is a fairly clear idea. There are people—and I do not mean just individuals—there

are peoples, whole sets of human beings, about whom there is a sense of "I am what I am." Within this bundle of skin is a distinctive personal me and no matter where you put me down I am still me. Other people have the feeling, "Yes, I know what I am, but what I am is a sum of my relationships or my statuses and consequently if you put me down in another place, I might be a different me." In the extremes there would be someone who is completely rigid about that who would say "I can't be anything other than I am," like Popeye, who said, "I am what I am and that is all what I am, I am Popeye the sailor man."

Prof. DeVos

He was bringing in a role relationship.

Prof. Inkeles

And we also have the old idea, I mean it goes back to the Reisman conception of the person who is more gyroscope as against the person who has a lot of antennal connections. It is related to that.

Prof. Hsu

In this regard we have to distinguish the Chinese way and the Japanese way. Both of them are different from the American or the Western way, but the Chinese, when you talk about situational—with reference to how large a circle—have a very small, or relatively small circle. The Japanese have a larger circle. That is what I talked about in my book on Yiamoto. The Chinese are revolutionary. Prof. Sun Yat-sen used to complain that the Chinese are like a trail of loose ends—nobody is related to anybody—as distinguished from Westerners who are much more solidly related to their particular groups.

Actually, the Chinese are not a trail of loose ends. That is inappropriate. The Chinese are like yellow clay that cling in small bundles as distinguished from the Japanese who have larger groupings, and the larger groupings start with *Iemoto*. The Chinese have the clan, but they are not *Iemoto* at all.

In answer to the question of how the Chinese relate to people outside this, they are looking for kinship ties or pseudo-kinship ties, or old friendship ties, or old locality ties. If you are from the Eastern part of the North, the Cantonese have many, many groups, whereas with the Japanese, as much as I have tried, they show no association of *Kagoshima* people. The Japanese simply do not have that; the Chinese have either kinship or locality. The Japanese have these larger groupings like Matsushita, Asahi and Toyota and that kind of grouping. The Chinese simply did not and do not have these larger groupings.

Prof. Inkeles

Prof. Hsu, in that connection I think you have to consider the issue of structure of the kind that is raised by Prof. Wilensky. I am not saying this has happened, and maybe it will be like Eastern Europe—it will all be overturned overnight—but one of the things the Chinese Communist regime has done is to lock a large number of people, not everybody, but large numbers of people, especially in the industrial sector, into units, the *dahnway*. What I and others have found very striking in China is that people talk of themselves very much in terms of their *dahnway*—it is the only thing that matters. You come in contact with a person and you do not find out a lot about their family. The initial contact is to learn what *dahnway* they are part of, and that is because the outside world is constantly asking them. They cannot do anything; they cannot get food, they cannot get clothing, they cannot get housing without getting it through the *dahnway*, and if they go somewhere else, the only thing anybody wants to know about their papers is first, what *dahnway* are they from, and do they have a right from their *dahnway* to be traveling; it is always the *dahnway* which authorizes it. That may not have penetrated the consciousness, but I think it has; in other words, this is an area where you can transform the sense of membership, by creating a new social structure.

Prof. Wilensky

On this point, locality ties are being introduced by Prof. Hsu as important in China and distinctly Chinese. In California, the very epitome of the mass society, modern style, there are literally hundreds of organizations in different cities—the Iowa-Californians, the Kansas-Californians—who meet weekly, monthly, go bowling together, etc. Again, the cross-national comparison of each element of the system we described here is necessary before one can say this is distinctly Chinese, Japanese, or American or anything else.

Prof. Hsu

But the point about Americans—I am a Californian—is that they can combine totally unconnected persons, whereas the Chinese cannot. They tend not to connect like that.

Prof. Inkeles

Could you elaborate on that, Prof. Hsu. Could you give us a concrete example of what you mean by the inability to relate totally unrelated persons. What would be an example of a meeting in the United States and a meeting in China that would embody this?

Prof. Hsu

Even in your *dahnway—dahnway* means "working unit" in China today (after the communist word)—there are all kinds of cleavages, according to the small locality or

kinship relationship in China. That is a problem. They talk about those who are in and those who are out within the same *dahnway*.

Prof. Inkeles

You would argue that would not be true for Japan?

Prof. Hsu

I certainly think it is not. For example, the Japanese have corporations that have been running for a couple of centuries—a long time. The Chinese, up to now, do not have corporations, businesses. There is no Chinese Matsushita.

Prof. DeVos

The interesting thing about looking at Korea, which we have not brought in here, is that it is intermediary to China because many of the large industrial organizations—if you look at them very carefully—are family operations. The government was aware of this and encouraged some of them. Although it used to be Japanese to a certain extent, that is no longer the case in Japan. The Japanese system has true corporations. Even the Japanese family, the *Ie*, and I think this is the point again structurally, is not the same as the Chinese family; that is, the genealogical concept of the Chinese family is different, and the Japanese family includes people that would never be considered part of a Chinese family.

Prof. Hsu

Outsiders, lots of outsiders.

Prof. DeVos

And adoption patterns are totally different. The concept of adoption and bringing in is totally different. And here is where the mentorship pattern comes in. The mentorship pattern in Japan is a pattern of loyalty that transcends in some cases the family pattern. This is not true in China in the same way.

Prof. Hsu

Also, at least one-third of Japanese marriages are *mukoyoshi* marriages; that is, a son-in-law marries into your family and takes your name. I have no sons and my daughter marries someone. He then becomes my son. In China that is widely practiced.

Prof. DeVos

Prof. Hsu, are you still working on that?

Prof. Hsu

Yes.

Prof. Inkeles

We had a chart at one point that showed the relative location in the spaces you are using of different sets of countries. Could we see that chart again? The one with the countries outlined in red.

Prof. Hayashi

I think Prof. DeVos or Prof. Schuman discussed the Japanese case as situational. Our national character survey clearly indicates that situational characteristics are supported by the surveys. That is, there are many "depends" or "depends on" responses. For example, regarding ideologies, when the question asked is, "Do you like capitalism, socialism, liberalism, democracy, and so on," a large proportion of respondents say "it depends"; indeed, more than 50 percent will say "it depends." Thus, it is crystal clear that the Japanese do not like to follow a specific ideology. Rather, they create a rationale or explanation on an ad hoc basis for example. They prefer to maintain a sort of balance of different ideas. So, for that reason, they do not give specific or clear answers to such questions.

Prof. Inkeles

Could you interpret that a little bit for us? Is it because people really have not made up their minds about these questions? or does it have something to do with this notion of consensuality; that is, to come back to Prof. Schuman's concern, that every question and every interview should be understood basically as a certain kind of human situation? When I am confronted by an interviewer, and I do not know where the interviewer stands, and he/she asks me a question, "Do you prefer this or that," I have a problem: if I say this maybe I am going against what he/she believes in. In fact, if you asked me and knew me privately, you would know that I favor capitalism rather than socialism. But I tend to say "It depends." That is different. It means not having made up your mind at all. What is going on in the mind of the Japanese when they say this?

Prof. Hayashi

"Depends on" means that they perceive, they recognize, they understand the pros and cons, the good parts and bad parts, of, for example, capitalism or socialism.

Prof. Inkeles

If that is really true, how can the Japanese ever act? Maybe they do not act. However, my impression is that, like any other set of human beings, they act. How do they manage to act? If you are so hung up about so many questions—you say, "I'm on this side, yes, but I'm also on this side, I don't know where I stand, I'm in the middle, I can't act normally." That is a basic human problem. How do the Japanese manage to act?

Prof. DeVos

Carl von Bjorkman has written a book about how Japanese have dynamic inactivity. There are a lot of things where you think someone is actually doing something where nothing is being done. There are a lot of situations like that.

Prof. Inkeles

No, no. Wait a minute. Obviously any human being can be ambivalent about any question. He is talking about a persistent pattern if he is right in what he is talking about. He is not talking about any human being in any situation. He is saying that if you compare the Japanese on the same set of questions across hundreds of questions with other countries, the Japanese are way out here in the proportion, for those same standard questions, on which other people are able to take a position. The Japanese say "I do not know," or "I am undecided."

Prof. Hayashi

It is not true for every sphere, for every field. It may occur only on questions about ideology, for example, or political issues. This is not the case on issues about everyday life.

Prof. Inkeles

There is another explanation for that. As Prof. Schuman will tell you, and as Prof. Guttman always used to stress, if people do not care about an issue, when you force them to take a stand, they will either take it at random or they will come down in the middle position. Thus, what this mainly tells us is not that the Japanese are indecisive, but rather in which areas they have strong affect and in which ones they do not.

Prof. Stevenson

Is it not a question of the situation? Does it not depend on the situation? They do not have any problem with it the minute you define the situation. As long as you define the situation; that is, am I speaking to a woman or to a man, or to my boss? Give me the situation, and I will answer you. So it is situation-centered. It depends on what? On the situation. If the question does not specify all the rest of the relationships, there is a problem, but if you give the situation there is no problem. We can act. Tell me what situation you want me to act in and I will.

Prof. DeVos

Another item that we used concerned religion. It did not make any difference if people in the family had different religions. If you asked the same thing of a Western family, it would cause dissension in the family to have people of different religions, but for the Japanese it is not of great moment.

Prof. Inkeles

That may be because they do not have much invested in religion. The evidence you have shows that they are not much invested in religion.

Prof. DeVos

Correct. I think that was Prof. Hsu's point. The Western concept is one of cognitive consistency about what you believe. For a Japanese, to believe in a particular religion is of no moment to other members of the family. The important thing is the family membership, not the religious belief. Religious belief is secondary to family membership. This is also true of political beliefs. Neither ideology nor religion are that important.

Prof. Inkeles

I think we are talking about two different things; whether consistency is important or not is a problem by itself, and how people feel about certain forms of variability within a tight group. If you say that it does not matter to them, all the members of the family can have different religions, that is okay. All the members of the family can have different politics, and that is okay. What if all the members of the family take a totally different attitude towards filial obligation? That is not okay.

Prof. DeVos

Apropos, I could make Prof. Stevenson's point for him again in translation. We have the word—and this point is made often—"sincerity" and it is translated from one language to another. Now, what does "sincerity" mean to a modern Westerner? It is acting in accordance with feelings. One's feelings and one's behavior are in accord; one is consistent. That is not what it means in Japanese. "Sincerity" is behaving in accordance with expected role behavior, regardless of one's feelings. What makes one a sincere person is behaving properly according to expectations; that is being sincere. It has nothing to do with feelings. Behavior is the important measure of how you are affecting the family.

Prof. Inkeles

We in the West are concerned about that too. We say "Do not trust him; he is inconsistent; he will tell you one thing and do another." Perhaps it is only a matter of the label.

Prof. Schuman

I have heard that the word—where we would say you are expressing your true attitude and that has a positive ring to it—in Japanese is one which is more like "disengorge" or "throw out" or "thrust out." It is a much more negative term.

Prof. Inkeles

But of course the problem of terminology by itself gives you no assurance about whether or not the concept is understandable if you find the right word. You mean to tell me that Japanese do not recognize the difference between what they feel and what they say?

Prof. DeVos

Of course they do, but they are not insincere if they do not say according to their feelings.

Prof. Inkeles

I am interested in the universality of the human similarity. I would like to hear Prof. Clausen talk about this a little bit from a psychological point of view. I think these syndromes are universal. They may vary in frequency; they may vary in consequences, but they are recognizable everywhere. Therefore I cannot accept the idea that there is

no such thing as sincerity in Japan. They may not use the same word, but the Japanese perfectly well understand the sequence–belief and action.

Prof. Clausen

It seems to me this is a little bit like Shakespeare in the bush, if I remember that anthropological tale of being sure that Shakespeare was absolutely universal. The story of *Hamlet* was told to an African tribe, and when it came to the fact that the king had been killed, well, obviously there was witchcraft that was involved there. When it came to the fact that the king's brother then married Hamlet's mother, well, of course he was being a good brother. So the story somehow had a totally different meaning here, and I am sure the basic sentiments may have been felt but they were ascribed to entirely different phenomena.

Prof. Inkeles

But if that were literally true, you could not have the same novel read all over the world. You have to take both sides. You are telling what the culture specifies as certain standard relationships, and that is what you are doing.

Prof. DeVos

You are caught in a different way in different societies. In a Japanese society you have the *giri-ninjo* problem; that is Japanese; that is a way of being caught in the Japanese concept.

Prof. Inkeles

That, I do not have any trouble dealing with. You remember early on I introduced the concept of characteristic dilemmas, which goes way back to what Levinson and I were talking about. What are the characteristic dilemmas? The polarities–which are more straining in one place than another, more fraught with risk, and harder to manage–will vary from culture to culture.

Unless these syndromes have universal meaning, it would be impossible. There is a difference between saying (a) not many people from culture A could understand the novels of culture B and (b) there is a whole set of novels which are completely meaningful to people in culture A but which cannot be understood in any other culture. Otherwise, why am I able to read as many Japanese novels as I read? And my wife too?

You have this underlying, pan-human stratum and the frequency with which a problem is presented in a Japanese novel may be very extensive in Japan and rare in my culture, but I can still understand it because the polarity is meaningful to me. When one talks about national character one of the things that happens is that one loses the notion

that there may be anything universal in the human experience, in the human psyche. I believe there is a very great risk in doing that. If it were not for the universality of these things, I do not believe a meaningful examination of national character would be possible at all.

Prof. DeVos

Going back to your analogy in the beginning, when you drew those diagrams, there are molecular structures with certain different adherences in different cultures, and that is what we are talking about. There are core things that we all share as humans, but the way we put them together, in what context we put them together, what gets added to them, is different in different societies, and I think that is what national character is.

Prof. Sasaki

In part of Prof. Suzuki's presentation, in Table 7, there is a question: "Suppose that a child comes home and and says that he has heard a rumor that his teacher had done something to get himself into trouble, and suppose that the parent knows that it is true. Do you think it is better for the parent to tell the child that it is true or to deny it?"

Prof. Hsu

From the Western point of view, the parent ought to tell the truth.

Prof. Sasaki

The results for Japan are shown in Table 8. In 1956, "Deny it" was at 38 percent, with "Tell the truth" at 42 percent. By 1988, "Deny it" was down to 23 percent and "Tell the truth" was up to 62 percent. So it is shifting. In the last thirty or forty years, "Tell the truth" has always been higher than "Deny it" and the trend has been increasing.

For the United States, in 1988, "Tell the truth" was at 90 percent and "Deny it" was at 3 percent.

Prof. DeVos

One of the most outstanding features of the response among Soviet refugees was precisely this issue of sincerity. Over and over and over again people said, "I hate it; I cannot stand it because I have to tell my children things that I know are not true." The children, for their part say, "Well, you know I can look around and see what is happening and my parents would not admit it!" "I saw five boys disappear from my class. My parents would say, 'You are imagining it; it is not so. There are just as many children as there were before.'" If the parents were to make a public declaration that they personally

knew about the disappearances, they could be put in jail. This issue of sincerity involves more; it involves imperative.

Prof. Inkeles

This is a pan-human issue.

Prof. DeVos

The question is: on what side is the moral justification? In many situations, the moral justification in Japan is to suppress one's feelings in the name of behavioral conformity. That is moral imperative; that is what you should do if you are a proper person. This may be shifting in terms of the legitimacy of that kind of suppression, but that is the traditional pattern. The question is: how much is the dilemma resolved, or how much moral justification is there for making a commotion? And, under what circumstances can you make a commotion, can you cause ill feelings to occur, can you cause social disruption to occur, by insisting on being "sincere"?

Prof. Inkeles

We will call it principle. I sit in departmental meetings where something dynamic like this is going on. I am very torn because one of my colleagues keeps saying, "Look, it is quite clear that the true opinion in this group is that they say A over B." But there are some deep divisions within the community and some people say, "If you take A that is like a terrible insult to us and we will scream and storm and fight and go get somebody else." So, some people, including myself, have said, "Well, maybe there is a possibility of getting a C that does not oblige a choice between A and B." Thus, for the sake of harmony, in order prevent departmental break-up, I am compromising. At least this person thinks I am compromising my principles. I am certainly compromising his or her principles because I am asking that person to go along with the harmonious decision. But, they keep saying, "I cannot go along with the harmonious decision because the rules of the game say that if it is clear that one person is the one who is the overall favored intellectual, then that is the person you have to be for."

Prof. Hsu

These problems are universal. The point about Japan is that more situations will be approached by individuals in such a way that once they sense that there is harmony and continuity, no matter what their personal feelings, they will give up their own disposition and compromise, whether that be "insincere" or however one might want to label it.

Prof. DeVos

I have sat in faculty meetings until three and four in the morning for some dissident who disagrees with a position. In the American scene, one can have a minority report or a minority position which spells out the differences of opinion. In my experience in Japan that was not possible. Consensus was obligatory.

Prof. Inkeles

There is a 20 to 30 percent difference with the majority in both countries going for the "sincere," anti-harmonious answer. There is a difference in the Japanese harmonious responses of 20 percent. The other 20 percent could be explained by some other differences that are obvious in these two countries. One is that teachers have higher prestige and are taken much more seriously in Japan than in the United States, where they rank low, are paid low and often have hostile relationships with pupils' parents. Therefore, in the United States, a mother is perfectly free to say, "To hell with the teacher"; whereas the Japanese would think twice because the teacher is a respected person whom one should protect.

Prof. DeVos

This is something that was discussed earlier. How far can one go in obtaining a general attitude from a single question? Every question requires consideration for status and so on. No one can provide an answer off the top of their head. While one may be exactly on target, the only way to find out is by asking many questions, at least some of which get at the status of the respondent.

Prof. Inkeles

I was taking this as a symbol of a syndrome because that is what we are discussing. Are we not confusing consensus decision which is going to force custom with the question of sincerity? I have been in departmental meetings where it was clear that we had to produce a unanimous opinion. In doing so, I do not consider this a question of insincerity.

Prof. DeVos

It is a question of moral imperative to take an uncomfortable position, and I think Americans are more compelled to be discomforting than are the Japanese.

Prof. Hsu

If a department is allowed only one yea or ney answer—no minority opinion, if that is the custom—then to say that the person who was forced to silence is insincere is not correct. I do not think it is a question of insincerity.

Prof. DeVos

I heard a different explanation of this which makes a little more sense. When we talk about a sincere expression it is often seen in Japan as somewhat selfish and impulsive.

Prof. Hsu

Seen as lack of self-control.

Prof. Inkeles

We have spent an hour on sincerity and that is not where we should be going. We must deal with some broader issues here. One of the major problems we face is that we have no real theory, so when we get to these little details, we can argue about them interminably, but I do not think that is a particularly fruitful way to try to get at the more general issues we need to deal with.

Prof. Clausen

Something occurred to me when we talked about the tendency for people to be rule-abiding. What kind of rules do people follow? Presumably, they do not follow every rule and it seems to me that this is one of the areas where we need an ethnographic type study within a given culture to determine what the rules are that are sacred, that are impressed upon people early on, that stick with them. I think there are some things that stick with people, and I gather in Japanese society that the mother-child relationship is a very intense one; that there is a kind of sacredness here in this relationship that permeates the relationship for the rest of one's life. Mothers are important to the American society too, but I do not know what happens to these relationships. It seems to me an interesting way of trying to get at some of these differences is to see what happens when there are divergencies for one reason or another, and whether these divergencies can be tolerated. In American society some parents and children do become alienated. Does this happen in Japanese society?

To return to the issue of rule behavior, can we specify the particularly important rules for people in a given culture, rules that seem to be reflected both in behavior and in what they say? Perhaps differentially in behavior and in what they say. We need to know enough about each culture to be able to ask intelligent questions. A lot is known,

but apparently a lot is not known when we make these comparisons across countries, especially when we do surveys. I do not know to what extent people in other countries are consulted, as to whether or not a given set of items would be appropriate for that given culture. The five items that were put up as to ways of living, for example, or ways of life, seem to me to be worded in a way that gives them entirely different meanings for Americans than would be intended. For example, with regard to "a pure and moral life," Americans tend to make fun of such an expression. "Oh come on now, you do not really mean a 'pure and moral life,' because that is too 'goody goody.'" So Americans are not going to choose that response to any large extent, but the idea that may be important there, put in different terms, might be responded to by a great many more people.

Prof. Inkeles

How would you phrase that so that you would not have this "goody, goody" aspect that would cut Americans off from answering? In other words, they would be giving an inaccurate or insincere answer because they are too thrown by the particular loadings, the particular weightings. So what would you suggest as an alternative? This is a common problem.

Prof. Clausen

For example, I think "pure" in American society has a connotation, or used to have the connotation "sexually pure." So I think I would want to avoid that. Let me give an example from our war-time surveys in which we tried to find out what are the qualities of a good non-com in the army. You could give them a checklist or give them an open-ended question and look at how the responses came out. If you gave them a checklist and put in it "guts and the ability to take it," about 60 percent would check "guts and the ability to take it, that is what I want in my sergeant." But, if you do not put it there, it comes up less then 20 percent of the time. What I am suggesting is that we need to formulate these questions in each country; the categories in each country according to that particular culture.

When Mel Kohn and I first started working on values that parents hold for children, I was interested in seeing if I could get the French Gallup poll to use the questions and so I took them over and they did indeed ask the questions, although they did not give us the kind of analysis that we wanted, and then I heard that there was a psychologist named Roger Peron who had just done a book on model children and models of the child. I went to see him and lo and behold he had a set of items in which he had asked parents "What are the values that you want in a child?" There was about 50 percent overlap but there was 50 percent that we had not thought of. The ones we had thought of just did not seem that appropriate to French culture. Thus, in order to have true comparability, one not only has to have the questions translated very well but also the categories that one uses must be developed. Prof. Schuman suggested earlier that we need more open-ended questions. I think we need to use more open-ended questions so that we can then develop appropriate categories for each society before we formulate

those categories on the basis of a single culture (our own) and our own experience, which certainly limits us in what we see.

I was trying earlier to address the more general question of where we go from here. It seems to me one of the places we must go is to make these studies more truly cross-national.

Prof. Inkeles

There are practical limits. What you are proposing has been done in some studies. I am proud to say that it was done in my study before we decided on the response categories in the modernity study. We had field work done in six countries and the people who had done the field work in the six countries, in a relatively open way—writing down everything everyone said—then met for a month in the heat of Dakkar. For one whole month they went question by question with one person speaking for each culture. That one person spoke for the culture they had studied and said that from the point of view of that culture, these categories would work and those would not. This process went on until something was found that seemed to be meaningful across the cultures. Whether you could do this for a hundred cultures stretches the imagination, so one may have to adopt a different approach. In fact, I think we are in a position to and have actually adopted that different approach.

Notice that I spoke jokingly of it the other day, like a social disease; certain questions appear over and over in many studies and they go round and round and that is because they have been found very serviceable. By now, as a result of using them a lot, people understand their meaning. The other thing that you run into is that there is bound to be noise. The problem is how to deal with noise. No one, to speak of purity, has yet devised a completely pure signal in communications. The problem is how much noise is there and how seriously will it interfere in being able to understand the message. The chief defense we have about that is the point I keep stressing about the necessity to base oneself on multiple attacks. You do not approach any particular realm of meaning in terms of any one question, but you approach it through many questions, in many ways. If one keeps doing that and there is some kind of core that emerges, then one can have confidence that probably the problem of noise has been overcome; in other words, you have discovered the true signal. This may be an illusion, but this is what makes it very expensive, of course; it makes it an expensive and slow process.

Prof. Clausen

I think it is even more expensive, Prof. Inkeles, in that I think you have to know the culture. You have to know a lot more about the problems within a given area of culture. What is problematic and what is not problematic for example?

Prof. Inkeles

To some extent you are right, but also I must state that to some extent you are wrong. I will point to my own research again. When I started out to study modernity in six different countries, not a few, but dozens, in fact hundreds of people said that is utterly ridiculous. How can Prof. Inkeles figure out what it means to be modern in six cultures, none of which he knows. And I did not know any of them. I said I think it is possible, and I am staking my career on it and also the lives of some of my associates like Prof. Schuman, who made the mistake of getting tied up with it by saying there are certain underlying psychological propositions and orientations in the person. It may not be easy to figure out how to tap them but they are all tappable. It is like an oil well down there. You may go in this way, you may go in that way. The oil is down there. And you can find out how to do it. And there, it is going to turn out that certain orientations and dispositions, not their frequency, but as structures, will hold together in the same way in each country, which is what they are basing their research on basically, except they are more interested in working on the side where you dissolve the clusters. I was interested in looking for those clusters that do not get weaker as you cross cultures; in other words, I thought of it, as getting at a psychological bedrock. My theory made that kind of statement; that there really is psychological bedrock.

It could have turned out that when I then intercorrelated the items, that the sets of items might intercorrelate within each country, but a different set would intercorrelate within each country. That did not happen. The same set of items intercorrelated at about the same level in all the countries, and furthermore, if you did a factor analysis the factor structures were the same. Indeed, they were virtually identical. I am not saying that would happen in all realms. It only works if you have something which is in fact cross-culturally universal. That does not mean that the syndrome, when it was measured in frequency terms, appeared in the same frequency in each country; quite the opposite. It was different in each country and statistically different, even though the populations were perfectly matched by way of their occupation and education. Incidentally, a very large part of the variance, as is true in all of these studies we have looked at, was accounted for not by the national factor but by the occupational and educational factors.

There may therefore be personalities that are cross-cutting. It may be more interesting to look at class personality than it is to look at national personality. That is an open question.

Prof. Wilensky

Prof. Inkeles, you did what Prof. Clausen wants you to do. You did a pilot study where you learned the meaning in different cultures of these items by having days of discussion of the initial results and then built those into the survey instrument. The second thing you did, and that is what Prof. Clausen wants you to do, is have a good theory; convergence theory, modernization theory, whatever you want to call it, and that is why you got where you were. All he is saying is that that is necessary in cross-national research.

Prof. Inkeles

Well, I am obviously not going to be against theory but let me say something about the first process. It is not quite the way it sounds. It is not that we did justice to each culture, and I will tell you two meanings of this. In the first place after it was designed, it was only those six cultures that we managed to line up; it should not have worked in any other culture. Or there should be a risk that it would not work in other cultures. It has now been applied in one culture after another and the coherence of the items is virtually identical in all of those cultures. Furthermore it works across ages. My scale has been administered to third-grade children in Brazil, and the structure of responses is the same for the third-grade children as it is for the thirty-year-olds; and it works for little children in terms of comprehensibility, so, this strengthens the argument that there are psychological syndromes that have some universality. How we get at them is a very "iffy" question. But there are such things.

The other side is that this is bound to be very imperfect; for example, when I tried to compare the people in my six countries, something seemed wrong about the Nigerians. I used a hundred questions but the Nigerians were not coming out where everyone felt they should come out. When we looked at what we did the first time we asked a hundred questions, and, without being aware of it, we allowed a large number to sneak in which somehow involved either the actual word or the concept of "luck." Nigerians are super-sensitive about the introduction of luck, so once that got into the set, even though it was only six out of a hundred, it changed their relative score. I do not think you could ever get rid of all such sensitivities in all combinations; i.e., there will always be an element of risk and noise. But in this case we were able to readjust the hundred questions. I think if you went to a thousand questions, it would be very difficult for any one of these sub-sensitivities to have very much effect, however.

Prof. Wilensky

Do you think of that as just an accident or as the introduction of a national character?

Prof. Inkeles

I would put it this way; that the strength of certain national character type sensitivities was so great that it became a big element of noise in my effort to measure something else that I did not think of as national character but as a trans-human phenomenon.

Prof. Clausen

I had a Nigerian student who told me that it would be impossible to ask questions about what attributes one would like to have in a child, because you would be threatening

the child's future and therefore you would not ask a parent such a question. So apparently there is something very deep-seated there.

Prof. Inkeles

On the other hand, you do not necessarily know how it would work out. Prof. Schuman was told that there were certain questions he could not ask in Pakistan because they would violate certain sensibilities in an Islamic country. If I remember correctly, he was told, "You cannot ask the question, 'Can a man be truly good who does not believe in God?' That would be an insult to everyone. They would throw the questionnaire and Prof. Schuman out. He went ahead and asked the question anyway. It turned out people were rather challenged by the question. And they gave very good answers to his random probe.

There are many stories like yours. For example, Ed Ryan reported that one day when interviewing was going on—it was done in a lot of little rooms—the door burst open and the interviewer ran out of the room chased by the interviewee who was brandishing a chair or a lamp and wanted to kill the interviewer. So Ed intervened and tried to find out why—they were both Nigerians. He got in between them, got them separated, got them calmed down, and he offered to drive the interviewee home, in order to show him respect and try to apologize for whatever had happened. On the way, he said to him, "Why did you chase that man?" and the man who was being interviewed said, "He was trying to hex me, he was trying to put something like the evil eye on me" (in Italian terms), and Ed said, "Well, I know the interviewer, I have trained him carefully, I doubt that he was doing that. What do you mean he was doing that to you?" He said, "You know that set of questions you have where you want me to give the opposites, you say rich I have to say poor, you say healthy I have to say sick. You know what he was doing to me? It always turned out that he said the good words and I had to say the bad words." So, he said, "Of course he was trying to do me in." Now we did not realize something very interesting had happened. When we were making up the list, in order to keep it simple, we put all the good on one side (this was in the pretest period) and all the bad on the other side. We had not yet got to the point of reversing them. That tells you a lot about a culture that we discovered by accident; that there is a sensitivity, but there would be other ways of finding that out.

Prof. Schuman

I have a favorite example of something that occurred and I think it does get into the issue of how much there are basic similarities that are just obscured by words and how much there are fundamental differences. You could not ask the question in what was then East Pakistan and is now Bangladesh, "How many children would you like to have?" a typical American question on a fertility survey—how many children would you prefer to have?—because whenever one asks that, these devout Muslims would say "As many as God wishes to give me." It was almost a hundred percent. We were about to give up and then worked around to another wording, "Suppose God wanted to give you as many children as you wanted. How many would you want Him to give you?" That

worked beautifully. No problems at all. That suggests that language here was more obscuring than it was revealing a fundamental difference or at least a convention.

Prof. Usui

One of the definitions made from the Japanese group, more specifically from Prof. Suzuki, about the agenda for the next step is to utilize more of the data collected in the United States, such as the GSS (General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago). From what I understand it is conducted every year since around 1972 to establish a trend study, and then compare these data with the data the Japanese group has brought. That way we would have a more concrete factual basis about which to talk about national character. Of course we have to determine the comparable questions among GSS or other survey data collected at ISR. Then, for example, one of the methods that they used here, correspondence analysis, could be performed to compare the results with the Japanese ones. That would represent a step forward—to identify trends in the United States. So far, the Japanese group has presented a trend in terms of Japanese responses, but we have not seen the changes on the American side, the trend analysis, and that is something that we need to have. Would any of you like to respond to this or have other suggestions for the future?

Prof. Schuman

Regarding the trend you gave before, Prof. Wilensky's objection to the question I thought was well taken. I mean to a Japanese-American comparison with respect to the future. On the other hand, the change over time, although its meaning is still uncertain, is a little less likely to be just an artifact and more likely to depict something about changes going on in Japan.

Prof. Usui

What you are saying is that the trend analysis is all right on the one hand but there are other factors we ought to be looking at, such as structural factors.

Prof. Schuman

I was agreeing that I think that trend analysis is very useful because, even with problems in the wording, the trend is more likely to reveal something going on.

Prof. Inkeles

Then, Prof. Schuman, you have to address the question about what theory would guide your efforts. One suggestion is that we must become better at asking questions, at insuring comparability and in making things meaningful in the same ways across

cultures. That is a whole big program. That can certainly influence future work, although it is very difficult to do it because no one has central control over the data collection process. It is intrinsically highly decentralized, especially when you farm out the studies, but even more so when you are using studies that accidentally were done so that they seem alike and you are trying to bring them together, which is what I am caught up with much of the time. The other way to go is to say, "We have a lot of good data." Let's work more to try—by reworking the data and meeting various challenges and checks and so on—to come to a better understanding of what is going on through the reworking of the data, and then use that for further work. It is a question, you know, of which way one would want to go, and what would be more feasible. The feasibility issue raises questions about sharing data. Could we in the United States get all of the surveys you have done in Japan for example? I mean the actual tapes.

Prof. Sasaki

This is a very touchy issue; a very important question.

Prof. Miyake

We have two nationwide surveys on general elections and mine is the 1978 election. This survey was funded by two Japanese foundations and by NSF (National Science Foundation) in the United States. In Japan, we are able to release that data. I believe our American collaborators would also release their data.

Prof. Inkeles

That applies to one study, but what about the National Character Study data?

Prof. Sasaki

Three tapes can be released. The remaining data cannot be released at this time, due to maintenance, coding and translation problems. Of course, it is possible to release the tapes, but these problems need to be taken care of first.

Prof. Inkeles

The reason I press this point is that a question was raised about theory, a very apt question. Let me give you a partial response to what I see from the data from Japan, an initial off-the-cuff response. It has three parts. The first part is I am struck by the extent to which even though there is very good agreement about what certain conceptions of things like *giri-ninjo* represent, I think if you would ask most anthropologists who have worked on Japan to estimate what the average score of the Japanese would be, they would get it wrong. They would grossly over-estimate the actual frequency with which

the Japanese take these positions. I think this is quite interesting and by itself is a whole subject for investigation.

Secondly, the number of instances in which a thing that is defined as a core in Japan is held in about the same frequency in the United States. This is also very challenging and raises all sorts of interesting questions about clusters and single items.

The third and most important observation is that what I find most striking about this data and most valuable about it, because of its continuity, taking into account the first two kinds of issues, Is that I would argue that if I had to go to court as an expert witness, and say by and large amongst those people including myself who have sometimes taken a position about the durability of core elements that you could call national character as against its being situational or ephemeral or moving in clear directions and better explained by some other theory, I would say the Japanese data on the whole more supports modernization theory than anything else. That is basically what is going on in Japan. If there ever was a core, and it was not too big, it has gradually had a virus put inside it which has exploded each of the original cells, so that fragments and elements are scattered around; they are not gone, but they are scattered around. I know you do not like this, Prof. DeVos, but anyhow it is a model. The cell has been broken up, the nucleus and the matter are still floating in there somewhere, but this thing has exploded it and instead there is a general movement towards a new type of cell to become dominant and it is gradually forming character. That is what that big circle showed, and where is it ending up? It is ending up much closer to where the Americans were, not because everybody is becoming Americanized. I do not think that is the case. They are not learning from the United States in this respect, I think because there are structural pressures of the kind that Prof. Wilensky wants especially to focus on, which move human beings because of the impact of a rational person interacting with pressures from an environment, which move them in certain directions. This is why I would like to see the data, because that is one test I would put it to; would be to say, let us put forth two competing hypotheses. One that argues in favor of the relative durability of a core and the other that says no, the predominant explanation for the patterning of the data is a modernization type theory. And see what happens.

Prof. DeVos

There is a third alternative. There is a question of the rapidity of change; whether one can determine something about the rapidity of things changing.

Prof. Inkeles

I think in order to do that, one has to have some comparative basis; that is, is Japan changing more rapidly than some other place? That partly relates to the starting point, of course. That is why, you will recall, I used the 7 percent figure. I said that if the proportion of people in a given country who hold the view of a certain type is doubling every ten years, then I am sort of arbitrarily suggesting that is a very high rate of change

because we know many instances in which there is change but it is sort of glacial. Prof. Wilensky, I think you are one of the people who are most dubious about some aspects of it.

Prof. Wilensky

Oh no, you have just summarized three propositions that I agree with. I think there is nothing I have to add to that. I think it is very important to straighten out the question of the meaning and comparability of the items and of clusters of items and I think it is very important to note these extraordinary similarities that are uncovered here, especially in the trend data on Japan. I think it is very meaningful, very important. Perhaps we should answer the question Prof. Suzuki posed to us: how can he get trend data established comparable to his own in the United States? Someone should address that. Prof. Schuman, isn't there already an NORC in the various places that he may know about it; shouldn't he know about it?

Prof. Inkeles

Is there anything further anyone would like to add? I do not think a group of this kind can settle practical details and there is always the matter of resources, but I think we have some general guidance. In the last few minutes—some of the Americans have really used up a lot of the time—I wonder if our Japanese colleagues would like a little time. In the United States we have on television and radio the concept of equal time; that means that anyone who uses the radio must allow another group to have the same amount of time too. I feel the United States people have had their share of time and now I think our Japanese colleagues should take up more of the remaining time. What does all this mean for them for the future?

Prof. Hayashi

From this conference, we would like to proceed to the goal of organizing a larger conference. This conference has been very meaningful for us. We would like to have some record of this conference. In other words, we would like to propose to construct a book or series of articles based on the papers which have been presented at this conference.

With regard to the methodologies, cohort analysis and correspondence analysis, which we discussed in this conference, we would place these methodologies in this document as an appendix. We are not interested simply in methodology, but we are also interested in content vis-à-vis national character. We can continue our relationship by using time-trend data analyses and by using the results of those analyses to exchange ideas, to verify and test the validity of convergence theory, for example.

To test the validity of convergence theory, modernization theory, and so on, it should not stem from simply comparisons of two nations. We need to extend this to a

multiple group of nations. Perhaps data from developed countries should be used because it is very reliable data, but we are also very interested in using data from underdeveloped and developing countries. This, however, is not easy, because there is little reliable data available, and in many cases it is quite difficult to carry out surveys in the underdeveloped and developing countries. It has been suggested, for these countries, using more anthropologically oriented types of analyses, more qualitatively oriented analyses.. As long as we can collect some data from the developing countries, then we carry out surveys or utilize existing data to do comparative analyses.

In the long run, we would like to include not only Japanese and American scholars, but also European scholars, Canadian scholars, Australian scholars and scholars from the developing countries. It is very important, then, as a first step, to organize some sort of series of papers based on our comparative analyses, based on the papers which have been presented for this conference. Of course, it will take a bit of time to pin down which articles we should select, or which topics we should deal with, before we actually create a such collaborative document. Long-lasting cooperation is vital for national character studies. I would like to get responses from our American colleagues on these issues.

This joint Conference represents a significant first step toward facilitating the presentation of a much larger scale conference in the near future, a conference which should greatly contribute to the furtherance of our comparative work between Japan and the United States. And, as Prof. Lipset pointed out in his presentation on the differences between the United States and Canada, it is essential that Canada be included in our cross-national studies, in particular for its salience to our cultural-link analyses.

Finally, it is essential that we all become acquainted with one another as we pursue our work on national character. This conference has provided a most valuable forum for that purpose.

Prof. Usui

Prof. Suzuki, a lot of time has been spent on how to define the concept of national character, and in describing the various methodologies and other factors that may be influencing national character, such as differences in values and attitudes. What seems to be lacking is, again, data that can tap what has been happening in the United States. We know that GSS and other data are out there. Someone can go and look at it. What we need, when we have a conference of this kind, is data that reveal what has been happening in the American society in the last couple of decades. When the Japanese talk about what is happening in Japanese society—about people's attitudes toward war, people's attitudes towards family, or certain issues about teachers, parents and children—the American correlates are missing. American scholars who are experts on Japan can voice their views about the differences. But we really do not have a database through which we can more constructively discuss the issues. We need more papers and studies, such as those Prof. Schuman has presented. We know the data are out there, but we need a basis that everyone can share. We need to know what has gone on in the last twenty or thirty years in the United States. Prof. Schuman has provided a

good model. We need that sort of basis for other issues, to facilitate a more productive discussion between Japan and the United States.

Prof. Inkeles

That was the idea behind this conference in general; that ideally we would have papers on national character broadly conceived in each of a number of different realms. Inevitably we had gaps in fulfilling that program because in some cases the persons who would be most capable of making such a presentation were not available. Partly, they were not available and in some cases, because my budget was very limited, I mainly had to invite people from the San Francisco Bay Area. The other problem is that often the material presented did not bear on the national character issue. We can correct this in the future because we can try to get people to rewrite their papers to focus more on that. It is a general tendency—all scholars do it—to report on what they are working on most recently and on what they have readily available. They do not easily get sent off on another line just because someone decides to hold a conference. So, that also creates a problem. But that was our initial assumption; that we would have a series of papers that would take the family, for instance, and summarize all the relevant data (attributes, behaviors, and so on) for the United States, paralleled with a comparable paper from Japan. For each other topic, such as politics, we would take the same dual-parallel approach. Of course, one would hope that in some cases the very same surveys would be used. In any event, that comparable kinds of material would be prepared. That is why this is called a "planning conference." The question before us is: is it feasible to do the kind of thing that we had in the original model; in other words, can you find people in Japan who can write the kind of paper that I have in mind, and similarly, can I find people in the United States who can write the kind of paper that I have in mind? And have them done so that they would be reasonably parallel or interactive. For example, if we choose the politics case, would Prof. Miyake give us a full-scale statement of what is true about political culture in Japan and have Prof. Almond or someone else do the same thing for the United States and have them be side-by-side. If we think this is feasible in the abstract, how much money would it take and how much time? I think this is the basic problem we face. One possibility is to make a joint application to the National Science Foundation for such an operation, which would be the actual conference based on this planning conference.

Prof. Hayashi

That is a very good approach. If NSF agrees to provide a grant, then the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) could also provide a comparable grant.

Prof. Inkeles

I am reasonably satisfied that if you want to go ahead from the Japanese side, I can mobilize Americans who would give you the kinds of papers that you want on each

of the themes that we have been dealing with, if you would invite them to Japan and give them some assistance in preparing their papers. They would not have a problem with access to data because the Survey Research Center, the Roper Center and all those places are the repositories where a lot of the data are already available. That is different from the problem of collecting new data. The next step might be to agree to ask exactly these questions in parallel. That is a separate problem of financing a study. The intermediate step would be to do a more systematic job than we have done so far of summarizing what we know with regard to each of these themes, taking into account the cautions that have been suggested by our colleagues about how not to make mistakes in interpreting the data, recognizing their limitations, and so on.

Prof. Clausen

I am afraid that more of us are going to have to leave at this point. But for myself I would like to thank both Prof. Inkeles and Prof. Hayashi for having planned this conference and I hope that you can negotiate something for another conference to further the comparative study of national characters.

Prof. Inkeles

I want to thank you and all the other participants for coming and especially our Japanese colleagues for coming such a great distance in order to have this dialogue. Thank you very much to all of you.